上市公司盈余预告择时披露策略及市场反应研究——基于股票市场波动的视角

盈余预告研究一直是学者们关注的重点领域,其披露规律也是学术界重要谜团之一。本文提出影响盈余预告披露的新机制——股市的波动性,并借此为特有的研究场景来观测管理层择时披露行为。本文以2003-2015年管理层盈余预告披露的上市公司为样本,实证检验上市公司管理层是否会利用股票市场的高频波动来选择盈余预告信息披露的时机及该策略的实施效果。研究发现:公司管理层盈余预告披露决策会隐性观察市场的波动态势及其幅度,基于披露法定的时滞裁量空间,利用短期市场行情波动性选择较优的披露时机。具体体现在管理层倾向选择市场行情上升期披露更多坏消息,在市场行情下降期披露更多好消息;与不使用该策略的公司相比,使用该策略的公司能获得更好市场反应。     

公司内部治理与会计信息透明度的实证研究——基于我国深市A股2008-2011年的经验数据

基于我国深市A股2008-2011年上市公司的经验数据,以深交所信息披露考评结果衡量会计信息透明度,采用有序Logistic回归检验了股权结构、董事会特征和管理层激励等公司内部治理因素对会计信息透明度的影响。研究表明,提高第一大股东持股比例、同时发行B股或H股、扩大董事会规模可显著提高会计信息透明度;两职合一不利于会计信息透明度的提高;独立董事比例和高管持股比例对会计信息透明度无显著影响;公司规模越大、业绩越好,会计信息透明度越高。     

企业社会责任报告择时披露现象研究

本文以2010年至2014年间披露社会责任报告的A股上市公司为样本,从企业履行社会责任的质量出发,探讨了不同所有制企业社会责任履行质量对择时披露社会责任报告的影响。结果表明,社会责任履行质量越高时,国有企业倾向交易日披露,而非国有企业倾向于周末披露。进一步研究发现,供应商、客户及消费者权益责任及环境责任的履行质量是国有企业择时披露的重要原因,而非国有企业则重点基于员工责任和环境责任的履行质量选择披露时间。     

管理层盈余预告与分析师预测关系的实证研究——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

论文以2006—2010年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,研究了管理层盈余预告消息性质、盈余预告披露精确性对分析师预测行为的影响。研究结果表明,相对于坏消息,管理层对好消息的预告会得到均衡透明的披露,因此分析师跟踪人数更多,预测更为准确,分歧度更小。另外还发现盈余预告精确性的提高对分析师跟踪人数并无显著影响,但是随着管理层盈余预告精确性的提高,分析师的预测误差和分歧度均有所减小。     

供应商集中度影响管理层业绩预告行为吗？——基于业绩预告精确性及其预告态度的视角

基于中国企业间关系信任的历史禀赋与现实情境,以2010-2017年A股公司业绩预告为样本,考察供应商集中度对业绩预告精确性与预告态度的影响。研究发现：供应商集中度越高,管理层业绩预告的精确性越低,预告态度也越倾向乐观。进一步研究发现：供应商集中度对业绩预告的精确性负向影响在业绩预告修正情况下作用更明显,在业绩预告未修正时企业更倾向于乐观的业绩预告;同时企业在自愿披露业绩预告情况下,供应商集中度对业绩预告精确性的反向作用更为显著,企业越倾向于披露乐观的业绩预告。以上研究为理解外部利益相关者与企业未来盈利预测之间的关系提供了直接的经验证据,丰富和拓展了供应商关系型交易影响企业信息披露策略选择的研究。     

异质机构投资者持股对上市公司盈余持续性的影响研究

通过对我国A股市场数据的实证检验和分析,检验不同类型的机构投资者持股行为对公司盈余持续性的影响.研究发现,我国A股市场上市公司存在盈余持续性,并且现金流量的持续性要高于会计应计的持续性;机构投资者持股比例越高,公司盈余持续性越强;独立机构投资者持股比例大的公司盈余持续性较强,非独立机构投资者持股比例对上市公司盈余持续性无显著影响;机构投资者持股集中度越高的公司盈余持续性越强.     

商誉减值与公司业绩预告行为

近年来,商誉减值引发的公司业绩“暴雷”风险成为资本市场的热点话题。本文基于中国A股上市公司数据,考察了商誉减值对业绩预告行为的影响。研究发现,商誉减值提高了公司自愿披露业绩预告积极性,但降低了业绩预告精确度和准确度。机制检验表明,商誉减值通过增加双重代理成本降低业绩预告精确度和准确度;坏消息、卖空机制下,发生商誉减值的公司通过降低业绩预告精确度和准确度以维稳股价的动机更强。进一步分析表明,商誉减值降低业绩预告精确度、准确度的作用在内部控制质量较低、分析师跟踪较少的公司中更显著,在自愿披露公司与强制披露公司之间不存在显著差异。本文结论对政策制定中防范商誉减值风险、完善上市公司信息披露制度提供了实证证据。     

上市保险公司年度业绩预告的信息效应研究

基于事件研究法,用超额收益率分析我国三家上市保险公司年度业绩预告的信息含量,测度了信息披露的公正性,揭示了业绩预告信息质量的进步性。超额收益率和累积超额收益率的变化轨迹显示,三家保险公司的业绩预告都有信息含量;随着披露次数的增多,业绩预告的信息质量都在逐年提高。“好消息”的披露往往会导致累积超额收益率逆转上升;“坏消息”的披露一般能减缓累积超额收益率的下降速度。信息披露公正性的检验表明,当业绩预告为“好消息”时,一般不存在信息泄露;为“坏消息”时,通常存在不同程度的信息泄露。     

卖空限制、意见分歧收敛与信息披露的股价效应——来自A股市场的经验证据

本文从盈余公告对投资者意见分歧影响的角度,解释A股市场年报公告期间的股价反应,在为意见分歧资产定价理论提供经验证据的同时,也为A股市场信息披露股价效应的研究提供一个全新的思路。研究发现,公告前投资者意见分歧程度与股票在公告日附近的超额收益负相关,证明上市公司年报会降低投资者的意见分歧,导致公告前因卖空限制和意见分歧而被高估的股价在公告日附近向其基础价值靠拢。此外,本文还发现上述股价反应在正式公告日前的几个交易日就已出现,证明A股市场存在年报信息提前泄露的情况。进一步研究显示,意见分歧与公告日附近股票超额收益的负相关关系随着机构持股比例和行业集中度的提高而逐渐增强。     

公司社会责任信息披露与公司治理的研究——以有色金属行业上市公司为例

我国越来越多的上市公司选择披露社会责任信息,在完善公司治理结构过程中增加对利益相关者诉求的关注。文章在梳理前人研究的基础上,以有色金属行业上市公司为样本对公司社会责任信息披露与公司治理的关系进行了实证研究。研究发现,国有持股比例、董事会人数、独立董事比例、监事会次数对公司社会责任信息的披露有显著正的影响,而高管持股人数对社会责任信息披露没有显著影响。     

Asymmetric effects of voluntary disclosure on stock liquidity: evidence from 8‐K filings

This paper examines whether the change in stock liquidity subsequent to voluntary disclosure is different between good news and bad news. Using voluntary 8‐K filings, we find that the increase in stock liquidity is more pronounced for firms with good news disclosure than for firms with bad news disclosure. In addition, such findings are stronger when a firm is less visible and when the short‐selling costs are high, suggesting that these two factors play an important role in increasing stock liquidity. Overall, this paper provides evidence that the tone of voluntary 8‐K news is an important determinant of stock liquidity.     

Impact of earnings performance on price‐sensitive disclosures under the Australian continuous disclosure regime

This study examines the relation between accounting earnings and the frequency of price‐sensitive corporate disclosure under Australia's statutory continuous disclosure requirements. Despite low litigation threats and excepting loss‐making firms, results show that firms with earnings declines (bad news) are more likely to make continuous disclosure than firms with earnings increases (good news). This suggests that market forces and regulators’ scrutiny are sufficient to induce a ‘bad news’ disclosure bias. This study also examines the ‘materiality’ requirement under the continuous disclosure requirements and finds a positive relation between disclosure frequency and the magnitude of earnings news. The earnings–return correlation is positively associated with disclosure frequency for the financial services industry.     

企业业绩组合业绩差异与季报披露的时间选择--管理层信息披露的组合动机与信息操作

本文主要考察企业业绩组合、业绩差异与季报披露的时间选择之间的关系以及季报披露时间的信息内涵。实证研究显示,上年年报和一季度季报均为“好消息”,一季度每股收益、净资产收益率和主营业务利润率高的上市公司季报披露时间间隔大;上年年报为“好消息”而一季度季报为“坏消息”,上年年报为“坏消息”而一季度季报为“好消息”,上年年报和一季度季报均为“坏消息”,一季度每股收益比上年度高的上市公司季报披露时间间隔小。这可能是由于一季度季报和上年年报均要求在4月30日之前披露的特殊性,上市公司管理层在信息披露的过程中可能存在组合动机与信息操作行为,一季度季报披露的时间选择可能关键取决于上年年报和一季度季报披露的“好消息”或“坏消息”带来的积极影响或消极影响的组合与权衡。     

Internal control effectiveness,textual risk disclosure,and their usefulness: U.S. evidence

This paper investigates the impact of internal control effectiveness (ICE) on the level of textual risk disclosure (TRD; including aggregate risk disclosure and its tone of good news and bad news about risk). Our findings suggest that firms with an ineffective internal control system exhibit significantly lower levels of TRD than firms with effective internal controls. Besides, we show a significant change in TRD behavior provided by managers of firms with recurrent ineffective internal controls. Pursuant to agency theory, this behavior change is prompted to reduce the expected public uncertainty and agency problems. We also investigate the usefulness of ICE reporting and TRD to the market. Results suggest that firms reporting ineffective internal controls are likely to have higher investor-perceived risk than firms reporting effective internal controls. Furthermore, TRD improves firms' market liquidity, and such improvement is principally driven by good news rather than bad news about risk. Collectively, our results fill an apparent gap in the literature on the importance of ICE, as well as the usefulness of the external auditor's attestation on a firm's internal controls and management TRD.     

Voluntary disclosure and the cost of equity capital: Evidence from management earnings forecasts

This paper examines the directional effects of management earnings forecasts on the cost of equity capital. We find that forecasters of bad news experience a significant increase in the cost of equity capital in the month after their disclosure. Conversely, the cost of equity capital for good news forecasters does not change significantly in the same period. We also indicate that the magnitude of changes in the cost of capital for good news forecasters is significantly lower than that for bad news forecasters and non-forecasters, which suggests that investors may view good news forecasts less credible. Finally, we show that the effect of the subsequent earnings announcement on the cost of equity capital is preempted by the management forecasts for bad news firms, and that the combined effects of the management earnings forecasts and the earnings announcement are not significant for both good news and bad news forecasters. Our paper contributes to the literature by adding evidence on directional effects of voluntary disclosures and on long-term economic consequences of management earnings forecasts.     

Earnings guidance and market uncertainty

We study the effect of disclosure on uncertainty by examining how management earnings forecasts affect stock market volatility. Using implied volatilities from exchange-traded options prices, we find that management earnings forecasts increase short-term volatility. This effect is attributable to forecasts that convey bad news, especially when firms release forecasts sporadically rather than on a routine basis. In the longer run, market uncertainty declines after earnings are announced, regardless of whether there is a preceding earnings forecast. This decline is mitigated when the firm issues a forecast that conveys negative news, implying that these forecasts are associated with increased uncertainty.     

Opportunistic disclosure in press release headlines

This paper examines managerial, self-serving, disclosure practices in the headlines of press releases announcing annual results. Headlines are a framing feature that can be used to capture and retain attention with the ultimate intention of affecting the thoughts and feelings of readers, thus influencing their opinions. Therefore, headlines have a key role in a company's communication strategy. Using a large sample of Spanish listed companies for the years 2005 and 2006, we provide evidence of persistent impression management in press release headlines. Companies, irrespective of whether they perform well or badly, are inclined to stress good news and downplay bad news. Companies with very small profits report surprising amounts of good news. We provide evidence that companies are selective in the performance figures they include in the headlines of press releases. In particular, the disclosure of profits or sales figures in press release headlines is also associated with earnings performance. Finally, we find that larger firms are more likely to issue press releases than smaller ones, consistent with the theory that highly visible firms face a greater demand for information transparency.     

The Credibility of Voluntary Disclosure and Insider Stock Transactions

We examine stock price reaction to voluntary disclosure of innovation strategy by high‐tech firms and its relation with insider stock transactions before the disclosure. We find that, despite the qualitative and subjective nature of strategy‐related disclosure, there is positive stock price reaction to the disclosure. The evidence suggests that investors view the disclosure as credible good news. We also find that the disclosure is associated with more positive stock price reaction when it is preceded by insider purchase transactions. This evidence is consistent with insider purchase enhancing the credibility of the disclosure. The credibility‐enhancing effect is found to be stronger for firms with higher degrees of information asymmetry (younger firms, firms with lower analyst following, loss firms, and firms with higher research and development (R&D) intensity). Our evidence also indicates that predisclosure insider purchase is associated with greater future abnormal returns, suggesting that managers are privy to good news shortly before the disclosure.     

Incentives for voluntary disclosure

Rule l0b-5 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act allows investors to sue firms for misrepresentation or omission. Since firms are principal-agent contracts between owners – contract designers – and privately informed managers, owners are the ultimate firms’ voluntary disclosure strategists. We analyze voluntary disclosure equilibrium in a game with two types of owners: expected liquidating dividends motivated (VMO) and expected price motivated (PMO). We find that Rule l0b-5: (i) does not deter misrepresentation and may suppress voluntary disclosure or, (ii) induces some firms to adopt a partial disclosure policy of disclosing only bad news or only good news.     

Voluntary Disclosures,Corporate Control,and Investment

We examine the valuation and capital allocation roles of voluntary disclosure when managers have private information regarding the firm’s investment opportunities, but an efficient market for corporate control influences their investment decisions. For managers with long‐term stakes in the firm, the equilibrium disclosure region is two‐tailed: only extreme good news and extreme bad news is disclosed in equilibrium. Moreover, the market’s stock price and investment responses to bad news disclosures are stronger than the responses to good news disclosures, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. We also find that myopic managers are more likely to withhold bad news in good economic times when markets can independently assess expected investment returns.