银行特许权价值的内生风险约束效应——基于中国上市银行的实证研究

本文采用托宾Q值来衡量上市银行的特许权价值,基于分阶段动态回归模型,对银行特许权价值的影响因素及其风险约束效应进行研究。实证结果显示,外生性和内生性的银行特许权价值都有显著的风险约束效应;回归结果可以通过稳健性检验。     

中国上市银行特许权价值的自律效应

银行特许权价值是银行风险自我约束的重要机制。本文使用托宾Q值衡量了中国14家上市银行的特许权价值,借助面板数据回归分析对银行特许权价值的自律效应进行了实证检验。结果表明:上市银行特许权价值对反映外部评价的市场风险确实存在着自律效应,但还未对表现为内部风险控制的资本充足率产生显著作用。因国家对银行业提供了全面担保,银行所有制性质对银行风险无显著影响。随着银行业竞争日趋激烈,通过引导商业银行提升特许权价值来激励银行审慎经营并加强内部风险控制,对后金融危机时期中国银行业的健康稳定发展具有积极意义。     

特许权价值、隐性保险与风险承担——中国银行业的经验分析

本文以特许权价值与风险承担为主要研究视角,运用面板数据模型,分析隐性存款保险制度下我国特许权价值经济效应的有效性。研究结果表明,隐性保险降低了特许权价值对银行风险承担行为的敏感性,特许权价值的自律机制不仅对国有银行几乎失效,而且对非国有银行的风险约束效应也不显著。如此说明当前中国商业银行受到隐性存款保险制度的全面保护,从而弱化了开展全面风险管理的激励机制。     

商业银行特许权价值风险约束效应研究

从银行特许权价值的定义入手,利用样本银行1998～2007年的年度数据,阐述和分析了银行特许权价值的风险约束效应。研究结果表明,银行特许权价值对银行的风险行为有很强的约束效应,即拥有较高特许权价值的银行不会倾向于采取过度冒险的经营行为,而那些特许权价值较低的银行会增加冒险经营的动机。     

数字技术驱动下商业银行数字化转型与特许权价值

随着金融自由化的逐步推进，商业银行特许权价值下降趋势明显，而在数字技术的赋能下，银行数字化转型为缓解特许权价值下滑提供了全新路径。本文基于2007-2021年中国商业银行的年度数据，实证考察数字化转型对银行特许权价值的影响效果及作用路径。研究发现，数字化转型可以显著促进银行特许权价值提升，降低风险承担是数字化影响银行价值的渠道机制。进一步分析表明，数字化转型对银行特许权价值的影响效应会由于银行管理水平、行业竞争程度及银行股权性质的不同产生差异化表现。     

金融自由化、特许权价值与银行风险行为

随着银行业竞争的日益激烈,深入探讨金融自由化、特许权价值以及银行风险行为之间的关系显得愈来愈有必要.较多的国外文献已经证明三者之间存在着密切相关的联系.在面临全球化竞争时,通过研究三者的具体联系,更加清晰地认识特许权价值对于银行自身的风险约束作用,有效控制自身风险将会是我国银行业最基本的要求,更是非常关键的一步.     

直接融资对我国银行业特许权价值的影响——基于Panzar-Rosse模型的实证研究北大核心CSSCISSCI

在中国经济新常态和供给侧结构性改革的大背景下,研究直接融资对银行特许权价值的影响,对于正确引导银行业的发展,继续维持银行业市场竞争力具有十分重要的意义。本文借鉴测度银行业特许权价值的PR模型,实证研究了2005-2014年我国的银行业特许权价值的变化趋势,发现这期间银行特许权价值呈倒U型变动趋势。在进一步控制了市场集中度等变量的情况下,实证发现直接融资市场的发展对银行业特许权价值存在显著地积极影响,即近年来直接融资的市场发展,不仅没有带来银行特许权价值的下降,而是通过扩大银行的业务范围,增强资金利用效率,提高了银行业的利润和经营稳健性,提升了银行特许权价值。     

我国银行特许权价值的决定因素分析

本文从市场相关和银行相关角度,运用面板数据模型,对我国14家上市银行特许权价值的决定因素进行了实证检验.结果发现,决定我国上市银行特许权价值的主要因素包括以银行为导向的金融结构,银行业垄断性和宏观经济因素;但并没有发现银行控股股东性质对银行特许权价值的显著影响.     

中国银行特许权价值的风险自律效应研究

将银行破产风险分解为经营不确定性与风险覆盖能力、杠杆风险与资产组合风险,建立动态面板模型并采用2003~2013年中国上市银行的数据和系统广义矩估计方法,分析特许权价值激励银行降低风险承担的途径和方式。研究发现：我国银行特许权价值具有抑制银行风险的自律效应,银行为避免过高风险而遭受监管惩罚或丧失市场资源,保持特许经营条件和优势,将进行积极的风险管理;特许权价值的风险自律效应主要通过促使银行提升风险覆盖能力、降低资产组合风险和杠杆风险来实现。     

市场竞争、资本约束与银行风险承担行为调整

本文通过运用我国14家商业银行1996～2009年的数据,研究了市场竞争下资本约束与银行风险承担行为之间的关系。结果表明:首先,资本与风险行为之间存在弱负相关关系,且这两者之间的相互影响程度不对称。其次,产权属性和产权结构对银行风险行为无显著影响,其要害在于:股份制银行风险承担行为的"工农中建化"现象。再者,市场竞争对银行风险行为具有显著的正面影响,且它对银行风险承担行为的影响系数大于资本约束。也即,伴随着国有银行制度改革的推进,多元化产权竞争格局逐渐形成,一方面银行业市场化竞争日趋激烈,另一方面银行资产负债表中国家声誉的不可退出性,使得中国银行业在完全隐性存款保险制度的默许下,内生出风险承担偏向。     

Loan Market Competition and Bank Risk-Taking

Recent literature (Boyd and De Nicoló, J Finance 60:1329–1343, 2005) has argued that competition in the loan market lowers bank risk by reducing the risk-taking incentives of borrowers. Using a model where competition arises from falling switching costs for entrepreneurs, we show that the impact of loan market competition on banks is reversed if banks can adjust their loan portfolios. The reason is that when borrowers become safer, banks want to offset the effect on their balance sheet and switch to higher-risk lending. They even overcompensate the effect of safer borrowers because loan market competition erodes their franchise values and thus increases their risk-taking incentives.     

Bank Competition and Financial Stability

Under the traditional “competition-fragility” view, more bank competition erodes market power, decreases profit margins, and results in reduced franchise value that encourages bank risk taking. Under the alternative “competition-stability” view, more market power in the loan market may result in higher bank risk as the higher interest rates charged to loan customers make it harder to repay loans, and exacerbate moral hazard and adverse selection problems. The two strands of the literature need not necessarily yield opposing predictions regarding the effects of competition and market power on stability in banking. Even if market power in the loan market results in riskier loan portfolios, the overall risks of banks need not increase if banks protect their franchise values by increasing their equity capital or engaging in other risk-mitigating techniques. We test these theories by regressing measures of loan risk, bank risk, and bank equity capital on several measures of market power, as well as indicators of the business environment, using data for 8,235 banks in 23 developed nations. Our results suggest that—consistent with the traditional “competition-fragility” view—banks with a higher degree of market power also have less overall risk exposure. The data also provides some support for one element of the “competition-stability” view—that market power increases loan portfolio risk. We show that this risk may be offset in part by higher equity capital ratios.

How does competition affect bank risk-taking?

A common assumption in the academic literature and in the supervision of banking systems is that franchise value plays a key role in limiting bank risk-taking. As market power is the primary source of franchise value, reduced competition in banking markets has been seen as promoting banking stability. A recent paper by Martínez-Miera and Repullo (MMR, 2010) shows that a nonlinear relationship theoretically exists between bank competition and risk-taking in the loan market. We test this hypothesis using data from the Spanish banking system. After controlling for macroeconomic conditions and bank characteristics, we find support for this nonlinear relationship using standard measures of market concentration in both the loan and deposit markets. When direct measures of market power, such as Lerner indices, are used, the empirical results are more supportive of the original franchise value hypothesis, but only in the loan market. Overall, the results highlight the empirical relevance of the MMR model, even though further analysis across other banking markets is needed.     

Do foreign ownership and home-host country distance matter? Evidence on the impact of bank market power on liquidity creation in a selected Southeast Asian country

This paper examines the roles of foreign ownership and home-host country distance in the impact of bank market power on bank liquidity creation in a selected Southeast Asian country (Malaysia) over the period 2001−2017. A key finding is that the impact of market power on liquidity creation is either significantly negative or insignificant for domestic banks, but is significantly positive for foreign banks, irrespective of the liquidity creation measures used. This finding points to evidence of “home-field advantage” of domestic banks as the banks possess greater ability to withstand interest margin compression, while competing with foreign banks in liquidity creation market. Moreover, this paper finds that foreign banks originated from countries with cultural, economic and institutional distance to the host country require greater market power to boost their liquidity creation performance, as compared to their domestic counterparts. Further analysis also indicates that the influence of host-home country distance is more evident among small foreign banks which have lower franchise value. Overall, the findings of this paper suggest that although bank competition policies may promote customer welfare, foreign banks should be granted with some degree of market power in the host country to help alleviating the banks’ operational challenges arising from home-host country distance.     

Competition versus efficiency: What drives franchise values in European banking?

This paper investigates how stock market investors perceive the impact of market structure and efficiency on the long-run performance potential of European banks. To that end, a modified Tobin’s Q ratio is introduced as a measure of bank franchise value. This measure is applied to discriminate between the market structure and efficient-structure hypotheses in a coherent forward-looking framework, in which differences in banks’ horizontal and vertical differentiation strategies are controlled for. The results show that banks with better management or production technologies possess a long-run competitive advantage. In addition, bank market concentration does not affect all banks equally. Only the banks with a large market share in a concentrated market are able to generate non-competitive rents. The paper further documents that the forward-looking, long-run perspective and the noise-adjustment of the performance measure overcome most of the drawbacks associated with testing these hypotheses in a multi-country set-up. Finally, notwithstanding the international expansion of bank activities, the harmonization of regulation and the macroeconomic convergence in the European Union (EU15), we still find that country-specific macroeconomic variables have a significant impact on bank performance. The findings indicate that there is a trade-off between competition and stability that should be taken into account when assessing mergers or acquisitions.     

Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?

How will banks evolve as competition increases from other banks and from the capital market? Will banks become more like capital market underwriters and offer passive transaction loans or return to their roots as relationship lending experts? These are the questions we address. Our key result is that as interbank competition increases, banks make more relationship loans, but each has lower added value for borrowers. Capital market competition reduces relationship lending (and bank lending shrinks), but each relationship loan has greater added value for borrowers. In both cases, welfare increases for some borrowers but not necessarily for all.     

对我国商业银行特许权价值形成要素的实证分析

特许权价值是银行具有的从受保护市场获取未来租金的牌照价值,由市场相关因素和银行相关因素决定.本文在5家上市银行1999-2006年的面板数据基础上,利用托宾Q的方法度量特许权价值,并构建多元线性回归模型,得知随着市场优势因素的弱化,特许权价值整体呈现下降的趋势,而银行内在效率是其稳定的关键,对于银行业的稳健经营具有重要意义.     

银行竞争提高了企业投资水平和资源配置效率吗？——基于分支机构空间分布的研究

银行贷款是我国企业融资的重要方式,在企业生产经营中发挥着举足轻重的作用。2006年和2009年,我国先后两次放松了商业银行分支机构市场准入规制,银行分支机构空间分布发生了较大变化,银行竞争水平和服务实体经济能力明显提升。本文利用2001-2012年国家统计局工业企业数据,以企业周边银行分支机构的数量衡量银行竞争水平,研究银行竞争对企业投资的影响。研究发现,银行分支机构数量的增加显著提高了企业投资水平和投资效率。进一步研究表明,银行分支机构数量增加对企业投资效率的提升作用主要表现在投资不足的企业和非国有企业中,企业融资约束降低和代理冲突减弱是银行竞争提高企业投资效率的主要原因。本研究拓展了银行竞争以及企业投资和资源配置效率的相关文献,对供给侧结构性改革和银行业高质量发展具有启示意义。