公司绩效、公司治理与管理者报酬实证研究

本文以中国深、沪两市在2004年上市公司样本作为公司绩效、公司治理与管理者报酬研究对象,从公司绩效、股权结构的安排以及董事会治理三个方面,通过构建最小二乘模型进行多元线性回归,来研究公司内部治理机制对公司管理层报酬的影响。研究结果表明:公司绩效、国有股比例、董事会规模、两职兼任均对管理者报酬产生显著的影响。     

The Effect of the Mandatory Adoption of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Executive Compensation

This study investigates empirically the effect of corporate governance principles on executive compensation and firm performance prior to and after the adoption of the first Greek Law on corporate governance. Prior to the adoption of the law, managers were not compensated in line with their performance. Since its introduction, a significant link has been observed between executive compensation and company performance as measured by accounting measures of performance. Following the adoption of corporate governance principles by law, the main mechanism that controls executive compensation is the election of independent non-executive board members. The results are robust to alternative accounting measures of performance.     

中小企业板上市公司股权结构、公司治理与企业绩效:基于随机前沿生产函数的分析

本文通过构建深圳中小企业板上市公司股权结构影响企业绩效的复合随机前沿生产函数,利用2006—2008年面板数据对中小企业的股权结构和企业绩效的关系进行了经验研究,结果表明中小企业的股权集中度与企业绩效之间显著正相关,这与国内文献中对大公司的经验研究结果一致,表明当前上市公司的股权集中有利于公司治理改善和企业绩效的提高。但是第一大股东持股比率却与绩效负相关,这与对大公司的研究结论相反,表明在中小企业中存在较为明显的"隧道挖掘"现象,"一股独大"在中小企业中并不利于公司治理。研究结果还表明,国家、法人、外资或个人对公司治理的绩效无显著差异;流通股比重、高管持股、研发人员投入等都与企业绩效不相关;中小企业具有较强的股权融资倾向,不符合"啄食顺序"的资本结构理论。     

Executive Compensation in UK Property Companies

We study the drivers of executive compensation in the listed UK property sector. The UK provides an excellent opportunity to analyze executive compensation due to high transparency in the different components of executive compensation. We show that company size is the most important variable in explaining the level of executive compensation. We find that absolute and relative share performance significantly explains long-term compensation, that management style has a distinct influence on the level of executive compensation, and that using alternative monitoring mechanisms (institutional shareholders, debtholders, and outside directors) leads to higher levels of long-term incentives. We find only weak evidence of pay-performance sensitivity for both cash and long-term compensation. Executive shareholdings provide a much stronger link between pay and performance than does executive compensation.

高管薪酬与公司业绩实证研究——以中小企业板上市公司为例

选取2009年前上市的235家中小企业板上市公司2013年的年报数据,实证检验高管薪酬与公司业绩之间的相关性。结果表明：中小企业板上市公司高管薪酬与公司业绩、公司规模存在显著正相关关系,高管薪酬与资本结构之间存在显著负相关关系。     

中国创业板上市公司治理与绩效的实证研究

公司治理的直接目标是提升公司绩效,公司绩效是衡量公司治理有效性的重要指标。本文以截至2010年9月30日在中国创业板上市的123家公司为样本,构建公司绩效与公司治理各变量的多元线性回归模型,对中国创业板上市公司的治理与绩效进行实证分析,并在实证研究的基础上,对如何完善我国创业板上市公司治理,提升公司绩效提出了政策建议。     

Insider Ownership and Risk–taking Behaviour at Bank Holding Companies

This paper investigates the relationship between bank ownership structure and risk–taking. We find robust evidence that the greater risk taking incentives of stockholder controlled banks (compared to managerially controlled banks) are more pronounced for the set of banks with larger asset size, lower stock–return volatility, and lower balance–sheet–risk characteristics. Considering that the probability of failure for these banks is relatively low, these results may suggest that the efficacy of insider ownership in mitigating the agency problem could be affected by the costs perceived by the managers associated with aligning their interests with outside stockholders (i.e., the expected loss of benefits from control of the firm in the event of failure).     

Executive incentive compatibility and selection of governance mechanisms

Executive incentive compatibility plays a crucial role in firm's selection of corporate governance mechanisms. We provide a simple model to explain why firms with enough executive incentive compatibility still prefer having external governance mechanisms, and firms with poor executive incentive compatibility have to rely on a combination of large investors monitoring and external governance. This model facilitates a better understanding of the co-existence of the two governance mechanisms and also reconciles conflicting findings with respect to a substitutive and complementary relationship between the two governance mechanisms. Empirical evidence supports there is a substitutive relation between large investors monitoring and executive compensation.     

提高大型商业银行公司治理效率的思考

银行公司治理改革取得了明显成效,但效率仍十分低下。应强化董事会的战略决策功能,提高决策效率。科学定位党委的角色,为公司治理各主体发挥作用创造条件。取消监事会,把内审部门划归董事会领导,强化董事会的监督功能,提高监督效率。加强分支行治理,提高公司治理的执行效率。加强企业文化建设,提升公司治理的效率基础。     

中国期货经纪公司治理有效性研究

中国期货经纪公司在内部治理方面存在着股权结构不合理、管理层独立性不强、监督机制不完善、独立董事制度尚未完全建立、相关利益主体对公司监控作用较小等问题;在外部治理方面存在信息披露制度落后和市场竞争不充分造成的经理人市场缺失等问题;期货经纪公司的经营业绩与其第一大股东持股比重、期货经纪公司的董事会和监事会规模、外部债权人质量、营业部数量等因素正相关,而期货经纪公司董事长兼任总经理现象则对公司业绩产生负面影响。