Bank Capital: Lessons from the Financial Crisis

Using a multicountry panel of banks, we study whether better capitalized banks experienced higher stock returns during the financial crisis. We differentiate among various types of capital ratios: the Basel risk‐adjusted ratio, the leverage ratio, the Tier 1 and Tier 2 ratios, and the tangible equity ratio. We find several results: (i) before the crisis, differences in capital did not have much impact on stock returns; (ii) during the crisis, a stronger capital position was associated with better stock market performance, most markedly for larger banks; (iii) the relationship between stock returns and capital is stronger when capital is measured by the leverage ratio rather than the risk‐adjusted capital ratio; (iv) higher quality forms of capital, such as Tier 1 capital and tangible common equity, were more relevant.     

Effectiveness of Capital Regulation at U.S. Commercial Banks, 1985 to 1994

Unless priced and administered appropriately, a governmental safety net enhances risk-shifting opportunities for banks. This paper quantifies regulatory efforts to use capital requirements to control risk-shifting by U.S. banks during 1985 to 1994 and investigates how much risk-based capital requirements and other deposit-insurance reforms improved this control. We find that capital discipline did not prevent large banks from shifting risk onto the safety net. Banks with low capital and debt-to-deposits ratios overcame outside discipline better than other banks. Mandates introduced by 1991 legislation have improved but did not establish full regulatory control over bank risk-shifting incentives.     

Bank Taxes,Leverage, and Risk

We use staggered changes in the taxation of banks by U.S. states to show how banks adjust their capital structure in response to taxes. A one percentage point increase in the income tax rate leads to a decrease in the ratio of equity to total assets of 15 basis points. The effect is symmetric for tax increases and decreases but heterogeneous in that small and strongly capitalized banks react more. In response to taxes, banks also adjust their assets consistent with regulatory arbitrage activities intended to keep down regulatory risk measures, thereby keeping regulatory ratios at acceptable levels despite increasing leverage. Finally, higher taxes may decrease banks’ ability to survive crises.     

Crises,Liquidity Shocks,and Fire Sales at Commercial Banks

If liquidity shortages cause financial crises, a lender of last resort can provide funds to banks facing potential fire sales. However, if funding problems primarily occur at banks with existing solvency problems, then government liquidity programs may not spur bank lending. We find that commercial bank funding does not typically dry up in a crisis, not even during the subprime crisis. Rather, weak banks are more likely to borrow less. Furthermore, banks rely more on deposits and newly issued equity than fire sales. When they do sell assets, they cherry pick assets in order to alleviate pressure from capital regulations.     

Examining the Relationships between Capital,Risk and Efficiency in European Banking

This paper analyses the relationship between capital, risk and efficiency for a large sample of European banks between 1992 and 2000. In contrast to the established US evidence we do not find a positive relationship between inefficiency and bank risk‐taking. Inefficient European banks appear to hold more capital and take on less risk. Empirical evidence is found showing the positive relationship between risk on the level of capital (and liquidity), possibly indicating regulators' preference for capital as a mean of restricting risk‐taking activities. We also find evidence that the financial strength of the corporate sector has a positive influence in reducing bank risk‐taking and capital levels. There are no major differences in the relationships between capital, risk and efficiency for commercial and savings banks although there are for co‐operative banks. In the case of co‐operative banks we do find that capital levels are inversely related to risks and we find that inefficient banks hold lower levels of capital. Some of these relationships also vary depending on whether banks are among the most or least efficient operators.     

Capital ratios and bank lending: A matched bank approach

This paper examines the impact of bank capital ratios on bank lending by comparing differences in loan growth to differences in capital ratios at sets of banks that are matched based on geographic area as well as size and various business characteristics. We argue that such comparisons are most effective at controlling for local loan demand and other environmental factors. For comparison we also control for local factors using MSA fixed effects. We find, based on data from 2001 to 2011, that the relationship between capital ratios and bank lending was significant during and shortly following the recent financial crisis but not at other times. We find that the relationship between capital ratios and loan growth is stronger for banks where loans are contracting than where loans are expanding. We also show that the elasticity of bank lending with respect to capital ratios is higher when capital ratios are relatively low, suggesting that the effect of capital ratio on bank lending is nonlinear. In addition, we present findings on the relationship between bank capital and lending by bank size and loan type.     

我国商业银行资本充足率与风险资产关系研究

资本充足率管理是商业银行风险管理的核心。本文构建了反映我国商业银行资本充足率和风险资产关系的模型,对我国商业银行资本充足率和风险资产之间的关系进行分析。结果发现:商业银行资本充足率的变化会引起资本结构的变化,从而对风险资产产生影响。风险资产的变化又会对资本充足率产生影响。商业银行资本充足率与风险资产这种相互影响的关系为商业银行风险资产管理提供了理论依据。     

Statement of the Financial Economists Roundtable: Bank Capital as a Substitute for Prudential Regulation

The Financial CHOICE Act recently passed by the House proposes to create an “off‐ramp” that would allow banks to escape burdensome prudential regulation if the ratio of their equity capital to their total assets is 10% or more. The Financial Economists Roundtable supports this idea as a means of reducing regulatory costs, but believes some additional safeguards are needed. A capital ratio of 10% may not be high enough to discourage banks from excessive risk taking. A solution is to have two capital requirements for banks choosing the off‐ramp: one absolute (as proposed in the act) and one risk‐based. The FER believes that many banks will prefer this regime to the current burdensome prudential regulation, especially if regulators simplify the setting of risk weights and make them more rule‐based. Regulators setting minimum capital requirements should consider not only a bank’s stand‐alone risk, but also the systemic risk posed by banks, as well as the tendency of accounting measures of income and assets to overstate the economic value of banks’ equity capital. The Financial Choice Act would also eliminate useful elements of ongoing supervision and regulation, not all of which can be addressed by higher capital alone. Furthermore, to facilitate regulatory learning about risks, off‐ramped banks should continue to report the data that regulators use for stress tests, even if they are no longer subjected to the discipline of stress tests. Finally, the act is viewed as too permissive in its treatment of off‐ramped banks that get into trouble. To prevent gaming of regulation, FERC recommends that off‐ramped banks that subsequently fall below the minimum requirements should be required to raise new capital immediately.     

Time‐Varying Capital Requirements and Disclosure Rules: Effects on Capitalization and Lending Decisions

We investigate how banks’ capital and lending decisions respond to changes in bank‐specific capital and disclosure requirements. We find that an increase in the bank‐specific regulatory capital requirement results in a higher bank capital ratio, brought about via less asset risk. A decrease in the requirement implies more lending to firms but also less Tier 1 capital and higher bank leverage. We do not observe differences between confidential and public disclosure of capital requirements. Our results empirically illustrate a tradeoff between bank resilience and a fostering of the economy through more bank lending using banks’ capital requirement as policy instrument.     

Financial factors and firm growth: evidence from financial data on Taiwanese firms

We investigate the possible predictability of firm growth in Taiwan using cross-sectional data of financial factors for the years 1997 and 2003 via principal component analysis. Our results reveal that the 18 financial variables (sales growth rate, total assets, total sales, return on assets, return on equity, gross margin, operating cost minus depreciation divided by sales plus other trading income, acid test ratio, debt–equity ratio, time interest earned, average receivables per average daily sales, inventory, average payables per average daily sales, working capital, working capital as a fraction of total assets, long-term liabilities as a fraction of total assets, and sales as a fraction of net worth of the firm) that we employ bunch together into five different financial ratios for the years 1997 and 2003 that are stable between these years. These financial factors are short-term liquidity, return on investment, long-term liquidity, firm size and capital turnover. Regressing these ratio groups (extracted principal components) on firm growth, we find return on investment in the year 1997 was positively and significantly related to firm growth, while long-term solvency was negatively related to firm growth. In addition, smaller firms tended to grow faster. By 2003, larger firms grew faster than smaller ones and short-term liquidity was positively and significantly related to firm growth, while return on investment was no longer a significant determining factor. Our findings suggest that firms that finance internally or do not rely too heavily on indebtedness may end up growing slower during boom periods but they are the ones that survive and outperform after the bust.