从优秀到卓越的飞跃——评《银行职业经理人必读》丛书

1841年，美国的两列客车相撞事件，呼唤出世界上第一位经理人；1999年，广东华帝的“七雄让贤”故事，造就了中国第一位职业经理人。2004年国家劳动部正式推出国家职业经理人资格认证培训，对获得认证的经理人颁发国家职业经理人资格证书，从而为我国职业经理人的发展开辟了一条通道，推动了我国职业经理人队伍的迅速扩充。职业经理人，就是以经营管理企业为职业，将所经营企业的成功视为自己人生的成功，通过管理企业来实现自身价值的专职管理者。北京大学光华管理学院副院长张维迎教授曾说过这样一句话：“未来的中国企业能否发展壮大，在很大程度上取决于职业经理人队伍的建设。”     

我国私营企业引入职业经理人的困难及对策研究

中国自加入世贸组织后,私营企业一直面临的最大的挑战是人才的短缺,职业经理人聘用的窘迫现象也随之凸显出来。私营企业要获得更大的发展,客观上需要建立一个规范化的职业经理人市场,但现实中真正聘用职业经理人的私营企业为数并不多。为什么会产生这样的现状,使得研究私营企业中职业经理人面临的困境成为必需。本文即对私营企业中的职业经理人现状及其产生的原因进行分析,并提出相应对策,希望能促进中国私营企业的职业化进程。     

我国私营企业引入职业经理人的困难及对策研究

中国自加入世贸组织后，私营企业一直面临的最大的挑战是人才的短缺，职业经理人聘用的窘迫现象也随之凸显出来。私营企业要获得更大的发展，客观上需要建立一个规范化的职业经理人市场，但现实中真正聘用职业经理人的私营企业为数并不多。为什么会产生这样的现状，使得研究私营企业中职业经理人面临的困境成为必需。本文即对私营企业中的职业经理人现状及其产生的原因进行分析，并提出相应对策，希望能促进中国私营企业的职业化进程。     

中国家族企业引进职业经理人的战略分析

职业经理人制度是现代企业治理结构中的重要组成部分。中国的家族企业在经历了初期的飞速发展之后,出现了发展瓶颈,管理资源的缺乏是一个重要原因。不少家族企业选择了引进职业经理人,将传统的家族治理与现代企业治理相结合。引进职业经理人的效果因不同企业而异。这也说明了家族企业内部机制是影响职业经理人发挥作用的重要因素。本文初步分析了职业经理人不能充分发挥作用的原因,并介绍了如何通过企业内外的机制协调委托-代理双方的利益。     

职业经理人应具备的素质

用公司制改造中国企业，最迫切的任务是要造就一职业经理人。并不是什么人都可以成为职业经理人，职业经理人应具备的素质包括创新精神、冒险精神、洞察力、宽容精神、道德素质及健康心态。     

寻找职业经理人精神

从上世纪90年代中期真正起步的中国职业经理人制度,发展至今已经出现了一大批优秀的职业经理人。这其中包含了企业中各个职位的高管,如招商银行行行马蔚华、万科地产总裁郁亮、3M中国区首席财务官兼首席运营官胡奋,都是成功职业经理人的代表。他们引领所在企业走向巅峰,个人的事业也达到令人倾慕的高度。在这个过程中有关职业经理人制度和素质的建设也在不断完善,不过也有一些不和谐的声音在给中国的职业经     

农民专业合作社多元化经营的成本管理问题——以JH农机专业合作社为例

近年来,在农村组建农民专业合作社成为一种新的合作发展潮流趋势。然而在这个过程中,农民专业合作社的经营成本控制还存在着许多的问题。本文以JH农机合作社为例,通过对其财务报表以及组织结构的分析,发现JH农机合作社存在成本管理体系不完善、成本控制制度在企业当中流于形式和管理者素质有待提高等问题,提出应提高管理者的成本控制意识、构建与完善合作社的财务管理体系、引进职业经理人、适度多元化经营等建议。     

职业经理人激励制度在国内外的发展现状

世界上第一个有历史记载的职业经理人诞生于1941年的美国。西方发达国家职业经理人成为一个引人注目的群体。关于职业经理人的概念，目前还没有统一的说法。职业经理人在很大程度上首先强调的是一个职业人，主要是对自己的职位负责，而不是对某个人或某个企业负责，也不依附于某个企业或个人；     

基于因子统计法的保险职业经理人胜任力模型构建

在前人研究的基础上,从分析保险职业经理人的现状入手,通过关键词频法筛选出保险职业经理人特征要素,初步建立了一个由33项要素组成的保险职业经理人胜任力模型,将得出的胜任力要素编制问卷并用因子分析法进行了初步验证,最终构建了包含30项要素的保险职业经理人胜任力的五大因素模型,即业务技能、专业知识、个人特质、领导特质和职业素养.     

我国汽车金融业的发展研究

21世纪以来中国汽车产业蓬勃发展,而汽车金融业对推动汽车行业进一步发展具有重要的意义.在中国,汽车金融仍处于萌芽阶段,中国的经济学家尚未对其理论进行系统的研究和分析,对汽车金融行业的组织系统,运营方式等也尚处于摸索阶段.我们应该通过从建立多元化开放的汽车金融机构体系,坚持汽车金融服务企业发展的专业定位,构建汽车金融服务信用体系,改善汽车金融相关法律法规,培养具有竞争力的国有汽车金融企业等措施,来构建适应我国汽车市场快速发展需要的新型汽车金融体系,使之成为推动中国汽车产业未来发展的"加速器".     

论基金管理人的股东化转型

在传统的基金治理结构中,基金管理人大多采用经理型模式,基金管理人的道德风险的发生难以避免。对基民与基金管理人的委托—代理合同进行优化,重激励、轻约束,不能从根本上消除基金管理人的道德风险。要消除基金管理人的道德风险,必须实现基金管理人从经理型向股东型的彻底转变,将基民与基金管理人的关系由传统的基金运行模式中的股东与经理的关系改造为优先股东与普通股东的关系。基金管理人的股东化转型,相对于经理型基金管理人而言,至少有两大功能:对基金管理人的机会主义行为的矫治功能;对基金管理人能力的甄别功能。     

“和而不群”还是“卓尔不群”?——基于基金网络信息使用的视角

如何识别出优秀的基金管理者,理解其信息决策机制,对于优化资源配置、提升市场效率具有重要意义。本文探究了基金经理对自身所处基金网络中的共享信息的使用程度与其管理能力之间的关系。具体而言,本文通过基金的重仓持股构建了基金网络,采用基金自身交易与其所处网络中其他基金平均交易的偏离程度作为该基金对基金网络中信息使用的衡量。研究发现:(1)对基金网络中信息使用程度较低的基金的业绩要显著好于对基金网络中信息使用程度较高的基金。(2)更高的超额收益主要来源于基金经理优异的选股能力,虽由此承担了更多的异质性风险,却并未增大总体风险水平。(3)基金经理更换数据表明基金对网络内信息的使用程度更多地与基金经理特征相关而非与基金特征相关。(4)网络内信息使用程度直接反映了基金私有信息含量,因此更可能与基金经理能力相关。     

“和而不群”还是“卓尔不群”?——基于基金网络信息使用的视角

如何识别出优秀的基金管理者,理解其信息决策机制,对于优化资源配置、提升市场效率具有重要意义。本文探究了基金经理对自身所处基金网络中的共享信息的使用程度与其管理能力之间的关系。具体而言,本文通过基金的重仓持股构建了基金网络,采用基金自身交易与其所处网络中其他基金平均交易的偏离程度作为该基金对基金网络中信息使用的衡量。研究发现:(1)对基金网络中信息使用程度较低的基金的业绩要显著好于对基金网络中信息使用程度较高的基金。(2)更高的超额收益主要来源于基金经理优异的选股能力,虽由此承担了更多的异质性风险,却并未增大总体风险水平。(3)基金经理更换数据表明基金对网络内信息的使用程度更多地与基金经理特征相关而非与基金特征相关。(4)网络内信息使用程度直接反映了基金私有信息含量,因此更可能与基金经理能力相关。     

How leaders create and use networks

Most people acknowledge that networking-creating a fabric of personal contacts to provide support, feedback, insight, and resources--is an essential activity for an ambitious manager. Indeed, it's a requirement even for those focused simply on doing their current jobs well. For some, this is a distasteful reality. Working through networks, they believe,means relying on "who you know" rather than "what you know"--a hypocritical, possibly unethical, way to get things done. But even people who understand that networking is a legitimate and necessary part of their jobs can be discouraged by the payoff--because they are doing it in too limited a fashion. On the basis of a close study of 30 emerging leaders, the authors outline three distinct forms of networking. Operational networking is geared toward doing one's assigned tasks more effectively. It involves cultivating stronger relationships with colleagues whose membership in the network is clear; their roles define them as stakeholders. Personal networking engages kindred spirits from outside an organization in an individual's efforts to learn and find opportunities for personal advancement. Strategic networking puts the tools of networking in the service of business goals. At this level, a manager creates the kind of network that will help uncover and capitalize on new opportunities for the company. The ability to move to this level of networking turns out to be a key test of leadership. Companies often recognize that networks are valuable, andthey create explicit programs to support them. But typically these programs facilitate only operational networking. Likewise, industry associations provide formal contexts for personal networking. The unfortunate effect is to give managers the impression that they know how to network and are doing so sufficiently. A sidebar notes the implication for companies' leadership development initiatives: that teaching strategic networking skills will serve their aspiring leaders and their business goals well.     

Manager characteristics: Predicting fund performance

A great deal of research effort has sought to understand whether fund managers have skill. However, most of this research draws inferences from fund returns attributable to funds that may have been managed by many different managers over the years. In this paper we focus on the fund manager. We put together a comprehensive data base of manager returns, including a time series of managers' career returns, concatenating performance from the different funds that a manager may have managed over time. We relate these returns to the characteristics of the managers as we seek to understand whether these characteristics have an impact on: manager skill; manager style; and on performance persistence.     

What is a global manager?

To compete around the world, a company needs three strategic capabilities: global-scale efficiency, local responsiveness, and the ability to leverage learning worldwide. No single "global" manager can build these capabilities. Rather, groups of specialized managers must integrate assets, resources, and people in diverse operating units. Such managers are made, not born. And how to make them is--and must be--the foremost question for corporate managers. Drawing on their research with leading transnational corporations, Christopher Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal identify three types of global managers. They also illustrate the responsibilities each position involves through a close look at the careers of successful executives: Leif Johansson of Electrolux, Howard Gottlieb of NEC, and Wahib Zaki of Procter & Gamble. The first type is the global business or product-division manager who must build worldwide efficiency and competitiveness. These managers recognize cross-border opportunities and risks as well as link activities and capabilities around the world. The second is the country manager whose unit is the building block for worldwide operations. These managers are responsible for understanding and interpreting local markets, building local resources and capabilities, and contributing to--and participating in--the development of global strategy. Finally, there are worldwide functional specialists--the managers whose potential is least appreciated in many traditional multinational companies. To transfer expertise from one unit to another and leverage learning, these managers must scan the company for good ideas and best practice, cross-pollinate among units, and champion innovations with worldwide applications.     

“When you make manager, we put a big mountain in front of you”: An ethnography of managers in a Big 4 Accounting Firm

Previous studies of the socialization of trainee accountants put emphasis on how disciplinary power mechanisms shape their professional identities. Literature on the ongoing growth and commercialization of the Big 4 Accounting Firms suggests that senior employees, and especially partners, have to be understood as entrepreneurially minded agents. These two bodies of knowledge provide the theoretical vantage point for our empirical analysis of the “missing link” between trainee and partner – the manager. Based on an ethnographic study of a Big 4 Firm (pseudonym Sky Accounting), we suggest understanding the career step of the manager as a rite of passage that has two effects: first, managers experience that their previous identity is destabilized; and second, our study shows how a set of new practices (performing, playing games and politicking) shape the identity of managers, enabling them to navigate the complex organizational network of a Big 4 Firm. We conclude our paper with a discussion of power effects of the rite of passage, how it shapes the identity of managers, and the practice of managerial work in a Big 4 Accounting Firm.     

Unobservable transfer price exceeds marginal cost when the manager is evaluated using a balanced scorecard

This study investigates the optimal level of transfer prices chosen by managers in a divisionalized firm when they are evaluated based on a balanced scorecard. A unique assumption of our model is that transfer prices are unobservable to a competing firm's managers. In contrast to the findings in several studies that examine strategic transfer pricing, this research shows that a manager who is evaluated using a balanced scorecard chooses a transfer price that exceeds marginal cost given a market competitor in a specific economic environment. This result is caused mainly by our model's assumption that a manager considers the competitor's profit in his/her in decision-making when the objective is to maximize long-term profit. This study makes a significant contribution to the strategic transfer pricing literature by showing that even if the transfer price is unobservable to rivals, the optimal transfer price exceeds marginal cost when the final product market is characterized by price competition, something not shown in previous analytical accounting research.     

Strategic Asset Allocation in Money Management

This paper analyzes the dynamic portfolio choice implications of strategic interaction among money managers who compete for fund flows. We study such interaction between two risk‐averse managers in continuous time, characterizing analytically their unique equilibrium investments. Driven by chasing and contrarian mechanisms when one is well ahead, they gamble in the opposite direction when their performance is close. We also examine multiple and mixed‐strategy equilibria. Equilibrium policy of each manager crucially depends on the opponent's risk attitude. Hence, client investors concerned about how a strategic manager may trade on their behalf should also learn competitors' characteristics.