我国商业银行贷款减值准备计提存在问题与对策

商业银行的资产业务,尤其是贷款业务逼常面临着较多的风险。为了应付可能发生的损失避免陷入经营困境或破产,商业银行需要在估计风险和损失的基础上提取资产损失准备金。对贷款计提损失准备,虽然已经成为一种国际惯例,但是,由于各国的情况千差万别,各国商业银行在贷款减值准备计提的会计处理上也有所不同。本文在分析我国商业银行贷款减值准备现状的基础上提出了存在的问题并给出了一些对策。     

论会计稳健性对我国国有控股上市公司过度投资的制约作用

本文主要从会计稳健性角度探讨其对国有控股上市公司过度投资的制约作用。首先,从理论上分析会计稳健性的"及时确认损失,推迟确认收益"的特有治理机制可以制约国有控股控股上市公司因信息不对称和委托代理导致的过度投资。然后,分析国企的股东和债权人为减少国企过度投资带来的损失,对会计稳健性是有需求的,即会计稳健性对国企过度投资的制约是现实存在的。最后,结合国有控股上市公司特有的治理特征进行分析,得出会计稳健性在特有的环境中治理作用被弱化。因此,本文最后为了会计稳健性更好发挥对国有控股上市公司过度投资制约作用提出两方面建议。     

如何防范资产减值准备审计风险

《企业会计制度》规定:"企业应当定期或者至少于每年年度终了,对各项资产进行全面检查,并根据谨慎性原则的要求,合理地预计各项资产可能发生的损失,对可能发生的各项资产损失计提资产减值准备。"资产减值准备具有内容特殊、金额较大、性质敏感、情况复杂等特点。其容易被审计单位用于操纵会计利润,粉饰经营业绩。因此,审计机构和审计人员稍有不慎,就会掉进"陷阱",作出不恰当的职业判断,导致审计风险。鉴于此,笔者谈几点防范对策。1.增大资产减值审计风险意识。根据我国会计制度的规定,合理计提并充分披露资产减值准备是被审计单位管理的责任;而根据审计准则的要求,注册会计师如果未能将资产减值准备计提与披露中严重失实的错误与舞弊揭露出来,应负审     

企业资产减值准备的会计处理分析

减值准备是根据会计核算的谨慎性原则而对企业资产价值可能或已经发生的减损进行确认计提的数额,正确核算坏账准备是保证企业资产不被高估的必要条件,新会计准则对企业资产减值的确认、计量及减值准备的计提、转回进行了详细明确的规定。本文对资产减值准备的会计处理问题进行了分析。     

资产减值:稳健性还是盈余管理

本文研究了我国上市公司资产减值的计提动机。很多研究已发现减值准备的两种计提动机:经济因素和盈余管理因素,但本文发现,稳健性因素也能影响资产减值准备的计提。在同样的毁损情况下,"坏消息"公司将比"好消息"公司计提更多的减值准备。此外,本文还发现,在利用减值准备进行利润操纵时,盈余管理动机的不同会影响减值类型的选择。扭亏和大清洗公司会采取各种类型减值准备进行盈余管理,而平滑和管理层变更公司只使用长期资产减值准备,而且是不影响营业利润的减值准备。     

浅析计提资产减值准备的几个问题

资产减值准备是指企业对可能发生的资产损失，按其预计损失金额预先确认损失并计提准备。从2001年起，上市公司的资产减值准备在原有的四项基础上新增加了四项，即除了原有的对应收账款、短期投资、长期投资、存货计提减值准备外。还要对委托贷款、固定资产、无形资产、在建工程这四项资产计提减值准备。这对完善我国会计制度，加强我国会计制度与国际会     

浅谈对新《会计准则8号—资产减值》的认识和看法

资产的可收回金额低于其账面价值的,应当将资产的账面价值减记至可收回金额,减记的金额确认为资产减值损失,计入当期损益,同时计提相应的资产减值准备。资产减值损失一经确认,在以后会计期间不得转回。     

上市银行资本充足状况与资产损失准备计提研究

资本充足状况监管是商业银行审慎监管的核心内容，银行资本充足状况与贷款损失准备等资产减值准备计提是否完全充分有着较为密切的关系。资产损失准备提取不充分，不仅会降低商业银行抗风险能力，也会造成商业银行利润虚增。因此，只有在充足计提资产损失准备的前提下，资本充足率计算才真实可信，各     

商誉减值准备测试与计提问题初探

并购重组是国际通行的公司扩张方式之一,作为世界新兴的经济体,并购重组已成为我国资本市场的主旋律。并购过程中确认商誉所产生的影响也越来越大,对应的商誉减值准备的计提与会计处理成为会计实务工作者经常面对的业务。如何提高商誉减值准备计提的可行性、可操作性、实用性也成为我们面对的财务课题之一。本文通过比较中国会计准则、美国会计准则和国际会计准则关于商誉减值的相关规定,分析我国会计准则关于商誉减值准备计提在实际操作方面存在的问题以及对企业和资本市场可能存在的影响,对商誉减值准备确认方法的完善进行初步探讨。     

初探资产减值会计理论的核心问题

我国在2000年底颁布的《企业会计制度》第五十一条规定：“企业应当定期或者至少于每年年度终了，对各项资产进行检查，并根据谨慎性原则的要求，合理地预计各项资产可能发生的损失，对可能发生的各项资产损失计提资产减值准备，企业应当合理地计提各项资产减值准备，但不得设置秘密准备”这条规定借鉴了IASC（国际会计准则委员会）1998年6月发布的IASNO．36——资产减值和FASB（美国财务会计准则委员会）1995年3月发布的SFAS121——长期资产的减值、处置的会计处理的规定要求企业对可能发生损失的资产计提减值准备，这一规定体现了中国会计准则和国际惯例的接轨。     

CEO Compensation Risk and Timely Loss Recognition

Prior studies demonstrate that high CEO compensation risk encourages managers to engage in risk‐seeking behavior, thus intensifying agency conflicts between creditors and borrowers. We argue and document that accounting conservatism plays an important role in mitigating debt holder and shareholder conflicts over asset substitution arising from high CEO compensation risk. Our empirical results show that firms with high CEO compensation risk tend to use more timely loss recognition and this positive relationship is more pronounced for firms with high leverage. Additional results show that the positive relationship between CEO compensation risk and borrowing costs is reduced for firms using timely loss recognition, suggesting that creditors perceive timely loss recognition as a risk‐reducing mechanism. Using the passage of FAS 123R as a quasi‐natural experiment on managerial compensation risk, we find a significant reduction in the use of timely loss recognition for firms experiencing a decrease in CEO compensation risk after the passage of FAS 123R. Lastly, we show that timely loss recognition is positively associated only with the compensation risk of the firm's primary decision maker (i.e., its CEO) and not with the compensation risk of subordinates.     

会计稳健性对投资效率的作用机理研究——基于企业并购的研究视角

在剩余收益估值模型的基础上构造了 Basu (1997)的反函数,从而构建了可同时度量非条件稳健性和条件稳健性的实证模型,并基于企业并购的视角,探究了会计稳健性对企业投资效率的事前和事后影响。研究发现：非条件稳健性可以提升企业事前投资效率(降低并购溢价,提升累计超额收益率),阻止管理层的机会主义行为;条件稳健性会促进企业事后投资效率(并购前后绩效变化),保证项目的盈利性。进一步的研究表明：会计稳健性与企业投资效率的关系会随着上市公司代理成本的增加而越加明显。此外,国有企业和民营企业对于会计稳健性的公司治理效应存在差异。最后扩展了由 Lawrence,Sloan and Sun (2013)提出的稳健性操纵的定义。     

Publicly traded versus privately held: implications for conditional conservatism in bank accounting

Compared with privately held banks, publicly traded banks face greater agency costs because of greater separation of ownership and control but enjoy greater benefits from access to the equity capital market. Differences in control and capital market access influence public versus private banks’ accounting. We predict and find that public banks exhibit greater degrees of conditional conservatism (asymmetric timeliness of the recognition of losses versus gains in accounting income) than private banks. We predict and find that public banks recognize more timely earnings declines, less timely earnings increases, and larger and more timely loan losses. Although public ownership gives managers greater ability and incentive to exercise income-increasing accounting, our findings show that the demand for conservatism dominates within public banks and that the demand for conservatism is greater among public banks than private banks. Our results provide insights for accounting and finance academics, bank managers, auditors, and regulators concerning the effects of ownership structure on conditional conservatism in banks’ financial reporting.

Conditional conservatism and labor investment efficiency

Prior literature documents that asymmetric timely recognition of losses versus gains (also known as conditional conservatism) can induce management to make more efficient investment decisions by mitigating information asymmetry between management and investors and providing early signals about the profitability of projects that are undertaken. In this paper, we investigate the impact of conservatism on an important investment decision that has been overlooked, namely, investment in labor. We find that conservatism is negatively associated with labor investment inefficiency; more specifically, conservatism reduces inefficient investment practices on the labor market, including over-hiring, under-firing, under-hiring, and over-firing. Our results hold after controlling for managerial ability, corporate governance, and other investments.     

The Effect of Accounting Conservatism on Corporate Investment during the Global Financial Crisis

This paper examines the effect of accounting conservatism on firm‐level investment during the 2007–2008 global financial crisis. Using a differences‐in‐differences design, we find that firms with less conservative financial reporting experienced a sharper decline in investment activity following the onset of the crisis compared to firms with more conservative financial reporting. This relationship was stronger for firms that were financially constrained, faced greater external financing needs, or had higher information asymmetry. We also find that more conservative firms experienced lower declines in both debt‐raising activity and stock performance. The evidence suggests that accounting conservatism reduces underinvestment in the presence of information frictions.     

Debt Maturity Structure and Accounting Conservatism

This study examines the association between debt maturity structure and accounting conservatism. Short‐maturity debt can mitigate agency costs of debt arising from information asymmetry and suboptimal investment problems inherent in debt financing. As such, debt‐contracting demand for accounting conservatism is expected to be lower in the presence of more short‐maturity debt. We find that short‐maturity debt is negatively associated with accounting conservatism. As firms could commit to more accounting conservatism to gain access to long‐maturity debt, we conduct lead‐lag tests of the direction of causality, and the results suggest that more short‐maturity debt leads to less conservative reporting, rather than the reverse. We also find the negative relation between short‐maturity debt and accounting conservatism is more pronounced among financially distressed firms, where ex ante severity of agency costs of debt are higher. Collectively, our results contribute to our understanding of the role of accounting conservatism in debt contracting and show how debt maturity, a key and pervasive feature of creditor protection in debt contracting, affects accounting conservatism.     

The Role of Accruals in Asymmetrically Timely Gain and Loss Recognition

We investigate the role of accrual accounting in the asymmetrically timely recognition (incorporation in reported earnings) of gains and losses. Timely recognition requires accruals when it precedes complete realization of the gains and losses in cash. We show that nonlinear accruals models incorporating the asymmetry in gain and loss recognition (timelier loss recognition, or conditional conservatism) offer a substantial specification improvement, explaining substantially more variation in accruals than equivalent linear specifications. Conversely, conventional linear accruals models, by omitting the loss recognition asymmetry, exhibit substantial attenuation bias and offer a comparatively poor specification of the accounting accrual process. Linear specifications also understate the ability of current earnings to predict future cash flows. These findings have implications for our understanding of accrual accounting and conservatism, as well as for researchers estimating discretionary accruals, earnings management, and earnings quality.     

The role of accounting conservatism in M&A target selection

Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are among the most important investment activities for companies, but they contain great risks. We investigate the role of accounting conservatism in M&A target selection and risk. We find that for risk-averse reasons, firms with high accounting conservatism are likely to acquire profitable targets and avoid loss-making targets. When such firms acquire loss-making targets, the conservatism’s risk-control role reduces M&A risk and increases M&A performance, but only when control of the target is transferred and the acquirer has high long-term debt and low management power. Furthermore, accounting conservatism reduces risk by increasing the maturity match between cash flow and debt. Our results suggest that accounting conservatism plays not only a risk-averse role but also a risk-control role, providing new evidence for the usefulness of accounting conservatism in M&A decisions.     

Determinants and consequences of timely asset impairments during the financial crisis

U.S. firms recorded an unprecedented number of asset impairments during the recent financial crisis. We investigate the timing of these losses in the context of two competing views on how firms use discretion over asset impairments. The first view posits that firms record impairments to convey private information as part of their commitment to a conditionally conservative reporting strategy. The second view argues that firms use their discretion to report opportunistically by delaying the recording of bad news. Consistent with the first view, we find that firms recorded timelier asset impairments during the financial crisis if they reported more conservatively in the five years preceding the crisis. Further tests show this relation is greater for firms with strong corporate governance, industry‐specialist auditors, and high leverage, indicating the importance of monitoring mechanisms in determining how firms handle the discretion involved in impairment decisions. We also test for the consequences of timely asset impairments during the financial crisis and find that firms reporting conservatively both before and during the crisis were able to acquire more debt financing, and their publicly traded bonds suffered smaller increases in illiquidity. Collectively, our study highlights the role of asset impairments in firms’ accounting choices over time.     

Non-GAAP Earnings and the Earnings Quality Trade-off

Using a large sample of earnings press releases by Australian firms, we compare multiple attributes of non-GAAP earnings measures with their closest GAAP equivalent. We find that, on average, non-GAAP earnings are more persistent, smoother, more value relevant, and have higher predictive power than their closest GAAP equivalent. However, the same set of non-GAAP earnings disclosures are also less conservative and less timely than their closest GAAP equivalent. The results are consistent with non-GAAP earnings measures reflecting a reversal of the trade-off between the valuation and stewardship roles of accounting inherent in accounting standards and the way they are applied. We also find that differences in several of these attributes between GAAP and non-GAAP earnings are more evident in larger firms, firms with lower market-to-book ratios, firms with a higher proportion of independent directors, and firms that report profits rather than losses. Our evidence is consistent with the argument that accounting standards impose significant amounts of conditional conservatism at some cost to the valuation role of accounting information. Non-GAAP earnings measures can therefore be seen as a response to the challenges faced by a single GAAP performance measure in satisfying the competing demands of value relevance and stewardship.