Institutional Equity Trading Costs: NYSE Versus Nasdaq

We compare execution costs (market impact plus commission) on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq for institutional investors. The differences in cost generally conform to each market's area of specialization. Controlling for firm size, trade size, and the money management firm's identity, costs are lower on Nasdaq for trades in comparatively smaller firms, while costs for trading the larger stocks are lower on NYSE. The cost differences estimated from a regression model are, however, sensitive to the choice of time period.     

The Post-Reform Bid-Ask Spread Disparity between Nasdaq and the NYSE

We report further evidence of the difference in execution costs between Nasdaq and the NYSE before and after the 1997 market reforms. We find that informed trading costs are consistently higher on Nasdaq both before and after the reforms. In the pre‐reform period the Nasdaq‐NYSE disparity in bid‐ask spreads cannot be completely attributed to the difference in informed trading costs. However, in the post‐reform period the spread difference between these two markets becomes insignificant with the effect of informed trading costs controlled. Our findings are consistent with the contention that the reforms have largely reduced noninformation trading costs and dealers' rents.     

Spreads, Depths, and Quote Clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq: Evidence after the 1997 Securities and Exchange Commission Rule Changes

This paper examines liquidity and quote clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq using data after the two market reforms—the 1997 order–handling rule and minimum tick size changes. We find that Nasdaq–listed stocks exhibit wider spreads and smaller depths than NYSE–listed stocks and stocks with higher proportions of even–eighth and even–sixteenth quotes have wider quoted, effective, and realized spreads on both the NYSE and Nasdaq. This result differs from the findings by Bessembinder (1999, p. 404) that "trade execution costs on Nasdaq in late 1997 are no longer significantly explained by a tendency for liquidity providers to avoid odd–eighth quotations," and "odd–sixteenth avoidance has little relevance for explaining post–reform Nasdaq trading costs."     

All else equal?: a multidimensional analysis of retail,market order execution quality

The extant execution quality literature generally suggests that brokers routing orders away from the NYSE might not fulfill their fiduciary best execution responsibility. This conclusion is drawn by comparing execution prices across trading venues and presumes that other execution-quality characteristics are equivalent. Using order audit-trail data, we find evidence that retail market orders obtain better trade prices on the NYSE but faster executions, more depth improvement, and order-flow payment at Trimark Securities, a Nasdaq dealer. Thus, non-price dimensions of execution quality are not equivalent across trading venues. Furthermore, considering order flow payments, brokers obtain better net prices with Trimark. If brokers pass enough of these payments through to investors in the form of lower commissions and/or better services, then investors also obtain better net prices with Trimark. Our results suggest that it may be misleading to evaluate execution quality or to base policy decisions on comparisons focusing on only execution prices.     

Post-Reform Market-Order Execution Quality: Multidimensional Comparisons Across Market Centers

We use market‐order data to determine execution quality on the NYSE, four regional stock exchanges, and the Nasdaq InterMarket. We examine a sample period after the reduction in the minimum price variation and after the SEC imposed new order‐handling rules, and analyze dimensions of execution quality in addition to trade prices. We find that in the postreform environment, the NYSE offers execution prices that are more favorable to the investor. However, the regional exchanges and the InterMarket offer executions that are faster and that more frequently allow investors to execute orders with sizes exceeding the quoted depth at the quoted price.     

Dimensions of execution quality: Recent evidence for US equity markets

I analyze market-order execution quality using order-based data reported in accordance with Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 11Ac1-5. These data facilitate a comprehensive investigation of multiple dimensions of execution quality, including measures of costs and speed, for large samples of common stocks on Nasdaq and the NYSE. The evidence is consistent with competitive equity markets. Overall execution costs on Nasdaq exceed those on the NYSE, but orders execute faster. This relationship reverses for larger orders exceeding 1,999 shares. The apparent trade-off between costs and speed suggests that inferring execution quality from costs alone could be problematical. It also illustrates the need for models of trader behavior that can accommodate multiple dimensions of execution quality.     

RECENT GROWTH IN NASDAQ TRADING VOLUME AND ITS RELATION TO MARKET VOLATILITY

We document a significant increase in Nasdaq trading volume relative to New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) trading volumes. Although recent increases in the number of shares traded are reported in the financial press, we also find it present in the percentage of dollar values traded. We then examine correlations between trading volume and several measures of market volatility. Nasdaq volume appears to be more closely correlated with residual variance, while NYSE and AMEX volumes are more closely correlated with overall market variance. We conclude that the type and quantity of information driving trading are different on Nasdaq than on the two exchanges, and that the relative growth in Nasdaq volume cannot be attributed solely to differences in the methods of counting volume in the two market environments.     

Pick Your Poison—Fragmentation or Market Power? An Analysis of RegNMS,High Frequency Trading,and Securities Market Structure

The publication of Michael Lewis's has intensified an already contentious debate over high frequency trading (HFT). But the causes that have given rise to HFT are more complicated—and the general economic consequences far more positive—than at least the popular accounts (including Lewis's own) of the book would suggest. While directing much of its attention to the powerful computers and “predatory” potential of HFT, the “media” version of Lewis's book has all but ignored the fundamental driver of such activity: the implementation in 2007 of SEC Regulation NMS, which required all exchanges to direct their orders to the exchanges with the best prices. Before RegNMS, U.S. equity trading was largely dominated by NYSE and Nasdaq. The major exchanges' effective “ownership” of their order flow gave exchange specialists significant edges in trading. RegNMS has resulted in the proliferation of competing stock exchanges, which in turn has dramatically reduced both trading costs and the economic franchise value enjoyed by institutional traders associated with the previously dominant exchanges. The balance of evidence strongly indicates that the cost of trading has declined for retail traders and investors. The big losers have been the previously advantaged wholesale traders. HFT is simply one of the outcomes of the new, more competitive trading environment created by Regulation NMS.     

How common are common return factors across the NYSE and Nasdaq?

We entertain the possibility of pervasive factors that are not common across two (or more) groups of securities. We propose and implement a general procedure to estimate the space spanned by common and group-specific pervasive factors. In our empirical analysis, we study the factor structure of excess returns on stocks traded on the NYSE and Nasdaq using our methodology. We find that there are only two common pervasive factors that govern the returns for both NYSE and Nasdaq. At the same time, the NYSE and Nasdaq each have one more group-specific factor that is not the same across the two exchanges. Our results point to the absence of complete similarity between the factors driving the returns on these exchanges.     

Trades outside the quotes: Reporting delay,trading option,or trade size?

In the period 1993 through 2002 examined in this study, quoted and effective spreads declined substantially on Nasdaq and to a lesser degree on the NYSE. At the same time, however, trades outside the quotes increased dramatically on Nasdaq. Because investors would prefer to trade at the quotes rather than outside the quotes, we examine why trades outside the quotes are observed. We focus on how the continuous market mechanism itself influences the outcome of orders and the reporting of trades, and we conclude that slippage exists in the market mechanism. Outside-trades occur on Nasdaq, first, because of delays in reporting trades, second, because the ability of dealers to delay execution of trades creates a look-back option, which when exercised results in outside-trades, and third, because large trades can take place at prices outside the quotes. Outside-trades are rarely observed on the NYSE because the market is more centralized. While the pattern of trading on the NYSE is not inconsistent with the presence of a look-back option, our tests provide no direct evidence that specialists are exercising such an option.     

竞争力、市场微观结构与证券交易所变革

纽约证券交易所和纳斯达克实施的重大并购行动标志着全球证券交易所新一轮并购浪潮的兴起,证券交易所之间的竞争再度趋于白热化.交易所之间的竞争已演变为市场微观结构的竞争.本文对纽约证券交易所和纳斯达克的交易成本进行了比较,无论是上市成本还是交易成本,新兴的纳斯达克都比传统的纽约证交所更胜一筹.因而本文认为有效降低交易成本应是提高交易所核心竞争力的关键所在,而改进交易机制、拓展产品服务以及调整组织架构,可以作为降低交易成本、提高交易所竞争力的具体竞争策略.     

Order Preferencing and Market Quality on U.S. Equity Exchanges

We present a detailed view of market quality in the presenceof preferencing arrangements. A unique dataset provides theopportunity to measure trading costs of marketable orders andfill rates and ex post costs of limit orders across tradingvenues. For market orders, we find the primary exchange providesthe lowest execution costs. However, the preferencing exchangesare no worse than, and in most cases better than, the nonpreferencingregional exchanges. For limit orders, the regionals executelimit orders more frequently than the primary market and withan ex post execution cost that is not very different from theprimary market.     

Estimating bid-ask spread components: Specialist versus multiple market maker systems

This paper tests two competing hypotheses concerning the relationship between adverse selection costs on NASDAQ versus specialist-dominated exchanges. We reject the hypothesis that specialist-dominated exchanges have smaller adverse selection costs than exchanges with multiple market makers. We provide direct evidence on the timing differences between closing transactions and quotes as well as evidence on the extent of nontrading on the AMEX and NYSE but cannot reject the hypothesis that adverse selection costs are a function of average transaction size (which is generally larger on the AMEX and NYSE). We also provide insight into institutional differences across exchanges and the ISSM data base.     

Intraday time and order execution quality dimensions

We examine intraday execution quality patterns on Nasdaq stocks using proprietary order-level data from a US broker dealer. Orders submitted midday execute slower than orders submitted around the open and close. However, midday orders have lower execution costs. Our results indicate that execution speed and execution cost exhibit offsetting intraday time-dependent patterns and these patterns appear to be induced by variations in informed trading levels. While some traders concentrate their trading activity around the open and close, others prefer to trade midday. Traders have varying preferences for when to trade, and offsetting patterns exist between speed and cost. These factors highlight the complexity in defining an optimal trading time, which, among other things, is dependent on the dimensional preferences of individual traders.     

Automated Versus Floor Trading: An Analysis of Execution Costs on the Paris and New York Exchanges

A global trend towards automated trading systems raises the important question of whether execution costs are, in fact, lower than on trading floors. This paper compares the trade execution costs of similar stocks in an automated trading structure (Paris Bourse) and a floor-based trading structure (NYSE). Results indicate that execution costs are higher in Paris than in New York after controlling for differences in adverse selection, relative tick size, and economic attributes across samples. These results suggest that the present form of the automated trading system may not be able to fully replicate the benefits of human intermediation on a trading floor.     

Differences in Trading Behavior across NYSE Specialist Firms

Using a sample of NYSE-listed equities from 1992, this study examines whether market maker performance differs across specialist firms. We find that spreads and depth differ across specialist firms, but the competitiveness of NYSE quotes relative to other exchanges does not appear to be affected by these differences. Differences are also evident in measures of transitory volatility and in the frequency and duration of order-imbalance trading halts. The results suggest that specialists have a significant effect on execution costs, liquidity, and noise in security prices and that these effects are not completely eliminated by competition or the NYSE's monitoring mechanisms.     

The competitive effects of US decimalization: Evidence from the US-listed Canadian stocks

This paper analyzes the impact of US decimalization on the Canadian stocks listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) and either the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System (Nasdaq) in the US. Using a sample of 126 firms, we find that the US trading of these stocks increases after decimalization, but this increase is not at the expense of TSE volume. Indeed, the TSE volume increases substantially for those securities that are traded on Nasdaq and increases marginally for those securities that are traded on the NYSE. Most of the increase in volume is in retail-sized trades. The bid–ask spreads and the quote depths decline on all exchanges, but by a greater amount in the US than in Canada. The depths on the NYSE decline from being above the TSE depths to well below the TSE depths. We also find that the decline in the TSE spread is directly related to the size of the firm and to the decline in the US spread, and is inversely related to the pre-decimalization ratio of spreads on the US exchange and the TSE. Overall, our results indicate that the US decimalization had the desired positive impact on trading in both the US and Canada, with a decrease in spreads and an increase in retail-sized trading.     

Implications of a Reduction in Tick Size on Short-Sell Order Execution

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is committed to having exchanges fully implement decimal pricing by April 9, 2001, and is also considering revising the Uptick Rule. We consider the likely impact of the pending smaller tick size associated with decimalization on the efficacy of this rule by examining the execution quality of NYSE short-sell orders immediately before and after the tick size was reduced from 1/8th to 1/16th in 1997. We conclude that, in general, short market orders will receive better execution after decimalization, but at-the-quote limit orders will receive worse execution, and suggest revisions to the Rule. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G18, K22.     

Short selling and trading abuses on Nasdaq

We examine the potential for short-selling trading abuses unique to Nasdaq during a period when there was no up-tick rule and no effective prohibitions against “naked” short selling. We find that (a) short sellers earned significant abnormal returns on Nasdaq securities, but these were smaller than on NYSE/AMEX securities; (b) they did not destabilize markets by selling into falling markets and exacerbating price drops; and (c) Nasdaq short sellers may be more susceptible than NYSE/AMEX shorts to “short squeezes”. Our results cast doubt on the appropriateness of recent regulatory reforms established for Nasdaq and public concern over Nasdaq short-selling abuses.     

Intraday Variation in the Bid-Ask Spread: Evidence after the Market Reform

In this article we show that intraday variation in spreads for Nasdaq‐listed stocks has converged to intraday variation in spreads for NYSE‐listed stocks after the implementation of the new order‐handling rules. We attribute this convergence to the Limit Order Display Rule, which requires that limit orders be displayed in Nasdaq best bid and offer when they are better than quotes posted by market makers. Our findings suggest that the different patterns of intraday spreads between NYSE and Nasdaq stocks reported in prior studies can largely be attributed to the different treatment of limit orders between the NYSE and Nasdaq before the market reform.