中国银行业市场约束状况及其对监管有效性的影响

市场约束对银行监管有效性具有重要的补充作用,银行业市场发育状况既受制于政府监管制度安排,又受制于银行自我约束能力,更受制于市场发展状况.本文从实证和理论两方面对我国银行业的市场约束状况进行了研究,并在此基础上进一步分析了市场约束对我国银行监管有效性的影响.     

市场约束与我国银行监管的有效性

巴塞尔新资本协议把市场约束作为实现有效资本监管的一个支柱,认为强化市场约束对帮助银行和监管当局管理风险、提高稳定性好处很多。那么,市场约束在我国银行监管中的作用如何?怎样通过发挥和运用市场约束来提高我国银行监管的有效性?     

我国银行业信息披露状况分析

一、银行业信息披露的重要性 银行体系的稳定对一个国家经济的有序运行至关重要.维护银行体系稳定的方式与方法主要有国家有关监管部门监管和市场约束.无论是政府监管,还是市场约束,其有效性都取决于银行所提供信息的有效性.随着市场环境的日益复杂化,仅靠监管部门的力量已远远不够,市场主体行为的规范,更需要市场约束的力量.     

阿根廷BASIC银行监管体系对我国的借鉴意义

20世纪90年代早期,阿根廷经历过严重的金融危机后,开始进行经济和银行监管改革,推出了鼓励私有化、以市场约束为核心的BASIC银行监管体系。这一体系在亚洲金融危机、俄罗斯金融危机等危机中被证明是十分有效的。阿根廷BASIC银行监管体系被认为是新兴市场经济国家中两到三个最成功的案例之一。阿根廷的银行监管改革经验,对于我国改革银行监管体系、发挥市场约束作用、提高监管的有效性具有一定的借鉴意义。     

我国银行监管有效性探讨

目前，我国银行监管有效性差，存在着一系列问题，主要表现在：监管重点不突出，忽视监管的成本与效益分析，缺乏强有力的市场约束机制，监管环境不健全，监管机制不协调，针对加入WTO后银行风险变化的新特点必须及时转变监管理念，转移监管重心，强化市场约束的监管作用，培育健康的银行监管环境，建立有效的银行监管协调机制，尽快培养一支高素质的监管队伍。     

我国银行次级债市场的衍生功能与改革方向

本文研究了银行次级债的债项特征设计对其市场约束功能和附属资本功能的影响．在此工作的基础上,再结合我国银行次级债市场的实际情况和具体特征,对其衍生功能进行了中外对比式的逻辑推理,并从次级债的债项特征、市场建设、法定监管等视角讨论了在满足附属资本功能的同时．如何尽可能地激发其市场约束功能,为我国银行次级债市场的改革提供了有意义的启示。     

政府监管、市场约束对商业银行风险承担行为的影响

在对中国银行业市场进行全面考察的基础上，本文以超额资本充足率和法定存款准备金率为政府监管度量指标，Lerner指数为银行市场约束度量指标，以中国14家上市银行2007年1月～2010年9月期间的季度数据为样本，实证研究了政府监管和市场约束对中国商业银行风险承担行为的影响。研究表明，超额资本充足率、市场约束和银行规模对中...     

我国银行业资本充足监管有效性分析——以上市银行为例

次贷危机的引爆充分暴露了杠杆比率过高的金融机构的经营风险,资本充足监管对银行的战略意义再次凸显,对资本充足监管有效性的分析也显得更加重要.目前,我国银行资本充足水平达标并不是来自外部资本市场和银行绩效的提升,而是监管上级的压力.在对我国14家上市银行2006-2007年的混合数据回归分析后发现,和国际著名的银行不同,我国上市银行资本充足监管有效性并不明显.其中的原因可能包括:银行的垄断竞争的行业特征、政府对银行的隐性担保以及不完善的制度环境.目前,次贷危机的爆发使得资本充足监管越来越被全球主要经济体的共同认可,作为<巴塞尔协议>的签约国,资本充足监管的正常化以及制度化才是正确的选择.要提高资本充足监管的有效性,重点应积极完善市场约束的功能.完善我国银行业的公司治理结构以及健全银行业所处的市场环境.     

实现银行有效监管的市场基础架构

目前 ,国际社会及各国金融监管当局在吸取近年一些国家的金融危机教训之后 ,已把关注的焦点从放松金融管制和金融深化转到金融的全球化和金融监管的有效性上。国际经验证明 ,有效的银行监管体系是一个由三大支柱、三层网络组成的整合系统。三大支柱是 :完善的法规体系、高效的监管组织体系和有效的市场约束体系 ;三层网络是 :严密的商业银行内部控制、高效的监管当局外部监督和为强化市场约束而建立的市场基础架构。完善的市场基础架构 ,在实现银行有效监管 ,促进银行体系安全、稳健、高效运行中正发挥着日益重要的作用。市场基础和市场约束…     

资本监管制度、充足率计量与资本监管有效性

资本监管是国际银行监管的最新趋势,能有效约束银行风险行为。但我国实施的资本监管对商业银行短期内有效,但中长期的有效性不足。本文主要从资本监管制度、充足率计量两个方面探讨了资本监管有效性的约束机制系统。     

The contribution of bank regulation and fair value accounting to procyclical leverage

Our analysis of how banks’ responses to asset price changes can result in procyclical leverage reveals that, for banks with a binding regulatory leverage constraint, absent differences in regulatory risk weights across assets, procyclical leverage does not occur. For banks without a binding constraint, fair value and bank regulation both can contribute to procyclical leverage. Empirical findings based on a large sample of U.S. commercial banks reveal that bank regulation explains procyclical leverage for banks relatively close to the regulatory leverage constraint and contributes to procyclical leverage for those that are not. We also show that fair value accounting does not contribute to procyclical leverage.     

Comparative advantages of regional versus national banks in alleviating SME's financial constraints

This paper provides new evidence on the impact of local banking market structure on SME's access to credit and emphasize the comparative advantages of regional versus national banks in alleviating SME's financial constraints. Matching a unique dataset on bank branch-level and firm-level information for a sample of 33,165 French manufacturing firms over the 2005–2013 period, we rely on two alternative indicators to capture different dimensions of SMEs financial constraints and find significant differences in the drivers of these constraints. While higher market share of regional banks or stronger presence of geographically-focused banks helps to alleviate SMEs' short-term credit constraint, higher market share of national banks or stronger presence of geographically-diversified banks is beneficial to reduce SMEs investment cash-flow sensitivity. Moreover, in both cases, SMEs' financial constraints are strengthened in functionally-distant markets. In addition, during crisis times, the benefits of relationship banking on short-term credit constraint remain and, in some cases, are reinforced. We also find that these benefits differ according to SMEs pre-crisis financial health. Regional banks facilitate access to short term credit for firms which were more profitable before the global financial crisis and particularly those who experienced a sharp decline in profitability in troubled times, supporting the hypothesis of continuation lending by relationship banks during economic downturns.     

A Model of the Commercial Loan Rate

This paper explores the theoretical and empirical determinants of the commercial loan rate charged by commercial banks based on a model of financial intermediary behavior which assumes monopolistic competition in asset and liability markets. The model incorporates the constraint that banks must maintain at least a minimum quantity of bonds in asset portfolios. Equations are estimated on a time series basis to explain the behavior of commercial loan rates over the period 1953 to 1980. The evidence appears consistent with the hypothesis that commercial banks operate in a market characterized by imperfect competition and that they explicitly set loan rates.     

On dividend restrictions and the collapse of the interbank market

Until recently, financial services regulation remained largely segmented along national lines. The integration of financial markets, however, calls for a systematic and coherent approach to regulation. This paper studies the effect of market based regulation on the proper functioning of the interbank market. Specifically, we argue that restrictions on the payout of dividends by banks can reduce their expected default on (interbank) loans, stimulate trade in this market and improve the welfare of consumers.     

银行间市场理财产品快速发展的原因及对银行业的影响

在融资类银信合作理财产品监管趋严并受到限制的背景下,投资银行间市场的理财产品快速发展是2011年理财市场的一个重要特点。本文的研究表明：一是在现有经济金融环境下投资者对较高收益率资产的需求与银行之间的存款竞争等多个因素共同促进了银行间市场理财产品的快速发展;二是银行间市场理财产品的发行不会对银行在市场中的地位产生影响,总体上对银行体系的稳定影响有限;三是银行间市场理财产品的发行对银行体系流动性总体有利,但会产生时点上的不利影响,并给中小机构的流动性管理带来压力;四是银行间市场理财产品的发行是一种金融创新．有利于金融机构的长远发展。本文建议：适当提高存款基准利率水平,稳步推进利率市场化;对现有银行间市场理财产品进一步加强监测与规范;在加强监管的前提下,继续鼓励银行金融创新．     

Market discipline, financial crisis and regulatory changes: Evidence from Indonesian banks

Following the 1997/1998 financial crisis, Indonesian banks experienced major regulatory changes, including the adoption of the blanket guarantee scheme (BGS) in 1998, a limited guarantee (LG) in 2005, and changes in capital regulation in 1998 and 2001. We examine the impact of these regulatory changes on market discipline during the period 1995-2009. The price of deposits is used to measure market discipline in a dynamic panel data methodology on a sample of 104 commercial banks. We find a weakening of market discipline following the introduction of the BGS. The result is consistent with the deposit insurance scheme being credible in the lower capital requirement environment. The adoption of LG in a recovering economy also mitigates the role of market discipline. However, market discipline is more pronounced in listed banks than unlisted banks and in foreign banks than domestic banks. These results have important implications for banking regulation and supervision, particularly during a crisis period.     

Regulate one service,tame the entire market: Credit cards in Turkey

In credit card markets banks provide both payment and credit services. Two regulations were recently enacted in the Turkish credit card market: one on payment services in 2005 and the other on credit services in 2006. By employing the well-known  and  method and a unique quarterly data set for 21 Turkish banks between 2002 and 2008, we investigate the extent of banks’ market power in the Turkish credit card market before and after the regulations. Unlike most of the existing literature, which considers competition and regulation for either credit or payment services and ignores the externalities between them, we consider the entire market by taking both services into account. Fixed effects estimations reveal that banks enjoyed collusive oligopoly power before the regulations. Although the first regulation did not have much impact, the second led to rises in both banks’ total revenues and competition in the entire market.     

资本监管对我国银行业市场竞争度的影响研究

2004年《商业银行资本充足率管理办法》颁布后，我国开始真正意义上的资本监管。统一的资本监管标准．有利于银行业市场竞争的公平性。本文通过对资本监管与银行业市场竞争度的相关性分析和Granger因果检验，探讨了资本监管对我国银行业市场竞争度的影响。结果发现，资本监管与银行业市场竞争度存在相关性，但相关系数较低，且他们之间没有明显的因果关系，我国商业银行资本监管还有待进一步的改进和完善。     

规制外资银行的法律思考

对在华外资银行进行法律规制,是我国金融法的重要内容之一,也是国家宏观调控法的组成部分.随着中国的入世和金融市场的逐步开放,外资银行大量"抢滩登陆"中国金融市场,对我国经济发展有着重要影响.为了保持金融市场经济秩序稳定与发展,有必要对在华外资银行进行法律规制.本文仅就有关我国对在华外资银行管理规定、存在的问题及法律措施或对策进行探讨,目的是为国家有关部门提供参考.     

Banking crises and market discipline: International evidence

This paper analyzes the effect of banking crises on market discipline in an international sample of banks. We also evaluate how bank regulation, supervision, institutions, and crisis intervention policies shape the effect of banking crises on market discipline. We control for unobservable bank, country, and time specific effects using a panel data set of banks from 66 countries around 79 banking crises. The results suggest that on average market discipline weakens after a banking crisis. This weakening is higher in countries where bank regulation, supervision, and institutions promoted market discipline before the banking crisis, and where a more accommodative approach is adopted to resolve it.