Overreaction of country ETFs to US market returns: Intraday vs. daily horizons and the role of synchronized trading

In this paper we study the intraday price formation process of country Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs). We identify specific parts of the US trading day during which Net Asset Values (NAVs), currency rates, premiums and discounts, and the S&P 500 index have special effects on ETF prices, and characterize a special intraday and overnight updating structure between these variables and country ETF prices. Our findings suggest a structural difference between synchronized and non-synchronized trading hours. While during synchronized trading hours ETF prices are mostly driven by their NAV returns, during non-synchronized trading hours the S&P 500 index has a dominant effect. This effect also exceeds the one that the S&P 500 index has on the underlying foreign indices and suggests an overreaction to US market returns when foreign markets are closed.     

Transmission of the financial and sovereign debt crises to the EMU: Stock prices,CDS spreads and exchange rates

This paper tests for the transmission of the 2007–2010 financial and sovereign debt crises to fifteen EMU countries. We use daily data from 2003 to 2010 on country financial and non-financial stock market indexes to analyze the stock market returns for three country groups within EMU: North, South and Small. The following results hold for both the North and South European countries, while the smallest countries seem to be relatively isolated from international events. First, we find strong evidence of crisis transmission to European non-financials from US non-financials, but not for financials. Second, in order to test how the sovereign debt crisis affects stock market developments we split the crisis in pre- and post-Lehman sub periods. Results show that financials become significantly more dependent on changes in the difference between the Greek and German CDS spreads after Lehman’s collapse, compared to the pre-Lehman sub period. However, this increase is much smaller for non-financials. Third, before the crisis euro appreciations coincide with European stock market decreases, whereas this relationship reverses during the crisis. Finally, this reversal seems to be triggered by Lehman’s collapse.     

Feedback and the success of irrational investors

We provide a model in which irrational investors trade based upon considerations that have no inherent connection to fundamentals. However, trading activity affects market prices, and because of feedback from security prices to cash flows, the irrational trades influence underlying cash flows. As a result, irrational investors can, in some situations, earn abnormal (i.e., risk-adjusted) profits that can exceed the abnormal profits of rational informed investors. Although the trading of irrational investors cause prices to deviate from fundamental values, stock prices follow a random walk.     

Selling winners, holding losers: Effect on fund flows and survival of disposition-prone mutual funds

Recent studies suggest that presence of a disposition effect in a large subset of investors can create stock mispricings, which has serious implications for market efficiency. We examine whether US equity mutual funds are disposition-prone, how that effect influences performance, investor flows and fund survival, and whether the disposition orientation of mutual funds affects stock prices in a sustained manner.We find that about 30% of all funds exhibit some degree of disposition behavior and that such funds underperform funds that are not disposition-prone by 4-6% per year. Moreover, after controlling for performance, tax overhang and other factors that potentially affect flows, disposition-prone funds attract significantly smaller flows than other funds. The results suggest that mutual fund investors are smart enough to minimize investment in disposition-prone funds. Consequently, disposition-prone funds have significantly higher rates of failure than other funds, thereby reducing the impact of such trading behavior on security prices.     

Wall Street’s bailout bet: Market reactions to house price releases in the presence of bailout expectations

The rise and subsequent collapse of US house prices was one of the factors underlying the recent financial crisis. One could expect that the crisis brought increased attention to the housing market and thus led to stronger market reactions to house price news. We find that reactions indeed change, but with a peculiar twist: from September 2008 on, good news from the housing market are associated with falling US stock prices, and vice versa. The likely explanation, for which we provide cross-sectional evidence, is that falling house prices increased the market’s trust in a government bailout, thereby increasing market valuations of firms that were expected to benefit from government rescue measures.     

Distress risk premia in expected stock and bond returns

Prior studies find that shareholders’ strategic actions over debtholders are significant for stock prices but not for bond prices. I find that for firms with private and public debt, strategic default has no significant effect on distress risk premia in expected stock or bond returns, suggesting that the dispersion of bondholders greatly weakens the shareholder advantage effect. The shareholder advantage effect on stock prices is only significant for firms with only private debt and to some degree affected by the dispersion of stockholders and complexity in capital structure. Overall, renegotiation friction helps explain the cross-sectional implications of strategic default for stock and bond prices.     

Trading imbalances,predictable reversals,and cross-stock price pressure

We test the implications of a multi-asset equilibrium model in which a finite number of risk-averse liquidity providers accommodate non-informational trading imbalances. These imbalances generate predictable reversals in stock returns. An imbalance in one stock also affects the prices of other stocks. The magnitude of the cross-stock price pressure depends on the correlations of the stocks’ underlying cash flows. The model implies that non-informational trading increases the volatility of stock returns. We confirm the model's implications using data from the Taiwan Stock Exchange.     

A comparative study of the probability of default for global financial firms

This article presents a modification of Merton’s (1976) ruin option pricing model to estimate the implied probability of default from stock and option market prices. To test the model, we analyze all global financial firms with traded options in the US and focus on the subprime mortgage crisis period. We compare the performance of the implied probability of default from our model to the expected default frequencies based on the Moody’s KMV model and agency credit ratings by constructing cumulative accuracy profiles (CAP) and the receiver operating characteristic (ROC). We find that the probability of default estimates from our model are equal or superior to other credit risk measures studied based on CAP and ROC. In particular, during the subprime crisis our model surpassed credit ratings and matched or exceeded KMV in anticipating the magnitude of the crisis. We have also found some initial evidence that adding off-balance-sheet derivatives exposure improves the performance of the KMV model.     

Equity home bias and corporate disclosure

I show that more comprehensive corporate disclosure reduces investors’ uncertainty about domestic companies’ payoffs at no cost, thereby decreasing investors’ equity home bias toward a country. Since investors should base their investment decisions on valid and easily interpretable company information only, more comprehensive disclosure will reduce the home bias only if domestic securities law is sufficiently stratified and domestic companies use international accounting standards. Using panel data for 38 countries from 2003 to 2008 I find that more comprehensive disclosure reduces investors’ home bias, though significantly only for countries that sufficiently enforce their securities law and implement international accounting standards.     

Buy high,sell low: How listed firms price asset transfers in related party transactions

We examine a sample of 254 related party and arms’ length acquisitions and sales of assets in Hong Kong during 1998–2000. Our analysis shows that publicly listed firms enter deals with related parties at unfavourable prices compared to similar arms’ length deals. Firms acquire assets from related parties by paying a higher price compared to similar arms’ length deals. In contrast, when they sell assets to related parties, they receive a lower price than in similar arms’ length deals. With the exception of audit committees, corporate governance characteristics have limited impact on transaction prices. Firms with audit committees on their boards pay lower prices to related parties for acquisitions and receive higher prices from related parties from divestments.     

Information asymmetry and international strategic alliances

This paper examines how information asymmetry affects cross-border strategic alliance formation by US firms over the period 2000–2008. We construct a measure, information costs, based on both geographical distance and the proportion of worldwide GDP the partner’s home country represents. Consistent with our expectations, we find an inverse association between information costs and cross-border strategic alliances. When considering the proportion of alliances formed with publicly quoted overseas partners, we find this is unaffected by the level of information costs but rather the level of stock market development, tax rate and general economic conditions. Information costs are, however, significantly negatively related to alliances with overseas private organizations. Our results offer clear support for the on-going importance of information asymmetry in corporate decision making.     

The value of excess cash and corporate governance: Evidence from US cross-listings

We examine whether and how a US cross-listing mitigates the risk that insiders will turn their firm’s cash holdings into private benefits. We find strong evidence that the value investors attach to excess cash reserves is substantially larger for foreign firms listed on US exchanges and over-the-counter than for their domestic peers. Further, we show that this excess-cash premium stems not only from the strength of US legal rules and disclosure requirements, but also from the greater informal monitoring pressure that accompanies a US listing. Overall, because investors’ valuation of excess cash mirrors how they expect the cash to be used, our analysis shows that a US listing constrains insiders’ inefficient allocation of corporate cash reserves significantly.     

Investors’ distraction and strategic repricing decisions

In this paper I analyze investors’ reactions to changes in the expense ratios of equity mutual funds. I show that investment flows’ response to fees cannot be fully explained by looking at investors’ performance sensitivity. While performance sensitivity monotonically increases with past performance, price sensitivity does not: investors who buy top past performers seem to be “distracted” by the fund’s previous return and pay relatively little attention to the expense ratios. Moreover price sensitivity increases with fund visibility while performance sensitivity decreases, and while looking at data from 1986 to 2006 no discernible trend can be observed in the average performance sensitivity, price sensitivity strongly increases due to the dramatic increase in the availability of mutual funds’ information for retail investors. Finally I show that investment companies strategically time their repricing decisions in order to exploit time variations in price and performance sensitivities, and that fund governance quality affects the degree to which investment companies engage in this opportunistic behavior.     

Reprint of Investors’ distraction and strategic repricing decisions

In this paper I analyze investors’ reactions to changes in the expense ratios of equity mutual funds. I show that investment flows’ response to fees cannot be fully explained by looking at investors’ performance sensitivity. While performance sensitivity monotonically increases with past performance, price sensitivity does not: investors who buy top past performers seem to be “distracted” by the fund’s previous return and pay relatively little attention to the expense ratios. Moreover price sensitivity increases with fund visibility while performance sensitivity decreases, and while looking at data from 1986 to 2006 no discernible trend can be observed in the average performance sensitivity, price sensitivity strongly increases due to the dramatic increase in the availability of mutual funds’ information for retail investors. Finally I show that investment companies strategically time their repricing decisions in order to exploit time variations in price and performance sensitivities, and that fund governance quality affects the degree to which investment companies engage in this opportunistic behavior.     

An empirical analysis of herd behavior in global stock markets

This paper examines herding behavior in global markets. By applying daily data for 18 countries from May 25, 1988, through April 24, 2009, we find evidence of herding in advanced stock markets (except the US) and in Asian markets. No evidence of herding is found in Latin American markets. Evidence suggests that stock return dispersions in the US play a significant role in explaining the non-US market’s herding activity. With the exceptions of the US and Latin American markets, herding is present in both up and down markets, although herding asymmetry is more profound in Asian markets during rising markets. Evidence suggests that crisis triggers herding activity in the crisis country of origin and then produces a contagion effect, which spreads the crisis to neighboring countries. During crisis periods, we find supportive evidence for herding formation in the US and Latin American markets.     

Is market fragmentation harming market quality?

We examine how fragmentation is affecting market quality in US equity markets. We use newly available trade reporting facilities (TRFs) data to measure fragmentation, and we use a variety of empirical approaches to compare execution quality and efficiency of stocks with more and less fragmented trading. We find that fragmentation affects all stocks; more fragmented stocks have lower transactions costs and faster execution speeds; and fragmentation is associated with higher short-term volatility but greater market efficiency, in that prices are closer to being a random walk. Our results that fragmentation does not appear to harm market quality are consistent with US markets being a single virtual market with multiple points of entry.     

Flow and stock effects of large-scale treasury purchases: Evidence on the importance of local supply

The Federal Reserve’s 2009 program to purchase $300 billion of US Treasury securities represented an unprecedented intervention in the Treasury market and provides a natural experiment with the potential to shed light on the price elasticities of Treasuries and theories of supply effects in the term structure. Using security-level data on Treasury prices and quantities during the course of this program, we document a ‘local supply’ effect in the yield curve—yields within a particular maturity sector responded more to changes in the amounts outstanding in that sector than to similar changes in other sectors. We find that this phenomenon was responsible for a persistent downward shift in yields averaging about 30 basis points over the course of the program (the “stock effect”). In addition, except at very long maturities, purchase operations caused an average decline in yields in the sector purchased of 3.5 basis points on the days when those operations occurred (the “flow effect”). The sensitivity of our results to security characteristics generally supports a view of segmentation or imperfect substitution within the Treasury market during this time.     

The strategic specialist and imperfect competition in a limit order market

The empirical literature suggests that the limit order book contains information that might be used by the specialist to his own advantage. I develop a model where there is a strategic specialist who competes against a limit order book and has information about supply. The presence of a strategic specialist in an imperfectly competitive limit order book market induces non-monotonicity of market indicators with respect to the variance of liquidation value. Moreover, the existence of private information about supply significantly affects market performance as it induces, among other effects, lower market liquidity. Finally, this model suggests another link between Kyle’s (1985, 1989) [Kyle, A., 1985. Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica 53, 1315–1336, Kyle, A., 1989. Informed speculators with imperfect competition. Review of Economic Studies 56, 317–356] and Glosten and Milgrom’s (1985) [Glosten, L., Milgrom, P., 1985. Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed markets. Journal of Financial Economics 14, 71–100] models by allowing for strategic behaviour of the specialist.     

Managerial entrenchment, equity payout and capital structure

I develop a contingent claims model to examine the impacts of managerial entrenchment on capital structure and security valuation. The analysis shows that managers’ self-interested leverage choices deviate significantly from the optimal leverages that maximize firm values, partially explaining the suboptimal leverage ratios observed empirically (Graham, 2000). Both the extent and sensitivity of the deviations are affected by firm characteristics, debt features and default solutions. The shareholder-manager conflicts over risk level and cash payout vary dynamically with a firm’s financial health. Managerial entrenchment does not mitigate the agency problems of debt since managers’ discretionary decisions on milking properties or asset substitution could be driven by incentives to increase their own utility.     

Mutual fund portfolio trading and investor flow

I estimate the extent to which mutual fund portfolio trading of securities is triggered by investor flows into and out of the funds, and find that this liquidity-induced portfolio trading activity is smaller than previously estimated by Edelen (1999). I obtain estimates from a much larger and broader sample of funds than Edelen’s (1999) sample. Portfolio managers of international funds trade a smaller fraction of investor flow than do those of domestic funds. Index funds invest a larger fraction. A funds’ usage of futures contracts does not have a statistically significant effect on how it trades in response to investor flows, but the unpredictability of investor flow weakly affects the trading response to flow.