大股东制衡机制对审计意见的影响——来自深市509家上市公司的经验数据

本文选取深市509家上市公司2004年度的相关数据为研究样本。从公司治理角度分析前三大股东的持股比例以及他们之间的股权制衡对上市公司审计意见的影响。运用Logistic回归模型分析得出：第一大股东持股比例与上市公司年报被出具非标准审计意见的可能性负相关，并且两者存在正“U”形关系。第二、第三大股东对第一大股东的监督制衡能力较弱，并没有充分利用外部审计约束的作用来保护其他股东的权益。     

个人大股东持股与股价暴跌风险

本文以2007至2016年中国A股上市公司为样本,考察了个人大股东持股与股价暴跌风险之间的关系。研究发现:第一,个人大股东持股比例的增加能够显著降低公司未来股价暴跌风险。这一结论在剔除了个人大股东中董监高持股数量、进行内生性处理、更换不同统计检验方法后依然成立。第二,个人大股东持股对公司管理层监督的效果并不明显,个人大股东持股比例的增加对于公司应计盈余管理、真实盈余管理、投资效率、过度投资等可能影响公司股价暴跌风险的经营指标并没有显著影响。第三,个人大股东的持股加强了公司股权制衡的力度,进而显著降低了公司股价暴跌风险。股权制衡机制解释了大股东持股对股价暴跌风险一半以上的影响。本文的研究对于全面认识个人大股东在资本市场中发挥的作用,促进股市平稳发展具有重要的理论和现实意义。     

大股东交易与中国A股市场股价暴涨暴跌风险北大核心

本文以2008-2016年A股上市公司为样本,研究大股东增持或减持股票如何影响股价极端波动现象的发生。结果表明:大股东交易强度提升显著增加了股价暴涨暴跌风险,其影响主要来源于大股东减持而非大股东增持;上市公司的信息透明度越低、管理层持股比例越高、管理层权力越小,则大股东交易对股价极端波动风险的影响越显著;较高比例的机构投资者持股和独立董事设置能够有效加强对上市公司的监督,削弱大股东交易对股价极端波动风险的不利影响。为了进一步规范大股东交易行为、维护股票市场稳定运行,提出以下对策建议:第一,完善规制大股东交易行为的法律法规和监管规则,防范内幕交易,避免大股东集中、大幅、无序减持股票对市场稳定带来冲击;第二,强化上市公司信息披露要求,提高信息透明度;第三,推动上市公司吸引机构投资者持股、提高独立董事比例,优化公司内部制衡和外部监督机制,以实现对大股东行为的有效制衡和约束。     

代理成本、弹性信息披露对审计收费的影响

本文研究了大股东与中小股东间的代理成本及弹性信息披露对审计收费的影响。我们发现上市公司不存在两权分离的情况下,大股东持股比例较低时,大股东持股比例与审计收费负相关;大股东持股比例较高时,大股东持股比例与审计收费正相关;两权分离程度较低的情况下,大股东持股比例较低时,大股东持股比例与审计收费负相关;两权分离程度较高的情况下,大股东持股比例较高时,大股东持股比例与审计收费负相关。上市公司弹性信息披露程度越高,审计收费越低;两权分离的存在会削弱弹性信息披露程度与审计收费之间的负相关关系。     

上市公司大股东的“掏空”路径及制衡机制研究

在中国股权相对集中或高度集中的上市公司中,由于控股股东或大股东掌握着公司的实际控制权,大股东的自利天性与机会主义行为可能导致其利用资金占用、关联交易、股利政策和内幕交易等种种手段实现大股东掏空。为遏制大股东掏空现象的泛滥,需从内部治理和外部制衡两个角度,构建大股东掏空的内外部制衡机制,以保护中小股东权益的不受侵害。     

管理层内部联盟与审计意见购买

本文以2003－2020年中国沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究管理层内部联盟与审计意见购买之间的关系。研究发现,管理层内部联盟关系越紧密,上市公司越可能进行审计意见购买。进一步研究发现,在国有企业、第一大股东持股比例低以及股权制衡度高的企业,管理层内部联盟与审计意见购买之间的关系更为显著;而声誉机制会提升会计师事务所的独立性,抑制审计意见购买行为。研究结论丰富了管理层内部联盟、审计意见购买和审计独立性等领域的文献,为优化公司治理和上市公司审计市场监管提供了理论支持和经验证据。     

上市公司大股东“掏空”路径及其制衡机制研究

本文运用公司治理的理论与研究方法,针对目前中国资本市场上存在的大股东掏空上市公司、侵占中小投资者权益问题进行了深入研究,从资金占用、关联交易、股利政策、内幕交易等角度剖析上市公司大股东的掏空路径,并在此基础上,从内部治理与外部制衡两个角度构建针对上市公司大股东掏空问题的政策建议与相关制度安排.     

公司治理对财务控制的影响——来自我国制造业上市公司的证据

本文以代理理论为指导,运用我国制造业上市公司调查数据和公开数据,考察了公司治理对财务控制的影响。实证研究发现,第一大股东持股比例、独立董事制度、董事会活跃程度等因素对财务控制效果有显著影响。改善财务控制需要从公司治理方面入手,包括建立健全约束大股东行为的相关机制,提高董事会独立性作为制衡大股东的重要措施,运用组合治理机制,实现对财务控制的再控制;多元化经营的公司要重视企业集团的内部治理,重视财务控制系统的更新与变革。     

上市公司大股东利益输送行为的影响因素研究

本文以2006-2008年我国A股上市公司的年报数据为基础,实证检验了公司内部治理结构和外部市场环境对大股东利益输送行为的影响。结果表明,大股东利益输送程度与大股东持股比例正相关,与第二至第十大股东持股比例负相关,与政府干预程度负相关。同时,经历了国有企业改革的国有上市公司,近几年来在中央地方和地方国资委的监管下,大股东利益输送行为较非国有企业有明显的减少。     

监督还是合谋:多个大股东与公司内部控制质量

中国上市公司大股东持股比例相对较高,大股东之间可能存在合谋掏空或监督制衡的关系,为此,以2008~2016年A股上市公司为样本,探究多个大股东的股权结构对公司内部控制质量的影响。研究发现：相对于只有单一大股东的公司而言,具有多个大股东的公司内部控制质量更高;大股东数量越多、非控股大股东持股比例越高、大股东之间股权偏离度越低,公司内部控制质量越高;外国投资者和国有法人大股东能够显著提升公司内部控制质量;多个大股东的治理效应主要体现在非国有企业中,公司所处地区的法律及市场环境越好,多个大股东监督效应对公司内部控制质量的提升作用越明显。     

Multiple blockholders and earnings management

This paper examines the impact of multiple blockholders on earnings management when the main conflict of interest is between controlling shareholder and other shareholders. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2000 to 2017 and controlling for potential sample selection and endogeneity, we find that firms with multiple blockholders tend to have higher earnings management than firms with a single controlling shareholder. The positive impact of multiple blockholders on earnings management is more pronounced when those blockholders are the same type – state or private. Earnings management is also enhanced with more large shareholders and higher relative ownership of other large shareholders to the controlling shareholder. The results are consistent with the cost-sharing hypothesis, where the other large shareholders shoulder the costs of earnings management with the controlling shareholder proportionally, but not the private benefits of control. Further tests show that the positive relation between multiple large shareholders and earnings management is less pronounced in firms with stronger internal or external governance. Overall, our paper demonstrates a potential dark side of multiple blockholders from the angle of financial reporting quality.     

股权制衡与内部控制有效性——基于2008—2010年酿酒类上市公司的案例分析

基于中国特殊的公司治理环境,早前研究内部控制主要集中在概念框架、影响因素辨析以及公司治理失效案例的研究,然这些研究鲜有将股权制衡作为重要因素之一加以考虑。本文通过对三家酿酒类上市公司的案例分析,从控股(制衡)股东性质、股权制衡效果等角度剖析了提高中国上市公司内部控制有效性的机理路径。研究结果表明:在实际控制人为国有时,引入非国有制衡股东能达到较优的内部控制状态,而引入国有制衡股东仅微弱地优于无制衡股东的高度集中的内部控制状态,且两者并不明显。     

中期财务报告自愿审计的动机和市场反应分析——基于中国上市公司的经验数据

作为外部治理机制的审计是公司信息披露质量的重要保证,目前法规对上市公司中期财务报告的审计并无强制性法规要求,许多上市公司选择中期财务报表自愿审计,其行为是一种主动传递信息的过程。本文通过对我国上市公司2007至2010年证券市场自愿中报审计的经验数据分析,对公司自愿中报审计的动机和市场反应进行了实证研究。研究发现:公司中期财务报表自愿审计与公司的成长性和公司规模显著相关,且公司的财务状况和股权性质对公司的自愿审计有一定影响;同时,市场对上市公司中期财务报告自愿审计行为有一定的正面反应,但这种反应效力不足,且持续力较低。     

Do minority acquisitions transfer better corporate governance practices? An analysis of UK's cross-border minority investments

This study examines the influence of minority shareholders on the transfer of corporate governance practices into companies in other countries where they invest. By analysing UK firms that acquired a minority ownership in foreign firms between 1993 and 2014, we find evidence of better corporate governance in the board structure of target foreign firms following UK firms taking a minority shareholding, the extent and nature of the changes varying depending on the quality of investor protection in the country the foreign target firm is located. Our findings contribute to the on-going debates on the spillover effect of better corporate governance practices via cross-border mergers and acquisitions as well as relationship between internal (board of directors) and external (country's quality of investor protection) corporate governance mechanisms.     

Tacit vigilance in an emerging economy: An institution-based perspective of passive blockholder monitoring

We argue that the relative effectiveness of active and passive blockholder monitoring is driven by the institutional context of the Korean financial market, characterized by the dominance of chaebols and the pressure sensitivity of institutional blockholders. We believe that the extensive business ties between chaebols and blockholders effectively increase the cost of shareholder activism in Korea, making passive monitoring a more applicable governance mechanism for blockholders. We test whether passive monitoring affects a firm’s earnings quality, represented by earnings persistence, value relevance, and timeliness. Furthermore, we decompose institutional shareholding by portfolio turnover and nationality and then determine the monitoring channel that influences earnings quality. We find that passive monitoring by domestic blockholders is most effective in improving earnings quality in Korea. In addition, our findings highlight that the difference between the institutional context of developed economies and that of Korea results in different outcomes related to blockholder monitoring.     

The effect of audit committee shareholding,financial expertise and size on interim financial disclosures

In recent years, corporate failures and accounting irregularities have led to concerns about the effectiveness of audit committees in the financial reporting process. In response, corporate governance committees in different countries have made specific recommendations designed to enhance the role of the audit committee in executing its financial reporting oversight duties. We investigate in this study, the effect of some of these recommendations by empirically examining the relationship between selected audit committee characteristics and the level of disclosure in interim reports of a sample of 262 UK listed companies. Specifically, the audit committee characteristics examined are shareholding of audit committee members (as a proxy for audit committee independence), audit committee size and audit committee financial expertise. Employing both a weighted and unweighted index to measure interim disclosure, the results indicate a significant negative association between shareholding of audit committee members and interim disclosure. Our results provide evidence of a significant positive association between interim disclosure and audit committee financial expertise. We find no significant relationship between audit committee size and the extent of disclosure in interim reports. Overall, however, our results suggest that audit committee characteristics have an impact on its monitoring effectiveness of the financial reporting process. These results have important implications for corporate governance policy-makers who have a responsibility to prescribe appropriate corporate governance structures to ensure that shareholders are protected.     

中小银行机构公司治理机制的替代效应

本文利用对山东省中小商业银行机构的调查数据,考察了金融机构各种监督机制之间的替代效应。笔者分别通过构建一个线性模型和一个Probit模型来对外部董事、管理层持股、董事长/总经理两职分离、大股东和监管机构这五种监督机制的替代效应进行研究,并对这些变量作了统计分析。通过回归结果,笔者发现在两种外部监督机制之间存在显著的替代效应,内部监督机制中的外部董事比例与外部监督机制之间也存在替代效应,但是其他两个内部监督机制并没有表现出这种效应,而内部监督机制之间则存在显著的互补效应。     

中小银行机构公司治理机制的替代效应

本文利用对山东省中小商业银行机构的调查数据,考察了金融机构各种监督机制之间的替代效应.笔者分别通过构建一个线性模型和一个Probit模型来对外部董事、管理层持股、董事长/总经理两职分离、大股东和监管机构这五种监督机制的替代效应进行研究,并对这些变量作了统计分析.通过回归结果,笔者发现在两种外部监督机制之间存在显著的替代效应,内部监督机制中的外部董事比例与外部监督机制之间也存在替代效应,但是其他两个内部监督机制并没有表现出这种效应,而内部监督机制之间则存在显著的互补效应.     

From Member of the Company to Registered Auditor: The Role of the External Auditor in Corporate Governance

Corporate governance has often been defined in a narrow way as comprising 'the range of control mechanisms that protect and enhance the interests of shareholders of business enterprises' ( Fama and Jensen 1983 ). In the corporate governance literature there has also been a general focus on the structure and functioning of boards of directors and the responsibilities of audit committees in relation to external auditing ( Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990 ; Shleifer and Vishny 1997 ). This article looks at the evolution of the role of external auditing in corporate governance. The role of the external auditor has changed through time, and consequently it should not be assumed that the role of external auditing is fixed or that it cannot be changed to meet societal needs and expectations. This observation leads to the primary argument of our article, which is that the role of the external auditor in corporate governance ought to be expanded in order to enhance the effectiveness of corporate governance for the benefit of a wider spectrum of stakeholders and society generally.