预算软约束与政府关联性实证研究

本文以民营上市公司2008-2010年的数据为样本,实证研究了预算软约束与政府关联性之间的关系.研究结果显示:具有政府关联性的民营企业,尽管承担较多的雇员负担,也会获得较多的政府补助,从而产生预算软约束现象；当民营企业承担相同的雇员负担时,具有政府关联性的民营企业则会获得更多的政府补助.     

现实政府供给公共物品的困惑——从公共物品供给效率的考察

以一个仁慈的、完全信息型政府供给公共物品的效率标准模型为基准,就不同预算约束下公共物品政府供给的效率及原因进行分析.比较不同预算约束、经济人假设情况下政府供给的效率.在经济人政府假设下,不论软预算约束还是硬预算约束,政府提供公共物品都存在效率问题:会出现过多和过少的供给,从而产生公共物品的供给浪费或不足,政府难以提供最适的公共物品水平.     

财政分权、预算软约束与地方政府债务

本文聚焦“地方政府债务悖论”,运用财政分权理论,以预算软约束为视角,解析地方政府过度举债的机制。在深入阐述预算软约束的内涵和形式的基础上,联系20世纪90年代国有企业债务危机与本次地方政府债务危机经验事实,本文从理论上剖析危机重演的逻辑,揭示地方政府举债的顺周期性。     

大型国有企业软预算约束的行为经济学分析

应从行为经济学视野中的沉淀成本效应角度解释政府对大型国有企业软预算约束的行为,从而与新古典经济理性解释形成互补关系。这样,在软预算约束与公有产权结构、前后期投资不一致以及政策性负担等有关经济解释的基础上,从决策者心理效用角度考察过去发生的沉淀成本对软预算约束的影响,从而认为解决软预算约束根本在于补偿沉淀成本,克服决策者的沉淀成本效应。     

农发行不良贷款的形成机制:一个分析框架

农发行要控制贷款质量，中央政府应该实行更加市场化的粮棉油流通体制改革，地方政府应该完善地方金融生态，打破企业的软预算约束预期，农发行应该加强对内管理，硬化基层经营机构的预算约束，确立效率型业务发展战略。     

产权性质、政府干预与企业财务困境应对——基于中国远洋、尚德电力和李宁公司的多案例研究

本文以中国远洋、尚德电力和李宁公司为研究对象,分析了财务困境企业的应对措施,并从产权性质和政府干预的视角进行了解释。本文发现,为了应对财务困境,企业需要站在全局的角度进行公司治理重组、战略和运营重组、资产重组和财务重组。在重组中,国有企业更倾向于采取关联交易等非市场化手段,而民营企业更注重公司战略和经营策略的调整。国有企业的财务困境应对成本要显著小于民营企业。对于财务困境企业,政府干预体现为"支持之手"。政府干预的"支持之手"不仅体现为国有企业中的预算软约束,也会对民营企业发挥作用。但是,投资者对政府干预导致民营企业应对财务困境措施的非市场化反应消极。     

财政分权、晋升激励与预算软约束——地方政府过度负债的一个分析框架

本文针对我国当下地方政府债务问题日益严重的局面,深入剖析地方政府偏好于大量建立地方债务融资平台的深层次原因和内在逻辑等问题。本文认为中国式财政分权并不是影响地方政府建立融资平台进行大量负债的全部激励,而政府的"经济参与人"和"政治参与人"的双重角色以及我国银行业普遍存在的软预算约束是地方政府融资平台过度负债的重要原因。在财政分权、晋升激励和银行软预算约束的共同作用下,促使了地方政府倾向于大量建立地方融资平台进行借贷。     

预算软约束视角下地方政府过度负债偏好的制度成因分析

当前地方政府的巨额债务已成为影响我国公共财政安全和社会经济的重大隐患。本文以预算软约束理论为视角,从传统的预算软约束和变异的预算软约束两个方面对我国地方政府过度负债偏好行为进行了分析,以探求其制度性根源。从这一新的视角出发,本文认为上述问题实际上是中央政府、地方政府、辖区内组织等各方各有期待、相互作用的结果,它是经济体制弊端和政府体制弊端混合体,解决问题的重中之重是政府体制改革。     

补助初衷与配置效率

基于异质性视角,本文在界定政府补助初衷的基础上,系统地考察了不同补助初衷下政府补助资源的配置效率问题。研究发现,相对于初衷明确的政府补助,初衷不明确的政府补助效率较低,对公司业绩的负面影响较大。这说明,政府补助资源的配置效率受制于补助初衷,政府补助初衷越明确,资源配置效率越高。而且,这一影响因产权性质不同而存在差异,相对于非国有企业,初衷不明确的政府补助在国有企业中的配置效率更低。政府质量则增强了政府补助初衷的明确性,提高了政府补助资源的配置效率。进一步研究发现,初衷不明确的政府补助增加了企业的无效率投资和寻租成本,从而降低了资源配置效率。本文为理解政府补助资源的配置效率提供了新视角,研究结论对于政府如何提高资源配置具有重要的借鉴意义。     

政府补助准则修订降低了公司股价同步性吗?

以2017年政府补助准则修订为准自然实验,本文考察了准则修订对股价同步性的影响。研究发现,政府补助削弱了公司异质性信息的传递,提高了股价同步性,降低了信息效率;政府补助准则修订要求公司结合经济业务实质进行差别化会计处理,增强了公司异质性信息的传递,因而降低了政府补助与股价同步性之间的联系强度。通过横截面分析,发现在信息不对称程度更严重、受产业政策支持的公司样本中,准则修订能更好地发挥强化公司异质性信息传递的作用。研究表明,高质量的会计准则有助于提高资本市场信息效率。     

Government R&D spending,fiscal instruments and corporate technological innovation

Using panel data from 242 cities in China, we examine the impact of government research and development (R&D) spending on corporate technological innovation. We find that listed firms located in cities with higher government R&D expenditures are more innovative than firms in other cities. Further, the positive effect of government R&D spending depends on fiscal instruments and factor allocation. Through subsidies and tax incentives, government R&D spending enhances firm innovation by alleviating financing constraints, improving employee creativity and ensuring efficient operations. We demonstrate that subsidies are more effective than taxes in spurring corporate technological innovation. We also show that the impact of government R&D spending is stronger for state-owned and high-tech enterprises than for other enterprises. Overall, our findings suggest that government R&D spending can substantially improve corporate technological innovation through fiscal instruments.     

Political Connections and Government Subsidies: Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms in China

Previous studies report mixed evidence regarding the effect of political connections on firm value. We seek new evidence in China, an important emerging market with a hallmark of a relationship-based economy. Using financially distressed firms (special treatment or ST firms) as a unique sample, we identify a direct channel through which political connections enhance firm value by showing that politically connected firms receive more government subsidies. Moreover, such effect becomes stronger for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), for firms with a better chance of survival, and after the government implemented a new policy to more strictly enforce the delisting in 2012.     

财政存款、银行竞争与僵尸企业形成

银行以优惠利率贷款为低质企业“输血”,是企业僵尸化的重要成因。然而,基于中国背景的文献,对银行“输血”动机的研究并不充分,本文从地方财政存款影响银行信贷分配的视角,分析僵尸企业形成的内在机理。首先,通过构建理论模型对银行竞争财政存款及影响企业融资和投资绩效进而僵尸化的逻辑进行刻画,而后依据省份财政存款、银行竞争与微观企业财务数据,对理论推论进行了验证。研究发现,财政存款占当地存款比重越大,企业僵尸化概率越高,并且银行竞争助长了企业僵尸化。此外,基于工具变量估计处理了核心变量的内生性问题,并进行了多种稳健性检验。机制检验表明,财政存款的信贷分配效应,促使企业过度投资,导致经营绩效恶化,进而提高了企业僵尸化概率,银行竞争则会加剧该效应。本文拓展了财政存款的经济效应与僵尸企业形成方面的文献,对于僵尸企业治理有一定参考意义。     

新型农村社会养老保险财政补贴机制优化研究

构建科学合理的财政补贴机制对于已经实现全覆盖的财政补贴型新型农村社会养老保险制度的可持续运行至关重要。现行补贴机制存在基础养老金补贴方式不合理、地方财政负担不均衡和地方财政补贴不规范等主要问题。基于此,文章设计了"定率补贴+分层筹资"的补贴机制,评估结论显示新补贴机制实现了地方政府财政补贴规模与财政能力的优化匹配、平衡了政府与个人的责任分担和有利于养老保险关系的城乡转续。     

Benefits of Downward Earnings Management and Political Connection: Evidence from Government Subsidy and Market Pricing

This paper examines the role of downward earnings management and political connection on the receipt of government subsidies and market pricing of subsidies. Using subsidies data hand-collected from Chinese listed firms over the period 2004–2014, the results show a significantly positive association between downward earnings management and the receipt of government subsidies. The results also reveal that a firm's political connection is conducive to securing subsidies for poor performers, but not for good performers. Market pricing analyses demonstrate that share markets value subsidies positively in general, but the effect is ameliorated in firms conducting downward earnings management. No discernible difference is found between the market pricing of subsidies received by firms with political connections and those without.     

财政存款、银行竞争与僵尸企业形成

银行以优惠利率贷款为低质企业“输血”,是企业僵尸化的重要成因。然而,基于中国背景的文献,对银行“输血”动机的研究并不充分,本文从地方财政存款影响银行信贷分配的视角,分析僵尸企业形成的内在机理。首先,通过构建理论模型对银行竞争财政存款及影响企业融资和投资绩效进而僵尸化的逻辑进行刻画,而后依据省份财政存款、银行竞争与微观企业财务数据,对理论推论进行了验证。研究发现,财政存款占当地存款比重越大,企业僵尸化概率越高,并且银行竞争助长了企业僵尸化。此外,基于工具变量估计处理了核心变量的内生性问题,并进行了多种稳健性检验。机制检验表明,财政存款的信贷分配效应,促使企业过度投资,导致经营绩效恶化,进而提高了企业僵尸化概率,银行竞争则会加剧该效应。本文拓展了财政存款的经济效应与僵尸企业形成方面的文献,对于僵尸企业治理有一定参考意义。     

税费替代:增值税减税、非税收入征管与企业投资

通过减税促进企业投资和提振宏观经济是近年来中国税收制度改革的重要目标,但减税政策的实际效果却存在争议。本文利用2009年增值税转型改革,研究了减税对地方政府税费收入和企业非税负担的影响,从税费替代的角度揭示非税负担变动如何影响企业固定资产投资。研究发现:(1)增值税转型在减税的同时提高了地方政府非税收入并加重了企业非税负担,地方财政收入受增值税转型冲击越大,企业非税负担上升越明显。(2)上述应主要体现在小型、微型和民营企业上,大中型、非民营企业的非税负担未发生明显变化。(3)非税负担上升会显著抑制小型、微型和民营企业的固定资产投资,促使小型微型和民营企业通过持有更多现金和减少流动性负债来应对税费负担不确定性。本文有助于理解减税政策对小型微型和民营企业非税负担的溢出效应及其影响,为通过减税降费促进投资和提振经济提供经验支撑。     

Depoliticization and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from the mandated resignation of directors in China

The 2013 depoliticization regulation (Rule 18) in China mandates government officials to resign from board positions in public firms, terminating firms' political connections established through these directors. Exploiting this regulation as a quasi-experiment, we document that politically connected firms increase their cash holdings 12.7% more than non-connected firms because of these resignations. This pattern is more pronounced among firms that rely more heavily on the government for external resources. Among state-owned firms, the pattern is more evident in firms that are more deeply privatized. In addition, firms that lose political ties experience a significant decline in obtaining bank loans and government subsidies, and they are also slower to adjust their cash holdings toward the optimal level. These findings underscore the role of corporate political linkages in facilitating firms' access to resources that “soften” firms' budget constraints.     

The “home bias” of corporate subsidiary locations

Analyzing hand-collected data on the corporate subsidiary locations of all publicly listed firms in China, we find that “hometown firms,” firms headquartered in the hometown of the key political leaders of the province, set up more subsidiaries in their home provinces. This effect is stronger for hometown firms that are non-state owned or without political connections, and more prominent in a political turnover year and the previous year. After a hometown firm sets up more subsidiaries in a key political leader's home province, the firm will enjoy more preferential government policies such as those related to subsidies and taxes. We find evidence consistent with the positive externalities of these subsidiaries for other firms in the cities where they reside, i.e., local firms. The number of these subsidiaries is also positively associated with the local employment rate. Various causality tests and robustness checks confirm the validity of our results. Our results provide some of the first evidence on the importance of corporate subsidiary locations, showing political geography significantly influences corporate geography.     

Do insiders trade on government subsidies?

We examine whether and how insiders trade on government subsidies, a major instrument through which the governments intervene in the economy. Using a novel dataset of government subsidies of Chinese listed firms, we find that net insider purchase increases significantly during the month of subsidy receipt. The effect of subsidies on insider trading is weaker in firms with a more transparent information environment and when subsidies are granted in a more predictable manner. In contrast, the effect is more pronounced for politically connected firms. Further analysis shows that the subsidy-trading relation may reflect both insiders’ informational advantage concerning subsidies and their superior ability to detect mispricing-related opportunities. Our findings provide new insights into the capital market consequences of government subsidies through the lens of insider trading.