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1.
Our paper examines whether audit quality is higher for industry audit specialists at the national and city‐office levels using the framework developed in Ferguson et al. [2003] and Francis et al. [2005] . We find that auditors who are both national and city‐specific industry specialists have clients with the lowest abnormal accruals, suggesting that joint national and city‐specific industry specialists have the highest audit quality. In addition, we find some evidence that abnormal accruals of firms audited by city‐industry specialists alone (without also being national specific industry specialists) are lower than those audited by nonindustry specialists. Using alternative measures of audit quality, we find that when the auditor is both a national and a city‐specific industry specialist, its clients are less likely to meet or beat analysts' earnings forecasts by one penny per share and more likely to be issued a going‐concern audit opinion. Together these results provide consistent evidence that audit quality is higher when the auditor is both a national and city‐specific industry specialist, suggesting that auditors' national positive network synergies and the individual auditors' deep industry knowledge at the office level are jointly important factors in delivering higher audit quality.  相似文献   

2.
The outsourcing of public‐sector audits to the private sector is an important issue. This study examines the fee premium in the public sector by comparing audit fees between the government auditor and the Big5. The study (i) statistically adjusts for self‐selection bias, (ii) allows the slope coefficients in the audit fee model to vary between the Big5 and the government audit and (iii) estimates the counterfactual audit fee premium. The Big5 premium is around 23 percent. However, the variation in premium depends on whether the Big5 auditor is an industry or city specialist.  相似文献   

3.
Several studies report an audit fee premium for auditor industry expertise measured at the office level. We extend this line of research by examining whether there is a fee premium for auditor industry expertise measured at the partner level. Using Australian data, we show that the coefficient for partner-level industry expertise is highly significant and economically important. This is consistent with industry knowledge or expertise residing in the human capital of individual engagement partners. Inconsistent with prior research, we show that there is no auditor industry expertise fee premium at the audit office level when partner-level expertise is controlled for. Consistent with prior research, we find little evidence of a fee premium at the national level. The results suggest that the auditor industry expertise fee premium is mainly a partner-level phenomenon, casting doubt on the belief that industry knowledge or expertise is distributed across engagement partners within an audit office.  相似文献   

4.
审计收费是对事务所的审计师团队努力的回报,而审计师团队有多种不同重要程度的属性,因此有必要把会计事务所作为一个拥有多个属性重要性的系统,具体考察其对于审计收费的影响。本文根据中国注册会计师协会年度会计师事务所综合评价前百家信息,具体考察了会计事务所的属性重要性对审计收费的影响。研究表明,事务所中的CPA的教育结构、CPA的经验(年龄)结构和事务所综合规模对审计收费具有显著正向影响。事务所其他属性与审计收费未发现存在显著相关性。  相似文献   

5.
Using unique data on audit hours from China, this paper investigates the effort-saving effect of the audit committee–auditor interlocking (AClk). We find that AClk is negatively associated with audit effort without any deterioration in audit quality. The results suggest that AClk has an effort-saving effect through information sharing between interlocked audit committee members and auditors. However, auditors retain the effort-saving benefits of AClk without sharing them with their client firms. Further analysis shows that the effort-saving effect of AClk is more pronounced for client firms whose auditors have industry expertise, for client firms that share the same individual auditor, or for client firms that share audit committee members with financial expertise.  相似文献   

6.
The purpose of this paper is to model and test the audit quality provided to local governments in England and Wales. A key question is: are there major differences in audit quality provided? The Audit Commission, a national public body under Parliament, regulates the audits. It sets audit standards, appoints the auditors, and (although each auditor and client local government set the specific audit fee for that client) it establishes a formula to determine standard audit fees. The Audit Commission also conducts an annual review of the audit quality provided by the selected auditors, as well as a survey of client satisfaction. The majority of audits are conducted by District Auditors (public sector employees of the Audit Commission). About a quarter of local governments are audited by one of six private sector auditors (including three of the Big 4). Actual results indicate that audit quality differences are associated with the number of governmental audit clients and local government type. Generally, there were modest quality differences by auditor category.  相似文献   

7.
We examine whether auditor independence is affected by the amount spent on non‐audit services. Faster growth in non‐audit fees and longer time periods over which non‐audit services are purchased might reduce the auditor's independence from that client. Our results do not provide any support for a relationship between non‐audit fee growth rates or the length of time of the non‐audit fee relationship with the client and discretionary accruals, our measure of earnings management. We do find some evidence that the interaction of the non‐audit fee time‐period measures and client importance is positive and significantly related to discretionary accruals.  相似文献   

8.
This research note examines the impact of client size on the estimation of audit fee premiums in the Australian market for audit services. Previous research suggests that higher audit fees are expected for both larger clients and for industry specialization. We find that in the Australian market for audit services, the fee premium attributed to industry specialist audit firms is concentrated in the audit fees paid by the largest clients in each industry. One reason for higher fees paid by larger clients is the demand for additional audit services. We find higher fees for companies cross‐listed on US exchanges. We also find that fee premiums to auditors that are city‐industry leaders are strongly related to client size.  相似文献   

9.
This study investigates the relation between audit firm tenure and clients’ financial restatements. Specifically, we extend the audit tenure literature by assessing restatement-based reporting failures using dimensions of auditor expertise and independence previously assumed to underlie short and long audit tenure problems. Short tenure expertise and independence effects are hypothesized using audit firm industry specialization and audit fees as proxies. Long tenure independence effects are hypothesized using nonaudit fees as a proxy. Using matched-sample logistic regression and 382 companies with and without financial restatements during 2000–2004, the results support prior findings by indicating a negative relation between the length of the auditor–client relationship and the likelihood of restatement. For short tenure engagements, we find that auditor industry specialization and audit fees are negatively related to the likelihood of restatement. This result is consistent with concerns about reduced audit quality due to a lack of client-specific knowledge and low audit fees on new audit engagements. Alternatively, the long tenure results indicate an insignificant relation between nonaudit fees and the likelihood of restatement. This finding contradicts independence concerns about nonaudit fees paid to entrenched auditors.  相似文献   

10.
The objective of this article is to revisit the literature on Big‐N audit fee premiums in the municipal setting using a methodology that controls for self‐selection bias. Because auditor choices can be predicted based on certain client characteristics, using standard one‐stage ordinary least squares regressions to draw inferences about the presence or absence of such a premium in the extant public‐sector audit fee studies may not be appropriate. Results indicate that, after controlling for a self‐selection bias, Big‐6 (non‐Big‐6) municipal clients on average pay a fee premium, compared to the case if they were to retain a non‐Big‐6 (Big‐6) auditor. Results continue to hold when we conduct further analyses on a subset of municipalities with access to both Big‐6 and non‐Big‐6 auditors in a local market defined by a 60‐km radius, rather than over a province‐wide audit market. The existence of non‐Big‐6 audit fee premiums has not been documented previously in the private‐ or public‐sector audit fee literature. We surmise that it may be caused by the dominance (79.4 percent) of non‐Big‐6 auditors in the Ontario municipal market, compared to most private‐sector audit markets where their market share generally does not exceed 20 percent. The strong market position of non‐Big‐6 firms in turn may have allowed these auditors to command a fee premium for the subset of municipalities that self‐selects to be audited by them. An implication from our study is that Ontario municipalities often choose to be audited by more costly auditors, even though they could have paid lower audit fees by switching to an alternative auditor type. These results do not support those reported by Chaney et al. (2004) , who find that U.K. private firms are audited by the least costly auditor type. The conflicting findings may be attributable to the fact that the Ontario municipal audit market is subject to regulation by not just the audit profession but also the Ontario government and that, unlike business corporations, municipalities receive funding from provincial governments to fulfil much of their financial requirements. Thus, municipal clients may be relatively more willing to accept higher audit fees provided their chosen auditor (or auditor type) matches their needs.  相似文献   

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