CEO political preference and credit ratings

This study investigates whether a CEO's personal political ideology, as captured by his or her political contributions, is associated with a firm's credit ratings. Republican CEOs, we find, are associated with higher credit ratings, especially when their firms are headquartered in conservative areas. In addition, the link between political ideology and credit rating is more pronounced in firms that exhibit high financial distress or weak corporate governance. Changes in political ideology are associated with changes in credit rating. Our results support the behavior consistency, upper echelon, and social identity theories, as well as the risk acceptance hypothesis, and are robust to a number of alternative specifications as well as when alternate approaches and measures of credit risk are introduced. Using Republican CEOs as a proxy for conservative CEOs, our evidence implies that credit rating agencies justifiably view a CEO's political ideology and conservatism as indicative of corporate policies and, therefore, as an important determinant of the firm's credit ratings.     

Financial Reporting and Credit Ratings: On the Effects of Competition in the Rating Industry and Rating Agencies' Gatekeeper Role

This paper studies firms' financial reporting incentives in the presence of strategic credit rating agencies and how these incentives are affected by the level of competition in the rating industry and by rating agencies' role as gatekeepers to debt markets. We develop a model featuring an entrepreneur who seeks project financing from a perfectly competitive debt market. After publicly disclosing a financial report, the entrepreneur can purchase credit ratings from rating agencies that strategically choose their rating fees and rating inflation. We derive the following core results: (1) More rating industry competition leads to stronger corporate misreporting incentives if ratings are sufficiently precise or if rating agencies assume a gatekeeper role. Under imperfect rating industry competition, (2) agencies' gatekeeper role primarily weakens firms' misreporting incentives, which then influences rating agencies' strategies, and (3) firms' misreporting and rating agencies' rating inflation can be strategic complements when agencies assume a gatekeeper role. (4) Regulatory initiatives aimed at increasing rating industry competition or at weakening rating agencies' gatekeeper role improve investment efficiency as long as corporate misreporting incentives are not significantly strengthened.     

ARE WATCH PROCEDURES A CRITICAL INFORMATIONAL EVENT IN THE CREDIT RATINGS PROCESS? AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

The Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006) model (Boot model) predicts certain credit rating events are likely to be more informative than others and that credit watch procedures are an important driver of such differences. We test the core empirical predictions of their model. Our sample comprises U.S. corporate issuer credit ratings provided by Moody's, 1990–2006. Our findings fail to uncover compelling evidence for the empirical predictions of the Boot model in relation to the role of watch procedures as coordinating mechanisms. Rather, our findings are more supportive of the view that rating agencies are always at an informational advantage relative to investors.     

Credit ratings and social capital

We posit that credit ratings are higher for firms headquartered in high social capital regions, where managers are more likely to be trustworthy. To test this hypothesis, 9460 corporate debt ratings of US firms from 2001– 2015 was examined. We find that firms headquartered in a county with high social capital in the US have a higher credit rating. This effect is incremental and economically comparable to that of corporate social responsibility. Additional tests suggest that the impact of social capital on ratings is likely because analysts find them more credible. We conclude that credit analysts may consider the social norm around the firm's headquarters when rating firms.     

How To Choose a Capital Structure: Navigating the Debt-Equity Decision

In corporate offices as well as the classroom, there continues to be significant debate about the costs and benefits of debt financing. There is also considerable variation in corporate credit ratings, even among companies as large and successful as those that make up the S&P 500. Many companies have been reassessing how they manage their balance sheet and their rating agency relationships; and with the market's generally favorable response to recapitalizations and dividend increases, such financing issues are likely to receive even more attention.
Underlying the diversity of corporate credit ratings is widespread disagreement about the "right" credit rating—a matter that is complicated by the fact that the cost of debt varies widely among companies with the same rating. Although credit ratings are clearly tied to measures of indebtedness such as leverage and coverage ratios, the most important factor in most industries is a company's size. For many mid-sized companies, an investment-grade rating can be attained only by making a large, equity-financed acquisition—or by making minimal use of debt. In this sense, the corporate choice of credit rating can be as much a strategic issue as a financial decision.
Maintaining the right amount of financial fl exibility is a key consideration when determining the right credit rating for a given company (although what management views as value-preserving flexibility may be viewed by the market as value-reducing financial "slack"). A BBB rating will accommodate considerably more leverage (30–60%) in companies with fairly stable cash flows and limited investment requirements than in more cyclical or growth-oriented companies (10–20%). When contemplating taking on more leverage, companies should examine all major operating risks and view their capital structure in the context of an enterprisewide risk management framework.     

Credit rating dynamics and Markov mixture models

Despite mounting evidence to the contrary, credit migration matrices, used in many credit risk and pricing applications, are typically assumed to be generated by a simple Markov process. Based on empirical evidence, we propose a parsimonious model that is a mixture of (two) Markov chains, where the mixing is on the speed of movement among credit ratings. We estimate this model using credit rating histories and show that the mixture model statistically dominates the simple Markov model and that the differences between two models can be economically meaningful. The non-Markov property of our model implies that the future distribution of a firm’s ratings depends not only on its current rating but also on its past rating history. Indeed we find that two firms with identical current credit ratings can have substantially different transition probability vectors. We also find that conditioning on the state of the business cycle or industry group does not remove the heterogeneity with respect to the rate of movement. We go on to compare the performance of mixture and Markov chain using out-of-sample predictions.     

The Real Effects of Credit Ratings: The Sovereign Ceiling Channel

We show that sovereign debt impairments can have a significant effect on financial markets and real economies through a credit ratings channel. Specifically, we find that firms reduce their investment and reliance on credit markets due to a rising cost of debt capital following a sovereign rating downgrade. We identify these effects by exploiting exogenous variation in corporate ratings due to rating agencies' sovereign ceiling policies, which require that firms' ratings remain at or below the sovereign rating of their country of domicile.     

ESG in credit ratings and the impact on financial markets

This study examines environment, social, governance (ESG) consideration in rating reports published by credit rating agencies. 3,719 Moody's credit rating reports between 2004 and 2015 are examined and the ESG consideration is analyzed using a latent dirichlet allocation (LDA) approach. We further analyze the stock returns and credit default swap (CDS) spread changes to check whether ESG consideration has an effect on the capital market reactions. We find a small but present consideration of ESG in rating decisions. Within ESG, corporate governance plays the most important role. Moreover, the results reveal that ESG consideration is a significant determinant in the stock return and CDS spread around the rating announcement. We find that all ESG criteria are important for equity and debt investors.     

Divergence in credit ratings

During the recent credit crisis credit rating agencies (CRAs) became increasingly lax in their rating of structured products, yet increasingly stringent in their rating of corporate bonds. We examine a model in which a CRA operates in both the market for structured products and for corporate debt, and shares a common reputation across the two markets. We find that, as a CRA’s reputation becomes good enough, it can be optimal for it to inflate its ratings with probability one in the structured products market, but inflate its ratings with probability zero in the corporate bond market.     

Do Rating Agencies Benefit from Providing Higher Ratings? Evidence from the Consequences of Municipal Bond Ratings Recalibration

We ask whether credit rating agencies receive higher fees and gain greater market share when they provide more favorable ratings. To investigate this question, we use the 2010 rating scale recalibration by Moody's and Fitch, which increased ratings absent any underlying change in issuer credit quality. Consistent with prior research, we find that the recalibration allowed the clients of Moody's and Fitch to receive better ratings and lower yields. We add to this evidence by showing that the recalibration also led to larger fees and to increases in the market shares of Moody's and Fitch. These results are consistent with critics’ concerns about the effects of the issuer‐pay model on the credit ratings market.     

Sovereign ceilings “lite”? The impact of sovereign ratings on corporate ratings

Although credit rating agencies have gradually moved away from a policy of never rating a corporation above the sovereign (the ‘sovereign ceiling’), it appears that sovereign credit ratings remain a significant determinant of corporate credit ratings. We examine this link using data for advanced and emerging economies over the period of 1995–2009. Our main result is that a sovereign ceiling continues to affect the rating of corporations. The results also suggest that the influence of a sovereign ceiling on corporate ratings remains particularly significant in countries where capital account restrictions are still in place and with high political risk.     

Tax credit rating and corporate innovation decisions

The tax credit rating mechanism was formally implemented in 2014. As an important tax collection and management innovation, it has attracted the attention of regulatory authorities and scholars. Different from the literature that directly examines corporate tax compliance, we focus on the impact of tax credit rating implementation on corporate research and development (R&D) investment decisions. Using listed companies’ data from 2014 to 2019, we find that companies with higher tax credit ratings invest more in innovation, because the system helps managers identify R&D opportunities, alleviates corporate financing constraints and reduces agency costs. We confirm that tax credit ratings have manifold impacts on corporate information environments and business decisions, with better ratings positively affecting firms’ business decisions. This discovery can inform tax policy reform, encourage corporate innovation and construct social credit systems.     

碳减排约束下中国工业企业信用评级

在碳达峰、碳中和目标愿景下,工业企业碳减排约束逐步趋强,有必要将碳要素相关风险纳入信用评级,合理区分不同企业信用风险水平。本文基于金融稳定视角提出一套碳减排约束下工业企业信用评级方法,即在评估企业碳减排绩效的同时,兼顾企业资金偿付能力,实现生态和经济效益平衡。研究表明:一是评级过程不仅关注企业自身信用风险水平的纵向比较,同时考虑企业间、企业与银行系统间信用风险传染效应以防控系统性金融风险;二是基于系统重要性工业企业的信用等级将全体工业企业划分至四类等级区间,进而将九分类等级划分问题转化为二分类问题,规避等级划分的“组合爆炸”困扰;三是基于“小范围遍历+序列前向选择算法”搜索不同等级间最优临界样本,既避免评级虚高给商业银行带来信贷损失,也不会因评级过低阻碍企业绿色低碳转型。 本文可为商业银行有效预警低碳转型风险、制定绿色信贷决策提供一定参考。     

Credit cycles and macro fundamentals

We use an intensity-based framework to study the relation between macroeconomic fundamentals and cycles in defaults and rating activity. Using Standard and Poor's U.S. corporate rating transition and default data over the period 1980–2005, we directly estimate the default and rating cycle from micro data. We relate this cycle to the business cycle, bank lending conditions, and financial market variables. In line with earlier studies, the macro variables appear to explain part of the default cycle. However, we strongly reject the correct dynamic specification of these models. The problem is solved by adding an unobserved dynamic component to the model, which can be interpreted as an omitted systematic credit risk factor. By accounting for this latent factor, many of the observed macro variables loose their significance. There are a few exceptions, but the economic impact of the observed macro variables for credit risk remains low. We also show that systematic credit risk factors differ over transition types, with risk factors for downgrades being noticeably different from those for upgrades. We conclude that portfolio credit risk models based only on observable systematic risk factors omit one of the strongest determinants of credit risk at the portfolio level. This has obvious consequences for current modeling and risk management practices.     

The effect of corporate governance on firm’s credit ratings: further evidence using governance score in the United States

We investigate whether corporate governance affects firms’ credit ratings and whether improvement in corporate governance standards is associated with improvement in investment grade rating. We use the Gov‐score of Brown and Caylor (2006) , the Gomper’s G index and an entrenchment score of Bebchuk et al. (2009) to proxy for corporate governance. Using a sample of US firms, we find that firms characterized by stronger corporate governance have a significantly higher credit rating, and that this association is accentuated for smaller firms relative to larger firms. We find that an improvement in corporate governance is associated with improvement in bond rating.     

Does it matter who pays for bond ratings? Historical evidence

We test whether Standard and Poor's (S&P) assigns higher bond ratings after it switches from investor-pay to issuer-pay fees in 1974. Using Moody's rating for the same bond as a benchmark, we find that when S&P charges investors and Moody's charges issuers, S&P's ratings are lower than Moody's. Once S&P adopts issuer-pay, its ratings increase and no longer differ from Moody's. More importantly, S&P only assigns higher ratings for bonds that are subject to greater conflicts of interest, measured by higher expected rating fees or lower credit quality. These findings suggest that the issuer-pay model leads to higher ratings.     

债券评级机构变更——基于评级选购与评级迎合视角

本文以2008年至2017年的公司债券为样本,研究了发行人变更评级机构的影响,以此来解释评级市场上发行人频繁变更评级机构的现象。本文发现发行人变更评级机构后,其信用等级得到显著提升。发行人变更评级机构的行为对信用等级的影响在以下两种情形中更显著:一是当发行人所处行业或评级机构所在的评级市场竞争激烈时;二是当发行人主体评级位于AA信用等级的临界点时。进一步研究发现,考虑到评级机构变更与信用等级之间的交互影响,变更评级机构的发行人整体上可实现发债成本的降低。但该类发行人未来的违约风险增加、经营业绩下降。最后,本文发现债券发行规模较大以及非国有发行人更倾向于变更评级机构来提高信用等级。本文通过分析发行人更换信用评级机构的动机和后果,为监管部门构建以评级质量为导向的良性竞争环境提供借鉴参考。     

信用评级变动能反映企业真实财务信息吗?——基于财务重述的视角

本文以2007-2018年拥有主体信用评级的A股上市公司为研究对象,利用企业财务错报在未来被重述这一场景,检验主体信用评级变动能否反映企业真实财务信息。研究发现,评级机构在发债企业财务错报年显著下调了主体信用评级,而在重述公告发布年没有上述现象,这表明主体信用评级下调反映了企业的真实财务信息。在控制内生性影响后,结论仍然成立。进一步研究发现,发债企业当期财务错报涉及盈余时,主体信用评级被下调的幅度更大,说明评级机构更加关注与盈余相关的财务信息。机制分析表明,评级机构维护自身声誉是主体信用评级变动能够反映企业真实财务信息的主要机制。此外,主体信用评级被下调还导致了资本市场投资者的负面反应。本文的研究结果为主体信用评级变动反映企业真实财务信息提供了直接的证据支持,揭示了主体信用评级的信息含量,也对理解中国情境下评级机构调整主体信用评级的行为动机提供参考。     

The information content of three credit ratings: the case of European residential mortgage-backed securities

We assess the information content of three credit ratings for tranches of newly issued European residential mortgage-backed securities. We find that tranches rated by three credit rating agencies where the rating by Standard & Poor's (S&P's) Ratings Service or Fitch is inferior to Moody's lead to higher funding costs and reflects what we refer to as rating risk. Our results suggest that market participants do not view credit ratings by Fitch and S&P's as redundant despite the fact that both employ the same rating approach.     

Moody’s investors service response to the consultative paper issued by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision “A new capital adequacy framework”

Moody's endorses the Basel Committee's proposal to use banks' internal risk assessments to refine the Basel Accord's risk weights on bank assets and commitments. External risk assessments, such as Moody's credit ratings, will likely play a supporting role as direct inputs into banks' internal rating systems and as tools for benchmarking and validating those systems. However, the widespread use of ratings in regulation threatens to undermine the quality of credit over time by increasing rating shopping, decreasing rating agency independence, and reducing incentives to innovate and improve the quality of ratings. This paper discusses how bank regulators can use external ratings in ways that mitigate the adverse incentives created by the resulting regulatory demand for rating agency services.