零售商信息分享影响延保服务供应链产品定价及服务质量决策机理探讨

当零售商与生产商分享需求预测信息时,对延保服务供应链的产品定价、服务定价和服务质量决策均产生影响,但现有文献尚未涉及有关零售商信息分享对延保服务供应链成员企业定价及服务质量决策的影响机理。笔者依据主从博弈理论,通过建立延保服务供应链分别采用集中决策与分散决策两种模式、零售商进行信息分享或不分享情形下的决策模型,对不同决策模式下延保服务供应链成员的均衡产品价格高低、延保服务价格高低及延保服务质量优劣之对比分析,探讨零售商与生产商进行需求信息分享对延保服务供应链成员的产品价格、延保服务价格及延保服务质量决策的影响机理。研究发现：随着消费者的延保服务质量敏感性提高、价格敏感性降低及延保服务成本系数减小,集中决策模式下需求信息分享使得延保服务供应链整体利润提升的额度增大;分散决策模式下,若零售商对市场需求的预测值大于市场需求的均值,信息分享使得产品批发价及零售价、延保服务批发价及质量均提高。本研究揭示了需求信息分享对延保服务供应链成员定价及延保服务质量决策的影响机理,丰富了延保服务供应链运营决策研究的现有文献,为合理运用需求预测信息优化延保服务供应链运营决策提供了理论依据。     

创新驱动下商誉投资与动态产品创新决策

为探讨创新驱动下企业商誉与产品创新动态投资决策问题，构建了企业生产运营与营销的非合作微分博弈模型，分析企业定价及投资的反馈纳什均衡策略与最优时间演化路径。结果表明，质量与广告投资的演化路径单调，而商誉与价格的路径非单调。广告反馈纳什均衡策略随商誉与产品质量的提升而增长，价格敏感度与品牌重视度正向影响广告投资水平，与质量意识相反。产品创新投资策略在反馈纳什均衡及成本恒定条件下不随商誉和产品质量的变动而变动，而产品创新投资随品牌重视度和质量意识正向变动，与价格敏感度呈反向关系，此外，定价策略随产品质量、商誉、品牌重视度及质量意识的提升而增长，随价格敏感度的提升而下降。企业调控定价与投资决策以提升消费者需求与竞争力。     

珠宝行业 冰火两重天

今年,北京工美大厦一层的首饰柜台疯狂打折,折扣都在5折以下,新东安商场中甚至出现2.9折的低折扣首饰,折扣这样低,商家如何赚钱?这个迷惑消费者的问题终于在羊肉胡同中找到了答案。首饰在那里加工好之后,被商场加了4倍价格之后就成了现在商场中动辄过万的标价,即使打折出售,还有暴利可赚。     

跨国公司转让定价相关主体的利益均衡分析

跨国公司转让定价是涉及多个利益主体的博弈过程,通过转让价格在全球范围内进行资源配置是跨国公司降低交易成本的必然选择。跨国公司母公司、子公司以及相关政府的利益追求及其之间的博弈均衡,对最优转让定价选择和最优全球税后总利润将产生影响。     

打折销售和销售折扣应如何计税

打折销售和销售折扣应如何计税目前，企业商场为了扩大销售，快速回笼资金，在市场中占据有利的地位，打折销售和销售折扣这两种销售方式日见频繁，但其在税务处理上有着很大的区别：打折销售是指销货方在销售货物或应税劳务时因购货方购货数量大或产品换季等原因，而给予...     

风险喜好型零售商主导的双渠道定价策略研究(英文)

针对由一个风险喜好的零售商和一个风险规避的供应商组成的两层双渠道供应链,本文研究了当零售商在供应链中占主导地位情况下,双渠道中参与者的风险偏好程度和需求方差变化对其定价决策的影响。研究表明,随着零售商风险喜好程度的增加,零售渠道最优定价会减小;当零售商风险喜好达到一定程度时,随着需求方差的增长零售渠道最优定价才会提高。最后用一个算例验证了结论。     

如何确定最优转让价格实现企业整体效益最大化

随着企业越来越大,越来越复杂,管理者的任务也越来越艰巨。在分权制下,企业内部的经营分部彼此购买商品和服务,并且每个分部一般都被视为利润中心。企业内部不同的经营分部相互转让产品或服务时,采用不同的转让价格对分部经理的绩效评估与激励将产生不同的影响。确定不同的转让价格也会影响公司的盈利能力与整体效益。基于此,本文重点论述了转让定价的内涵及重要性,转让定价的主要方法,如何确定最优转让价格以及转让定价政策与绩效挂钩的激励问题。     

商业银行产品定价研究

商业银行产品定价的目标,包括利润目标、市场份额、风险控制和现金流量,本文通过对这些目标的分析找出影响产品定价的成本、风险、预期利润、经济环境、产品周期、政策水平、服务水平等主要因素及量化方法,为存贷款产品定价模型的选择提供支撑。文章介绍了国际流行的两种定价理念,并结合我国实际情况进行了选择,进而深入分析了工商银行定价管理现状,提出健全定价决策机制、制定统一的价格政策、建立高效的定价执行系统、完善定价信息系统及实施客户关系定价法等构建定价管理体系初步建议。最后对提出的客户盈利性定价方法做了实证数据推导,为下一步实施的方法和可行性提供了保障。     

转让定价避税筹划的策略分析

一、转让定价概述 (一)概念界定 转让定价又称转移价格,是指在经济活动中,有经济联系的企业各方为均摊利润或转移利润而在产品交换或买卖过程中,不依照市场买卖规则和市场价格进行交易,而根据他们之间的共同利益或为了最大限度地维护他们之间的收入进行的产品或非产品转让.在这种转让中,产品的转让价格根据双方的意愿,可高于或低于市场上由供求关系决定的价格,以达到少纳税甚至不纳税的目的.     

商业银行产品定价研究

商业银行产品定价的目标，包括利润目标、市场份额、风险控制和现金流量，本文通过对这些目标的分析找出影响产品定价的成本、风险、预期利润、经济环境、产品周期、政策水平、服务水平等主要因素及量化方法。为存贷款产品定价模型的选择提供支撑。文章介绍了国际流行的两种定价理念，并结合我国实际情况进行了选择，进而深入分析了工商银行定价管理现状，提出健全定价决策机制、制定统一的价格政策、建立高效的定价执行系统、完善定价信息系统及实施客户关系定价法等构建定价管理体系初步建议。最后对提出的客户盈利性定价方法做了实证数据推导，为下一步实施的方法和可行性提供了保障。     

Vertical relations,opportunism, and welfare

This article revisits the opportunism problem faced by an upstream monopolist contracting with several retailers over secret agreements, when contracts are linear. We characterize the equilibrium under secret contracts and compare it to that under public contracts in a setting allowing for general forms of demand and retail competition. Market distortions are more severe under secret contracts if and only if retailers' instruments are strategic complements. We also investigate the effect of opportunism on firms' profits. Our results remain robust whether retailers hold passive or wary beliefs. We derive some implications for the antitrust analysis of information exchange between firms.     

Resale price maintenance and collusion

The article revisits the conventional wisdom according to which vertical restrictions on retail prices help upstream firms to collude. We analyze the scope for collusion with and without resale price maintenance (RPM) when retailers observe local shocks on demand or retail costs. In the absence of RPM, retail prices react to retailers' information, and deviations from collusive behavior are thus difficult to detect. By eliminating retail price flexibility, RPM facilitates the detection of deviations but reduces profits and thus increases the short‐run gains from a deviation. Overall, RPM can facilitate collusion and reduce total welfare when firms adopt it.     

Resale price maintenance and manufacturer competition for retail services

We investigate the incentives of two manufacturers with common retailers to use resale price maintenance (RPM). Retailers provide product‐specific services that increase demand and manufacturers use minimum RPM to compete for favorable retail services for their products. Minimum RPM increases consumer prices and can create a prisoner's dilemma for manufacturers without increasing, and possibly even reducing, the overall level of retail services. If manufacturer market power is asymmetric, minimum RPM may distort the allocation of services toward the high‐priced products of the manufacturer with more market power. These results challenge the service argument as an efficiency defense for minimum RPM.     

Loss leading with salient thinkers

In various countries, competition laws restrict retailers' freedom to sell their products below cost. A common rationale, shared by policymakers, consumer interest groups and brand manufacturers alike, is that such “loss leading” of products would ultimately lead to a race-to-the-bottom in product quality. Building on Varian's (1980) model of sales, we provide a foundation for this critique, though only when consumers are salient thinkers, putting too much weight on certain product attributes. But we also show how a prohibition of loss leading can backfire, as it may make it even less attractive for retailers to stock high-quality products, decreasing both aggregate welfare and consumer surplus.     

两阶段闭环供应链制造商直销渠道入侵策略研究

运用博弈方法构建由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的两阶段供应链模型,研究有无再制造情形下制造商直销渠道的入侵策略和入侵时机问题。结果表明：无再制造情形下,在渠道竞争较弱且入侵将平分市场时,制造商不会开通直销渠道,否则会选择在第一阶段开通直销渠道;再制造情形下,在渠道竞争较弱且入侵将平分市场时制造商同样不会开通直销渠道,但竞争较弱且零售渠道占比较大时会选择在第二阶段开通直销渠道,否则其会在第一阶段开通直销渠道;无论是否进行再制造,制造商的渠道入侵都可能会损害零售商的利润,但是在竞争较强且零售渠道占比较大时渠道入侵却能使制造商和零售商均获益,且再制造情形下实现共赢的可能性更大。     

零售商主导型供应链中不同博弈结构的分析

在零售商主导的二级供应链中,供应商之间不同的博弈结构对产品价格、供应链各成员以及整体利润有影响。当供应商实力均衡并同时决策时,产品的批发价、零售价都要低于供应商之间为主从关系时进行决策行动的情况。此时,供应商的利润受损,而零售商和整体供应链的利润增加,另外,当产品之间的替代率增加时,产品批发价、零售价和供应商的利润都减少,而零售商的利润增加,供应链的利润变化不大,说明产品替代率的增加只是改变了供应链成员的利润分配。     

Vertical integration,foreclosure, and productive efficiency

We analyze the consequences of vertical integration by a monopoly producer dealing with two retailers (downstream firms) of varying efficiency via secret two‐part tariffs. When integrated with the inefficient retailer, the monopoly producer does not foreclose the rival retailer due to an output‐shifting effect. This effect can induce the integrated firm to engage in below‐cost pricing at the wholesale level, thereby rendering integration procompetitive. Output shifting arises with homogeneous and differentiated products. Moreover, we show that integration with an inefficient retailer emerges in a model with uncertainty over retailers' costs, and this merger can be procompetitive in expectation.     

Exchange Rates and Cash Flows in Differentiated Product Industries: A Simulation Approach

How do exchange rate changes impact firms' cash flows? We extend a simulation method developed in industrial organization to answer this question. We use prices, quantities, and product characteristics for differentiated products, coupled with a discrete choice framework and an assumption of price competition, to estimate marginal costs for all producers. Using a Monte Carlo approach we generate counterfactual prices and profits for different levels of exchange rates. We illustrate the method using the market for bottled water. Our results stress that even in a relatively simple market such as this one, different brands face very different exchange rate risks.     

Market power,price discrimination,and allocative efficiency in intermediate‐goods markets

We consider a monopolistic supplier's optimal choice of two‐part tariff contracts when downstream firms are asymmetric. We find that the optimal discriminatory contracts amplify differences in downstream firms' competitiveness. Firms that are larger—either because they are more efficient or because they sell a superior product—obtain a lower wholesale price than their rivals. This increases allocative efficiency by favoring the more productive firms. In contrast, we show that a ban on price discrimination reduces allocative efficiency and can lead to higher wholesale prices for all firms. As a result, consumer surplus, industry profits, and welfare are lower.     

不同收入者对食品安全度的不同需求研究

基于食品特征价格需求模型,考量城镇居民和农村居民对蛋白质、脂肪和碳水化合物三种常量营养元素的效用评价,结果显示,相对高收入人群对食品的营养程度和安全度更加重视,相对低收入人群对价格更为敏感.食品安全问题相关的新闻报道统计数据表明,监管力度强并不能完全杜绝食品违规生产行为,消费者尤其是低收入消费者对食品中必需品的需求,会为企业过度压低生产成本提供空间.鉴此,应从需求角度考虑食品安全治理问题,提高低收入消费者的收入水平,是对加强监管力度的重要补充.