Understanding Housing Market Volatility

The Campbell–Shiller present value formula implies a factor structure for the price–rent ratio of housing market. Using a dynamic factor model, we decompose the price–rent ratios of 23 major housing markets into a national factor and independent local factors, and we link these factors to the economic fundamentals of the housing markets. We find that a large fraction of housing market volatility is local and that the national factor has become more important than local factors in driving housing market volatility since 1999, consistent with the findings in Del Negro and Otrok (2007). The local volatilities mostly are due to time variations of idiosyncratic housing market risk premia, not local growth. At the aggregate level, the growth and interest rate factors jointly account for less than half of the total variation in the price–rent ratio. The rest is due to the aggregate housing market risk premium and a pricing error. We find evidence that the pricing error is related to money illusion, especially at the onset of the recent housing market bubble. The rapid rise in housing prices prior to the 2008 financial crisis was accompanied by both a large increase in the pricing error and a large decrease in the housing market risk premium.     

Rent control with rationing by search costs: A note

This note derives the long-run implications of rent controls when rent-controlled apartments are implicitly rationed to tenants who are more efficient in searching for apartments in the controlled sector. Rent controls are shown to involve transfers that essentially are from some to other tenants, as well as dead-weight losses due to higher search costs that are borne by tenants. Key to this analysis is the condition that, at the margin, rent plus the higher cost of search for a rent-controlled apartment must equal rent in the noncontrolled sector.     

Risk and return in residential spatial markets: An empiric and theoretic model

The paper is concerned with price and rent fluctuations in predominantly owner-occupied residental real estate. It presents the owner-occupier household as a housing consumer as well as an investor. It conjectures that since risk and return are known to be positively related in financial markets, they might also be thus related in residential real estate markets. If that is so, neighborhoods that are known to yield high returns will be the ones less price and rent stable than low yielding ones.The Capital Asset Pricing Model is not helpful in explaining a possible risk/return relationship in housing markets. Its major assumption about portfolio diversification is contrary to the nature of owner-occupied residential real estate. An owner occupier household, by definition, holds one unit of the asset and acts simultaneously as an investor and consumer of housing. For the capital market investor, investment and consumption decisions are separable. Therefore, a new theoretical model of consumer choice is proposed. Tel-Aviv price and rent data during a volatile market period are used for testing the main risk/return conjecture as well as other related hypotheses stemming from the model. The findings lend support to the conjecture and shed light on possible spatial determinants of owners' risk.     

What do economists know about the effect of rent control on housing maintenance?

Economists' views concerning the effect of rent control on the maintenance of controlled apartments are based on extremely simple models of housing markets and rent control ordinances and on casual empiricism. This paper shows that the models are seriously deficient in that they ignore essential features of actual rent control ordinances and important responses to them. When these features and responses are taken into account, the effect of rent control on maintenance of the controlled stock is theoretically ambiguous. The paper also shows that the few systematic empirical studies have serious flaws. Therefore, there is no basis for economists' strongly-held belief that rent control leads to worse maintenance.     

House Price Index Construction in the Nascent Housing Market: The Case of China

Most existing house price index construction methods are developed mainly based on transaction data from the secondary housing market, and are not necessarily suitable for the nascent housing markets where a predominant portion of housing transactions are new units. Using the booming market in China as an example, we evaluate and compare the performances of three most common house price measurement methods in the newly-built housing sector, including the simple average method without quality adjustment, the matching approach with the repeat sales modeling framework, and the hedonic modeling approach. Our analyses suggest that the simple average method fails to account for the substantial complex-level quality changes over time of sales during our sample period, and the matching model fails to control for the effect of developers’ pricing behaviors when adopted in the newly-built sector, hence both are downward biased. Based on this finding, we apply a hedonic method, which allows us to control for both quality changes over time of sales and developers’ pricing behaviors, to 35 major newly-built housing markets and provide the first multi-city constant-quality house price index in China. The new index reveals that the current Chinese housing market is facing a greater risk of mispricing than reported by the existing official metrics.     

What Drives Housing Markets: Fundamentals or Bubbles?

This study applies the dynamic Gordon growth model which is in the circumstance of rational bubbles to decompose log price-rent ratio into three parts, i.e., rational bubbles, discounted expected future rent growth rates and discounted expected future returns. The latter two terms represent housing fundamentals. The magnitudes of the components of price-rent ratio’s variance are estimated to distinguish the relative impact of the three parts on housing prices. Using time series data from the housing markets in the four largest cities in China (1991:Q1–2011:Q1 for Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen; 1993:Q2–2011:Q1 for Beijing), this paper presents a number of empirical findings: (a) the variance of rational bubbles is much larger than the variance of price-rent ratio, and rational bubbles contribute more fluctuations directly to price-rent ratio than the expected returns or the expected rent growth rates do; (b) the covariance between rational bubbles and expected returns or expected rent growth rates is also large; (c) the positive covariance of rational bubbles and expected returns implies that high expected returns coexist with bubbles, which differs from previous findings that lower expected returns drive asset prices; (d) the negative covariance of rational bubbles and expected rent growth rates indicates that the larger the bubbles are, the lower the expected rent growth rates are; (e) the positive covariance of expected returns and expected rent growth rates reveals under-reaction of the housing markets to rents.     

Housing Vouchers,Tenant Quality,and Apartment Values

Landlords face unique concerns in maximizing profits when they accept subsidized as well as unsubsidized tenants. Subsidized tenants come with lower rental collection risk because part or all of the rent is paid by a public agency and accepting subsidized tenants may widen the potential tenant market. But subsidized tenants tend to reduce overall tenant quality and to impose higher operating costs. By accepting subsidies, landlords may also subject themselves to periodic site inspections that may increase capital costs. Further, subsidized tenants may eventually crowd out unsubsidized tenants, lowering the average quality of the resident mix. Tests from Washington, DC apartments on accepting and advertising for Section 8 tenants support these qualitative predictions. Accepting Section 8 tenants enhances revenues, but advertising for them lowers revenues. More aggressive solicitation of subsidized tenants leads to a crowding out or displacement risk that dominates over any diminished collection risk.     

Economic and political aspects of negotiated rents in the Swedish housing market

The aim of this paper is to describe the rent control system in Sweden, evaluate the effects on consumption and production in the housing market, and provide a public choice explanation of the present rent control system.The first section of this paper contains introductory remarks and an overview of the rental market in Sweden. The Swedish rent control system and its prerequisites are described in section 2. Attention is given to two important prerequisites: the existence of a large municipal housing sector and a strong tenants' movement. As a result, a rent system has been developed with all rents set by negotiations. The rent structure is determined by a fairness principle, which has some resemblance to market adapted rents. The rent level will be determined by a non-profit condition in municipal housing companies.In section 3 the effects of the existing rent control system are discussed with the municipality of Stockholm as a test case. Effects on rent level and rent structure are evaluated, and the relation between rent policy in municipal housing companies and resulting rents in private housing is analyzed. Gains and losses to tenants and landlords are evaluated as well as effects on construction and maintenance.In section 4 a political perspective is discussed. The aim is to explain why the system is not implemented in the market adapted way it was intended. Finally, the future of the rent system is discussed.     

Does Residential Housing Crowd Out or Promote Households’ Stock Investment? Evidence from China

Limited participation in risky financial markets has long been a puzzle. Empirical evidence shows a strong relationship between housing and investment of risky financial assets, but with varying and conflicting results. We contribute to the literature by distinguishing housing for consumption and for investment, and by considering the role of housing price expectation when exploring households’ participation in stock markets. We find that home equity ratio and housing area play significant roles in households’ participation in stock markets. Households with higher home equity ratio or larger housing are less likely to own, and hold fewer stock assets if they do. We also find that the number of houses has a positive effect on stock investment for households with the same home equity ratio and housing size, which could be explained by credit rationing. Furthermore, housing price expectation has a negative effect on stock investment; this effect is larger for homeowners with multiple houses who are more likely to take houses for investment. Our results show insights into conflicting results of the relationship between real estate and stock investment.     

Is there a tradeoff between bank competition and financial fragility?

We use a model of mean-shifting investment technologies to study the relationship between market structure, risk taking and social welfare in lending markets. Introduction of loan market competition is shown to reduce lending rates and to generate higher investments without increasing the equilibrium bankruptcy risk of borrowers. Hence, there need not be a tradeoff between lending market competition and financial fragility. Such a tradeoff may not emerge either when banks compete by conditioning interest rates on investment volumes irrespectively of whether credit rationing takes place or not.     

The economic effects of long-term rent control: The case of New York City

This article presents a simple model of rent control in which the costs and benefits can be analyzed in terms of Hicksian consumer and producer surpluses. Data from New York City are then used to examine the effect of the long-term rent control in that city. Estimates are presented which suggest that the program provided tenants with benefits amounting to about 5 percent of their income in the years 1965 and 1968. Additional evidence shows that tenant benefits declined rather sharply between the two years, and that in each of the years benefits were higher for older tenants, richer tenants, and white tenants than for their counterparts. Finally, evidence presented here suggests that, due to the in-kind nature of the program, the cost to landlords exceeded the benefits to tenants by about 75 percent.     

住房资产对中国家庭风险金融资产配置的影响研究

随着时代的发展,住房资产与金融资产的联系越来越紧密,逐渐向住房资产金融产品化发展,成为一种新型金融产品,呈现出货币化和金融化的趋势。本文使用probit模型、普通最小二乘法(OLS)、中介效应以及调节效应,采用2015年中国家庭金融问卷调查微观数据(CHFS)对住房资产价值细化,从住房增值、住房贷款和住房总值三个方面对居民家庭风险金融市场进入和风险金融资产配置的影响进行研究。研究发现:(1)住房总值和住房增值对居民家庭是否参与金融市场呈现显著的负向影响,住房贷款对其具有正向影响。(2)住房贷款对居民家庭风险金融资产投资有负向影响,住房增值和住房总值对其有正向影响。(3)幸福感在居民家庭是否参与金融市场和住房增值中存在部分中介效应,安全感在居民家庭风险金融投资和住房贷款之间存在部分中介效应,未来预期在居民家庭是否参与金融市场与居民家庭是否拥有住房贷款中存在调节效应。最后,根据实证结果提出完善金融市场和优化居民金融资产结构的政策建议。     

A Comparison of Federal Government Office Rents with Market Rents

This study examines Federal Government office leases using data from Texas and Oklahoma during the 1981–1991 time period. The lease indifference model presented here indicates that landlords may be willing to accept lower rents from government tenants due to reduced tenant risk, but that such discounts may be offset by other premiums implicit in the lease contract. The data collected for this study reveal that rents paid by the government are significantly higher than average market rents during this time period. A time-series, cross-sectional regression analysis of the spread between market rents and office rents to government tenants in nine metropolitan markets suggests that the difference is affected in part by expense pass-throughs, lease period, amount of space leased, and local market conditions.     

The Great Capitol Hill Baby Sitting Co‐op: Anecdote or Evidence for the Optimum Quantity of Money?

This paper studies a centralized market with idiosyncratic uncertainty and money as a medium of exchange from a theoretical as well as an experimental perspective. In our model, prices are fixed and markets are cleared by rationing. We prove the existence of stationary monetary equilibria and of an optimum quantity of money. The rational solution of our model, which is based on the assumption of individual rationality and rational expectations, is compared with actual behavior in a laboratory experiment. The theoretical results are strongly supported by this experiment.     

Financial services consumption constraints: Empirical evidence from Rwandan rural households

The concentration of banking and financial institutions in the city and/or urban in any developing countries in general, Rwanda in particular creates various constraints in availing and consuming different financial products and services by the rural households. The article examines the forms and determinants of credit constraint status of rural households of Rwanda and the impact of constraints variables on availing and using the range of financial products and services. The study concludes that 42.5 per cent of the Rwandan rural households surveyed face triple forms of credit constraints including self-imposed constraints, quantity rationing and risk rationing by formal financial institutions. However, quantity rationing is perhaps not as pervasive as self-imposed rationing and risk rationing by the lenders. The results from the empirically tested model revealed that in addition to demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of households, the variables constraining demand and/or supply of financial services with reference to accessibility were significant predictors of households' credit constraints. The study informs on the needs for innovative systems, products and services that would increase access relax credit constraints and improve rural consumers' welfare. The authors conclude that establishing an enabling legal and regulatory environment, providing adequate public goods and physical infrastructure, designing capacity building and technical assistance programs and maintaining political and macroeconomic stability are perhaps major public and policy issues needed for a robust rural financial market.     

Does credit rationing affect residential investment? Déjà vu all over again

This paper develops an empirical model to examine the impacts of credit rationing on residential investment for the 1960–1984 period. Our statistical results strongly support the position that noninterest rate variables affect mortgage activity and housing construction. Though we find a structural change in the housing construction and mortgage markets in the early 1980s, probably attributable to capital market integration and financial institutional deregulation, noninterest rate terms continue to matter. In other words, credit rationing continues to be an allocative device in the housing and mortgage markets.Earlier versions of this article have been presented at the Western Economic Association Conference, Los Angeles, June 1988; the Tenth Pacific Regional Science Conference, Pusan, Korea, July 1987; the AREUEA Annual Meetings New York City, December 1985; and the American Finance Association Annual Meetings, San Francisco, December 1983.     

Markets versus governments

We provide a simple framework for comparing market allocations with government-regulated allocations. Governments can collect information about individuals’ types and enforce transfers across individuals. Markets (without significant government intervention) have to rely on transactions that are ex post beneficial for individuals. Consequently, governments achieve better risk sharing and consumption smoothing than markets. However, politicians in charge of collective decisions can use the centralized information and the enforcement power of government for their own benefits. This leads to political economy distortions and rents for politicians, making government-operated allocation mechanisms potentially worse than markets. We provide conditions under which it is ex ante beneficial for the society to tolerate the political economy distortions in exchange for the improvement in risk sharing. For example, more effective controls on politicians or higher discount factors of politicians make governments more attractive relative to markets. Moreover, when markets cannot engage in self-enforcing risk-sharing arrangements and income effects are limited, greater risk aversion and greater uncertainty make governments more attractive relative to markets. Nevertheless, we also show theoretically and numerically that the effect of risk aversion on the desirability of markets may be non-monotonic. In particular, when markets can support self-enforcing risk-sharing arrangements, a high degree of risk aversion improves the extent of risk sharing in markets and makes governments less necessary. The same pattern may also arise because of “income effects” on labor supply. Consequently, the welfare gains of governments relative to markets may have an inverse U-shape as a function of the degree of risk aversion of individuals.     

房价波动、金融稳定与最优宏观审慎政策

本文通过构建包含家庭住房抵押借款摩擦和银行贷款摩擦的动态随机一般均衡模型,重点考察了异质性冲击下房价波动对金融稳定的影响。研究发现,房价上涨会导致银行风险溢价及杠杆率显著上升,进而加剧金融体系的内在不稳定。为降低房价波动及维护金融稳定,选取两类宏观审慎政策工具进行逆周期调控实验,结果表明,在住房需求冲击下,金融管理部门应选取贷款价值比政策,且应对房贷积极调控,而对房价进行中性调控。在最终产品部门生产率冲击、房地产部门生产率冲击及跨期偏好冲击下,应选取资本充足率政策,但对房贷和房价调控力度的把握则存在差异。本研究为厘清房价波动对金融稳定的动态传导机制,以及金融管理部门如何选取宏观审慎政策工具以稳定房价并降低系统性金融风险提供了启示。     

风险分类对保险市场效率的影响分析

本文将社会福利作为衡量保险市场效率的标准,分析保险人的风险分类行为是否有助于信息不对称保险市场效率的提高.本文首先证明了信息不对称保险市场存在市场失灵,然后比较了实施风险分类前后社会福利的差异.结论表明:当保险市场处于R-S均衡时,准确性较高的分类能使社会福利得到改进,准确性不高的分类不能使社会福利得到改进;当保险市场...     

Housing-market heterogeneity in a monetary union

This paper studies the implications of cross-country housing-market heterogeneity in a monetary union for both shock transmission and welfare. I develop a two-country new Keynesian general equilibrium model with housing and collateral constraints to explore this issue. The conventional wisdom is that welfare would be higher in a monetary union if mortgage markets were homogeneous. This paper shows instead that welfare is higher only when homogenization does not result in higher aggregate volatility (because of financial accelerator effects) or does not redistribute too much wealth from borrowers to savers.