管理者过度自信、投资者情绪与上市公司负债融资决策

文章以情绪感染理论为理论基础,实证检验了管理者过度自信、投资者情绪与上市公司负债融资决策的关系.文章以2005年-2013年沪深A股在第三季度披露盈余预告的公司为研究对象,以上年度累积月度股票收益率作为投资者情绪的度量指标,以盈余预测偏差作为管理者过度自信的度量指标,以资产负债率和长期借款与资产总额的比例作为公司负债融资和长期负债融资的测量指标,并选取公司规模、公司的成长性、盈利能力、有形资产担保价值、公司的实际所得税率以及企业自由现金流为控制变量,同时引入年度和行业虚拟变量,通过全样本、投资者情绪高涨组、投资者情绪低落组三个模型的回归分析发现,过度自信的管理者更倾向于进行负债融资和长期负债融资,当受到高涨的投资者情绪感染时,过度自信的管理者对负债融资和长期负债融资的偏好进一步加强;当受到低落的投资者情绪感染时,过度自信的管理者不再偏好负债融资和长期负债融资.     

管理者非理性行为与非效率投资关系研究

本文基于有限理性假设,以中国A股上市公司2009-2015年财务数据作为研究样本,研究管理者的三种非理性行为(管理者过度自信、管理者风险偏好和管理者从众行为)对企业非效率投资的共同影响。结果表明:管理者过度自信与管理者从众行为会导致上市公司非效率投资;过度自信和非过度自信管理者的从众行为均会加剧企业非效率投资,非过度自信管理者的从众行为对非效率投资的影响尤为严重;过度自信管理者的风险偏好与非效率投资显著正相关,而非过度自信管理者的风险偏好与非效率投资显著负相关,即非过度自信管理者适当的风险偏好行为在一定程度上会缓解企业非效率投资。因此,要想提高公司非效率投资管理应从管理者的心理素质培养入手,重点培养其避免从众心理,积极主动地根据自己企业的实际情况进行投资;对非过度自信的管理者还需要培养其适当的风险偏好。     

高管过度自信与现金股利相关性研究——基于融资约束的视角

〗以股改后2007~2011年A股上市公司为样本,考察融资约束对高管过度自信与现金股利支付关系的影响。结果发现：高管过度自信与上市公司现金股利支付之间具有负相关关系,但这种负向关系只有在非国有上市公司较为显著。进一步研究表明,高管过度自信与现金股利支付关系在不同股权性质下存在差异的主要原因来自于外源融资约束的影响,较强的外源融资约束加剧了高管过度自信对现金股利支付的降低效应,而外源融资环境的改善可以在一定程度上抑制高管过度自信对现金股利支付的降低效应。     

管理者自信会影响投资效率吗——兼论融资融券制度的公司外部治理效应

基于我国2008-2017年A股上市公司数据,研究发现管理者自信通过促进过度投资与投资不足而降低投资效率;进一步检验发现自信不足管理者通过降低过度投资与投资不足而提升投资效率,但过度自信管理者通过促进过度投资和投资不足而降低投资效率。然后采用双重差分模型研究发现相比控制组样本,在引入融资融券制度后,处理组中的融资融券标的企业通过降低过度投资与投资不足而提升了投资效率;融资融券通过降低管理者自信对过度投资的促进作用削弱管理者自信对投资效率的负向影响,上述结果表明实施融资融券制度具有显著的公司外部治理效应。本文的研究发现对于证券监管部门、上市公司及其投资者具有一定的参考意义。     

我国上市公司股权融资偏好分析

上市公司股权融资的直接成本低于债权融资的成本、公司治理结构不完善、考核指标不合理以及公司有利润无现金是我国上市公司后续融资偏好股权融资的原因。尽管股权融资偏好也许是上市公司经营者的“理性选择”，但上市公司过分偏好股权融资所存在的融入资金配置绩效差、间接成本高以及不利于金融体系的安全运行等问题也不容轻视。本文建议上市公司在经济人理性与相机选择原则的基础上，采用多元化的融资策略并提出以现金净流量，每股税后收益等手段作为考核指标，促使上市公司以股东利益最大化为目标选择融资方式。     

管理者特质、负债融资与企业价值

本文基于行为金融理论和高层梯队理论,选用2008-2013年我国A股上市公司数据作为研究样本,区分企业产权性质,实证检验了拥有不同特质的管理者对负债融资行为与企业价值的影响。研究结果显示:我国上市公司的负债融资可以降低企业代理成本,对企业价值有正面的治理效应;管理者为男性、教育水平越高、任期越短、有财务相关工作经历时,越容易出现过度自信,也更偏好使用负债融资,其中管理者性别、教育水平、工作经历更是可以显著提高负债融资对企业价值的提升作用。进一步区分产权性质后发现,和国有公司相比,非国有公司负债融资对企业价值的提升效果更好;非国有公司管理者教育水平、工作经历与负债融资的正相关更强,也更能显著提高负债融资对企业价值的提升作用。本研究不仅丰富了管理者特质和企业融资研究领域的文献和经验证据,而且也表明了在研究负债融资对企业价值的治理效应时,管理者特质和公司的产权性质是重要的考量因素。     

信息不对称、管理者内生偏好与上市公司股权融资偏好

一般以为,上市公司的股权融资偏好是由于不合理的成本因素、有缺陷的监管制度和政策与低效的资本市场等原因造成的.本文分析认为,上市公司股权融资偏好产生的基本原因是管理者的内生融资偏好.如果公司绩效影响管理者的财富(或职位、声誉等),管理者的偏好将支配公司的融资决策;对称信息下,管理者将有充分的股权融资偏好.不对称信息下,如果管理者对公司项目(或资产)拥有私人信息,且厌恶风险,管理者将最大限度地使用股权融资,直至达到均衡.最后,本文提出,管理者对股权融资的偏好是内生的,治理目前上市公司股权融资偏好所产生危害的基本思路是"疏",而不是"堵".     

会计稳健性、管理层过度自信与债务融资

本文以2006-2012年A股上市公司为数据样本,实证检验了管理层过度自信与债务融资之间的关系,及会计稳健性对二者关系的影响。研究结果表明,非国有企业的过度自信管理层倾向于债务融资,尤其是短期债务融资;会计稳健性增强了过度自信管理层对债务融资的偏好。国有企业的高负债率限制了过度自信管理层利用债务融资的空间,且会计稳健性在债务融资中发挥了积极的作用。     

公司治理、管理者过度自信与企业股利政策

文章基于公司行为财务学视角,以2008—2010年间在上海、深圳证券交易所上市的公司为样本,对我国上市公司的高管人员过度自信、公司治理与股利政策进行了实证检验。研究结果表明,管理者过度自信与股利政策正相关,有效的公司治理能抑制管理者过度自信对股利政策的影响。     

中小板上市公司股权结构对融资偏好的影响研究

本文从代理成本和控制权收益角度分析了股权结构对融资偏好的影响,以2006年年底之前在中小企业板上市的102家公司2007至2009年的数据为样本进行了实证分析。研究结果表明,不同类型的股权结构对公司融资偏好的影响有着很大差异。法人股比例与股权融资率显著正相关,限售自然人持股比例和股权融资率呈负相关关系,国有股、高管持股比例、股权集中度、股权制衡度则对股权融资率影响不显著。中小板上市公司并未表现出主板上市公司＂偏好股权融资＂的特征,但高管持股比例过低、一股独大是中小板与主板上市公司的共性。我国中小板上市公司的高管持股比例需要提高,股权激励制度仍需进一步完善,股权集中度和股权制衡度应适度提高。     

Managerial overconfidence and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from primary and secondary data

The corporate finance literature argues that overconfident managers tend to hold less cash, and this leads to a significant deviation from optimal cash levels. We analyse the impact of executive overconfidence on the corporate cash holdings of listed Vietnamese firms. To quantify managerial overconfidence, a novel core measure used in our analyses is voice pitch, which is obtained from interviews with top-line managers. Other measures of managerial overconfidence are also used to support the results and confirm the validity of the voice pitch measure. Our empirical evidence, with economically significant results, reveals that higher levels of overconfidence amongst managers are associated with lower cash holdings. Surprisingly, the findings show that overconfident managers tend to be associated with a low level of deviation from optimal cash holding levels. In addition, our findings also provide evidence that managerial overconfidence can increase cash levels and deviations from target cash holdings for overinvesting firms.     

Time-varying managerial overconfidence and pecking order preference

This paper examines whether managerial overconfidence enhances or weakens pecking order preference. We construct time-varying managerial words-based (i.e. tone of Chairman’s Statement) and action-based (i.e. firm investment and directors’ trading) overconfidence measures. Both optimistic tone and industry-adjusted investment have significant and negative impacts on the pecking order coefficient in the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (J Financ Econ 51:219–244, 1999) regression framework. Overconfident managers tend to use more equity than debt to finance deficits. This new evidence is consistent with the proposition that overconfident managers who underestimate the riskiness of future earnings believe that their debt (equity) is undervalued (overvalued) and therefore prefer equity to debt financing. Thus, managerial overconfidence can lead to a reverse pecking order preference. We also find that managerial overconfidence significantly weakens pecking order preference especially in firms with high earnings volatility and small firms.     

政治关联、过度自信与非效率投资

通过运用2006～2010年上市公司的管理者个人背景数据以及投资数据样本,对不同政治关联形式对管理者过度自信心理形成的影响,以及在不同产权性质下,政治关联所导致的过度自信心理同企业非效率投资之间的相关关系进行实证研究。结果表明,对于管理者而言,具有政府部门工作背景比担任人大或政协代表更易引发其过度自信心理的形成。同时,在政治关联所引起的管理者过度自信心理的作用下,企业会加剧其过度投资水平,而缓解其投资不足状况。     

CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment

We argue that managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and view external funds as unduly costly. Thus, they overinvest when they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they require external financing. We test the overconfidence hypothesis, using panel data on personal portfolio and corporate investment decisions of Forbes 500 CEOs. We classify CEOs as overconfident if they persistently fail to reduce their personal exposure to company‐specific risk. We find that investment of overconfident CEOs is significantly more responsive to cash flow, particularly in equity‐dependent firms.     

Effects of managerial overconfidence and ability on going-concern decisions and auditor turnover

I examine how the appearance of managerial overconfidence and managerial ability affect 1) auditors' decisions to issue a going concern opinion and 2) auditor dismissal rates after issuing a going concern opinion. Managerial attributes are likely to have an influence on auditors' decisions because auditors obtain and evaluate information about client management's remedy plans when there is substantial doubt about the entity's ability to continue as a going concern. While prior literature on managerial overconfidence classifies all managers who demonstrate overconfident behaviors in one group, I argue that the literature needs to take managerial ability into consideration when measuring overconfidence. I find that auditors are more likely to issue a going concern opinion to clients with seemingly overconfident managers only when the management who appears overconfident is also incompetent. I also find that auditors are more likely to be dismissed after issuance of a going concern opinion when the client company has seemingly overconfident management. Finally, I find that the association between managerial overconfidence and auditor dismissal subsequent to issuance of a going concern opinion is stronger when management is relatively more powerful than the company's audit committee.     

Momentum,Reversals, and Fund Manager Overconfidence

This paper examines the role of investor overconfidence and self‐attribution bias in explaining the momentum effect. We develop a novel measure of overconfidence based on characteristics and trading patterns of US equity mutual fund managers. Stocks held by more overconfident managers experience greater momentum profits and stronger return reversals than stocks held by less overconfident managers. The difference in momentum profits is not compensation for risk nor is it attributable to stock characteristics that influence momentum. Our results are consistent with Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) who argue that momentum results from delayed overreaction caused by overconfidence and biased self‐attribution.     

Chief financial officer overconfidence and stock price crash risk

Numerous studies have shown the prevalence of overconfidence among Chief Financial Officers (CFOs). Surprisingly, the real effect of CFO overconfidence is under-researched. Using data from a large sample of US-listed firms over the period 1993–2019 and adopting an eclectic theoretical approach, we find that overconfident CFOs are more likely to increase stock price crash risk than non-overconfident CFOs through risk-taking and bad news hoarding. These findings pass a series of robustness tests. Furthermore, departing from most overconfident studies that merely examine one type of top managers (i.e., Chief Executive Officer (CEO)), we consider the influence of CEO and CFO overconfidence jointly. Interestingly, we find that CFO overconfidence outweighs CEO overconfidence in influencing stock price crash risk. Moreover, the overconfidence effect is intensified when overconfident CFOs collaborate with overconfident CEOs, thus raising stock price crash risk. However, stronger governance and a transparent information environment constrain overconfident CFOs' effect on stock price crash risk. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of CFO overconfidence in determining stock return tail risks.     

管理者过度自信对现金持有量的影响——来自我国上市公司的经验证据

本文选取2006—2010年沪深两市的公司为样本,实证分析了高管人员过度自信与现金持有决策的关系。结果发现,管理者的自信程度与现金持有显著正相关,证明管理者的过度自信是影响企业现金持有行为的一个重要因素,丰富和拓展了企业现金持有影响因素的研究。     

Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators?

Previous empirical work on adverse consequences of CEO overconfidence raises the question of why firms hire overconfident managers. Theoretical research suggests a reason: overconfidence can benefit shareholders by increasing investment in risky projects. Using options‐ and press‐based proxies for CEO overconfidence, we find that over the 1993–2003 period, firms with overconfident CEOs have greater return volatility, invest more in innovation, obtain more patents and patent citations, and achieve greater innovative success for given research and development expenditures. However, overconfident managers achieve greater innovation only in innovative industries. Our findings suggest that overconfidence helps CEOs exploit innovative growth opportunities.