民间借贷法律问题探析

近年来，民间融资活动日趋活跃，引起了全社会的广泛关注。从法律角度看，当前我国民间借贷面临着许多困境．如存在限制过严、合法与非法之间的界限不明确等问题。结合当前讨论热烈的《放贷人条例》，本文对我国民间借贷的立法提出若干建议。     

金融危机背景下我国农村民间金融法律制度的因应与完善——基于对《放贷人条件(草案)》的思考

金融危机背景下,我国金融生态失衡不断加剧,民间借贷活动异常活跃,农村民间金融法制化迎来一个契机。《放贷人条例》的择机出台将使民间借贷通过国家立法获得合法之身份,这不仅有利于打破金融垄断,构建有效竞争秩序;而且有利于规范农村民间金融,维护金融安全。本文以农村民间金融的制度变迁与现状考量作为金融危机下我国农村民间金融法律制度研究的逻辑起点,从法律制度的因应与完善两个视角,全面分析了《放贷人条例(草案)》的相关规定并提出了相应的对策与建议。     

南非的非吸收存款类放贷人法律制度

本文回顾了南非非吸收存款类放贷人以及消费信贷行业监管法律制度的演进过程,着重介绍了南非2005年《国家信贷法》、2006年《国家信贷规定》的立法背景和主要内容,指出我国应加快非吸收存款类放贷人的立法规范进程,积极促进信贷市场创新与发展,规范和引导民间借贷市场,形成金融机构+贷款零售商的新型信贷市场格局。     

引导民间借贷规范发展的思考

即将出台的《放贷人条例》，明确了非吸收存款类放贷人主体的法律地位，引导民间金融成为农村金融市场的重要竞争主体。《放贷人条例》的出台可以视为中国金融改革的政策性宣示，它将改变民间借贷游离于正规金融市场之外的状况，引导其“阳光化”、规范化发展，有助于缓解中小企业和“三农”资金困难。在《放贷人条例》即将出台之际，本文通过对民间借贷的特点及效应分析，提出了规范发展民间借贷的相关建议。     

关于我国民间借贷利率法律规制的思考

自1991年8月13日最高人民法院颁布《关于人民法院审理借贷案件的若干意见》（以下称《若干意见》以来,“四倍红线”成为我国民间借贷市场必须遵守的基本原则。本文在对我国民间借贷利率形成过程进行研究的基础上,综合分析“四倍红线”带来的一系列问题,并借鉴国外的立法经验,对完善我国民间借贷利率的法律规制提出建议。     

央行表态建议民间借贷合法化

面对日益高涨的民间融资需求,央行近日首次表态,“应加快我国有关非吸收存款类放贷人的立法进程,适时推出《放贷人条例》．给民间借贷合法定位,引导其阳光化、规范化发展。”这将是小额贷款公司试点后更重大的一次金融突破。     

浅谈我国民间放贷人监管

随着我国民间金融市场的发展,民间借贷的规模不断壮大、借贷形式、用途不断增多,民间放贷成为民间金融非常重要的一部分,发展并规范我国民间放贷人显的非常必要的。尤其在2008年中央人民银行分别出台了《关于小额贷款公司试点的指导意见》和初拟了《放贷人条例》草案,其中《放贷人条例》的最大特点是允许个人注册从事放贷业务,符合条件的个人和企业都可以开办放贷业务,以促进民间借贷活动的阳光化,规范化。此时,研究民间放贷人的监管有着普遍意义和特殊意义。     

浅谈我国民间放贷人监管

随着我国民间金融市场的发展,民间借贷的规模不断壮大、借贷形式、用途不断增多,民间放贷成为民间金融非常重要的一部分,发展并规范我国民间放贷人显的非常必要的。尤其在2008年中央人民银行分别出台了《关于小额贷款公司试点的指导意见》和初拟了《放贷人条例》草案,其中《放贷人条例》的最大特点是允许个人注册从事放贷业务,符合条件的个人和企业都可以开办放贷业务,以促进民间借贷活动的阳光化,规范化。此时,研究民间放贷人的监管有着普遍意义和特殊意义。     

民间借贷的法律规制和完善

民间借贷是近年来民间中小企业融资的重要渠道,其高效、灵活的方式为民间经济的发展提供了非常大的帮助,然而民间借贷当中存在的种种弊端也非常明显,而且并没有被有我国法律进行具体有效的规制。伴随着我国民间借贷迅猛发展的背景下,民间借贷的法制化需求更加强烈。本文就将从民间借贷的问题入手,发现民间借贷在运行当中存在的主要问题,进而提出对民间借贷的法律规制建议。     

论金融抑制下的民间借贷立法原则——兼论合法民间借贷的法律边界

“金融抑制”一直是我国经济发展中存在的突出问题,由此导致金融运作与市场的某种背离.在此情况下,民间借贷作为“草根金融”得到快速发展,一定程度上填补了正规金融留下的空白.但民间借贷长期以来受到意识形态和政策的压制,相关法律建设严重滞后,出现了较多的法律真空或盲点.加快民间借贷立法,明确合法民间借贷法律边界,已经成为十分紧迫的课题.本文从民间借贷的定义入手对民间借贷立法原则、合法民间借贷的法律边界进行了分析和阐释.     

"放贷人"立法的国际经验研究

本文在收集世界各国有关放贷人立法的相关细则基础上,就立法中对放贷主体、放贷许可、放贷利率以及放贷监管等规定中的共性进行总结,并以新加坡和印度为典型案例,通过回顾两国放贷人法案的修正重点,试图说明当前放贷人立法的发展趋势,以期对我国的放贷人立法提供参考。     

Relationship lending and the transmission of monetary policy

Repeated interactions allow lenders to uncover private information about their clients, decreasing the informational asymmetry between a borrower and his lender but introducing one between the lender and competing financiers. This paper constructs a credit-based model of production to analyze how learning through lending relationships affects monetary transmission. I examine how monetary policy changes the incentives of borrowers and lenders to engage in relationship lending and how these changes then shape the response of aggregate output. The results demonstrate that relationship lending prevails in equilibrium, smoothes the steady state output profile, and induces less volatile responses to certain monetary shocks.     

Lender Automation and Racial Disparities in Credit Access

Process automation reduces racial disparities in credit access by enabling smaller loans, broadening banks' geographic reach, and removing human biases from decision making. We document these findings in the context of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), where private lenders faced no credit risk but decided which firms to serve. Black-owned firms obtained PPP loans primarily from automated fintech lenders, especially in areas with high racial animus. After traditional banks automated their loan processing procedures, their PPP lending to Black-owned firms increased. Our findings cannot be fully explained by racial differences in loan application behaviors, preexisting banking relationships, firm performance, or fraud rates.     

Attitudinal Asymmetries and the Lender-Borrower Relationship: Survey Results on Farm Lending in Shandong,China

This paper addresses the problem of social interactions and the lender-borrower relationship by measuring the disconnect between borrowers and lenders across a wide range of lending-related attributes. The degree by which lenders and borrowers connect disconnect depends on whether lenders’ and borrowers’ perceptions across these attributes are symmetric or asymmetric. We compare field survey results from 120 loan officers at Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs) in China’s coastal Shandong province, and pair them with an existing survey on identical questions to 394 farm households in the same region. Pairing lenders’ perception towards borrowers regarding RCC microcredit lending mechanism, against borrowers’ perception towards lenders and how themselves were perceived by lenders in the same regards, we observe on many dimensions a disconnect between them in the context of lenders’ “care” towards borrowers, loan rejection, memberships of RCC and group guarantee, lending concerns, cost of borrowing, reasons for default, credit rationing, and lending preferences. This research provides financial institutions with outreach mechanisms to borrowers, while also training lenders to borrowers’ sensitivities.     

Price Discovery and Dissemination of Private Information by Loan Syndicate Participants

We delineate key channels through which flows of confidential information to loan syndicate participants impact the dynamics of information arrival in prices. We isolate the timing of private information flows by estimating the speed of price discovery over quarterly earnings cycles in both secondary syndicated loan and equity markets. We identify borrowers disseminating private information to lenders relatively early in the cycle with firms exhibiting relatively early price discovery in the secondary loan market, documenting that price discovery is faster for loans subject to financial covenants, particularly earnings‐based covenants; for borrowers who experience covenant violations; for borrowers with high credit risk; and for loans syndicated by relationship‐based lenders or highly reputable lead arrangers. We then ask whether early access to private information in the loan market accelerates the speed of information arrival in stock prices. We document that the stock returns of firms identified with earlier private information dissemination to lenders indeed exhibit faster price discovery in the stock market, but only when institutional investors are involved in the firm's syndicated loans. Further, the positive relation between institutional lending and the speed of stock price discovery is more pronounced in relatively weak public disclosure environments. These results are consistent with institutional lenders systematically exploiting confidential syndicate information via trading in the equity market.     

Settlement delays in the money market

We track 38,000 money market trades from execution to delivery and return, and provide a first empirical analysis of settlement delays in financial markets. In accord with the predictions of recent models of strategic settlement of financial claims, we document a tendency by lenders to delay delivery of loaned funds until the afternoon hours. We find banks to follow a simple strategy to manage the risk of account overdrafts, by delaying settlement of large payments relative to that of small payments. More sophisticated strategies such as increasing delays when own liquid balances are low and when dealing with small trading partners play a marginal role. We find evidence of strategic delay also when returning borrowed funds, although we can explain a smaller fraction of the dispersion in delays in the return than in delivery leg of money market lending.     

Borrower Self-Selection,Underwriting Costs,and Subprime Mortgage Credit Supply

In the U.S., households participate in two very different types of credit markets. Personal lending is characterized by continuous risk-based pricing in which lenders offer households a continuous distribution of borrowing possibilities based on estimates of their creditworthiness. This contrasts sharply with mortgage markets where lenders specialize in specific risk categories of borrowers and mortgage supply is stepwise linear. The contrast between continuous lending for personal loans and discrete lending by specialized lenders for mortgage credit has led to concerns regarding the efficiency and equity of mortgage lending. This paper sheds both theoretical and empirical light on the differences in the two credit markets. The theory section demonstrates why, in a perfectly competitive credit market where all lenders have the same underwriting technology, mortgage credit supply curves are stepwise linear and lenders specialize in prime or subprime lending. The empirical section then provides evidence that borrowers are being effectively sorted based on risk characteristics by the market.     

基于结构洞理论的农村民间借贷监管研究

随着正规金融机构涉农融资增速的减缓以及农民融资需求的增加,近年来我国农村民间借贷活动更趋活跃,而监管缺失是农村民间借贷纠纷事件频繁发生的重要原因之一。本文运用结构洞理论深入分析农村民间借贷活动的特征及风险,并提出监管对策建议。     

Payments systems and monetary policy

A dynamic spatial model is constructed where there is a role for money and for centralized payments arrangements, and where there are aggregate fluctuations driven by fluctuations in aggregate productivity. With decentralized monetary exchange and no centralized payments arrangements, there is price level indeterminacy, and the equilibrium allocation is inefficient. A private clearinghouse arrangement improves efficiency but produces a real indeterminacy. The pricing of daylight overdrafts is irrelevant for the equilibrium allocation. Efficiency is achieved with a zero nominal interest rate on overnight central bank lending, or through private overnight interbank lending.     

Liquidity creation and funding ability during the interbank lending crunch

This study examines the portfolio response of US banks to the interbank lending collapse during the global financial crisis. The paper documents that a bank's response to the collapse of interbank markets is related to whether or not the bank was a net borrower or lender of funds. In particular, we find that typical borrowers had lower loan growth than typical lenders, but that the crisis did not differentially affect borrowers and lenders with respect to loan growth. However, borrowing and lending banks were differentially affected by the crisis in terms of their liquid asset growth. The typical borrowers reduced their liquid asset growth relative to lending banks during the crisis. We interpret this finding as saying that borrowing banks had to reduce their risky asset holdings because access to interbank funds had been reduced. The paper presents analogous analyses of the possible differential response of borrowers and lenders to changes in counterparty risk and lending through the Fed's TAF facility.