目的?手段?策略?——如何看跨国公司在华投资的控股问题

<正> 合资企业控股权问题始终是个敏感问题。5年前的1997年国内曾有过一场关于“跨国公司在华投资控股”的激烈讨论,对于跨国公司在华合资企业中外资控股及独资化倾向的利弊得失进行了多角度的探讨,但当时主要着眼于我国宏观经济发展视角。近来,随着中国加     

对在华跨国公司融资管理策略的实证研究——基于广东的调查

对在华跨国公司按合资和独资的组织形式分类,问卷调查了广东省在华跨国公司的融资管理策略.分析表明,在华跨国公司的两类组织企业的融资管理策略没有显著差别,同时,在华跨国公司更为注重适应我国政策环境,尽量在我国本土进行融资,实行集权式资金管理模式,注重内部融资以降低融资成本.     

跨国公司在华投资企业金融风险防范探讨

随着我国改革开放的深入，外资企业特别是跨国公司加大了在我国的投资力度，考虑到跨国公司在经济中的影响力及其需求的复杂性，我国理论界和银行界更多关注如何改进和提升服务，而对跨国公司的风险防范关注不够。本文结合一个跨国公司在华投资企业由盛及衰的真实案例，剖析跨国公司在华投资企业经营中的主要风险，并提出防范风险的对策措施。     

跨国公司在华投资策略调整及对策研究

跨国公司在华投资策略的调整是其全球化战略中的一个重要环节。面对跨国公司在中国投资的迅速发展,我们应从制度和投资环境入手,优化投资环境,鼓励跨国公司在华的并购重组,做好对跨国公司来华投资产业结构和地区结构的引导工作,此外应逐步形成自己的跨国公司,以促进我国经济的健康发展。     

外商投资“独资化”将带给中国什么

近几年来，外商在华投资出现了独资化倾向趋势，引起了国内学术界及有关部门的关注。本文对外商在华投资“独资化”倾向趋势、原因、负面效应进行深入的分析与研究，并在此基础上有针对性地提出相关对策建议     

跨国公司在华投资的市场策略分析

近年来,跨国公司大举投资中国市场,已逐步成为外商在华投资的主流。到目前为止,已有200多个国际知名的跨国公司在华落户,其在华的投资、经营活动必将对我国产生重大而深远的影响。本文拟就跨国公司在华投资的特点、市场策略作进一步的总结和分析,以便为我们今后的吸引利用外资工作提供参考,使我们能及时准确地把握国际资本流动的新态势和新特点,审时度势,趋利避害,更加积极、合理、有效地利用外资。     

现阶段在华企业的独资化发展趋势探究

近些年来，随着经济的不断发展，在华企业出现了比较明显的独资倾向。本文以分析对外商直接投资形成一种模式的影响为基础，分别从微观和宏观这两个层面上分析了在华企业独资化的发展因素，探讨了这种发展倾向对我国企业成长和经济技术的发展所带来的挑战与机遇，并就此现象提出了对应的建议和策略。     

现阶段在华企业的独资化发展趋势探究

近些年来，随着经济的不断发展，在华企业出现了比较明显的独资倾向。本文以分析对外商直接投资形成一种模式的影响为基础，分别从微观和宏观这两个层面上分析了在华企业独资化的发展因素，探讨了这种发展倾向对我国企业成长和经济技术的发展所带来的挑战与机遇，并就此现象提出了对应的建议和策略。     

挑战与机遇：跨国公司在华新趋势

我国投资环境的变化对跨国公司在华经营提出了新挑战与更高要求，跨国公司必须适应公平竞争的新环境，积极应对。     

信息窗

<正> ■中国将允外商创办独资出口采购中心 中国商务部副部长魏建国在第五届中国国际机电产品博览会的“机电制造与跨国公司在华贸易投资机会·世界五百强企业高层论坛”发表演讲时说,为推动跨国采购,发展中国制造业,中国将进一步放宽外商在华采购出口的政策,允许外商在部分地区兴办独资的出     

Agency Problems,Equity Ownership,and Corporate Diversification

We provide evidence on the agency cost explanation for corporate diversification. We find that the level of diversification is negatively related to managerial equity ownership and to the equity ownership of outside blockholders. In addition, we report that decreases in diversification are associated with external corporate control threats, financial distress, and management turnover. These findings suggest that agency problems are responsible for firms maintaining value-reducing diversification strategies and that the recent trend toward increased corporate focus is attributable to market disciplinary forces.     

Agency costs and ownership structure in Australia

Financial economics often assumes that equity agency costs increase with the separation of ownership and control. This paper tests this relationship using a survey sample of approximately 3800 Australian small and medium enterprises for 1996–1997 and 1997–1998. Following Ang et al. [J. Finance 55 (2000) 81], we estimate a zero equity agency cost benchmark (in terms of operating expenses and asset utilization ratios) for the 100% owner-manager firm. We then examine how agency costs change when ownership and control are separated. We report a positive relationship between equity agency costs and the separation of ownership and control.     

优化股权结构:完善上市公司治理结构的突破口

从公司治理结构产生的历史和逻辑来看 ,股权结构和公司治理结构有渊源关系。股权结构是公司治理结构的基础 ,它决定了公司治理的形式和模式。本文对 94 4家上市公司的股权结构进行全面的统计分析 ,并结合各类持股主体的行为特征 ,得出我国公司内、外部治理机制都不能有效发挥作用的结论 ,作者提出了优化我国股权结构进而完善上市公司治理结构的政策建议。     

股权结构与上市公司经营业绩关系研究--基于2016年-2018年A股上市公司的数据

企业的股权结构在一定程度上对企业的经营绩效产生影响。文章利用沪深A股上市公司2016年-2018年的面板数据,主要运用回归模型研究了股权集中度和股权制衡度对上市公司经营绩效的影响。研究结果表明股权集中度越高对上市公司经营业绩起到消极作用,股权集中度越分散越有利于公司经营业绩的提升。     

控制权冲突、资本配置决策与投资组合选择

本文以长期股权投资和固定资产的投资组合选择为研究对象,从控制权私利的视角探讨了大股东自利性动机对资本配置决策的作用机理,并进行了相应的数值模拟。研究发现：（1）固定资产投资规模与长期股权投资高状态收益存在负相关关系,而长期股权投资规模则与其高状态收益概率正相关;（2）大股东自利性动机驱使下的资本配置决策偏离了分散持股时的资本配置水平,偏离程度会随着现金流权与控制权分离度的增加而展现出非线性变化态势。上述研究结论为当前有关加强上市公司大股东财务决策监管的政策导向提供了重要的经验启示。     

Passive Institutional Ownership,R2 Trends,and Price Informativeness

A distinctive trend in the capital markets over the past two decades is the rise in equity ownership of passive financial institutions. We propose that this rise has a negative effect on price informativeness. By not trading around firm‐specific news, passive investors reduce the firm‐specific component of total volatility and increase stock correlations. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that the growth in passive institutional ownership is robustly associated with the growth in market model R²s of individual stocks since the early 1990s. Additionally, we find a negative relation between passive ownership and earnings predictability, an informativeness proxy.     

A theory of private equity turnarounds

This paper explores the advantage of private equity in fixing turnaround situations. Meaningful corporate value creation may require addressing operational problems, replacing management, or changing the incentive structure. Change may be implemented under either without change of ownership or through a buyout. The paper derives scenarios under which transferring ownership to private equity prior to implementing a turnaround can emerge as an optimal solution, even when current ownership can conceivably implement the same operational changes as private equity. Also considered is the possibility of investment syndication in which the private equity buyer shares the transaction with other private equity firms. Various alternatives are considered for implementing turnarounds; in particular, ones that allow for management replacement and others that are effectively management buyouts.     

Large Shareholders and Independent Director Equity Compensation

This paper investigates the use of equity compensation for independent directors, with a focus on the impact of large shareholders on a company's tendency to use equity compensation to align independent directors’ interests with those of shareholders. Based on data from 215 large Australian listed companies from 2005–2009, our analyses show that the use of equity incentive pay for independent directors is more likely when the aggregate ownership percentage of large shareholders is moderate, when there are multiple large shareholders and when the ownership stakes of large shareholders are more comparable. This paper contributes to the literature by providing new evidence of how various aspects of ownership dispersion affect compensation design for independent directors.     

The Political Determinants of the Cost of Equity: Evidence from Newly Privatized Firms

In this paper, we investigate the political determinants of the cost of equity using a unique data set of 236 firms privatized between 1987 and 2006 in 38 countries. We find robust evidence that the cost of equity is increasing in government ownership. We also show that the cost of equity is significantly related to political orientation and the extent of government expropriation. Furthermore, we report a less pronounced effect of state ownership on the cost of equity in more populist governments and in more financially developed countries, in addition to a more pronounced effect of state ownership on the cost of equity when the risk of government expropriation is higher. Results from an event study examining the replacement of left‐wing governments by right‐wing governments suggest a lower cost of equity in more financially developed countries and a higher cost of equity in more autocratic countries and in countries with a high risk of government expropriation. Finally, we find that chief executive turnover is associated with a higher cost of equity in more autocratic countries.     

城市商业银行股权结构改革的制度经济学解释

产权结构的优化依然是城市商业银行完善公司治理、提高银行经营效率的决定因素。城市商业银行制度演变的逻辑起点,决定了地方政府对城市商业银行的绝对控制权的掌握,进而决定了城市商业银行产权制度安排的非效率特征,也决定了城市商业银行的产权结构改革的趋势。正是城市商业银行的产权结构的制度安排现状,成为产权制度强制性变迁的路径依赖。"金股"机制前提下的多元化股权制度安排,不失为城市商业银行产权变迁的政策切入点。