创业企业股票期权激励研究

本文根据股票期权的理论、方法,结合我国创业企业的背景和特点,探讨股票期权激励在我国创业企业中的实际应用。文章具体研究了创业公司股权激励的可行性、股权激励的作用,从股票期权的制度原则、激励对象、行权方式、授予时机选择、退出机制等条款的制订方面来设计股票期权激励方案。文章最后分析了股权激励为创业公司带来的风险,提出了适合我国创业企业的股票期权激励方案和注意点。     

中国上市公司股票期权激励效应的影响因素研究

作为一种激励制度,股票期权是在二十世纪中叶出现的,其可以有效地解决企业委托代理的问题。随着我国股权分置改革的进行以及2006年《上市公司股权激励管理办法》的实施,我国上市公司股权激励的制度环境得到了一定的改善,资本市场也越来越完善,这又在一定程度上促进了我国上市公司实施股权激励的制度,但是,与西方国家相比,我们还是有一定差距的,因此,本文首先对股票期权激励作用机制的理论进行了分析,然后分析了实施股票期权激励对公司业绩的影响,最后,在此基础之上,对我国股票期权激励效应的影响因素进行了分析。     

股票期权激励方式下的财税处理分析

目前,越来越多的企业开始注重股权激励机制在企业管理中的研究和应用。企业开展股票期权激励,在会计核算上,应遵循企业会计准则;在方案的设计与实施上,要符合国家相关股权激励办法的规定;在税务处理上,应当依照国家相关税收法规执行。各种法规制度规范要素和侧重点的不同,使得股权激励在财税处理上较为复杂。本文主要对企业股票期权实施过程中的财税处理进行了相关的分析。     

股权激励机制的利与弊

从股权激励制度的产生来看,就是源于财务筹划的合法避税。20世纪90年代之后,在美国等发达国家的企业中,尤其在大企业中,股票期权成为高级管理人员报酬的最重要组成部分。对股权激励制度的优点我们可以列出许多,如引入股权激励可以减少代理成本,提高员工的生产效率。合适的财务薪酬是激励经营者的必要条件,财务薪酬制度必须包含长期激励的成份,而股权激励可以提供多种形式的长期激励。对股权激励制度我们同样可以列出诸多缺点,如股权激励制度与企业经营绩效并非完全正相关。国外经济学界对股票期权的激励效果的认识从一开始就存在较大的分歧…     

股票期权费用化与我国期权激励问题

股票期权是公司采取的长期激励手段,但是它的出现却引发了一系列的会计丑闻。于是准则制定者推出了股票期权费用化。本文通过期权计划的正面效应和负面效应来解释股票期权计划的激励功效及其不足,得出期权费用化是针对股票期权激励的约束机制,其存在具有重要的意义。我国只有股权激励的试点,但没有正式的期权制度。本文从我国股权激励以及06年颁布的新的会计准则来分析我国在期权计划执行上与外国存在的差距,以及我国会计准则与外国准则不断趋同。     

"后危机时代"我国上市国企实施股票期权激励势在必然

股权激励制度作为一种长期的激励手段,在国外的上市公司中得到了普遍的运用.本文详细阐述了我国企业股票期权和股份激励制度的理论与实践,针对国企实施股票期权激励制度应考虑的问题,提出了一些相关性的建议.     

上市公司股票期权激励模式研究

股票期权计划是国际上经典的、使用最为广泛的股权激励模式,我国越来越多的上市公司正在运用这一模式激励公司的管理者。但是,股票期权要求公司的业绩与公司股票价格正相关,而我国股票市场是新兴证券市场,上市公司的股票价格与上市公司的业绩并非高度相关。这导致了上市公司不能实施股票期权激励计划,出现了市场价格低于行权价格而不能行权的问题。本文针对这一问题,通过较为深入分析和研究,提出了适合新兴证券市场的股票期权激励模式,这对股票期权激励模式理论的完善和发展,对我国上市公司股权激励计划的实施,具有十分重要的现实意义。     

限制性股票、激励性股票对薪酬制度选择的影响分析

限制性股票期权与激励性股票期权在授权价格和行权价格、受赠股份的数量、收益大小、风险大小、员工投资程度以及税收待遇等上存在差别。不同的企业在薪酬制度中都会选择适合本企业的股票期权。选择适合企业目标的薪酬制度不仅有利于激励员工,更能帮助企业留住人才。因此,选择适合的股权激励方案就成为企业薪酬制定的重中之重。但是不同层次的员工,需求也不相同。这就要求企业应该对不同层次的员工,提出不同的股权激励方案。     

公司股权激励(股票期权)对公司业绩的影响

股权激励对公司业绩的影响,即股权激励是否会给公司的业绩和带来明显改变。本文将试图通过回归来验证股权激励(股票期权)规模与公司业绩存在正相关的关系和实施股权激励(股票期权)与公司短期股价波动存在正相关的关系这两个假设。     

《股份支付》会计准则与上市公司股权激励——以中捷股份股权激励方案为例

股权激励是指上市公司以本公司股票为标的,对其董事、监事、高级管理人员及其他员工进行的长期性激励。股权激励方式中最传统的是股票期权激励,在股票期权方式上衍生出来的有限制性股票、股票增值权、业绩股票等长期激励方式。2006年2月,中国财政部推出了新的会计准则,其中增加了《股份支付》准则,对国内公司股权激励的相关会计处理作了明确的规定。新会计准则对股权激励会计处理主要是与国际会计准则中《国际财务报告准则第2号—以股份为基础的支付》以及美国2004年12月新修订的准则比较类似,要求对股权计算公允价值,然后以费用的形式计入到利润表中,这一会计处理原则将对上市公司的股权激励产生重要影响。     

股权结构、公司规模与公司绩效——基于公司成长性的差异化分析

本文将2007年642家上市公司分为股权集中组、股权制衡组和股权分散组，对三组样本进行描述性分析和差异性检验，发现股权集中类公司的经营绩效优于股权分散类公司，股权制衡类公司的经营绩效也优于股权分散类公司．而股权集中类公司与股权制衡类公司的经营绩效没有显著的差别。为了考察股权集中度、股权制衡及公司规模对成长类公司绩效的影响，本文构建三个MMR模型。结果显示，成长类公司可以通过提高股权集中程度和控制公司规模来提高公司经营业绩；成长类公司的经营业绩优于非成长类公司；较高的股权集中度是成长类公司经营绩效较好的原因：通过控制公司规模，成长性公司可以获得更好的经营绩效。同时发现股权集中度与公司经营绩效不存在二次非线性关系．公司规模与公司经营绩效存在倒U型二次关系。     

Ironing out the kinks in executive compensation: Linking incentive pay to average stock prices

Traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation. Applying a principal-agent analysis, we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices. Among other benefits, averaging reduces volatility by about 42%, making the incentive pay more attractive to risk-averse executives. Holding the cost of the option grant to the firm constant, Asian stock options are more cost effective than traditional stock options and provide stronger incentives to increase stock price. More importantly, the improvement is achieved with little impact on the option grant’s risk incentives (after adjusting for option cost). Finally, averaging also improves the value and incentive effects of indexed stock options.     

Too much of a good incentive? The case of executive stock options

Using a utility-maximization framework, I show that the incentive to increase stock price does not always increase as more options are granted. Keeping the total cost of his compensation fixed, granting more options creates greater incentives to increase stock price only if option wealth does not exceed a certain fraction of total wealth. Beyond this critical level, granting more options actually reduces incentive effects and becomes counterproductive. In addition, stock options also create incentive to reduce (increase) idiosyncratic (systematic) risk. These incentive effects are sensitive to the choice of exercise price.     

CEO Stock Options and Equity Risk Incentives

Abstract:   We test the hypothesis that the risk incentive effects of CEO stock option grants motivate managers to take on more risk than they would otherwise. Using a sample of mergers we document that the ratio of post‐ to pre‐merger stock return variance is positively related to the risk incentive effect of CEO stock option compensation but this relationship is conditioned on firm size, with firm size having a moderating effect on the risk incentive effect of stock options. Using a broader time‐series cross‐sectional sample of firms we find a strong positive relationship between CEO risk incentive embedded in the stock options and subsequent equity return volatility. As in the case of the merger sample, this relationship is stronger for smaller firms.     

股票期权的个人所得税问题探讨

股票期权制度是一种新型的薪酬激励制度。股票期权制度作为富有成效的激励制度之一，在发达国家得到了广泛的应用，已成为市场经济国家和地区的企业对员工进行长期激励的非常普遍的方式。近两年来，股票期权成为我国企业改革和发展的一个热门话题，并在部分企业开始实施。如何针对股票期权所得的特点，并借鉴国外经验，制定相应的税收政策，是我们迫切需要解决的问题。本对我国股票期权所得税目、纳税义务发生时间、计税依据、税收优惠及税收征管等作了较为详细的探讨。     

中国影子银行发展趋势与展望

在多角度界定影子银行的基础上,总结中国影子银行的主要特征,即处于初期发展阶段、杠杆率相对较低、主体独立性低、金融创新活跃地带。从欧美国家影子银行发展实践来看,中国影子银行是金融体制过渡性的产物,代表了未来金融创新的方向,其发展趋势主要包括：业务发展：由银行表外业务向资产证券化业务转变;运作模式：由＂一对一＂对接向＂多对多＂对接转变;融资结构：由非标债权融资向标准化债权融资转变;体系构成：由商业银行为主向非银行金融机构为主转变;监管动向：由机构监管向机构监管与功能监管相结合转变。     

Financial crisis and bank executive incentive compensation

We study the executive compensation structure in 14 of the largest U.S. financial institutions during 2000–2008. We focus on the CEO's purchases and sales of their bank's stock, their salary and bonus, and the capital losses these CEOs incur due to the dramatic share price declines in 2008. We consider three measures of risk-taking by these banks. Our results are mostly consistent with and supportive of the findings of Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann (2010), that is, managerial incentives matter — incentives generated by executive compensation programs are correlated with excessive risk-taking by banks. Also, our results are generally not supportive of the conclusions of Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) that the poor performance of banks during the crisis was the result of unforeseen risk. We recommend that bank executive incentive compensation should only consist of restricted stock and restricted stock options — restricted in the sense that the executive cannot sell the shares or exercise the options for two to four years after their last day in office. The above incentive compensation proposal logically leads to a complementary proposal regarding a bank's capital structure, namely, banks should be financed with considerably more equity than they are being financed currently.     

The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting

This paper examines the effect of CEO compensation contracts on misreporting. We find that the sensitivity of the CEO's option portfolio to stock price is significantly positively related to the propensity to misreport. We do not find that the sensitivity of other components of CEO compensation, i.e., equity, restricted stock, long-term incentive payouts, and salary plus bonus have any significant impact on the propensity to misreport. Relative to other components of compensation, stock options are associated with stronger incentives to misreport because convexity in CEO wealth introduced by stock options limits the downside risk on detection of the misreporting.     

期权激励与企业并购行为

本文以2006年至2015年我国上市公司为研究对象,考察了期权激励对企业并购行为的影响。研究发现:授予高管的期权激励显著提升了企业发起并购的可能性和并购规模。缓解代理问题和提升风险承担是潜在的作用渠道。进一步研究表明,激励对象异质性会影响期权激励的效果,期权激励对企业并购倾向和并购规模的提升作用在管理者年龄较高、管理者任期较长以及管理者相对薪酬水平较低的企业中更加明显。此外,期权激励对企业并购行为的影响在非国有企业中更加突出。最后,本文还发现期权激励提升了企业并购的财务业绩。本文的研究不仅丰富了有关期权激励效果方面的文献,而且对于理解企业并购行为具有一定的参考意义。     

The impact of the market portfolio on the valuation,incentives and optimality of executive stock options

This paper examines the effect on valuation and incentives of allowing executives receiving options to trade on the market portfolio. We propose a continuous time utility maximization model to value stock and option compensation from the executive's perspective. The executive may invest non-option wealth in the market and riskless asset but not in the company stock itself, leaving them subject to firm-specific risk for incentive?purposes. Since the executive is risk averse, this unhedgeable firm risk leads them to place less value on the options than their cost to the company.

By distinguishing between these two types of risks, we are able to examine the effect of stock volatility, firm-specific risk and market risk on the value to the executive. In particular, options do not give incentive to increase total risk, but rather to increase the proportion of market relative to firm-specific risk, so executives prefer high beta companies. The paper also examines the relationship between risk and incentives, and finds firm-specific risk decreases incentives whilst market risk may decrease incentives depending on other parameters. The model supports the use of stock rather than options if the company can adjust cash pay when granting stock-based compensation.