丰富多样的百货联名卡

银行与百货、超市合作发行联名卡已经不是什么新鲜事。从早些时候的全国性商场超市，如沃尔玛、百盛等，到近年来的社区超市，大大小小的百货公司、商场、连锁超市等都成为银行发行联名卡的必争之地。有的商家甚至和多家银行合作发行联名卡，如银泰百货先后和建设银行、工商银行、民生银行、广发银行、     

工商银行牡丹卡赏析

工银亚运信用卡 中国工商银行亚运信用卡简称“工银亚运信用卡”，AT商银行与第16届亚洲运动会组织委员会合作发行的全国性联名卡，AT商银行作为2010年亚运会银行合作伙伴，为2010年亚运会提供的银行卡业务服务保障之一。     

联名卡项目中的常见问题及其解决方案

联名卡是银行卡产品的一种。根据中国人民银行《银行卡业务管理办法》的定义，联名卡是商业银行与盈利性机构合作发行的银行卡附属产品，发卡银行和联名单位应当为联名卡持卡人在联名单位用卡提供一定比例的折扣优惠和特殊服务。由此可见，银行与其他机构合作发行联名卡，     

工银亚运卡

中国工商银行亚运信用卡简称“工银亚运信用卡”，是中NT商银行与第16届亚洲运动会组织委员会合作发行的全国性联名卡，是中国工商银行作为2010年亚运会银行合作伙伴为2010年亚运会提供的银行卡业务服务保障重点工作之一。     

中行云南省分行发行首张金融IC卡

2011年12月6日,中行云南省分行携手昆明市住房公积金中心联合发行了该行首张金融IC卡——“长城住房公积金联名卡”。作为该行“长城卡”优质核心品牌中的一员,长城住房公积金联名卡集住房公积金的账户查询、提取、还贷等银行金融功能于一体,旨在为广大公积金缴存客户提供更优质、便捷的服务,     

值得推广的银行联名体验卡

银行联名卡按照功能可以分为联名借记卡和联名贷记卡两大类。随着联名卡市场的发展，如今又衍生出既不属于借记卡也不属下贷记卡的一种联名卡。它将银行某一类别的客户直接转换为商家的客户，涉及影院、网络、医疗卫生、装饰、建材、美容院、机场贵宾室、高尔夫球场、健身房、影楼等多个行业。     

农行助力“智慧旅游”游客可“刷脸”畅游景区

10月2日,农行智慧景区“金穗五山旅游联名卡”在南通狼山风景区启用,助力景区信息化建设。据悉,联名卡既有银行普通IC借记卡取现、转账、消费、网上支付等功能,又有景区智慧门票和缴费的“一卡通”服务功能。游客只需开立一张联名卡（年卡）,至狼山景区各景点后通过人脸识别,闸机自动开门,就能进入景区,不用再排队购票、检票入园。     

琳琅满目联名卡

联名卡,顾名思义是发卡银行（机构）与营利性企业联名发行的信用卡。卡面除印有发卡银行（机构）的标志外,还印有联名企业的标识。联名卡的推出由来已久,由于其可以实现银行与各商户的联动,又可使消费者享受到银行与联名机构的双重优惠,因此近年来呈现遍地开花、琳琅满目之势。要想在品目繁多的联名卡中选择适合自己的一款,并将联名卡的优惠、     

农行湖北十堰分行发行首张地方性旅游联名卡

9月23日，为迎接第三届世界传统武术节暨第八届武当国际旅游节，农行湖北十堰分行与十堰市运通商务服务有限公司联合推出了金穗“武当灵”旅游联名卡。金穗“武当灵”旅游联名卡具有农行金穗借记卡全部功能，并增加了旅游消费增值服务功能，在十堰市区及附近五县一市刷卡消费可享受多方面优惠服务。     

联名卡业务相关法律问题分析北大核心SSCI

联名卡是信用卡的主要产品之一,由银行与企业合作发行。合作双方借助对方在各自领域的影响和实力提高自己品牌的认知度,扩大市场占有率,增加收益,最终实现发卡银行和联名企业的共赢。随着各发卡银行在联名卡发卡领域和品种上不断创新,寻求合作的企业逐渐增多,联名卡业务开展中也面临一些因持卡人理解偏差、联名企业行为不当等引发的法律风险。本文介绍了联名卡业务存在的法律关系,分析了联名卡业务中涉及的主要法律风险,并对防控相关法律风险提出了建议。     

我国商业银行信用卡业务发展战略研究

信用卡业务面临着难得的发展机遇,已成为我国商业银行的战略重点。本文在SWOT分析的基础上,制定了信用卡业务的发展战略及实施策略。以期为该业务的长期健康发展提供借鉴。     

金融市场开放背景下信用卡业务发展态势研究

信用卡业务是现代商业银行的重点业务,在国内金融市场全面开放后,我国银行业如何迎接这一挑战将在一定程度上影响着自身的竞争能力.本文从分析国内银行卡业务的发展现状出发,详细阐述了信用卡业务竞争激烈的原因、外资银行在信用卡业务上具有的优势,以及国内商业银行在信用卡业务上面临的挑战.在此基础上,提出了国内商业银行应从5个方面改进信用卡业务的经营管理,具体包括更新经营理念、完善相关制度体系、培养专业人才、健全营销机制和提升服务品质.     

互联网金融对商业银行信用卡业务影响的实证研究

基于上市商业银行2007~2013年信用卡业务数据,运用结构方程模型考量互联网金融对商业银行信用卡业务的影响,结果表明,互联网金融通过网络银行业务的中介作用,实现对信用卡业务的溢出效应,在一定程度上促进商业银行信用卡业务的发展,但互联网金融的替代效应却不显著。有鉴于此,商业银行应积极开拓互联网金融,加快其自身业务的发展。     

Competitive effects of Basel II on US bank credit card lending

We analyze the potential competitive effects of the proposed Basel II capital regulations on US bank credit card lending. We find that bank issuers operating under Basel II will face higher regulatory capital minimums than Basel I banks, with differences due to the way the two regulations treat reserves and gain-on-sale of securitized assets. During periods of normal economic conditions, this is not likely to have a competitive effect; however, during periods of substantial stress in credit card portfolios, Basel II banks could face a significant competitive disadvantage relative to Basel I banks and nonbank issuers.     

对银行卡POS回佣收费状况的分析研究

本文通过对银行卡产业基本特征的分析,结合对云南、山东、内蒙古等地区银行卡特约商户回佣收费状况的调研,分析了国内银行卡产业的基本特征,提出了POS回佣收费应根据地区状况等因素采取差别定价机制和改革的建议,即在我国商户细分的基础上,按照商户交易规模实施二级差别定价,根据交易区间实施超额累退制定价方案,建议将发卡行、银联、收单行的收益分配比例进行适当调整.采取POS差别定价机制代替现行的单一定价机制,有利于解决＂银商＂之间有关手续费率的争端,有利于发卡行之间的良性竞争,促进和保障银行卡产业的持续健康稳定发展.     

对银行卡POS回佣收费状况的分析研究

本文通过对银行卡产业基本特征的分析,结合对云南、山东、内蒙古等地区银行卡特约商户回佣收费状况的调研,分析了国内银行卡产业的基本特征,提出了POS回佣收费应根据地区状况等因素采取差别定价机制和改革的建议,即在我国商户细分的基础上,按照商户交易规模实施二级差别定价,根据交易区间实施超额累退制定价方案,建议将发卡行、银联、收单行的收益分配比例进行适当调整.采取POS差别定价机制代替现行的单一定价机制,有利于解决"银商"之间有关手续费率的争端,有利于发卡行之间的良性竞争,促进和保障银行卡产业的持续健康稳定发展.     

Credit CARD Act of 2009: What did banks do?

The Credit CARD Act of 2009 was intended to prevent practices in the credit card industry that lawmakers viewed as deceptive and abusive. Among other changes, the Act restricted issuers’ account closure policies, eliminated certain fees, and made it more difficult for issuers to change terms on credit card plans. Critics of the Act argued that because of the long lag between approval and implementation of the law, issuing banks would be able to take preemptive actions that might disadvantage cardholders before the law could take effect. Using credit bureau data as well as individual data from a survey of U.S. consumers, we test whether banks closed consumers’ credit card accounts or otherwise restricted access to credit just before the enactment of the CARD Act. Because the period prior to the enactment of the CARD Act coincided with the financial crisis and recession, causality in this case is particularly difficult to establish. We find evidence that a higher fraction of credit card accounts were closed following the Federal Reserve Board’s adoption of its credit card rules, but not between May 2009, when the CARD Act was signed, and when most of its provisions became law in February 2010. However, we do find evidence that banks deteriorated terms of credit card plans at a higher rate during this period, especially lowered the credit limits. Among the survey respondents whose bank accounts were closed during that period, account holders were much more likely to close their own credit card accounts than to have them closed by their card issuers.     

从"万事达卡"事件看信用卡风险防范机制

伴随信息技术的飞速发展和技术专业化的要求,信用卡数据处理外包服务已成为商业银行长期战略成本管理的新兴工具,逐渐被越来越多的商业银行所采用.面对国内蓬勃发展的信用卡市场,如何有效利用外包服务带来的高效率,同时防范信用卡风险至关重要.本文首先从经济学角度探讨采用信用卡外包服务带来的高效率与较优的安全性,并指出采用信用卡外包服务可能带来的风险以及我国商业银行信用卡业务防范外包风险的服务外包策略.     

商业银行金融IC卡行业应用探究

加载多行业应用，是银行卡芯片化产业升级的重要标志。商业银行应清晰规划银行卡产业升级的战略和策略，大力推进金融IC卡的产品创新，积极探索行业应用模式，从而在银行卡芯片化时代的激烈竞争中占据优势。     

Regulate one service,tame the entire market: Credit cards in Turkey

In credit card markets banks provide both payment and credit services. Two regulations were recently enacted in the Turkish credit card market: one on payment services in 2005 and the other on credit services in 2006. By employing the well-known  and  method and a unique quarterly data set for 21 Turkish banks between 2002 and 2008, we investigate the extent of banks’ market power in the Turkish credit card market before and after the regulations. Unlike most of the existing literature, which considers competition and regulation for either credit or payment services and ignores the externalities between them, we consider the entire market by taking both services into account. Fixed effects estimations reveal that banks enjoyed collusive oligopoly power before the regulations. Although the first regulation did not have much impact, the second led to rises in both banks’ total revenues and competition in the entire market.