上市公司高级管理层报酬业绩敏感度与风险之间关系的实证检验

本文以中国上市公司2002-2004年度的高管人员报酬数据为基础,对高管人员的报酬业绩敏感度与风险之间的关系进行了实证分析。结果表明,中国上市公司高管人员的报酬与公司绩效、股东财富存在正相关关系,其报酬业绩敏感度与风险之间如经典代理理论所预测的那样存在负相关关系,但显著性较弱。进一步分析发现,对于那些增长机会很小或没有增长机会的公司,报酬业绩敏感度与风险存在负相关关系,而对于那些增长机会大的公司,报酬业绩敏感度与风险之间存在正相关关系,这在一定程度上拓展了经典代理理论的预测。     

The impact of bank merger growth on CEO compensation

We examine the impact of bank mergers on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation during the period 1992–2014, a period characterised by significant banking consolidation. We show that CEO compensation is positively related to both merger growth and non‐merger internal growth, with the former relationship being higher in magnitude. While CEO pay–risk sensitivity is not significantly related to merger growth, CEO pay–performance sensitivity is negatively and significantly related to merger growth. Collectively, our results suggest that, through bank mergers, CEOs can earn higher compensation and decouple personal wealth from bank performance. Furthermore, we document a more severe agency problem in CEO compensation as a consequence of bank mergers relative to mergers in industrial firms. Finally, we find that the post‐financial crisis regulatory reform of executive compensation in banks has limited effectiveness in curbing the merger–pay links.     

Performance volatility,information availability,and disclosure reforms

Using the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley reform as an exogenous disclosure shock, we find that high, relative to low, volatility firms opt for lower levels of information availability pre reform and experience increases in information availability, CEO turnover-to-performance sensitivity, myopic behavior, CEO compensation with a structure tilted towards more cash pay, and a reduction in firm value post the reform. Our findings suggest that mandating high levels of information availability across the board increases managerial evaluation risk and produces additional agency costs for firms with volatile performance.     

Ceo Compensation And The Transformation Of Banking

We examine the compensation strategies of commercial bank holding companies (BHCs) during 1992–2000. In particular, we analyze whether CEO compensation is more closely tied to the presence of growth options and to risk than is revealed in earlier research. We also examine whether BHC entry into investment banking has influenced compensation policies. Our evidence shows a stronger link between growth options and CEO compensation in the 1990s than observed in earlier studies and that pay‐for‐performance sensitivities are substantially larger for BHCs that have entered the underwriting business. We also find that BHC leverage and variability in returns have positive effects on CEO incentive pay. Finally, we find some evidence supporting the hypothesis that pay‐for‐performance sensitivities decline generally at BHCs as return variability increases, as agency theory predicts.     

Default risk and equity returns: Australian evidence

We test whether default risk is related to equity returns using the Fama and MacBeth [Fama, E.F., MacBeth, J., 1973. Risk, return, and equilibrium: empirical tests. Journal of Political Economy 81, 607–636.] regression framework. The proxy we use for default risk is the default probability obtained from option-based models. Our findings show that default probability is negatively related to returns. While we find that size and book-to-market are related to default risk, the ability of these variables to explain cross-sectional variation in returns is not because they are proxying default risk. Further, our evidence suggests that the negative relationship between default probability and returns is not due to a leverage, volatility or momentum effect.     

Incentive Compensation and the Stock Price Response to Dividend Increase Announcements

Linking executive compensation to stock price performance is predicted to decrease the usual positive price response to dividend increases for two reasons. One, increasing pay‐performance sensitivity (PPS) exacerbates managers' optimistic bias regarding future firm performance, reducing the credibility of dividend signals. Two, increasing pay‐performance sensitivity reduces the need for dividends as a means of reducing agency costs. Consistent with behavioral and agency theories of corporate finance, we find that price response does decrease as pay‐performance sensitivity increases and that this effect is concentrated in firms with low market‐to‐book ratios. Additional findings are most consistent with the agency cost explanation.     

Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation

We find that institutional ownership concentration is positively related to the pay‐for‐performance sensitivity of executive compensation and negatively related to the level of compensation, even after controlling for firm size, industry, investment opportunities, and performance. These results suggest that the institutions serve a monitoring role in mitigating the agency problem between shareholders and managers. Additionally, we find that clientele effects exist among institutions for firms with certain compensation structures, suggesting that institutions also influence compensation structures through their preferences.     

CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: an Empirical Investigation of UK Panel Data

This paper examines the link between CEO pay and performance employing a unique, hand‐collected panel data set of 390 UK non‐financial firms from the FTSE All Share Index for the period 1999–2005. We include both cash (salary and bonus) and equity‐based (stock options and long‐term incentive plans) components of CEO compensation, and CEO wealth based on share holdings, stock option and stock awards holdings in our analysis. In addition, we control for a comprehensive set of corporate governance variables. The empirical results show that in comparison to the previous findings for US CEOs, pay‐performance elasticity for UK CEOs seems to be lower; pay‐performance elasticity for UK CEOs is 0.075 (0.095) for cash compensation (total direct compensation), indicating that a ten percentage increase in shareholder return corresponds to an increase of 0.75% (0.95%) in cash (total direct) compensation. We also find that both the median share holdings and stock‐based pay‐performance sensitivity are lower for UK CEOs when we compare our findings with the previous findings for US CEOs. Thus, our results suggest that corporate governance reports in the UK, such as the Greenbury Report (1995) that proposed CEO compensation be more closely linked to performance, have not been totally effective. Our findings also indicate that institutional ownership has a positive and significant influence on CEO pay‐performance sensitivity of option grants. Finally, we find that longer CEO tenure is associated with lower pay‐performance sensitivity of option grants suggesting the entrenchment effect of CEO tenure.     

The residual claim of rank and file employees

This paper estimates the intensity of the value-maximization incentives for average employees generated through the combination of wage, salary, and bonus mechanisms. This is accomplished through estimation of the elasticity of average employee hourly compensation with respect to changes in firm performance. This performance elasticity indicates the degree of alignment between employee and shareholder objectives, and it can also be interpreted as an incomplete residual income claim for employees. The estimated performance elasticity for the full sample of firms is not significantly different from a CEO salary-plus-bonus performance elasticity of 0.1 published in Coughlan and Schmidt [Journal of Accounting and Economics 7 (1985) 43]. Jensen and Murphy [Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990) 225] find that CEOs received approximately US$3.25 for each US$1000 increase in shareholder wealth. This translates to an elasticity of just over 57, but most of these payments come through channels other than salaries and bonuses. Jensen and Murphy report a performance sensitivity of salary and bonus payments for CEOs that is equivalent to analogous elasticities for rank and file workers reported in this paper. While the rewards CEOs receive through salary and bonus channels are larger than those of average employees in absolute terms, these rewards represent comparable fractions of income. This paper also finds differences in the pay-performance link based on firm size. The estimated performance elasticity is 0.197 in small firms and is indistinguishable from zero in large firms. The results indicate that firms use wage, salary and bonus adjustments to direct approximately 5.3% of firm value increases to employees. Although the precise link between pay and performance is not visible with this data, these results indicate that average employees benefit when the firm performs well.     

Optimal CEO Compensation with Search: Theory and Empirical Evidence

We integrate an agency problem into search theory to study executive compensation in a market equilibrium. A CEO can choose to stay or quit and search after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the firm. The market equilibrium endogenizes CEOs’ and firms’ outside options and captures contracting externalities. We show that the optimal pay‐to‐performance ratio is less than one even when the CEO is risk neutral. Moreover, the equilibrium pay‐to‐performance sensitivity depends positively on a firm's idiosyncratic risk and negatively on the systematic risk. Our empirical tests using executive compensation data confirm these results.     

Habit persistence: Explaining cross-sectional variation in returns and time-varying expected returns

This paper uses an iterated GMM approach to estimate and test the consumption based habit persistence model of Campbell and Cochrane [Campbell, J.Y., Cochrane, J.H., 1999. By force of habit: A consumption-based explanation of aggregate stock market behavior. Journal of Political Economy 107, 205–251] on the US stock market. The empirical evidence shows that the model is able to explain the size premium, but fails to explain the value premium. Further, the state variable of the model – the surplus consumption ratio – explains counter-cyclical time-varying expected returns on stocks. The model also produces plausible low real risk-free rates despite high relative risk aversion.     

Corporate performance and CEO compensation in China

This paper examines the compensation of CEOs in China's listed firms. First, we discuss what is known about the setting of CEO compensation and then we go on to examine factors that may help explain variations in the use of performance related pay. In China, listed firms have a dominant or controlling shareholder and we argue that the distinct types of controlling shareholder have different impacts on the use of incentive pay. We find that firms that have a State agency as the major shareholder do not appear to use performance related pay. In contrast, firms that have private blockholders or SOEs as their major shareholders relate the CEO's pay to increases in stockholders' wealth or increases in profitability. However the pay–performance sensitivities for CEOs are low and this raises questions about the effectiveness of firms' incentive systems.     

On the predictive power of the surplus consumption ratio

This paper shows that the surplus consumption ratio, specified by Campbell and Cochrane [1999. Journal of Political Economy 107, 205–251], is a good predictor of excess returns at long horizons. We also provide empirical evidence that this variable captures a component of expected returns, not explained by the proxies for the consumption to wealth ratio, cay and cdy, proposed by Lettau and Ludvigson [2001a. Journal of Finance 56, 815–849; 2001b. Journal of Political Economy 109, 1238–1286; 2005. Journal of Financial Economics 76, 583–626]. Moreover, used as a conditioning information for the Consumption based Asset Pricing Model (C)CAPM, the resulting linear model helps to explain for the variation in average returns across the Fama–French (25) portfolios sorted by size and book-to-market characteristics.     

CEO power and the structure of CEO pay

This paper fleshes out the rent extraction view of CEO compensation put forward by the managerial power theory (Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker, 2002), and tests its main implications on the relation between CEO power and the structure of CEO pay. For a measure of CEO power most relevant to managerial power theory, we use the CEO pay slice due to Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011). Based on the sample of S&P 500 firms for the period of 1999–2008, we find that the implied relation between power and pay is largely supported. Our findings suggest that the managerial power theory has relevance in explaining the relation between power and pay when the focus is on managerial bargaining power. Given the multiple dimensions of CEO power, however, the scope of power may need to be broadened for a better understanding of how managerial power affects firm performance.     

Auditors’ Economic Incentives and the Sensitivity of Managerial Pay to Accounting Performance

The use of managerial incentives to manage earnings in order to enhance accounting performance‐based compensation is greater when auditors have economic incentives to compromise their independence. Hence, compensation committees face more difficulties in determining cash compensation when earnings quality declines. This study investigates whether boards of directors can mitigate the agency problems between managers and shareholders by being aware of the opportunistic earnings management encouraged by auditors’ economic incentives and actively adjusting performance‐based compensation for the reduced earnings quality. To this end, it examines how auditors’ economic incentives affect the sensitivity of managerial pay to accounting performance. The findings show a negative association between the client's economic importance to the auditor and the sensitivity of managerial pay to accounting performance, with this association more pronounced for firms that opportunistically inflate earnings, suggesting that boards mitigate agency problems by actively intervening to modify performance‐based compensation schemes for the reduced earnings quality. Additional analyses show that board effectiveness in determining compensation depends on its characteristics. These results suggest the urgent need to oblige companies to establish compensation committees, particularly in countries that lack such a mandatory requirement or where few companies have such committees.     

Consumer confidence indices and stock markets' meltdowns

Consumer confidence indices (CCIs) are a closely monitored barometer of countries' economic health and an informative forecasting tool. Using European and US data, we provide a case study of the two recent stock market meltdowns (the post-dotcom bubble correction of 2000–2002 and the 2007–2009 decline at the beginning of the financial crisis) to contribute to the discussion on their appropriateness as proxies for stock markets' investor sentiment. Investor sentiment should positively covary with stock market movements [DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann. 1990. “Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets.” Journal of Political Economy 98 (4): 703–738]; however, we find that the CCI–stock market relationship is not universally positive. We also do not find support for the information effect documented in the previous literature, but identify a more subtle relationship between consumer expectations about future household finances and stock market fluctuations.     

CEO gender and managerial entrenchment

This paper investigates the effect of gender on managerial authority and control over firms. The study examines S&P 1500 firms for the period of 1999–2014. Our findings suggest that accounting performance, firm value, CEO age, firm age, and board size reduce the likelihood of appointing female managers. On the other hand, the appointment of female CEOs is directly associated with the percentage of female directors, board independence, and beta. The study confirms the notion that female CEO appointments are generally associated with firms facing adverse conditions, and shows that female CEOs are more entrenched as compared to male CEOs. We find that the presence of female CEO decreases the turnover-performance sensitivity, increases the E-index, and inflates CEO compensation. Our research suggests that the level of female CEOs’ entrenchment provides them with greater job security, higher level of control, and inflated pay that compensate the risk of accepting the appointment in a high risk and poor performing firm.     

Outside monitoring and CEO compensation in the banking industry

We hypothesize that CEO compensation is optimally designed to trade off two types of agency problems: the standard shareholder-management agency problem as well as the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debtholders. Analyses in this setup produces two predictions: (1) the pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation decreases with the leverage ratio; and (2) the pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation increases with the intensity of outside monitoring on the firm's risk choice. We test these two hypotheses for the banking industry where regulators and nondepository (subordinated) debtholders provide outside monitoring on the risk choice. We construct an index of the intensity of outside monitoring based on three variables: subordinated debt rating, non performing loan ratio and examination rating assigned by regulators. We find supporting evidence for both hypotheses.     

Executive compensation,firm performance,and Chaebols in Korea: Evidence from new panel data

Using new panel data for 246 publicly-traded firms in Korea from 1998 to 2001, we find that cash compensation of Korean executives is significantly related to stock market performance and that the magnitude of the pay–performance sensitivity is comparable to that of the U.S. and Japan. Further analysis reveals for the first time that such overall significant executive pay–performance link is driven by non-Chaebol firms and that no such link exists for Chaebol firms. The evidence is consistent with the recent literature on the nature of Chaebols in Korea and the current corporate governance reform efforts in Korea that are aimed mostly at Chaebol firms.     

Investment spikes: New facts and a general equilibrium exploration

Using plant-level data from Chile and the U.S., we show that investment spikes are highly pro-cyclical, so much so that changes in the number of establishments undergoing investment spikes (the “extensive margin”) account for the bulk of variation in aggregate investment. The number of establishments undergoing investment spikes also has independent predictive power for aggregate investment, even controlling for past investment and sales. We re-calibrate the Thomas [2002. Is lumpy investment relevant for the business cycle. Journal of Political Economy, CX 508–534] model (that includes fixed costs of investing) so that it assigns a prominent role to extensive adjustment. The recalibrated model has different properties than the standard RBC model for some shocks.