关于完善反腐倡廉体系的思考

腐败问题是目前全球广泛关注的热点问题之一,也是我国面临的最大社会污染和重大政治挑战。目前我国腐败现象之所以蔓延,虽然有其社会、经济、文化等各种原因,但从反腐倡廉层面上分析,其体系不健全是重要原因。本文通过对腐败的现实状况、形成原因的分析,探讨了完善反腐倡廉体系的对策和途径。     

反腐倡廉必须从廉政教育入手

开展廉政教育是抓好反腐倡廉工作的重要手段,是做好党风廉政建设工作的重要保证。在当前反腐倡廉形势日趋严峻的形势下,必须重视抓好党员干部的廉政教育工作,认真将反腐倡廉工作的各项制度落到实处。     

反腐倡廉教育是先进性教育的有效载体

党中央提出在全党开展的保持共产党员先进性教育活动,是新时期加强和改进党的建设的一项重大举措。反腐倡廉,拒腐防变。是加强党的先进性建设的重要内容之一,开展反腐倡廉教育更是先进性教育活动的有效载体。     

构建警示训诫防线推进基层央行反腐倡廉工作有效开展

一、加强学习,提高认识,充分认识构建警示训诫防线对搞好反腐倡廉工作的重要意义.要结合警示教育,深刻剖析违纪违法案件发生的原因,分类分层次开展教育,把专题教育、群众评议与改进工作、解决实际问题结合起来,把思想教育、纪律教育与社会公德、家庭美德教育和法制教育结合起来,增强全社会的反腐倡廉意识,形成以廉为荣,以贪为耻的良好社会风尚.     

对构筑反腐倡廉家庭防线的一点思考

近年来，党员领导干部中的违法违纪、腐化堕落案件时有发生。从腐败现象发生的源头来看，一些领导干部走上违法违纪的道路，除他们的世界观、人生观和价值观嬗变，抵挡不住各种腐蚀思想的侵蚀外，还有一个重要原因就是家庭防线不牢。因此，要从根本上解决领导干部的廉洁自律问题，除了加强制度建设，继续抓好对领导干部本人的党风廉洁教育外，还要全面认识、充分发挥家庭在反腐倡廉中的积极作用，努力构筑反腐倡廉的家庭防线。 　　家庭是人们生活和从事社会活动的基础。从近年来反腐败斗争的实践看，不同的家庭环境在加强党风廉政建设和开…     

充分发挥反腐倡廉教育基础性作用的思考

反腐倡廉建设是全党一项重大的政治任务.深入开展反腐倡廉教育是贯彻落实<实施纲要>的重要举措,是加强基层央行班子建设、队伍建设、全面落实科学发展观,促进干部职工依法办事、合理用权、减少过错、防范风险的重要保证.反腐倡廉建设是一项系统工程,需要教育、制度、监督多管齐下才能奏效.教育、制度、监督是一个相互联系的有机整体,但三者又各有不同的功能和作用,教育在其中起着基础性作用.……     

对当前反腐倡廉宣传教育现状与出路的思考

本文对近年来反腐倡廉宣传教育工作的现状、取得的成绩进行了客观的描述，对反腐倡廉宣传教育工作中存在的问题进行了认真剖析，并根据当前反腐倡廉教育工作面临良好的发展机遇，结合实际对如何进一步有效深入开展反腐倡廉宣传教育工作进行了有益的探索与思考。反腐倡廉宣传教育是一项系统性的工程。新时期、新任务对反腐倡廉教育提出了更新更高的要求，只有深入研究新情况，解决新问题，开辟新途径，创造新方法，才能开创反腐倡廉教育宣传工作的新局面。     

关于对党员干部反腐倡廉教育的思考

党员干部反腐倡廉教育是党风廉政建设的基础工作。也是构建惩治和预防腐败体系的重要内容,同时也是预防腐败的有效手段。通过深入实际调查了解和针对客观现实的深刻分析,对加强新形势下党员干部反腐倡廉教育工作进行深度思考和探索。     

切实加强高校廉政文化建设

廉政文化具有十分丰富的内涵,高校廉政文化建设的主要任务是在高校校园里运用文化手段,达成廉政文化氛围,形成褒廉耻贪的共识。加强高校廉政文化建设是实践"三个代表"重要思想的内在要求,是高校反腐倡廉形势的需要,是关系到培养社会主义建设者和接班人的大事。加强高校廉政文化建设,应结合高校实际,利用有利条件,切实加强廉政教育,大力树立廉政典型,把校园文化作为宣传廉政文化的重要载体,充分发挥社会实践在廉政文化建设中的作用,完善反腐倡廉教育的工作体制,形成反腐倡廉教育的整体合力。     

把反腐倡廉教育融到实际工作中

保持共产党员先进性教育活动，是党的十六大作出的战略部署，是深入学习贯彻“三个代表”重要思想的重大举措。在保持共产党员先进性教育活动中，要把反腐倡廉教育作为一项必不可少的重要内容贯穿于保持共产党员先进性教育始终。笔者以为，当前，进一步加强和改进对广大党员的反腐倡廉教育应当着眼于以下几方面：     

Government auditing and corruption control: Evidence from China’s provincial panel data

Since its foundation, China’s government auditing system has played a very important role in maintaining financial and economic order and improving government accountability and transparency. Though a great deal of research has discussed the role of government auditing in discovering and deterring corruption, there is little empirical evidence on whether government auditing actually helps to reduce corruption. Using China’s provincial panel data from 1999 to 2008, this paper empirically examines the role of government auditing in China’s corruption control initiatives. Our findings indicate that the number of irregularities detected in government auditing is positively related to the corruption level in that province, which means the more severe the corruption is in a province, the more irregularities in government accounts are found by local audit institutions. Also, post-audit rectification effort is negatively related to the corruption level in that province, indicating that greater rectification effort is associated with less corruption. This paper provides empirical evidence on how government auditing can contribute to curbing corruption, which is also helpful for understanding the role of China’s local audit institutions in government governance and can enrich the literature on both government auditing and corruption control.     

Administrative corruption and taxation

Administrative corruption, whereby taxpayers and collectors collude to reduce remissions, is central to tax evasion in developing countries. A framework is developed for the analysis of such corruption, based on imperfect information concerning true tax liabilities. Some tolerance of corruption can be part of an efficient collection system, especially when there are constraints on government wages or effort is required to learn payers' tax liabilities. With variable collector effort a certain amount of corruption is required, together with a two-level penalty structuredismissal if revenue targets are not met and much heavier penalties for gross corruption.     

加快监督信息化步伐 提升央行反腐败水平

在经济转型发展、社会不断变革进步的关键时期,反腐倡廉工作面临着新情况、新挑战.党中央从完成经济社会发展的重大任务和巩固党的执政地位的全局出发,作出了建立健全惩治和预防腐败体系、从源头上防治腐败的重大战略决策.     

Corruption Distance and Foreign Direct Investment

We study the effects of “corruption distance,” defined as the difference in corruption levels between country pairs on bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI). Using a “gravity” model and the Heckman (1979) two-stage framework on a data set of forty-five countries from 1997 to 2007, we find that corruption distance adversely influences both the likelihood of FDI and the volume of FDI. A novel finding in this study is that we identify the asymmetric effect of corruption distance and find that the positive corruption distance, defined as the corruption distance from a high corruption source to a low corruption host country, is the prominent one that affects the behavior of bilateral FDI.     

The role of auditing in the fight against corruption

The purpose of this paper is to analyze how various types of auditing may contribute to fight corruption. While previous literature has primarily addressed auditing's ability to prevent corruption, this paper systematically explores auditing's potential to detect corruption. It argues that financial auditing has excluded corruption from the definition of fraud and instead classified it as ‘non-compliance with laws and regulations’. The main arguments for this exclusion is that corruption leaves no material errors in financial statements and no evidence for the auditor to follow. The paper refutes this, arguing that commercial and political corruption creates misstatements in the financial statements of the corruption giver's organization as well as the corruption receiver's organization. Thus, if auditing is to gain a more prominent role in the fight against corruption, auditing standards must include corruption in the definition of fraud, private and public sector auditors need to cooperate and exchange information, auditing techniques to detect corruption should be employed, and the auditing profession must embrace effective preventive measures such as anti-corruption certifications.     

外汇体制、税收与腐败

本文研究了外汇体制、税收和腐败之间的关系,比较了在有外汇管制和无外汇管制两种情况下,外汇体制对税收和腐败的影响。研究结果表明,当腐败对产出有正作用时,外汇管制将导致较高的税收和较严重的腐败。如果腐败对产出的正作用较小,那么外汇管制将导致税收增加。如果税收扭曲的作用非常大,那么外汇管制将导致腐败下降。当腐败对产出有负作用时,外汇管制将会导致较轻微的腐败和较高的税收。如果腐败对产出的正作用非常大,足以弥补由于高税收所造成的产出减少时,政府会采取外汇管制措施。如果腐败对产出的正作用较小,并且高税收对产出负作用很大,那么政府将采取没有外汇管制的体制。     

Corruption, inequality, and fairness

Bigger governments raise the possibilities for corruption; more corruption may in turn raise the support for redistributive policies that intend to correct the inequality and injustice generated by corruption. We formalize these insights in a simple dynamic model. A positive feedback from past to current levels of taxation and corruption arises either when wealth originating in corruption and rent seeking is considered unfair, or when the ability to engage in corruption is unevenly distributed in the population. This feedback introduces persistence in the size of the government and the levels of corruption and inequality. Multiple steady states exist in some cases.     

Factors in the Development of Trade Credit: Case Study of Provinces in China

Using Chinese province-level panel data for 2001-9, we investigate significant factors for the development of financial intermediation via trade credit in developing economies. First, we confirm that a competitive market environment, a well-functioning legal system, and greater bank loans for non-state-sector firms promote the development of trade credit in China. Conversely, corruption hinders its development. Second, we find that proper functioning of the legal system and bank lending to non-state-sector firms are highly likely to be the causes of the complex relationships between these determinants. Finally, we observe that an increase in the number of lawyers effectively improves the quality and function of the legal system, which, in turn, alleviates the harmful influence of corruption on trade credit development.     

Accounting practice,fiscal decentralization and corruption

In prior studies, accounting and decentralization corruption solutions have so far been analysed in isolation. In this article, we connect these two strands of literature on corruption. Understanding this connection is important because weak financial accounting and reporting systems can inhibit monitoring incentives and thus reduce decentralization benefits in countering corruption. We argue that the effectiveness of decentralization as an anti-corruption barrier is complemented by the quality of the accounting practice in a country. Using multiple sources of data, we find that decentralization has a positive and increasing effect on reducing corruption among countries with a high-quality accounting practice. In contrast, decentralization has a negative and decreasing effect on reducing corruption among countries with weak-quality accounting practices. These findings are robust to alternative measures of accounting, decentralization and corruption and to endogeneity tests. Our findings demonstrate the crucial information role of accounting in enhancing decentralization monitoring mechanisms and in thereby reducing corruption.