处于财务困境的上市公司变更会计师事务所的动因及后果分析——基于2010年深沪两市的数据

近几年来我国沪深两市上市公司变更会计师事务所的动因和后果引起了越来越多的关注。关于上市公司自愿性变更会计师事务所的原因的研究有很多,主要有盈余管理、审计收费、审计意见、会计师事务所的规模、公司处于财务困境、管理层变更等。本文主要基于2010年的沪深两市的数据,分析可能引起上市公司变更会计师事务所的一个动因,即公司处于财务困境。同时分析由此带来的结果,以审计意见的变更为变现形式,进而得出相关结论并给出一点政策建议。     

财务困境公司变更会计师事务所的实证研究

近年来,我国上市公司更换会计师事务所的现象逐年增多,上市公司的管理当局利用更换会计师事务所粉饰会计报表从而误导投资者的恶性案件也日益增多。证券市场中陷入财务困境的上市公司是一个独特的群体,他们具有更为强烈的动机变更会计师事务所,来隐藏其存在的重大问题,这极有可能给投资者带来巨大的损失。本文是在前人研究的基础上进一步深入分析了有哪些因素影响财务困境公司变更会计师事务所及这些因素与事务所变更有怎样的关系,并关注财务困境公司变更会计师事务所所传递的信息,洞察陷入财务困境的上市公司变更事务所行为背后的真实动机,为完善中国证券市场的运作,改善监管部门的措施提供依据与政策建议。一、研究现状Schwartz和Melon(1985),他们研究了濒临破产公司变更会计师事务所的动机。他们认为[1]公司陷入财务困境可能会影响会计师事务变更,因为财务困境容易引起下列现象:会计师事务所与客户容易在财务报告的列报方面产生分歧、预期会被出具保留意见、就审计收费高低而产生分歧、保险动机,而上述因素均容易导致会计师事务所变更。他们认为,对会计原则的恰当运用方面所产生的分歧和即将被出具保留意见将会使客户与其主审会计师事务所之间的关系变得紧张。在...     

2012年上市公司变更会计师事务所现状分析

上市公司更换会计师事务所的现象层出不穷,文章以2012年度更换会计师事务所的上市公司作为研究对象,对我国上市公司更换会计师事务所的情形进行分析,得出结论：上市公司后任会计师事务所的排名在前任会计事务所之前;处于财务困境的上市公司更倾向于变更会计师事务所,在变更会计师事务所后扭亏为盈的公司中有50％的上市公司曾处于财务困境;后任会计师事务所出具审计意见总体情况较前任会计师事务所有所改善.     

会计师事务所变更、盈余管理与审计质量

上市公司变更会计师事务所的现象日益严重并受到广泛的关注.从会计师事务所变更与盈余管理、审计质量之间的关系看,盈余管理是事务所变更的主要动机,上市公司管理层的主导地位使盈余管理由动机成为现实,而由此引起的事务所变更将会降低审计质量.     

盈余管理、事务所客户资源控制权的归属与审计质量——来自中国证券市场的经验证据

与西方市场仅能观察到事务所变更不同的是,中国资本市场还同时提供了审计师变更的佐证。基于此,本文应用新制度经济学中的资产专有理论,从审计师和事务所两个角度,分析了中国证券市场特有的审计师/事务所变更行为,并结合盈余管理和审计意见进一步分析这种行为的原因和后果。文章通过对比签字审计师离开事务所并带走客户的公司与签字审计师离开事务所没有带走客户的公司后,发现在审计师跳槽之前,公司的盈余管理越强,越会跟随审计师到新的事务所,表明客户资源的控制权归审计师而非事务所所有。并且,我们还发现,这类公司在审计师变更前的审计质量更差。本文的研究丰富了审计理论的研究手段和现有成果,并对于规范审计师行为和提高审计独立性具有积极的理论价值和现实意义。     

会计师事务所变更方向与审计意见的实证研究

会计师事务所变更是证券市场监管的一个重要问题,因为事务所变更往往被理解为审计意见购买.本文在细分会计师事务所变更类型的基础上,考察了不同事务所变更方向与审计意见之间的关系.本文以2007～ 2009年我国证券市场会计师事务所变更数据为样本,经研究发现,在控制其他影响审计意见的变量后,仅大所换为大所的变更对上市公司收到非标准无保留意见有显著影响,而其他三种变更类型对审计意见没有显著影响.     

代理冲突、董事会质量与“污点”审计师变更

当审计师因受监管部门处罚而致声誉受损时,公司变更"污点"审计师表明其对高质量审计服务存在较大需求。本文利用2002-2010年间被中国证监会处罚的会计师事务所及其上市公司客户数据,从代理冲突和董事会质量的角度,考察相关因素对上市公司变更其声誉受损审计师决策的影响。结果发现,就代理冲突变量而言,当原审计师受到处罚后,股权集中度与审计师变更之间呈显著正向关系,而财务杠杆及管理层是否持股与审计师变更之间没有表现出显著的关系;就董事会质量而言,董事会的规模、独立性和勤勉性与"污点"审计师变更之间均未表现出显著关联,仅是否同时设立四个专门委员会与"污点"审计师变更之间呈显著正向关系。     

我国上市公司注册会计师变更的动因及其后果分析

近年来,上市公司愈加频繁地变更注册会计师,这其中可能隐藏着上市公司的不良动机,并导致损害上市公司会计信息质量,误导证券市场投资者决策,扰乱审计市场公平竞争秩序等一系列严重的不良后果。因此,本文通过上市公司变更注册会计师的行为进行研究,探究上市公司变更注册会计师的真正动因及其产生的后果,可以更全面地认识上市公司变更注册会计师这一现象。     

会计师事务所任期会影响审计质量吗？——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文在我国会计师事务所自愿性变更的大环境下，研究事务所任期的长短是否对耳计质量造成影响，试图为会计师事务所强制轮换制度的制定提供实证证据。我们以1995年至2002年中国证券市场3466家上市公司为样本，以上市公司盈余乍理程度作为审计质量的衡量指标，研究会计师事务所任期与审计质量之间的关系。分别以主观应计利润和线下项目度量上市公司的盈余管理程度，研究结果显示：首先，对于与会计师事务所的审计业务委托关系持续时问在五年及五年以上戢上市公司，随着事务所任期的增加，上市公司利用主观应计利润进行盈余管理的程度更加严重。而这种行为主要是将利润调低的盈余管理。其次，随着会计师事务所任期的增加，上市公司利用线下项目进行盈余管理行为的程度加重了。而且，这一关系对于存在稳定的审计业务委托关系的上市公司来说更加明显。这种行为不仅包括将盈余调高的盈余管理，也包括了将盈余调低的盈余管理。以上两个结论均支持会计师事务所任期的增加加重了上市公司盈余管理程度的观点，与会计师事务所强制轮换制度暗含的假设是一致的。     

审计委员会特征与会计师事务所变更的经验研究

本文以会计师事务所变更为视角,探讨具备怎样特征的审计委员会才能有效履行其职责。研究表明:审计委员会的独立性和专业性与会计师事务所变更显著负相关;审计委员会的开会次数与会计师事务所变更没有显著关系,说明审计委员会的存在有助于减少会计师事务所变更。但在对会计师事务所变更的进一步研究中,我们并没有发现会计师事务所变是为了追求更高审计质量的进一步证据,也说明审计委员会对会计师事务所变更的影响仍然有限。这些研究结论为完善我国审计委员会制度提供了经验证据。     

Market reactions to auditor switches under regulatory consent and market driven regimes

We examine market reactions to announcements of auditor switches by Australian-listed companies during the ‘regulatory consent’ period (2000–2011) under which auditor resignations require consent by the corporate regulator before taking effect at annual general meetings. Overall, we find no clear evidence of significant market responses to firms announcing auditor switches, consistent with a lack of information content or potential information leakage argument. However, examination of a more recent sample in the ‘partial deregulation’ period (2015–2017), whereby timing and consent provisions have been relaxed under a more market-driven regime, uncovers univariate evidence of market reactions directionally consistent with the audit quality interpretation. Overall, these results provide support for the regulator’s recent initiative to deregulate the auditor resignation process in Australia to become more disclosure driven as in other jurisdictions.     

Determinants and consequences of voluntary switches to Chinese auditors in Hong Kong

Hong Kong market regulators have permitted 12 large Chinese accounting firms to audit the financial statements of Chinese firms that cross list in Hong Kong (i.e., H-share firms) since 2010. This paper examines the characteristics of H-share firms that voluntarily replaced their Hong Kong (HK) auditors with Chinese auditors, and the market reaction to auditor switches following this policy. We find that 38 out of 147 H-share firms voluntarily switched to Chinese auditors during 2011–2013. Switching firms are larger in size and are less likely to use Big4; they also have less need for external financing, a longer cross listing history, and a lower percentage of foreign revenue. We also find that investors negatively react to the auditor switches from HK non-Big4 to China non-Big4, but do not react to the auditor switches from HK Big4 to China Big4. This suggests that investors perceived lower audit quality for China non-Big4.     

Using machine learning to predict auditor switches: How the likelihood of switching affects audit quality among non-switching clients

In this paper, we utilize machine learning techniques to identify the likelihood that a company switches auditors and examine whether increased likelihood of switching is associated with audit quality. Building on research that finds a deterioration in audit quality associated with clients that engage in audit opinion shopping, we predict and find lower audit quality among companies that are more likely to switch auditors but remain with their incumbent auditor. Specifically, we find that companies more likely to switch auditors have a higher likelihood of misstatement and larger abnormal accruals. These results are consistent with auditors sacrificing audit quality to retain clients that might otherwise switch. Our findings are especially concerning because there is no public signal of this behavior, such as an auditor switch. Our methodology is designed such that it could be implemented by investors, audit firms and regulators to identify companies with a higher probability of switching auditors and preemptively address the deterioration in audit quality.     

Acquirers’ abnormal returns and the non-Big 4 auditor clientele effect

I analyze the effect of auditor choice on acquirers’ values around merger announcements and the factors affecting the interaction between auditor size and the market reaction to merger announcements. I find that acquirers audited by non-Big 4 accounting firms outperform those audited by Big 4 firms. This effect is more pronounced when the targets are privately held and when the likelihood of the auditors playing a prominent advisory role increases. While the largest auditing firms are usually assumed to offer superior services, the study suggests that smaller firms have a comparative advantage in assisting their clients in merger transactions.     

The effect of mandatory auditor assignment and non-audit service on audit fees: Evidence from Korea

In Korea, regulators could assign auditors to firms. We investigate the relationship among audit fees, mandatory auditor assignment, and the joint provision of non-audit and auditor services in Korea. We find that assigned auditors charge significantly higher audit fees than freely selected auditors. We also find that the joint provision of non-audit and audit services does intensify the relation between auditor assignment and audit fees. Combined with the results of other studies that have shown that firms audited by assigned auditors report smaller amounts of discretionary accruals than firms audited by freely selected auditors, our results suggest the possibility that mandatory auditor assignment may improve auditor independence.     

FRC intervention,financial reporting quality and due diligence

This study provides evidence of the relationship between government intervention, financial reporting quality and due diligence. Specifically, the authors examine the consequences of the disclosure of inspection reports by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) for individual audit firms inspected in the UK. Using a difference-in-differences design, it is found that clients are more likely to receive qualified audit opinions during the post-disclosure period. This significant impact on reporting decisions is more concentrated among clients of small audit firms. Moreover, despite general efficiency during the sample period, clients affected by an FRC intervention experience longer delays in receiving their audit reports. Overall, this study contributes to literature on corporate governance and audit regulation, and has implications for policy making. FRC inspections are of greater concern to small audit firms than large firms, as the latter have already built a strong reputation. In general, the transparent inspection process may be beneficial in enhancing auditor oversight.     

Audit quality, auditor compensation and initial public offering underpricing

We jointly study the impact of audit quality on auditor compensation and initial public offering (IPO) underpricing using a sample of Australian firms going public over the period 1996–2003. We find that quality (Big Four) audit firms earn significantly higher fees than non-Big Four auditors, and audit quality is positively associated with IPO underpricing. The positive relation between audit quality and underpricing is more pronounced for small issues, IPOs underwritten by non-prestigious underwriters, and those that are not backed by venture capitalists. Taken together, our results suggest that quality auditors serve as a signalling device that enhances post-issue market value of equity.     

企业风险与审计师选择

信号传递理论认为,IPO市场中审计师选择可以作为信号机制,降低发行企业和投资者之间的信息不对称程度.本文以股权分置改革后我国证券发行制度向市场化过渡为背景,考察我国审计师声誉和IPO企业特征之间的关系.研究结果表明,在公司规模、资产负债率、资产净利率、投资银行声誉、公司成立时间这五个反映公司风险的变量中,公司规模、投资银行声誉、公司成立时间与是否选择大事务所进行审计有显著正相关关系,且大规模事务所审计的IPO企业的首日回报显著要低,这意味着大规模事务所的高声誉得到了市场的认可,审计师的信号传递功能在我国初步有效.     

Earnings quality: Some evidence on the role of auditor tenure and auditors’ industry expertise

Prior studies suggest that auditors with short tenure are associated with lower earnings quality because of the lack of client-specific knowledge and/or low balling. In this study, we examine whether industry specialization of auditors and low balling affect the association between auditor tenure and earnings quality. We find that the association between shorter auditor tenure and lower earnings quality is weaker for firms audited by industry specialists compared to non-specialists. In addition, we do not find results consistent with the low balling explanation.     

The impact of corporate governance on auditor choice: Evidence from China

As the largest and fastest growing emerging market, China is becoming more and more important to investors throughout the world. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of firms’ auditor choice in China in respect of their corporate governance mechanism. Normally firms have to take a trade-off in their auditor choice decisions, i.e., to hire high-quality auditors to signal effective audit monitoring and good corporate governance to lower their capital raising costs, or to select low-quality auditors with less effective audit monitoring in order to reap private benefits derived from weak corporate governance and less-transparent disclosure (the opaqueness gains). We develop a logit regression model to test the impact of firms’ internal corporate governance mechanism on auditor choice decisions made by IPO firms getting listed during a bear market period of 2001–2004 in China. Three variables are used to proxy for firms’ internal corporate governance mechanism, i.e., the ownership concentration, the size of the supervisory board (SB), and the duality of CEO and chairman of board of directors (BoDs). We classify all auditors in China into large auditors (Top 10) and others (non-Top 10), assuming the large auditors can provide higher quality audit services. The empirical results show that firms with larger controlling shareholders, with smaller size of SB, or in which CEO and BoDs chairman are the same person, are less likely to hire a Top 10 (high-quality) auditor. This suggests that when benefits from lowering capital raising costs are trivial, firms with weaker internal corporate governance mechanism are inclined to choose a low-quality auditor so as to capture and sustain their opaqueness gains. On the other hand, with improvement of corporate governance, firms should be more likely to appoint high-quality auditors.