The Use of Noncourt‐Based Corporate Rescue: Does the Australian Voluntary Administration Procedure Provide a Model for China?

In the recent international history of insolvency law reform, the reform of corporate rescue and restructuring has been an ongoing project. In China, the enactment of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 saw the introduction of a bankruptcy reorganisation procedure that incorporates the debtor‐in‐possession model found in Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. However, the Chinese corporate rescue procedure has been significantly underused due in part to various drawbacks associated with this court‐based and highly politicalised process. This paper explores the possibility of reforming China's current corporate rescue regime by drawing upon the Australian voluntary administration procedure. Found in Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), this procedure was designed to provide a relatively swift, inexpensive and flexible corporate rescue mechanism for companies in financial distress. It comprises a noncourt based mechanism under the control of one or more professionally qualified private administrators. It is interesting to note that the UK also moved away from exclusive reliance upon court‐based administration procedures following the passage of the Enterprise Act 2002. This moved the UK closer to the Australian practitioner‐dominated approach to corporate rescue. This paper argues that the addition of a voluntary administration‐style procedure to China's current corporate rescue regime may be needed as China develops its market economy based on the rule of law. Copyright © 2017 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

Harmonisation of European Insolvency Law and the Need to Tackle Two Common Problems: Common Pool and Anticommons

Insolvency law has finally become a field of law for which harmonisation at a European level is considered both important and feasible. In deciding upon the content of such harmonised rules, there will need to be a common understanding about the goals of insolvency law and, therefore, a European debate on bankruptcy theory. Bankruptcy theory, and most notably the influential creditors' bargain theory, has long viewed insolvency law as a set of rules for overcoming common pool problems. Bankruptcy theory thus far has almost completely overlooked anticommons problems. Anticommons present themselves in a situation in which there are several owners or entitled parties, and each of the parties has it within its power to block the use by others. Should anticommons behaviour in insolvency procedures go unchecked, creditors as a whole will be harmed. Insolvency is a collective process, and this process may not be sabotaged by a single party. Four typical insolvency issues, each identified by INSOL Europe as a candidate for harmonisation at a European level, are discussed, analysing them in terms of common pool problems and anticommons: preferences, reorganisation/composition plans, claim validation and insolvency of a group of companies. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

From subordination to parity: an international comparison of equity securities law claims in insolvency proceedings

Securities law claims in insolvency proceedings raise important questions of allocation of risk and remedies. In the ordinary course of business, equity claims come last in the hierarchy of claims during insolvency. What is less clear is whether this should encompass claims arising from the violation of public statutes designed to protect equity investors. Discerning the optimal allocation of risk is a complex challenge if one is trying to maximize the simultaneous advancement of securities law and insolvency law public policy goals. From a securities law perspective, there must be confidence in meaningful remedies for capital markets violations if investors are to continue to invest. From an insolvency perspective, creditors make their pricing and credit availability choices based on certainty regarding their claims and shifting those priorities may affect the availability of credit. The critical question is the nature of the claim advanced by the securities holder and whether subordination of securities law claims gives rise to inappropriate incentives for corporate officers within the insolvency law regime. A comparative analysis reveals that the U.S. has provided a limited statutory exception to complete subordination through the fair funds provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by allowing SEC claims for penalties and disgorgement to rank equally with unsecured claims even though the funds are distributed to shareholders. The U.K. and Australian schemes permit shareholders to claim directly as unsecured creditors for fraudulent acts and misrepresentation by the issuer. In contrast, Canadian law is underdeveloped in its treatment of such claims. The paper canvasses the policy options available to reconcile securities law and insolvency law claims, including a discussion of the appropriate gatekeeping role for regulatory authorities and the courts, and the need for a framework that offers fair and expeditious resolution of such claims. If the public policy goal of both securities law and insolvency law is to foster efficient and cost-effective capital markets, it seems that the systems need to be better reconciled than currently. The paper also examines the codified response to the time and resources consumed in various common law tracing claims by customers in a securities firm insolvency. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Preference Transaction Avoidance in Ghana: Has the Liquidator's burden changed?

Financially distressed companies sometimes conceive plans to pay off certain creditors before petitioning the Court for winding up. This last‐minute payment referred to as a preference transaction puts the preferred creditor in a better position than the rest of the company's creditors because the distressed company may not have enough assets to satisfy everyone. Insolvency law frowns on such last‐minute transactions and provides the Liquidator with the power to avoid these transactions, to restore the asset to the company and distribute it to all the creditors. Preference avoidance forms an integral part of the corporate insolvency law in Ghana. These principles founded upon the common law of England are now provided for under the Bodies Corporate (Official) Liquidation Act 1963 (Act 180) of Ghana. This essay discusses preference avoidance under Ghanaian law. It also examines a recent judicial application of the law and finally suggest avenues for reform.     

The United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade: insolvency aspects

Breaking new ground, the UN Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade refers all priority conflicts with respect to receivables to the law of single and easily determinable jurisdiction, and one that is most likely going to be the insolvency jurisdiction, namely to the law of the assignor's place of business or, in the case of places of business in more than one State, the assignor's central administration. In the case of an insolvency proceeding in another jurisdiction, the mandatory rules of that juridiction displace any priority rule of the law of the assignor's location only if that priority rule is manifestly contrary to the public policy of that jurisdiction. In such a case, the balance of the priority rules of the law of the assignor's location prevails over the priority rules of the insolvency jurisdiction with the exception of rules relating to preferential rights. In any case, the Convention ensures that priority rules do not interfere with basic insolvency rights, such as those relating to stays, avoidance actions and to the performance of contracts or maintenance of the estate. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effectiveness and efficiency of corporate insolvency law—part two

Little empirical research has been done in the Netherlands (or internationally) into the effect of corporate insolvency proceedings. The Dutch legislature has made several attempts in the past decades to revise the current Dutch Bankruptcy Act (Faillissementswet) of 1893, while almost nothing is known about the effectiveness and efficiency of the Dutch corporate insolvency law. I have studied the effectiveness of the current Dutch insolvency law and of European Directive 2001/23/EC which is incorporated in this law, on the basis of theoretical and large‐scale empirical research. The study concerned all 4167 of the corporate insolvencies that ended in 2004. In the first part of this Article (International Insolvency Review, Volume 17, 3, Winter 2008, pp. 189–209), the research results showed that the Dutch Bankruptcy Act achieved the goals set on it only to a limited degree and that the informal restructuring procedure is of great social importance. In this second part, I concentrate on the conditions imposed by European Directive 2001/23/EC on the European national legislatures to protect employees' rights: automatic transfer of employment contracts in the event of transfers as part of insolvency proceedings, together with measures to prevent misuse of insolvency proceedings in such a way as to deprive employees of the rights provided for in this European Directive. The study shows that, in the Netherlands, not applying automatic transfer of employment contracts when an undertaking or business is transferred as part of an insolvency proceeding does not result in large‐scale misuse of insolvency law. It appears that automatic transfer of employment contracts outside insolvency proceedings can actually impede the informal restructuring of financially unsound companies. These surprising results are interesting for corporate insolvency proceedings worldwide. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

非高管股权激励与企业创新:公平理论视角

股权激励管理办法允许上市公司通过股权激励计划对部分非高管员工进行股权激励,但设定激励对象等方面的有关规定对企业的影响却鲜有研究关注。本文从公平理论视角分析我国非高管员工股权激励对上市公司创新的影响,并依据中国上市公司股权激励计划与专利数据实证检验了非高管员工股权激励有效性假说与不公平假说。研究发现,总体上我国股权激励计划能够显著促进企业创新,但非激励员工因薪酬不公平而产生的消极行为在一定程度上削弱了股权激励计划的激励效果。具体而言,在国有控股上市公司以及激励与非激励员工收入差距小的上市公司中,非高管股权激励弱化企业创新的影响明显小于其他公司;而在非高管员工覆盖比例较高的公司中,非高管股权激励计划弱化企业创新的影响不存在。因此适当提高员工股权激励覆盖的范围可以减少激励员工与非激励员工之间因激励错配导致的薪酬不公平问题,有助于提升我国上市公司股权激励计划的创新激励效果。     

Cross-border insolvency law in India: Are the principles of comity of courts and inherent common law jurisdiction relevant?

Deliberations are in the final stages for enacting a cross-border insolvency law in India based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency 1997 (‘Model Law’). The cross-border insolvency regime in India will provide an avenue for recognising foreign insolvency proceedings in India. Although it is a matter of time before India adopts the Model Law, it is important to examine whether there remains an independent basis in addition to the Model Law for recognising and providing assistance to cross-border insolvency proceedings in India. This is crucial on account of the following reasons: first, the Model Law does not provide that it is the exclusive pathway for foreign creditors to seek remedies under domestic law. The Model Law, as reflected in Article 7, was intended by its drafters to be an additional gateway to those provided under local laws. The proposed Indian law in Article 5 of Draft Part Z of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 also does not depart expressly from this principle. Second, there may be instances where neither the ‘Centre of Main Interests’ nor an establishment of a corporate debtor is situated in India; therefore, assistance and cooperation in respect of such cross-border insolvency proceeding can only be based on the inherent common law jurisdiction, if available. Third, the cross-border insolvency framework in India will be premised on the requirement for reciprocity and, therefore, countries that do not meet the reciprocity requirement may find it beneficial if such an independent basis for recognition exists in India. This article argues that foreign representatives should be encouraged to explore the possibility of seeking assistance from the commercial courts in India under the common law principles governing cross-border insolvency and that the courts in India should be open to this possibility.     

Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy

In this testimony to the House Ways and Means Committee on February 1, 1989 (when LBOs and other highly leveraged transactions were under fierce attack by politicians and the media), the author identified “LBO associations” such as KKR and Forstmann Little as a valuable innovation in organizational form—a new model of management and governance that was competing directly with the headquarters of large public corporations, especially conglomerates. In the author's words, LBOs “substitute incentives provided by compensation and ownership plans for the direct monitoring and often centralized decision-making in the typical corporate bureaucracy.” In illustrating his point, the author noted that whereas the CEOs of U.S. companies during the '70s and '80s saw their personal wealth go up by only about $3 for every $1,000 increase in firm value, the average CEO in an LBO experienced a change of $64 per $1,000—and for the partners of the LBO firm, the closest equivalent to a conglomerate CEO, the change was about $200 per $1,000. Based on the performance of the first wave of LBOs to return to public ownership, such dramatic concentrations of equity ownership appear to have produced large gains in operating efficiency. (And since the author's testimony, these findings have been confirmed by subsequent studies of later periods and in other countries.) The heavy debt loads in these transactions, besides making possible the concentration of equity ownership, also perform an important control function, intensifying the search for efficiencies and discouraging reinvestment in low-return projects. For those LBOs that have trouble servicing their debt loads, the author argues that the costs of insolvency should turn out to be significantly lower than for traditional public companies because LBOs provide strong incentives to keep the process of reorganizing troubled companies out of the bankruptcy court (a prediction that, although proving wrong in the early‘90s, has turned out to be true of the most recent wave of private equity deals).     

Allocating Shareholder Capital to Pension Plans

This article discusses the corporate challenge of providing retirement income to employees while limiting the costs and risks of pension plans to the companies themselves by addressing five main questions:

• ? What are the major issues and challenges surrounding pensions? Although the pension shortfalls have been the focus of attention, the author argues that the more serious concern is the risk stemming from the mismatch between pension assets and pension liabilities— that is, the funding of debt‐like liabilities with equity‐heavy asset portfolios.
• ? To what extent do the equity market and equity prices reflect the shortfall in value and the mismatch in risk? While the author describes some evidence of the market's ability to capture pension risk, analysts' P/E multiples and management's assessments of cost of capital may still be distorted by failure to take full account of the risks associated with pension assets.
• ? How should management analyze and formulate strategic solutions? Without offering specific solutions, the author presents a framework for analyzing the problem from a strategic perspective that can be used in formulating a company's pension policy. In particular, the article recommends that companies take an integrated perspective that views pension assets and liabilities as parts of the corporate balance sheet, and the pension asset allocation decision as a critical aspect of a corporate‐wide enterprise risk management program.
• ? If a company chooses to make a major change in its pension policy, such as a partial or complete immunization accomplished by substituting bonds for stocks, how would you communicate the new policy to the rating agencies and investors?
• ? What are the major issues to be thinking about when contemplating a change from a DB plan to a defined contribution, or DC, plan? The author argues that DC plans without some corporate oversight or responsibility for results are not a long‐term solution.

     

Paradigm shift from a liquidation culture to a corporate rescue culture in Malaysia: A legal review

The company law landscape in Malaysia has witnessed a significant change in its insolvency law with the adoption of two new corporate rescue mechanisms, the corporate voluntary arrangement and judicial management under the Companies Act 2016 (CA 2016), which has repealed the Companies Act 1965 (CA 1965). Previously, the insolvency laws under the CA 1965 were based on the traditional pro‐creditor laws of winding up and receivership, which embodied the liquidation culture. This article examines the transition of the insolvency laws in Malaysia from a liquidation culture under the CA 1965 to a corporate rescue culture under the CA 2016. It also reviews the necessary changes to the pro‐creditor laws, which are preserved under the CA 2016 in order to accommodate the pro‐debtor laws with the introduction of the corporate rescue mechanisms, which came into force on March 1, 2018. Through comparative and critical analysis of similar laws in the United Kingdom and Singapore, this article argues that while the corporate rescue mechanisms are regarded as pro‐debtor however the review reveals that the position of secured creditors are impeding its application and reforms ought to be considered.     

Comment on: “When does a central bank’s balance sheet require fiscal support?” by Marco Del Negro and Christopher A. Sims

A central bank is insolvent if its plans imply a Ponzi scheme on reserves so the price level becomes infinity. If the central bank enjoys fiscal support, in the form of a dividend rule that pays out net income every period, including when it is negative, it can never become insolvent independently of the fiscal authority. Otherwise, this note distinguishes between intertemporal insolvency, rule insolvency, and period insolvency. While period and rule solvency depend on analyzing dividend rules and sources of risk to net income, evaluating intertemporal solvency requires overcoming the difficult challenge of measuring the present value of seignorage.     

Reconsidering Procedural Consolidation for Multinational Corporate Groups in the Context of the Recast European Insolvency Regulation

Procedural consolidation, as a solution to the rescue of insolvent multinational corporate groups (‘MCGs’), is said to be able to preserve group value for creditors. This article explores the desirability of procedural consolidation in the EU in the light of theories of corporate rescue law, cross‐border insolvency law, multinational enterprises and relevant EU cases with reference to the European Insolvency Regulation. It argues that, based on current cross‐border insolvency rules in the EU, there is an inherent difficulty for procedural consolidation in balancing the goal of preservation of group value and the goal of certainty. The article also considers the new ‘group procedural coordination proceedings’ offered by the Recast European Insolvency Regulation and argues that it may help to supplement the gap left by the procedural consolidation in the EU. Copyright © 2017 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A comparative analysis of the Australian and New Zealand liquidation schemes

On September 28, 2022, Australia announced an inquiry into the effectiveness of its corporate insolvency laws. The Australia and New Zealand corporate insolvency frameworks have similar objectives and operate in a similar context where, as is the case the world over, most companies are small to medium enterprises. Despite liquidation being just one of several collective and formal corporate insolvency procedures, it is the most frequently occurring procedure in both countries by a large margin. The Australian and New Zealand liquidation schemes have many similarities but also some key differences. Differences include the structure of the respective schemes; the levers prompting liquidation of companies in appropriate circumstances; the role of creditors, the court and the regulator; and the management of low-value and assetless liquidations. These differences are analysed to determine what, if anything, the New Zealand scheme might contribute to development and/or reform of Australian corporate insolvency law. As consistency and coordination with Australian insolvency law is a New Zealand policy aim, the lessons the Australian scheme might have for New Zealand are also considered. Many of the points on which the Australian and New Zealand liquidation schemes differ are of universal concern (such as the management of low-value liquidations), meaning that the nature and success (or otherwise) of the Australian and New Zealand responses are of wider, comparative interest.     

A Glimpse into the Future: Cross‐border Judicial Cooperation in Insolvency Cases in the European Union

After 2 years of study, discussion and consultation, in February 2015, the EU Cross‐Border Insolvency Court‐to‐Court Cooperation Principles were published. The EU Cross‐Border Insolvency Court‐to‐Court Cooperation Principles (‘EU JudgeCo Principles’) contain 26 principles. The EU JudgeCo Principles aim to strengthen efficient and effective communication between courts in EU Member States in insolvency cases with cross‐border effects. The EU JudgeCo Principles, in short, include principles on their non‐binding status and their objectives, case management of courts and the equal treatment of creditors, and principles about the judicial decisions itself, on the reasoning and for instance on providing a stay or moratorium. Several principles relate to the course of the proceedings, such as notifications and authentication of documents, and the last principles concern the outcome of judicial cooperation, for instance, cross‐border sales, assistance to a reorganisation or rules for binding creditors to an international reorganisation plan. The Principles include 18 EU Cross‐Border Insolvency Court‐to‐Court Communications Guidelines (‘EU JudgeCo Guidelines’). These EU JudgeCo Guidelines aim to facilitate communications in practice, in individual cross‐border cases. The EU JudgeCo Principles try to overcome present obstacles for courts in EU Member States such as formalistic and detailed national procedural law, concerns about a judge's impartiality, uneasiness with the use of certain legal concepts and terms, and, evidently, language. Presently, court‐to‐court communication between judges in insolvency matters in the EU, especially on the continent, is limited to only a few cases. In the near future, judicial cooperation and communication will be a cornerstone in the efficient and effective administration of insolvency cases within the EU. The EU JudgeCo Principles will then certainly serve as a significant guide. Copyright © 2015 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

Liquidity,the Value of the Firm,and Corporate Finance*

The theory of corporate finance has been based on the idea that a company's market value is determined mainly by just two variables: the company's expected aftertax operating cash flows or earnings, and the risk associated with producing them. The authors argue that there is another important factor affecting a company's value: the liquidity of its own securities, debt as well as equity. The paper supports this argument by reviewing the large and growing body of evidence showing that differences—and, perhaps even more important, sudden changes—in liquidity can have major effects on the pricing of corporate stocks and bonds or, equivalently, on investors' required returns for holding them. The authors also suggest that the liquidity of a company's securities can be managed by corporate policies and actions. For those companies whose value is likely to be increased by having more liquid securities—which is by no means true of all companies (for example, mature firms with little need for outside equity are likely to benefit from having more concentrated ownership and hence less liquidity)—management should consider actions such as reducing leverage and substituting dividends for stock repurchases as well as measures designed to increase the effectiveness of their disclosure and investor relations program and the size of their retail investor base.     

Corporate pension funding policy

What policy should a corporation adopt concerning the funding of a defined-benefit pension plan and the investment of the assets held in trust for the plan? Until recently, pension plans did not have to be insured, and some risk could be borne by intended beneficiaries. Federal legislation has now mandated such coverage. This paper analyzes corporate policy under three conditions which correspond, roughly, to the earlier situation (‘uninsure’ loans), the current situation (‘partially insured’ loans), and the situation required by law to be implemented in the future (‘completely insured’ plans). We show that if insurance premiums are set correctly, corporate policy in this area may not matter; otherwise the optimal policy may simply be that which maximizes the difference between the value of the insurance and its cost.     

Corporate assets as a trust: for whom are corporate officers trustees in insolvency? the role of incentives in maintaining the trust

Uncertainty is a constant theme when corporations are in financial distress. Yet any successful restructuring of an insolvent corporation requires numerous stakeholders, including creditors, employees and suppliers, repose some degree of trust in those corporate officers who are trying to continue to operate the firm while restructuring it into a viable entity. This article looks at the issue of the positive and negative incentives that can be generated for corporate officers and directors from both their continuing control of corporate assets and their potential personal liability arising from corporate activity both before and after the corporation became insolvent. The potential role these incentives can play in providing a basis for the trust needed to meet the other governance challenges that arise in a restructuring is reviewed in the context of recent developments in Canada concerning the duties of corporate directors to creditors during insolvency. Also reviewed is the role of directors' insurance and indemnification in altering the incentives' effects on directors' behavior. Finally a critical appraisal is given of the present legal regime's provision for compromise of claims against corporate officers during restructuring, as well as the proposal to amend the law to allow complete exoneration of corporate directors from certain liabilities on insolvency. The article urges caution in altering the effects of incentives that may create the necessary basis for trust in the distressed corporation's officers amongst those stakeholders whose co‐operation is crucial to restructuring. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Morgan Stanley Roundtable on Capital Structure and Payout Policy

A group of finance academics and practitioners discusses a number of topical issues in corporate financial management: Is there such a thing as an optimal, or value‐maximizing, capital structure for a given company? What proportion of a firm's current earnings should be distributed to the firm's shareholders? And under what circumstances should such distributions take the form of stock repurchases rather than dividends? The consensus that emerged was that a company's financing and payout policies should be designed to support its business strategy. For growth companies, the emphasis is on preserving financial fl exibility to carry out the business plan, which means heavy reliance on equity financing and limited payouts. But for companies in mature industries with few major investment opportunities, more aggressive use of debt and higher payouts can add value by reducing taxes and controlling the corporate “free cash flow problem.” Both leveraged financing and cash distributions through dividends and stock buybacks represent a commitment by management to shareholders that the firm's excess cash will not be wasted on projects that produce growth at the expense of profitability. As for the choice between dividends and stock repurchases, dividends appear to provide a stronger commitment to pay out excess cash than open market repurchase programs. Stock buybacks, at least of the open market variety, preserve a higher degree of managerial fl exibility for companies that want to be able to capitalize on unpredictable investment opportunities. But, as with the debt‐equity decision, there is an optimal level of financial fl exibility; too little can mean lost investment opportunities but too much can lead to overinvestment.     

Predicting Returns with Managerial Decision Variables: Is There a Small‐Sample Bias?

Many studies find that aggregate managerial decision variables, such as aggregate equity issuance, predict stock or bond market returns. Recent research argues that these findings may be driven by an aggregate time‐series version of Schultz's (2003, Journal of Finance 58, 483–517) pseudo market‐timing bias. Using standard simulation techniques, we find that the bias is much too small to account for the observed predictive power of the equity share in new issues, corporate investment plans, insider trading, dividend initiations, or the maturity of corporate debt issues.