证券市场内幕交易监管的有效性分析

在对内幕交易监管有效性的分析上,由于研究方法和目标的不同,研究的结果也出现了很多分歧。本文对已有的研究进行了纵向比较和横向比较,从内幕交易法律的实施和国际监管的角度入手,对内幕交易监管的有效性进行分析,认为内幕交易监管是相对有效的。投资者信心、市场与法律的测度方法,以及投资者交易策略等因素都会影响到内幕交易监管的有效性。     

浅析证券市场内幕交易法律监管的完善

中国证券市场产生以来内幕交易如影随行。伴随证券市场的发展，由于制度缺失和监管不到位，内幕交易愈演愈烈。本文通过探究证券市场内幕交易的界定，分析我国现行法律监管的现状和实践情况，进而提出完善我国证券市场内幕交易法律监管的几点建议。     

内幕交易监管与监管困境研究综述

各国对内幕交易的监管基本采取立法的形式，许多学者都探讨了实施内幕交易监管的有效性以及监管效率问题。本文对相关文献进行了梳理，发现从内幕交易监管有效性的纵向比较分析，内幕交易监管并不能达到预期的效果；从横向比较分析，内幕交易监管越严格，越有利于降低内幕交易程度。总体而言，内幕交易监管是必要与相对有效的。因交易者策略与量价甄别指标的主观性而产生了监管困境，降低了监管效率。但是监管总体上可以带给市场的效益高于成本，那么内幕交易监管的实施与不断完善是非常有必要的。     

浅谈证券市场内幕交易的法律监管——以美国法为比较对象

内幕交易乃证券欺诈表现形式之一,伴随着证券市场的发展而又屡禁不止。美国是世界上最早对内幕交易进行规制的国家,其在长期的司法实践中已经探索出了较为完备的内幕交易监管规则,比较中美内幕交易监管制度的异同可以为我国制度完善佐以镜鉴。     

法律执行异质性与内幕交易监管效率——基于PIN指数的研究视角

本文考察在一个国家统一的立法体系下,不同公司对法律执行的异质性与差异性,探讨其对内幕交易监管效率的影响。本文一方面借助我国上市公司对中国证监会的调查问卷所作的公开回复——《自查报告和整改计划》,构建公司层面的投资者保护指数,另一方面运用高频数据计算知情者交易概率(即PIN指数)来衡量内幕交易程度的严重性,在此基础上对二者展开细致的实证分析。研究结果表明,投资者保护执行情况是影响内幕交易监管效率的重要因素。随着公司在投资者法律保护上执行水平的提高,内幕交易监管效率将得以有效提高,并且受控制权私利驱使的内幕交易行为也会得到明显的遏制。     

论我国对跨境证券内幕交易的监管

内幕交易行为是一种证券违法行为,禁止内幕交易是各国证券监管的重要内容。随着证券市场的国际化,各国证券市场的关联性日益紧密,内幕交易行为随之日益凸现出跨境性、复杂性和技术性使之成为各国监管的难题。我国在加入WTO后,逐步放开本国证券市场,也将带来更多监管问题。本文将对跨境内幕交易监管中的相关问题进行讨论。     

我国证券市场内幕交易的法律界定和监管

内幕交易在各国证券市场上都是禁止的。由于内幕交易具有很强的隐蔽性，因此，内幕交易我国也频繁发生。本文通过内幕交易的国际比较，提出对我国内幕交易的界定和监管。这对规范我国的证券市场有一定借鉴意义。     

期货市场内幕交易监管及认定——美国期货期权内幕交易最新案例的比较视角

本文以近期美国期货市场发生的内幕交易案件为着眼点，具体分析美国商品期货交易委员会(CFTC)最近查处的期货市场利用客户信息型内幕交易行为，即利用客户大笔交易期货及期权的信息抢先下单并以有利的交易价格进行成交获利。案件中，被告在近五年的时间内2000余次实施类似的交易行为，违反了CFTC反欺诈细则及内幕交易监管规定。通过案例比较，分析境内外期货内幕交易行为特征以及认定，为我国期货市场内幕交易监管提供启示。     

完善我国网络银行监管法律制度

网络银行的出现对传统银行业产生了深刻的影响,对其实施必要监管非常重要。本文分析了我国网络银行监管法律制度中存在的不足,从监管体系的构建、市场准入条件的完备、银行内部监控制度的强化等方面阐述了完善我国网络银行监管法律制度的具体措施。     

对我国银行业监管法律体系完善性的现实思考

着重从监管法律法规框架还不够完备、监管法律体系立法质量仍不够高、一些法律规定立法界定不全、存在疏漏以及监管责任制度和内部监督制度尚未健全等方面分析,总结了当前银行业监管法律体系存在的主要问题,并就如何完善我国银行业监管法律体系相应提出了一些对策和建议.     

事前披露能够降低董监高减持的获利能力吗?——基于中国“减持新规”的实证检验

"事前披露"能否降低董监高交易的信息优势?中国证监会于2017年5月修订并实施的"减持新规"首次为上述命题的检验提供了独特的研究场景。通过"事件研究法",本文对"减持新规"颁布前后的董监高减持行为进行研究,考察事前披露减持计划是否会削弱董监高减持时的信息优势。实证结果表明,"减持新规"实施后董监高减持的短期超常回报显著低于"减持新规"实施前,这说明事前披露会抑制董监高交易的择时能力。进一步研究发现,当公司信息质量较差、所处地区的市场化程度较低、成长性较高、减持规模较大时,事前披露对董监高减持获利能力的削弱作用更强;"减持新规"实施对董监高减持超常回报的削弱主要体现在交易日与减持计划披露日间隔短的减持样本中。本文不仅在实证层面上验证了"事前披露"可以降低董监高交易的信息优势,丰富了内部人交易研究文献,也为我国"减持新规"的实施效果提供了证据和建议。     

Applying developed‐country regulation in emerging markets: an analysis of Thai insider trading

This paper undertakes an out‐of‐sample test of developed‐country insider trading regulation in an emerging market environment (Thailand), where severe information asymmetry, lax enforcement and poor pricing efficiency are endemic. Thai insider trading regulation, which mimics developed market rules, fails on all three measures of success. Insiders trade with impunity during a regulated trading ban. Their trading performance outperforms other investors at all times, and they continue to exploit their privileged position with respect to information flow. Our study suggests it is inappropriate for emerging market regulators to adopt developed market regulation without first considering the unique characteristics of their own environment.     

More insiders,more insider trading: Evidence from private-equity buyouts

Prior theoretical research has found that, in the absence of regulation, a greater number of insiders leads to more insider trading. We show that optimal regulation features detection and punishment policies that become stricter as the number of insiders increases, reducing insider trading in equilibrium. We construct measures of the likelihood of insider activity prior to bid announcements of private-equity buyouts during the period 2000–2006 and relate these to the number of financing participants. Suspicious stock and options activity is associated with more equity participants, while suspicious bond and CDS activity is associated with more debt participants — consistent with models of limited competition among insiders but inconsistent with our model of optimal regulation.     

Do Insider Trading Laws Work?

This paper presents the first comprehensive global study of insider trading laws and their first enforcement. In a sample of 4,541 acquisitions from 52 countries, I find that insider trading enforcement increases both the incidence, and the profitability of insider trading. The expected total insider trading gains increase. Consequently, laws that proscribe insider trading fail to eliminate insider profits. However, harsher laws work better at reducing the incidence of illegal insider trading.     

Trading on inside information when there may be tippees

This paper compares four scenarios of a model in which, for the possible presence of tippees, firm insiders may not be the only persons having inside information. The four scenarios are that of free insider trading, that with a ban on insider trading, that of observable insider trading, and that with full disclosure of information. Each of these scenarios is shown to be strictly more efficient than the one before so long as there is a positive probability that a tippee exists. The paper sheds some light on why and how insider trading should be regulated, and also on the role of the disclosure system in the overall scheme of securities regulation.

对金融衍生品市场内幕交易的一些新思考--澳大利亚现行的反内幕交易法及其带给我们的若干启示

本文着眼于澳大利亚在治理金融衍生品市场内幕交易中积累的丰富经验,针对一个崭新的前瞻性课题,即金融衍生品市场的内幕交易问题展开研究。作者认为,由于内幕交易与信息非对称性之间存在的内在冲突,实际上反内幕交易法规很难有效地阻止金融衍生品的内幕交易行为,过于复杂的反内幕交易法规会对市场产生一些负面影响,而放松内幕交易监管这一新思维将对市场的良性发展更为有益,应该让市场来决定内幕交易行为的“存亡”。但目前最为现实、温和的选择仍然是修改现行反内幕交易法,以维护市场的公平性和有效性。最后,笔者对如何缓解中国目前内幕交易猖獗的现状提出建议。     

内幕交易新动向及其法律规制研究

在资本市场企业并购重组活跃环境下,内幕交易这一资本市场"痼疾"不断呈现出新动向,如行为加剧化、主体多元化等.内幕交易新动向的法律成因主要在于现行法律法规对内幕交易规制的缺陷,即内幕交易法律责任的不力、内幕信息认定标准的不足、内幕交易取证的不易以及上市公司内部控制信息披露机制的不健全.因此,应立足于这些缺陷,完善内幕交易的法律规制,以维护资本市场的健康发展.     

内部控制与内部人违规交易行为

以2009~2012年沪市上市公司为研究样本,以内部人违规交易比率、内部人敏感期交易比率和内部人延迟披露比率作为内部人违规交易行为的替代变量,考察了内部控制对内部人违规交易行为的影响。研究发现,内部控制质量与内部人违规交易比率和内部人敏感期交易比率显著负相关,与内部人延迟披露比率之间的关系不显著。研究结果表明,总体而言,内部控制能有效抑制内部人违规交易行为的发生,有利于提高内部人交易的合法合规性。     

The World Price of Insider Trading

The existence and the enforcement of insider trading laws in stock markets is a phenomenon of the 1990s. A study of the 103 countries that have stock markets reveals that insider trading laws exist in 87 of them, but enforcement—as evidenced by prosecutions—has taken place in only 38 of them. Before 1990, the respective numbers were 34 and 9. We find that the cost of equity in a country, after controlling for a number of other variables, does not change after the introduction of insider trading laws, but decreases significantly after the first prosecution.     

Culture and the regulation of insider trading across countries

We find that individualistic countries regulate insider trading activities more intensely. The result is robust to controlling for alternative culture variables, additional controls, and instrumental variable analysis. We also document that individualism's effect is magnified in democratic countries. In addition, we study the economic and financial consequences of individualism, insider trading regulation, and its enforcement. The analysis suggests that individualism and the enforcement of insider trading regulation promote financial development. Interaction effects reveal that individualism and insider trading regulation serve as complements to promote financial development. These findings contribute to the insider trading debate since regulation alone may not be the primary determinant of market efficiency. Combined, our results challenge prior works concluding that individualism is anti-regulation.