资源型企业资产减值计提动机的实证研究

本文分别从经济因素和盈余管理因素两个方面对我国资源型企业资产减值计提的计提动机进行研究;实证研究发现,影响资源型企业资产减值计提的因素既包括企业自身的经济因素也包括盈余管理中的扭亏动机、大清洗动机和利润平滑动机等.     

盈余管理与短期资产减值准备关系的实证研究

本文选取2009年—2012年我国A股的工业上市公司的数据,对上市公司盈余管理的动机与短期资产减值准备的关系进行了实证研究。研究发现:微利公司、配股达线公司倾向于少计提短期资产减值准备以避免亏损,亏损公司倾向于多计提减值准备进行盈余大冲洗,高盈利公司则利用资产减值准备进行利润平滑,而对于当年扭亏的上市公司则不存在利用短期资产减值准备进行扭亏的动机。     

盈余管理与短期资产减值准备关系的实证研究

本文选取2009年—2012年我国A股的工业上市公司的数据,对上市公司盈余管理的动机与短期资产减值准备的关系进行了实证研究。研究发现:微利公司、配股达线公司倾向于少计提短期资产减值准备以避免亏损,亏损公司倾向于多计提减值准备进行盈余大冲洗,高盈利公司则利用资产减值准备进行利润平滑,而对于当年扭亏的上市公司则不存在利用短期资产减值准备进行扭亏的动机。     

管理防御视角下的CFO背景特征与会计政策选择——来自资产减值计提的经验证据

本文选取2008-2012年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,以资产减值准备的计提为例,从管理防御视角探究CFO背景特征对公司会计政策选择的影响。研究发现,在控制经济因素和盈余管理因素后,CFO背景特征会显著影响公司资产减值准备的计提行为:与男性CFO和高学历CFO相比,女性CFO和低学历CFO的管理防御程度更高,计提资产减值准备的比例更低;CFO的年龄越大、任期越长,管理防御程度越高,计提资产减值准备的比例越低。进一步区分资产类型和产权性质后发现,CFO背景特征对流动资产减值计提和长期资产减值计提的影响存在一定差异,不同产权性质下CFO背景特征对资产减值计提的影响存在显著差异。     

会计准则变更与资产减值计提行为分析

本文以2007年1月1日开始实施的新会计准则为研究背景,分析资产减值准则对资产减值计提行为的影响。结果发现:减值前亏损的公司会以转回资产减值进行盈余管理来避免亏损,减值前亏损且无法以转回资产减值避免亏损的公司会以计提资产减值从事大洗澡行为,为下一年盈利做准备;新会计准则的实施并不能有效遏制上市公司的扭亏盈余管理行为,但能够遏制上市公司的大洗澡盈余管理行为。     

盈余管理与资产减值准备的相关性研究——来自我国交通运输、仓储业A股上市公司的经验数据

本文以中国A股上市的交通运输、仓储业公司为研究对象,分析了在2006年新会计准则发布后交通运输业上市公司的资产减值准备计提行为是否存在有盈余管理的行为及动机。实证检验结果表明:A股上市的交通运输仓储业公司普遍存在有盈余管理行为;A股上市的交通运输仓储业上市公司对于资产减值准备的计提存在有盈余管理的动机。     

盈余管理与资产减值准备的相关性研究——来自我国交通运输、仓储业A股上市公司的经验数据

本文以中国A股上市的交通运输、仓储业公司为研究对象,分析了在2006年新会计准则发布后交通运输业上市公司的资产减值准备计提行为是否存在有盈余管理的行为及动机。实证检验结果表明：A股上市的交通运输仓储业公司普遍存在有盈余管理行为;A股上市的交通运输仓储业上市公司对于资产减值准备的计提存在有盈余管理的动机。     

基于资产减值的盈余管理与税务成本之间的关系研究

资产减值的计提与转回作为利润的“蓄水池”、历来是上市公司进行盈余管理的重要手段。本文以沪深两市2007—2009年3207家A股上市公司为研究样本，对企业利用减值准备进行盈余管理的现象进行研究。研究发现，随着公司计提（转回）的减值准备在利润总额中比例的提高，公司的所得税税负也将提高。     

浅析新会计准则下资产减值准备对企业盈余管理的影响

在我国,利用资产减值准备的计提与转回调节利润是上市公司盈余管理的重要手段之一。但过度的盈余管理行为不仅会影响社会经济资源的有效配置．而且会误导投资人的投资决策．导致不同的利益集团受益或受损。财政部2006年2月15日发布的新准则中关于资产减值的规定与原有会计准则相比发生了很多变化。这对上市公司资产减值准备的计提与转回产生了巨大的影响．从而对利用资产减值进行的盈余管理行为产生一定的作用及影响。因此,研究新会计准则下资产减值准备对上市公司盈余管理的影响是相当必要的。     

资产减值与盈余管理——论《资产减值》准则的政策涵义

2006年2月15日我国颁布了《资产减值》准则,规定已确认的资产减值不得转回。本文研究了上市公司的资产减值与盈余管理之间的关系,发现减值前亏损的公司存在以转回和计提资产减值进行盈余管理的行为, 一方面是为了避免亏损,另一方面是为了进行大洗澡(big bath);同时有较弱的证据说明减值前盈利的公司也存在以转回和计提资产减值进行盈余管理的行为,一方面是为了利润平滑化,另一方面是为了达到盈余增长。     

Do acquirers disclose good news or withhold bad news when they finance their acquisitions using equity?

Companies that use their own stock to finance acquisitions have incentives to increase their market values prior to the acquisition. This study examines whether such companies mislead investors by issuing overly optimistic forecasts of future earnings (“deception by commission”) or by withholding bad news about future earnings (“deception by omission”). We compare the management forecasts of acquiring firms in a pre-acquisition period (days −90 to −30 before the acquisition announcement) and a post-acquisition period (days +30 to +90 after the acquisition is completed). We show that, when acquisitions are financed using stock, companies are not more likely to issue overly optimistic earnings forecasts during the pre-acquisition period compared with the post-acquisition period. However, these same acquirers are more likely to withhold impending bad news about future earnings. Consistent with litigation having an asymmetric effect on disclosure incentives, our findings suggest that deception by omission occurs more often than deception by commission.     

Value rules: senior management incentives in the post-option era

Big changes are in the news and on boardroom agendas. This is a good time for many companies to step back and think fundamentally about how senior management incentives are structured and how these programs should be redesigned for better business results. This article describes the main problems with current incentive structures. It then shows how "value rules" can help employers make better use of incentive plans and create a real stake in business units' long-term results, so that the overall structure of executive incentives consistently encourages value creation for shareholders.     

Conditional conservatism and disaggregated bad news indicators in accrual models

Conditional conservatism is an integral but often unmodeled part of the normal accrual process. The standard economic determinants of accruals contain information about unrealized losses. We argue that accountants recognize these unrealized losses as disaggregated write-downs for small asset pools. Modeling disaggregated impairments yields new economic insights about accruals and improved accrual models. We predict that accrual conservatism manifests as a sum of asymmetries for a vector of news indicators, rather than as an asymmetry for a scalar aggregate news proxy. We argue that more detailed segment-level and quarterly indicators have an incremental effect on annual firm-level accruals. We also predict a dynamic effect of successive loss indicators because accountants look for consistent patterns in these variables. Empirical results for U.S. firms support our predictions. The asymmetries in accruals are consistent with conservatism in validation tests. We also document improved statistical power and type I error in earnings management tests.     

会计准则、资本市场监管规则与盈余管理之遏制:来自上市公司债务重组的经验证据

本文利用1999年、2001—2007年上市公司债务重组的数据来研究会计准则和资本市场监管规则在遏制公司盈余管理方面的作用。本文通过分析认为,为遏制上市公司的盈余管理,从上市公司盈余管理的动机端入手更为有效。就上市公司盈余管理主要为满足资本市场监管要求之动机而言,应该从资本市场监管规则的改进入手。而会计准则因其公共合约性质和不完备性,既没有责任也没有能力去遏制上市公司的盈余管理行为。1999年、2001—2007年间上市公司的债务重组行为支持本文的这一观点,来自上市公司债务重组的经验证据显示,是资本市场监管规则而非会计准则在影响和制约着上市公司是否利用债务重组来进行盈余管理。     

The spillover effect of shareholder activism: Evidence on firm reporting

This study examines the spillover effect of shareholder activism against target firms on financial reporting by non-target firms in portfolios held by the same activist shareholders. We find that firms that are not the target of institutional shareholders’ activism campaigns report more positive abnormal accruals. Cross-sectional tests indicate that the effect is more pronounced i) for firms that have more opportunities to engage in upward earnings management, or for firms with less effective alternative monitoring forces, and ii) when investors are more sensitive to good news. We also find that the effect is stronger when activist shareholders are more experienced, are waging more confrontational campaigns against target firms, and have larger holdings in non-target firms. We further find that non-target firms tend to report lower magnitude of asset write-downs, are more likely to restate financial statements and meet or beat earnings benchmarks, and exhibit a more optimistic tone in their 10-K/10-Q filings. Overall, our findings suggest that firms tend to window-dress their mandatory reporting to preempt possible shareholder activism against them.     

Why Do Managers Voluntarily Issue Cash Flow Forecasts?

We study a relatively recent change in voluntary disclosure practices by management, namely, the issuance of cash flow forecasts. We predict and find that management issues cash flow forecasts to signal good news in cash flow, to meet investor demand for cash flow information, and to precommit to a certain composition of earnings in terms of cash flow versus accruals, thus reducing the degree of freedom in earnings management. Our results also suggest that management discloses good news in cash flow to mitigate the negative impact of bad news in earnings, to lend credibility to good news in earnings, and to signal economic viability when the firm is young. Our finding that management cash flow forecasts primarily convey good news is in contrast to the generally negative nature of management earnings guidance and suggests that different incentives drive firms' disclosure of different financial information.     

The Effect of Earnings Management on the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings

Abstract:   Is earnings management affecting (driving) the measures of earnings conservatism? Ball et al. (2000) point out that the asymmetry in the recognition of good and bad news in earnings (faster recognition of bad news: earnings conservatism) is more pronounced in common‐law than in code‐law based accounting regimes. However, comparative studies on earnings conservatism in Europe have failed to identify significant differences between common‐law and code‐law based countries. We argue that in code‐law based countries managers have incentives to reduce earnings consistently. This enhances the association between earnings and returns in bad news periods. We find that after controlling for discretionary accruals, the differential earnings response to bad news in Germany and France decreases significantly.     

避免亏损与公开增发盈余管理的识别与估计:来自聚束设计的实证证据

基于2002-2017年中国A股上市公司披露的加权平均净资产收益率(ROE)数据,本文识别出上市公司在0%(避免亏损)和6%(公开增发股票)两个阈值处的盈余管理动机,并对盈余管理频率和幅度进行估计。首先,数据证实A股上市公司ROE分布图在阈值0%和6%处存在明显的左侧样本缺失、右侧样本聚集现象,表明公司确实为满足政策要求在阈值附近进行了盈余管理,将公司ROE从阈值左侧操纵至右侧。其次,本文用聚束设计方法估计出3.18%的上市公司为避免汇报亏损而进行盈余管理,占真实亏损公司的59.25%,进行盈余管理的公司将ROE平均提高了2.115个百分点。为了成功公开增发而进行盈余管理的上市公司比例虽然仅有0.28%,但占到了实际股票公开增发公司的58.13%,平均盈余管理幅度为0.524个百分点。最后,异质性分析表明:2016年以前上市公司为了避免亏损而进行盈余管理的动机一直很稳定,2002-2005年是为了满足公开增发条件而进行盈余管理最严重的年份;动机强烈的ST企业和杠杆率高的企业进行盈余管理的频率更高。     

Detecting overproduction: Evidence from inventory write-down

We use inventory write-downs to differentiate opportunistic and non-opportunistic overproduction measures. We posit that non-opportunistic overproduction is positively associated with future write-downs because overproduction generally leads to excess inventory, while opportunistic overproduction (to inflate earnings) is negatively associated with write-downs because write-downs decrease earnings. We find that change-based proxies (deviations from past behaviour) are positively associated with the likelihood of future write-downs, whereas residual-based proxies (deviations from industry norms) are negatively associated with this likelihood, suggesting that the former (latter) primarily capture non-opportunistic (opportunistic) overproduction. Our study highlights the importance of using appropriate overproduction measures for each research setting.