Are publicly held firms less efficient? Evidence from the US property-liability insurance industry

This paper studies the performance of publicly held firms in the US property-liability insurance industry by analyzing companies that issued initial public offerings (IPOs) from 1994 to 2005, using private firms as the benchmark. I investigate ex ante determinants and ex post effects of IPOs on firm efficiency, operating performance, and other financials. I also analyze stock returns and follow-on SEO and acquisition activities to provide further information on IPO motivation. The paper finds that the likelihood of an IPO significantly increases with firm size and premium growth. IPO firms experience no post-issue underperformance in efficiency, operations, or stock returns; register improvement in allocative and cost efficiency; and reduce financial leverage and reinsurance usage. Moreover, IPO firms are active in follow-on SEO issues and acquisition activities. The findings are mostly consistent with the theory that firms go public for easier access to capital and to ease capital constraints.     

Investment performance of “environmentally-friendly” firms and their initial public offers and seasoned equity offers

We employ a sample of 748 environmentally-friendly (or “green”) firms listed on U.S. stock exchanges to extend studies of the effects of socially responsible investment (SRI) on stock investment returns and the performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Our empirical tests document positive and statistically significant excess returns for our environmentally-friendly firms and their IPOs and SEOs, in contrast to our control IPO and SEO samples which underperform. In summary, a “green” equity premium is evident in returns calculated from a variety of benchmarks.     

Cross‐sectional determinants of post‐IPO stock performance: evidence from China

This paper examines the cross‐sectional determinants of post‐IPO long‐term stock returns in China. We document that the aftermarket P/E ratio has the most robust negative association with post‐IPO stock returns. The negative relation indicates that the market corrects the aftermarket overvaluation of IPO firms in the long run. Underwriter reputation has a positive effect on post‐IPO stock returns, while board size has a negative impact, consistent with the views that reputable underwriters mitigate the information asymmetry in IPO pricing and over‐sized boards reduce the effectiveness of corporate governance. However, we find little evidence indicating that the equity ownership structure is significantly associated with post‐IPO stock returns.     

Timing Equity Issuance in Response to Information Asymmetry Arising from IFRS Adoption in Australia and Europe

This study examines the association between changes in reported financial performance resulting from mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and equity issuance during the transition period leading up to IFRS adoption for listed firms in Australia and Europe. We hypothesize that firms affected by the accounting standards change strategically time equity issuance around the time the firm discloses the effects of IFRS adoption on reported financial performance. We document circumstances where market returns are associated with the reconciliation of net income between local GAAP and IFRS. We find that a firm's likelihood of equity issuance and equity issue size during the three years prior to the IFRS reconciliation disclosure are negatively associated with the unexpected change in net income resulting from the conversion to IFRS.     

Monitoring or colluding: the role of venture capital investors in the IPO process

We argue and provide evidence that instead of playing a monitoring role, venture capital (VC) investors collude with controlling shareholders in the IPO process of Chinese non‐state‐owned enterprises (non‐SOEs). We show that VC‐backed IPOs’ applications are more likely to be approved by regulators, especially in firms with excess control rights, but have worse post‐IPO performance. Through investing in firms with excess control rights, VC investors are able to make higher exit returns. We further document that VC investors’ role in the IPO process is stronger when they have political connections, hold higher ownership, and when they make pre‐IPO investment.     

Extrapolation Errors in IPOs

We demonstrate that relatively high revenue growth prior to an initial public offering (IPO) is associated with high IPO prices and poor returns. In particular, low‐growth IPO returns, ?1% on a three‐year annualized basis compared to ?12% (equal‐weighted) or ?29% (value‐weighted) for high‐growth new issues. There is no evidence that the performance differentials reflect risk premia. Rather, low‐growth firms’ returns are more stable over time. Finally, while analysts’ forecasts are upwardly biased for all firms, the magnitude of this bias is greatest for firms with rapid pre‐IPO revenue growth. Overall, these results are consistent with the extrapolation errors model suggested by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994).     

THE MARKET'S PRICING OF DEBT IPOs

Based on the authors' recent study published in the Journal of Financial Economics , this article summarizes new evidence on the first-day and aftermarket price performance of a firm's first public offer of bonds after its equity IPO. Unlike equity IPOs, such bond IPOs are not underpriced on average. However, bonds that are more equity-like (junk bonds) are underpriced at the initial offer whereas high-grade debt is actually overpriced. This finding supports the view that riskier debt issues have a larger equity component and, as a consequence, a higher degree of information asymmetry.
The authors' study also showed that less prestigious underwriters are associated with more underpriced offers, and that the issuer's stock market listing plays an important role in determining the first-day price performance of bond IPOs. The degree of underpricing is lower for bonds issued by firms whose equity is listed on NYSE/AMEX than for bonds issued by firms listed on Nasdaq. Finally, the aftermarket performance for the full sample and various subsamples is consistent with bond market efficiency in the sense that, once prices adjust after the first day of trading, there are no clearly exploitable opportunities for excess returns.     

Going public via special purpose acquisition companies: Frogs do not turn into princes

Special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) are cash shells that try to buy private operating firms to which they confer a public-listing status. Private operating firms tend to use SPACs as an alternative way to get listed, particularly in years with weak IPO activity and volatile markets, such as 2008 and 2009. In these two years, approximately 31% of firms went public through a SPAC acquisition rather than through an IPO. Our results from the analysis of 127 SPAC acquisitions and 1128 IPOs during the wave of “new-generation” SPACs starting in 2003 lend support to the conjecture that particular small and levered firms with low growth opportunities tend to use this vehicle. SPAC acquisitions also may be fueled by the cash-out motives of existing shareholders. Venture capitalists and private equity investors tend to refrain from using SPAC acquisitions as an exit route. Tracking long-term abnormal returns, we find that SPAC firms are associated with severe underperformance in comparison to the market, the industry and (comparable) IPO firms.     

The Roles of Performance Measures and Monitoring in Annual Governance Decisions in Entrepreneurial Firms

This paper analyzes annual corporate governance decisions at firms making initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stock between 1996 and 1999. Our objective is to examine relations between firms' corporate governance decisions and the informativeness of available measures of managerial performance. We consider financial measures such as earnings and stock return, as well as direct monitoring. We collect a sample of IPO firms from the manufacturing, Internet, and technology (non-Internet) industries, and examine how the use of various performance measures in annual compensation grants and turnover decisions varies with the information environment of the firm and with the extent of venture capital influence. Consistent with prior research that finds earnings are of limited usefulness in firm valuation for Internet firms, we find Internet firms place less importance on earnings and greater importance on stock returns in determining compensation grants than do non-Internet firms. We also find that compensation grants of firms with little or no venture capital influence display significantly stronger association with accounting and stock performance measures than those of firms with more intense monitoring by venture capitalists. This result is consistent with direct monitoring and the use of explicit performance measures acting as substitute governance mechanisms.     

Myth or Reality? The Long-Run Underperformance of Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Venture and Nonventure Capital-Backed Companies

We investigate the long-run underperformance of recent initial public offering (IPO) firms in a sample of 934 venture-backed IPOs from 1972–1992 and 3,407 nonventure-backed IPOs from 1975–1992. We find that venture-backed IPOs outperform non-venture-backed IPOs using equal weighted returns. Value weighting significantly reduces performance differences and substantially reduces underperformance for nonventure-backed IPOs. In tests using several comparable benchmarks and the Fama-French (1993) three factor asset pricing model, venture-backed companies do not significantly underperform, while the smallest nonventure-backed firms do. Underperformance, however, is not an IPO effect. Similar size and book-to-market firms that have not issued equity perform as poorly as IPOs.     

The Initial Public Offerings of Listed Firms

A number of firms in the United Kingdom list without issuing equity and then issue equity shortly thereafter. We argue that this two‐stage offering strategy is less costly than an initial public offering (IPO) because trading reduces the valuation uncertainty of these firms before they issue equity. We find that initial returns are 10% to 30% lower for these firms than for comparable IPOs, and we provide evidence that the market in the firm's shares lowers financing costs. We also show that these firms time the market both when they list and when they issue equity.     

IS THE BOOK‐TO‐MARKET RATIO A MEASURE OF RISK?

We develop a leverage‐based alternative to traditional asset pricing models to investigate whether the book‐to‐market ratio acts as a proxy for risk. We argue that the book‐to‐market ratio should act as a proxy because of the expected relations between (1) financial risk and measures of capital structure based on the market value of equity and (2) asset risk and measures of capital structure based on the book value of equity. We find no relation between average stock returns and the book‐to‐market ratio in all‐equity firms after controlling for firm size, and an inverse relation between average stock returns and the book‐to‐market ratio in firms with a negative book value of equity.     

Universal Banking, Asset Management, and Stock Underwriting

This paper examines institutions that underwrite IPOs and have asset management divisions from 1993 through 1998. We provide evidence that these firms use asset management funds as vehicles to help them earn more equity underwriting business. We also show that asset managers affiliated with IPO underwriters use their superior information about their own institution's IPOs to earn annualised market adjusted returns 7.6% above asset managers of firms who did not underwrite the IPO. Superior future returns by asset managers who trade affiliated IPOs are dependent on the information environment for the IPO and the underwriter reputation rank.     

PERFORMANCE LEVERAGE, AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE IN REVERSE LBOs

Previous studies have provided convincing evidence of improvements in the performance of companies that undergo leveraged buyouts (LBOs). This article presents evidence from the authors' recent study of the performance of 90 "reverse LBOs–LBO firms that go public again in an IPO—after they return to public ownership. The aim of the study was to track the performance of reverse LBOs and to reveal any association between operating performance and changes in leverage and equity ownership.
Among the principal findings of the study were the following: Despite a substantial decline in leverage ratios and equity ownership by insiders at the time of the IPOs, equity ownership of reverse LBOs remained more concentrated and leverage higher than that of public companies in the same industries.
The operating performance of reverse LBOs was significantly better than that of the median firm in their industries in the year prior to and in the year of the IPO. Although there is some evidence of a deterioration in the performance of the reverse-LBO firms, they continue to outperform their industry competitors for at least four full fiscal years after the IPO.
Greater reductions in the percentage equity owned by managers and other insiders at the time of the reverse LBO are associated with larger declines in operating performance.
The stock price performance of reverse LBOs after going public appears more "rational" than that of other IPOs—that is, there is less initial under pricing and no sign of the negative, longer-term abnormal returns reported by recent studies of IPOs.     

Management quality,certification, and initial public offerings

We empirically examine the relationship between the quality and reputation of a firm's management and various aspects of its IPO and post-IPO performance, a relationship that has so far received little attention in the literature. We hypothesize that better and more reputable managers are able to convey the intrinsic value of their firm more credibly to outsiders, thereby reducing the information asymmetry facing their firm in the equity market. Therefore, IPOs of firms with higher management quality will be characterized by lower underpricing, greater institutional interest, more reputable underwriters, and smaller underwriting expenses. Further, if higher management quality is associated with lower heterogeneity in investor valuations, firms with better managers will have greater long-term stock returns. Finally, since better managers are likely to select better projects (having a larger NPV for any given scale) and implement them more ably, higher management quality will also be associated with larger IPO offer sizes and stronger post-IPO operating performance. We present evidence consistent with the above hypotheses.     

Do Privatization IPOs Outperform in the Long Run?

This paper investigates the long-run stock returns of privatization initial public offering (IPO) firms using a sample of 241 privatization IPOs from 42 countries during the period 1981-2003. We compare one-, three-, and five-year holding period returns of privatization IPOs to those of the domestic stock market indices and to size and size- and book-to-market equity ratio (BM)-matched firms from the same countries. Consistent with previous studies, we find that privatization IPOs significantly outperform their domestic stock markets in the long run. However, they show less consistent abnormal long-term stock performance relative to their size or size- and BM-matched benchmark firms.     

Underwriter reputation,earnings management and the long‐run performance of initial public offerings

This study contributes to the extant literature on the nature of earnings management surrounding initial public offerings (IPOs) by investigating the role of underwriter reputation. We argue that prestigious underwriters will protect their reputation by carefully monitoring and certifying financial information on IPO firms, thereby limiting any potential earnings manipulation. As a result, those IPO firms that are associated with more prestigious underwriters are likely to exhibit substantially less‐aggressive earnings management. Conversely, we find the existence of a negative relationship between earnings management and the post‐offer performance of an IPO firm’s stocks only for those firms associated with less‐prestigious underwriters.     

The reputation effect of venture capital

The main purpose of this paper to examine how the reputation effect of venture capital (VC) is associated with the initial return and ex-post performance of its invested IPO firms. In this paper, we use 267 Taiwanese IPO firms in 1994–2007 periods and find that VC-backed firms outperform non-VC-backed firms in terms of ex-post equity market-to-book ratio, ROA and R&D expenditure ratio. For those VC-backed IPOs, reputable VC-backed firms outperform mediocre VC-backed ones. Moreover, among the four proxies of VC reputation, the market share with respect to total IPO proceeds is most promising in explaining IPO firms’ ex-post performance. The overall result confirms the reputation effect associated with VC.     

Transforming the management and governance of private family firms: The role of venture capital

We analyze the role of venture capitalists (VCs) in transforming the management and governance of China's private family firms. We show, causally, that VC-backed family firms are more likely than non-VC backed family firms to experience departures of family members from top management positions and decreases in the separation between family control rights and cash-flow rights; these effects are stronger when VCs have greater equity ownership or board representation. We show that these changes in top management and governance in family firms are associated with higher IPO firm valuations and better post-IPO long run stock returns.     

The Pricing of Equity Carve-Outs

This article examines the pricing of stock for 251 equity carve‐outs during the 1986–1995 period. We document a mean initial‐day return of 5.83% and a mean one‐week return of 5.43%. Among carve‐outs, the initial underpricing is lower for issues represented by high prestige investment bankers and those that have a lower offer price. In comparison with 251 initial public offering (IPO) firms matched by size and book‐to‐market ratio of equity, carveouts exhibit significantly lower initial‐day returns, but their buy‐and‐hold returns for sixmonth and one‐year periods are not significantly different from IPOs. The IPO firms have a three‐year return of 28.82% which is significantly higher than the 21.07% return for the carve‐out firms.