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1.
道德风险是保险业长期存在的难题。其中保险代理人欺诈问题在我国目前保险市场较为混乱、诚信体系尚未健全的情况下显得尤为突出。本文在建立代理人、委托人、自然先后行动的不完全信息动态博弈模型的基础上,结合“效率工资”理论,分析了保险公司如何激励保险代理人按照公司的利益行动的问题。在研究博弈的第二阶段——委托人选择时,本文进一步分析了委托人的代理成本问题,同时建立委托人最优监督水平模型。文章的最后,笔者结合文章模型的各个参数,提出了抑制代理人欺诈倾向的建议。  相似文献   

2.
一、医疗保险中的静态博弈与纳什均衡在本文中,设定的是单阶段的静态博弈,即代理人和委托人虽然不是同时行动,但是对于代理人的行动,委托人是观测不到的,一轮博弈结束后立即支付收益。(一)医疗欺诈博弈基本假设:Y:代理人(投保人和医疗机构共同体)的初始财富;x:委托人收取保险费  相似文献   

3.
一、医疗保险中的静态博弈与纳什均衡 在本文中,设定的是单阶段的静态博弈,即代理人和委托人虽然不是同时行动,但是对于代理人的行动,委托人是观测不到的,一轮博弈结束后立即支付收益.  相似文献   

4.
完全信息状态下保险市场主体间的静态博弈研究   总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3  
李涛 《海南金融》2006,(2):10-12
保险市场主体的行为以及他们之间的复杂关系直接影响着保险市场的发展,特别是投保人的逆向选择、道德风险和保险代理人的违规操作广泛存在,长期困扰着保险界。本文针对投保人和保险代理人的问题行为,通过建立完全信息静态博弈模型,来深入研究保险人与投保人、保险代理人之间的博弈关系,探讨解决问题的现实对策。  相似文献   

5.
我国政府采购制度实施时间不长,但是政府采购对于我国市场经济体制的完善有着重要的作用。本文利用了演化博弈模型分析我国政府采购中委托代理采购的演化路径,通过本文的分析得到如下结论:当R相似文献   

6.
我国保险代理人制度存在的问题及其改进   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
保险公司同保险代理人之间的关系是委托一代理关系,因此委托一代理理论同样适用于我国保险代理人问题。解决问题的关键是要建立一个合理的代理人激励和约束机制,使代理人效用最大化目标同委托人效用最大化目标相一致,代理人自愿向委托人提供各种信息,实现二者的激励相容。  相似文献   

7.
王小青 《云南金融》2012,(7X):141-142
近年来,我国保险业发展迅速,保险代理行业进入发展的机遇期。但是,我国保险代理欺诈案件却屡见不鲜,使得保险机构和投保人受到损失,对社会风气也有不好的影响。本文在讲述保险代理人欺诈行为的基础上,分析了造成保险代理人欺诈的原因,并针对杜绝保险欺诈行为,促进我国保险代理业发展提出了建议。  相似文献   

8.
王小青 《时代金融》2012,(21):141-142
近年来,我国保险业发展迅速,保险代理行业进入发展的机遇期。但是,我国保险代理欺诈案件却屡见不鲜,使得保险机构和投保人受到损失,对社会风气也有不好的影响。本文在讲述保险代理人欺诈行为的基础上,分析了造成保险代理人欺诈的原因,并针对杜绝保险欺诈行为,促进我国保险代理业发展提出了建议。  相似文献   

9.
武建强 《上海保险》2007,(3):53-54,37
作为保险公司与消费者之间桥梁的保险营销员对我国保险业的发展功不可没。截至2006年底,全国155.8万保险营销员共实现保费收入2650.88亿元,占总保费收入的46.99%。然而,在当前保险市场中,保险营销员销售误导等不讲诚信的问题仍然相当程度地存在。究其原因,主要在于:在信息非对称的保险营销活动中,作为代理人的保险营销员与作为委托人的保险公司的效用函数经常不一致,代理人可能通过“隐藏行动”故意偏离委托人的目标函数,由此产生“道德风险”,也即保险营销员的失信问题。解决问题的关键在于如何构建有效的激励监督机制来规制代理人的行为。本文试图从委托代理理论视角对保险营销员代理问题进行分析,并在现有保险营销员激励约束机制基础上,对构建“三结合、一配合”的保险营销员激励监督机制作了若干思考。  相似文献   

10.
一、信息不对称理论的基本内涵信息经济学是非对称信息博弈论在经济学上的应用。所谓信息不对称,是指在参与博弈的各方中间某些方拥有的信息,其他方并不拥有。信息经济学的所有模型都是在委托——代理的框架下进行分析,这里的委托——代理人关系泛指任何一种非对称交易或关系,交易或关系中拥有信息优势的一方称为"代理人",处于信息劣势的一方称为"委托人"。信息经济学的目标是在非对称信息情况下寻求最优的制度安排,即设计一个最优激励与约束机制,促使代理人从自身利益出发选择对委托人最有利的行为。委托代理关系并不必然导致"代理问题"。代理问题的核心是动力问题,如果代理人的效用函数和委托人的效用函数完全一致,则不  相似文献   

11.
车险已成为我国产险的龙头险种,但由于信息不对称,车险市场道德风险已严重制约产险业的发展。各利益主体为自身效用最大化不断博弈的最终结果,使得车险市场整体运行效率大打折扣。本文运用博弈论的研究方法,通过构建博弈模型,对投保人、保险人、保险代理人以及汽车修理商四方行为主体的道德风险进行博弈分析,探寻其最优策略,并给出对策建议。  相似文献   

12.
The current fundamental reform of the German insurance law cannot and will not stop short of the law of insurance mediation. Up to now Sec. 43 to 48 Versicherungsvertragsgesetz (VVG = German Insurance Act) govern only one type of insurance intermediary known as insurance agent. The act only sets up rules to which extent the insurance agent has authority to bind the insurer. In the way the law is construed by the courts it differs in many aspects from the written law. Thus it is suggested to define the generic term ?insurance intermediary“ in the act as well as the subcategories ?insurance broker“ and ?insurance agent“, whereby the term ?insurance agent“ also includes the field staff employed by an insurer. In connection with the diffi-cult distinction between insurance brokers and insurance agents it remains questionable on which type of intermediary the rules regulating the relationship between agents and insurants and thereby protecting the potential customers should be applied accordingly. This controversial and in practice significant question should be explicitly decided by the legislator for reasons of legal certainty. In so far Sec. 43a of the Austrian Insurance Act could act as a model function. Regarding the insurance agents’ authority to receive (Empfangsvertretungsmacht des Versicherungsvertreters) for the insurer propositions exist to explicitly declare Sec. 43 No.l VVG, which grants the agent the authority to receive when accepting a contractual offer for the insurer, as mandatory. This suggestion would be in accordance with the current case law. Furthermore the wording of Sec. 43 No.l VVG should be altered so that the insurants’ pre-contractual risk-notifications, which the prevailing opinion already regards as being included, is explicitly mentioned. In principle Sec. 43 No.2 WG, which grants the agent the authority to receive notifications and representations for the duration of the insurance contract, should be declared as mandatory, too. Exempted should be the authority to receive for dispositions regarding the entitlements to benefits from (life) insurance contracts and the right to receive the insured sum. Sec. 44 WG, which strongly restricts the attribution of the agent’s knowledge to the insurer, is unconvincing, especially from a legal policy point of view. Therefore it is to be cancelled without substitution. Finally the legislator should refrain from codifying the customary liability based on the principles of reliance.  相似文献   

13.
保险公司重整程序是一个多方权力参与、相互博弈的过程.如何处理重整程序中行政权与司法权之问的关系,将影响到保险公司重整程序能否顺利进行.我国保险公司重整程序中存在行政权“扩张”与司法权“收缩”的现象,要想使权力结构分配合理,应注重行政权与司法权之间的均衡,在保险公司重整程序中,采取行政权实质决策、司法权终局裁定的权力模式.只有合理处理行政权与司法权的关系,保险公司破产重整才能达到事半功倍的效果.  相似文献   

14.
This paper re-evaluates the Diamond-Dybvig analysis of deposit insurance by constructing a model in which an agent not in need of liquidity sets up a financial intermediary to sell liquidity insurance to other agents who desire such insurance. This intermediary resembles a real-world bank in that it is financed by both demand deposits and equity. It also dominates the Diamond-Dybvig intermediary, which is funded only by demand deposits. Provided the intermediary has adequate capital, it also is perfectly safe. Deposit insurance then is both unnecessary and incapable of achieving a superior outcome to that which private agents could achieve on their own.  相似文献   

15.
We extend the Rothschild-Stiglitz (RS) insurance market model with adverse selection by allowing insurers to offer either non-participating or participating policies, that is, insurance contracts with policy dividends or supplementary calls for premium. It is shown that an equilibrium always exists in such a setting. Participating policies act as an implicit threat that dissuades deviant insurers who aim to attract low-risk individuals only. The model predicts that the mutual corporate form should be prevalent in insurance markets where second-best Pareto efficiency requires cross-subsidisation between risk types.  相似文献   

16.
In this paper we ask whether an aspect of social security, namely its role as a provider of insurance against uncertain life spans, is welfare enhancing. To this end we use an OLG model where agents have a bequest motive and differ in sex and marital status and where families are formed and destroyed and their characteristics evolve (exogenously) according to U.S. demographic patterns of marriage, divorce, fertility and mortality. We compare the implications of social security under a variety of market structures that differ in the extent to which life insurance and annuities are available. We find that social security is a bad idea. In economies where the private sector provides annuities and life insurance, it is a bad idea for the standard reason that it distorts the intertemporal margin by lowering the capital stock. In the absence of such securities social security is still a very bad idea, only marginally less so compared with economies with annuities and life insurance. We also explore these issues in a world where people live longer and we find no differences in our answers. As a by-product of our analysis we find that the existence of life insurance opportunities for people is important in welfare terms while that of annuities is not.  相似文献   

17.
Insurance has for a long time been perceived as a way of transferring responsibility from insured agents to insurers and thus as potentially influencing insured agents' behavior. Two particular opportunistic behaviors have been analyzed. First, the theory of adverse selection predicts that high-risk agents are likely to demand more insurance than are low-risk agents. Second, the theory of moral hazard predicts that the wider the insurance coverage, the less agents will try to prevent accidents. Both theories thus conclude that agents who are totally insured should have a higher probability of accident than those with only partial insurance, ceteris paribus. Nevertheless, one of the aims of insurance rating systems is to control for these opportunistic behaviors. In this article, we use individual data to see if the French automobile insurance rating system has achieved this aim. We do this using a two-step maximum-likelihood method. First, we compute a probit model to estimate the probability of taking out comprehensive versus third-party insurance. We then calculate the generalized residual, which is included as an independent variable in a negative binomial model estimating the probability of having an accident. The coefficient of this variable is argued to represent adverse selection and ex-ante moral-hazard behavior.  相似文献   

18.
Abstract:  Banking sector globalization has caused an expansion in foreign-owned bank assets. In this paper we analyse the effects of a MNB's liability structure upon its investment in a foreign country. We develop a model in which capital adequacy requirements introduce some deliberate underinvestment which counters deposit insurance-induced overinvestment. Diversification is unattractive with fixed bank capital requirements, because it reduces the expected value of the deposit insurance net. This effect applies in multinational banks (MNBs), where shocks to the home country economy alter the value of the deposit insurance net and hence affect overseas lending incentives. Thus, MNBs act as a channel for financial contagion. We discuss the policy implications of our results.  相似文献   

19.
The selection of a deductible level in insurance is governed by the willingness to limit the risk borne by risk-averse agents at an acceptable cost, given the deadweight insurance loading. We examine the demand for insurance in a simple lifecycle model with a liquidity constraint and no serial correlation in the insurable risk. This allows for consumers to follow a time-diversification (self-insurance) strategy by accumulating buffer stock wealth. We conclude that insurance would only be demanded for catastrophic risks, or by people that are currently liquidity constrained. The added value of the insurance sector is thus surprisingly low in such an economy.  相似文献   

20.
This paper studies an optimal insurance and reinsurance design problem among three agents: policyholder, insurer, and reinsurer. We assume that the preferences of the parties are given by distortion risk measures, which are equivalent to dual utilities. By maximizing the dual utility of the insurer and jointly solving the optimal insurance and reinsurance contracts, it is found that a layering insurance is optimal, with every layer being borne by one of the three agents. We also show that reinsurance encourages more insurance, and is welfare improving for the economy. Furthermore, it is optimal for the insurer to charge the maximum acceptable insurance premium to the policyholder. This paper also considers three other variants of the optimal insurance/reinsurance models. The first two variants impose a limit on the reinsurance premium so as to prevent insurer to reinsure all its risk. An optimal solution is still layering insurance, though the insurer will have to retain higher risk. Finally, we study the effect of competition by permitting the policyholder to insure its risk with an insurer, a reinsurer, or both. The competition from the reinsurer dampens the price at which an insurer could charge to the policyholder, although the optimal indemnities remain the same as the baseline model. The reinsurer will however not trade with the policyholder in this optimal solution.  相似文献   

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