Optimal dividend payments in the classical risk model when payments are subject to both transaction costs and taxes

In this paper, we study optimal dividend problem in the classical risk model. Transaction costs and taxes are required when dividends occur. The problem is formulated as a stochastic impulse control problem. By solving the corresponding quasi-variational inequality, we obtain the analytical solutions of the optimal return function and the optimal dividend strategy when claims are exponentially distributed. We also find a formula for the expected time between dividends. The results show that, as the dividend tax rate decreases, it is optimal for the shareholders to receive smaller but more frequent dividend payments.     

Optimal dividend strategy with transaction costs for an upward jump model

In this paper, we consider the optimal dividend problem with transaction costs when the incomes of a company can be described by an upward jump model. Both fixed and proportional costs are considered in the problem. The value function is defined as the expected total discounted dividends up to the time of ruin. Although the same problem has already been studied in the pure diffusion model and the spectrally negative Lévy process, the optimal dividend problem in an upward jump model has two different aspects in determining the optimal dividends barrier and in the property of the value function. First, the value function is twice continuous differentiable in the diffusion case, but it is not in the jump model. Second, under the spectrally negative Lévy process, downward jumps will not cause any payment actions; however, it might trigger dividend payments when there are upward jumps. In deriving the optimal barriers, we show that the value function is bounded by a linear function. Using this property, we establish the verification theorem for the value function. By solving the quasi-variational inequalities associated with this problem, we obtain the closed-form solution to the value function and hence the optimal dividend strategy when the income sizes follow a common exponential distribution. In the presence of a fixed transaction cost, it is shown that the optimal strategy is a two-barrier policy, and the optimal barriers are only dependent on the fixed cost and not the proportional cost. A numerical example is used to illustrate how the fixed cost plays a significant role in the optimal dividend strategy and also the value function. Moreover, an increased fixed cost results in larger but less frequent dividend payments.     

Optimal Dividends In An Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Type Model With Credit And Debit Interest

Abstract

In the absence of investment and dividend payments, the surplus is modeled by a Brownian motion. But now assume that the surplus earns investment income at a constant rate of credit interest. Dividends are paid to the shareholders according to a barrier strategy. It is shown how the expected discounted value of the dividends and the optimal dividend barrier can be calculated; Kummer’s confluent hypergeometric differential equation plays a key role in this context. An alternative assumption is that business can go on after ruin, as long as it is profitable. When the surplus is negative, a higher rate of debit interest is applied. Several numerical examples document the influence of the parameters on the optimal dividend strategy.     

Optimal excess-of-loss reinsurance and dividend payments with both transaction costs and taxes

In this paper we study the optimal excess-of-loss reinsurance and dividend strategy for maximizing the expected total discounted dividends received by shareholders until ruin time. Transaction costs and taxes are required when dividends occur. The problem is formulated as a stochastic impulse control problem. By solving the corresponding quasi-variational inequality, we obtain analytical solutions for the optimal return function and the optimal strategy.     

On capital injections and dividends with tax in a diffusion approximation

We consider a diffusion approximation to a risk process with dividends and capital injections. Tax has to be paid on dividends, but capital injections lead to an exemption from tax. That is, tax is only paid for the aggregate excess of dividends over the capital injections. The value of a strategy is the expected value of the discounted dividend payments after tax minus the discounted capital injections. We solve the problem and show that the optimal dividend strategy is a barrier strategy.     

Optimal dividend policy,debt policy and the level of investment within a multi-period DCF framework

This paper simultaneously analyses optimal dividend, debt and investment policy within a conventional multi-period DCF framework, and takes account of differential personal taxation over both investors and types of income, the effect of dividends and interest on the level of share issues and hence share issue costs, and the effect of dividends and interest on the level of internally-financed investment. Application of the model to three distinct tax regimes reveals that the value benefit from debt is small at best whilst the value benefit from dividends is substantial even in a regime without dividend imputation.     

Semiparametric estimation in the optimal dividend barrier for the classical risk model

In the context of an insurance portfolio which provides dividend income for the insurance company’s shareholders, an important problem in risk theory is how the premium income will be paid to the shareholders as dividends according to a barrier strategy until the next claim occurs whenever the surplus attains the level of ‘barrier’. In this paper, we are concerned with the estimation of optimal dividend barrier, defined as the level of the barrier that maximizes the expected discounted dividends until ruin, under the widely used compound Poisson model as the aggregate claims process. We propose a semi-parametric statistical procedure for estimation of the optimal dividend barrier, which is critically needed in applications. We first construct a consistent estimator of the objective function that is complexly related to the expected discounted dividends and then the estimated optimal dividend barrier as the minimizer of the estimated objective function. In theory, we show that the constructed estimator of the optimal dividend barrier is statistically consistent. Numerical experiments by both simulated and real data analyses demonstrate that the proposed estimators work reasonably well with an appropriate size of samples.     

Dividend payout and executive compensation: theory and evidence from New Zealand

Using a model based on Bhattacharyya (2007), we predict a positive (negative) relationship between the earnings retention ratio (dividend payout ratio) and managerial compensation. We use tobit regression to analyse data for New Zealand firms' dividend payouts over the period 1997–2015 and find results consistent with Bhattacharyya (2007). These results hold when the definition of payout is modified to incorporate both common dividends and common share repurchases. Our results indicate that corporate dividend policy among New Zealand firms is perhaps best understood by considering the dividend payout ratio, rather than the level of, or changes in, cash dividends alone.     

股权激励与股利分配——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文以《上市公司股权激励管理办法》颁布后的2006年1月1日至2011年6月30日沪深两市公告股权激励计划的上市公司为对象,研究了股权激励与股利政策的关系。结果表明,股权激励公司的送转股水平和现金股利水平从公告计划前一年起显著高于非股权激励公司;上市公司公告股权激励计划对送转股和现金股利水平均有正向的影响,但从股利政策影响因素的回归结果来看,上市公司的现金股利政策较为适合自身的特征,但在送转能力不足的情况下依然"异常高送转",表明送转股是管理层眼中最大化其股权激励收益的更为理想的掘金工具。     

The relative pricing of European dividend futures and their predictive abilities for index returns

We use dividend futures prices to derive a dividend future discount model. Arbitrage arguments postulate that the sum of discounted dividend futures prices should equal the index price, i.e. the sum of discounted dividends. We analyze whether this relation holds and find that the two valuation approaches lead to a different valuation of expected dividends. These observations indicate that dividend futures and index prices seem to provide the investor with different information on future dividends. We further show that the difference in valuation can be used to forecast index returns and show how an investment strategy can exploit this predictability.     

Optimal Dynamic Premium Control in Non-life Insurance. Maximizing Dividend Pay-outs

In this paper we consider the problem of finding optimal dynamic premium policies in non-life insurance. The reserve of a company is modeled using the classical Cramér-Lundberg model with premium rates calculated via the expected value principle. The company controls dynamically the relative safety loading with the possibility of gaining or loosing customers. It distributes dividends according to a 'barrier strategy' and the objective of the company is to find an optimal premium policy and dividend barrier maximizing the expected total, discounted pay-out of dividends. In the case of exponential claim size distributions optimal controls are found on closed form, while for general claim size distributions a numerical scheme for approximations of the optimal control is derived. Based on the idea of De Vylder going back to the 1970s, the paper also investigates the possibilities of approximating the optimal control in the general case by using the closed form solution of an approximating problem with exponential claim size distributions.     

Inside shareholders’ effective tax rates and dividends

Using information collected from the Swedish tax authorities, we calculate insiders’ actual effective tax rates on dividends. With this unique dataset, we find a significant negative cross-sectional relationship between insiders’ effective tax rates and dividend payout. This result is consistent with a tax-induced clientele effect for dividends. We also look at the impact of large block trades on dividends. We find that when insiders with zero effective taxes sell blocks, subsequent dividend payments are significantly more likely to decrease. This provides evidence that large shareholders are adjusting dividends for their individual tax situations.     

On dividends in the phase–type dual risk model

The dual risk model assumes that the surplus of a company decreases at a constant rate over time, and grows by means of upward jumps which occur at random times with random sizes. In the present work, we study the dual risk renewal model when the waiting times are phase-type distributed. Using the roots of the fundamental and the generalized Lundberg’s equations, we get expressions for the ruin probability and the Laplace transform of the time of ruin for an arbitrary single gain distribution. Then, we address the calculation of expected discounted future dividends particularly when the individual common gains follow a phase-type distribution. We further show that the optimal dividend barrier does not depend on the initial reserve. As far as the roots of the Lundberg equations and the time of ruin are concerned, we address the existing formulae in the corresponding Sparre-Andersen insurance risk model for the first hitting time, and we generalize them to cover also the situations where we have multiple roots. We do that working a new approach and technique, approach we also use for working the dividends, unlike others, it can be also applied for every situation.     

Managerial entrenchment and payout policy: A catering effect

Agency theory suggests that entrenched managers are less likely to pay dividends. However, according to the catering theory, external pressures from investors can force managers to increase dividend payments. Hence, we test whether entrenched managers respond to investor demand for dividends and share repurchases. Using a large sample of 9677 US firms over the period 1990–2016 (i.e. a total of 80,478 firm-year observations), we test and find evidence that managerial entrenchment negatively impacts dividend payments. Our findings suggest that catering effects weaken the negative impact of managerial entrenchment on payout policy and that in firms with entrenched managers an increase in the propensity to pay dividends is conspicuous only when there is external investor demand for dividends. Our results indicate that while insiders and institutional owners might not necessarily favour dividend payments, firms respond to catering incentives when dominated by insiders but not institutional owners. Overall, our findings are consistent with the view that dividend payments are a result of external pressures to reduce agency problems associated with firms run by entrenched managers.     

AN ANALYSIS OF SHAREHOLDER REACTION TO DIVIDEND CUTS AND OMISSIONS

In this paper the proposition is tested that stock market reaction to a dividend change is a function of its information content. A multiple regression model is formulated to identify the factors that contribute significantly to the capital loss suffered by shareholders when firms decide to cut/omit dividends. Results indicate that, in conformity with the information content hypothesis, the announcement period capital loss induced by a dividend deduction significantly depends on the percentage change in dividends, the size and risk of the firm, and the price performance of the firm's stock in the immediately preceding period. The results further reveal that (1) simultaneous announcements of poor earnings cause larger capital losses; (2) prior announcements of loss/lower earnings, strikes, etc. attenuate the negative impact of dividend cuts; (3) managerial reassurances that the dividend reduction is growth-motivated produces a weakly favorable effect, and (4) institution of stock dividends concurrently with the dividend cut significantly reduces the negative valuation effect. It is concluded from the evidence that stock market reaction to managerial signals is a function of the perceived costs associated with these signals.     

Do firms use dividend changes to signal future profitability? A simultaneous equation analysis

This paper retests the signaling hypothesis of dividends by examining whether managers change dividends to signal their expectation of earnings prospects using a simultaneous-equation approach. This approach allows us to more clearly test the earnings prospects signaling hypothesis and facilitates the control of several alternative motives that managers may have for changing dividends. We also examine the information content of dividend changes with respect to future earnings changes in the same model system. Our results show that managers change dividends to signal equity-scaled rather than asset-scaled earnings prospects. In addition, we find evidence that managers also change dividends for signaling previous earnings changes and for catering to dividend clienteles. As for the information content of dividend changes, we find that dividend changes have significant and negative impact on ROA changes. The findings suggest that if investors consistently cannot recognize the signaling purpose and find that dividend increases (decreases) are not useful in predicting favorable (unfavorable) future earnings, managers may someday give up using dividend changes to signal the earnings prospects of their firms because they cannot obtain the expected market benefits anymore.     

Dividend changes and catering incentives

We extend Baker and Wurgler's [2004a. Journal of Finance 59 1125–1165] catering theory to include decreases and increases in existing dividends. Consistent with our extended model, we find that the decision to change the dividend and the magnitude of the change depend on the premium that the capital market places on dividends. We also find that the stock market reaction to dividend changes depends on the dividend premium. Thus, the capital market rewards managers for considering investor demand for dividends when making decisions about the level of dividends.     

Political institutions,stock market liquidity and firm dividend policy: Some international evidence

In this cross-country study, we draw on the dividend liquidity hypothesis and the political economy literature to examine whether political institutions affect the relationship between stock market liquidity and a firm’s dividend policy. In countries with weak political institutions, we expect that investors are less able to demand higher dividends for stocks with low liquidity. Using a sample of 52 countries, we show that the negative association between stock market liquidity and dividends is more pronounced in countries with sound political institutions, consistent with the “outcome” model of dividends. These results are stronger in countries with better legal institutions and weaker for firms with financial constraints.