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1.
工商银行个人经营贷款以及个人助业贷款都设有商户联保的担保方式。这种方式解决了商户贷款难的问题,在一定程度上促进了地方经济的发展,尤其是“三农”经济的发展,但也存在一定风险:一是联保小组内的业户多属于同一行业,导致风险比较集中;二是联保小组商户普遍经营时间短、经营规模小,且经验相对较少;三是借款人存在使用银行贷款偿还民间借贷的可能性;  相似文献   

2.
农户联保贷款是小额贷款的主要品种,农户联保贷款的出现有效地解决了农户贷款抵押担保难的问题,有效地支持了"三农"的发展。本课题采用山东省荣成县域调查数据,探究农户联保贷款需求现状,联保贷款申请意愿,分析探讨不同情况下的农户联保贷款的获得情况以及联保贷款资金是否达到满足。研究表明:存在难以选择合适的联保人的问题,贷款发起人与联保人之间的关系主要是邻居、亲戚和朋友,借款人对小组联保人的考察主要是基于自己的了解和判断,贷款发起人与联保人之间存在权利义务不对等的问题。基于此,本研究试图以交易信息这个崭新的角度对农户联保贷款交易信息不对称的现状提出改进的对策。  相似文献   

3.
农户联保贷款是指由社区居民组成联保小组,贷款人对联保小组成员发放的,并由联保小组成员相互承担连带保证责任的贷款。农户联保贷款实行个人申请、多户联保、周转使用、责任连带、分期还款的管理办法。是为解决农户贷款难、  相似文献   

4.
吴敬 《上海金融》2012,(7):47-52,117
联保小组合谋是农村联保贷款失败的重要原因之一,设计出防范合谋的机制才能实现农村金融的可持续性发展。文章研究和对比了静态、动态模型下以及农户有限理性下联保贷款合谋的条件以及相应防范机制,证明了有限理性农户会增加合谋的风险,为了规避这种风险,需要政府以及掌控人等提供一些增强农户理性程度的措施,银行需要提供额度递增、自有资金比例降低和利率递减等条件的合同诱使农户采取积极还贷注重长期利益的策略。  相似文献   

5.
宋延边 《金融博览》2004,(11):59-59
20 0 0年以来 ,各地农信社积极推进农户联保贷款 ,有效地解决了农户贷款难、信用社放款难问题。但由于农信社信贷管理和农户信用差异等方面存在的问题 ,农户联保贷款出现了较大的隐性风险。一、存在“一户多保”、“多贷一用”或“同户联保”取得农户贷款现象 ,形成欺骗性贷款风险。当授信额度满足不了部分种养大户和多种经营大户的资金需求时 ,他们便以个人或配偶、子女的名义同时参加一个或多个联保小组借款 ,或者动员其乡邻、族人、员工分头组成联保小组借款 ,供其一户使用 ,一旦该户经营出现问题 ,便给贷款带来风险。部分农户为获取联保…  相似文献   

6.
(一)开发贷款品种。一是推行农户联保贷款。按照"多户联保、余额控制、周转使用、按季结息、分期还款"的原则,农户在自愿的基础上组成联保小组,签订联保贷款协议,明确信用社、联保小组成员的权利和义务,信用社根据农业生产及经济发展状况对联保小组成员提供贷款。  相似文献   

7.
中小企业联贷联保业务是由若干借款人组成一个联合体,每个借款人均对联合体贷款总额度提供连带保证责任,银行藉此发放一定额度的贷款。联贷联保业务是在团体贷款成功经验的基础上,从制度创新方面探索的一种新型授信模式,它不单纯依赖抵押物,而是通过充分调动企业在贷款申报和贷款管理过程中的主观能动性,利用企业的现有和可利用资源(私人信息资源、关系资源和社会资本等),增强企业还款的约束力,一定程度解决中小企业融资难问题.风险约束问题是联贷联保业务的核心。[编者按]  相似文献   

8.
《云南金融》2012,(8):45-45
产品定义 农户联保贷款是指不少于3户的农户组成联保小组,云南省农村信用社对联保小组成员发放用于农业生产经营和消费等用途、并由联保小组成员相互承担连带保证责任的贷款。  相似文献   

9.
《云南金融》2011,(10):35-35
基本概念 农户联保贷款是指不少于3户的农户组成联保小组,云南省农村信用社对联保小组成员发放用于农业生产经营和消费等用途、并由联保小组成员相互承担连带保证责任的贷款。  相似文献   

10.
农村居民由于经济规模小,与金融机构存在信息不对称,致使难以获得贷款。农户联保贷款制度通过连带责任在成员间形成风险识别和相互监督机制,一定程度解决了上述问题。但联保小组必须保持一定的规模,太大会导致“搭便车”和小组成员之间信息不对称,太小易使成员之间形成共谋,二者都会使农户联保的作用丧失。因此农户联保的作用是有限的,必须发展合作经济、民间金融等方式以适应农村发展。  相似文献   

11.
Optimal Loan Interest Rate Contract Design   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
This paper analyzes optimal loan interest rate contracts under conditions of risky, symmetric information for one-period (static) and multi-period (dynamic) models. The optimal loan interest rate depends upon the volatility of, and co-variation among the market interest rate, borrower collateral, and borrower income, as well as the time horizon and the risk preferences of lenders and borrowers. For a risk-averse borrower with stochastic collateral, variable interest rate contracts are, in general, Pareto optimal. For plausible assumptions, the optimal loan interest rate for the multi-period model often exhibits muted responses to changes in market interest rates, making fixed rate loans a reasonable approximation for the optimal loan. Hence, in the absence of optimal contracts, long-term (short-term) borrowers tend to prefer fixed rate (variable) contracts.  相似文献   

12.
We investigate how borrowers’ corporate governance influences bank loan contracting terms in emerging markets and how this relation varies across countries with different country‐level governance. We find that borrowers with stronger corporate governance obtain favorable contracting terms with respect to loan amount, maturity, collateral requirements, and spread. Firm‐level and country‐level corporate governance are substitutes in writing and enforcing financial contracts. We also find that the distinctiveness of borrowers’ characteristics affect the relation between firm‐level corporate governance and loan contracting terms. Our findings are robust, irrespective of types of regression methods and specifications.  相似文献   

13.
The attitudes of lending bankers to the use of restrictive ratio covenants in loan contracts are of importance to both corporate management and accounting policy makers. Such attitudes also underly research linking costly contracting with accounting policy choices. This paper reports a survey of 33 UK lending bankers. It analyses their views on (a) the extent of ratio covenants in UK bank loan contracts and factors with which their presence is most likely to be associated; (b) costs that may be imposed on borrowers violating such covenants or expecting to do so; and (c) the ability of borrowers to avoid such costs by appropriate choice of accounting methods. Respondents indicated that ratio covenants are widely used, particularly for loans in excess of £1 million and with companies that are relatively highly geared. ‘High cost’ penalties such as loan acceleration are most likely to be adopted where no prior warning has been given of a covenant breach. Where prior warning has been given, or where a breach is due to an acquisition, waivers and contract renegotiation are more likely responses. Breaches caused by new SSAPs cause few real costs to borrowers, while just under 60% of respondents indicate they may take no action in response to a voluntary accounting method change.  相似文献   

14.
杜立  屈伸  钱雪松  金芳吉 《金融研究》2015,482(8):130-148
地理因素对保持距离型市场交易的影响已被大量文献证实,但系统考察地理因素是否以及如何影响企业内部经济活动的研究仍十分匮乏。基于手工搜集整理的企业集团内部委托贷款这一独特数据,我们实证考察了地理距离对企业集团内部借贷契约设计的影响及相关的风险防控问题。实证结果显示,借贷距离越远,针对借款者的契约设计越严苛,不仅贷款者更可能要求借款者提供抵押担保,而且对资金用途施加限制的概率也大幅增加。进一步研究发现,与地理距离阻碍了信息搜集和监督的经济直觉一致,距离对企业内部借贷契约严苛性的推高作用会因为借贷双方之间的信息摩擦问题差异而改变。而且,基于借贷违约信息的检验结果表明,作为应对信息不对称的机制,动态调整契约严苛性这一精巧契约设计有效降低了企业内部贷款违约风险。本文不仅增进了对地理因素影响企业内部资本配置的认识,而且加深了对企业内部借贷契约设计的理解,从而对如何有效防控企业内部资本市场运作风险具有启示意义。  相似文献   

15.
We examine the rise in student loan defaults in the Great Recession by linking administrative student loan data at the individual borrower level to student loan borrowers’ individual tax records. A Blinder-Oaxaca style decomposition shows that shifts in the composition of student loan borrowers and the massive collapse in home prices during the Great Recession can each account for approximately 30% of the rise in student loan defaults. Falling home prices affect student loan defaults by impairing individuals’ labor earnings, especially for low income jobs. By contrast, when comparing the default sensitivities of homeowners and renters, we find no evidence that falling home prices affect student loan defaults through a home equity-based liquidity channel. The Income Based Repayment (IBR) program introduced by the federal government in the wake of the Great Recession reduced both student loan defaults and their sensitivity to home price fluctuations, thus providing student loan borrowers with valuable insurance against negative shocks.  相似文献   

16.
杜立  屈伸  钱雪松  金芳吉 《金融研究》2020,482(8):130-148
地理因素对保持距离型市场交易的影响已被大量文献证实,但系统考察地理因素是否以及如何影响企业内部经济活动的研究仍十分匮乏。基于手工搜集整理的企业集团内部委托贷款这一独特数据,我们实证考察了地理距离对企业集团内部借贷契约设计的影响及相关的风险防控问题。实证结果显示,借贷距离越远,针对借款者的契约设计越严苛,不仅贷款者更可能要求借款者提供抵押担保,而且对资金用途施加限制的概率也大幅增加。进一步研究发现,与地理距离阻碍了信息搜集和监督的经济直觉一致,距离对企业内部借贷契约严苛性的推高作用会因为借贷双方之间的信息摩擦问题差异而改变。而且,基于借贷违约信息的检验结果表明,作为应对信息不对称的机制,动态调整契约严苛性这一精巧契约设计有效降低了企业内部贷款违约风险。本文不仅增进了对地理因素影响企业内部资本配置的认识,而且加深了对企业内部借贷契约设计的理解,从而对如何有效防控企业内部资本市场运作风险具有启示意义。  相似文献   

17.
In this paper we study the relevance of the gender of the contracting parties involved in lending. We show that female entrepreneurs face tighter credit availability, even though they do not pay higher interest rates. The effect is independent of the information available about the borrower and holds if we control for unobservable individual effects. The gender of the loan officer is also important: we find that female officers are more risk-averse or less self-confident than male officers as they tend to restrict credit availability to new, un-established borrowers more than their male counterparts.  相似文献   

18.
This paper examines the relation between corporate debt maturity dispersion and the pricing and terms of bank loans. Analyzing a sample of U.S. bank loans from 2002 to 2016, we find that firms with a dispersed debt maturity structure pay a lower interest rate. The rate-reduction effect is significant only for firms without a credit rating. For these firms, spreading debt maturity dates also results in lower commitment fees, fewer covenant restrictions, and less collateral in their loan contracts. The impact of debt maturity dispersion on the pricing and structure of bank loans is stronger when borrowers have higher rollover risk or when the need for monitoring is greater. Our results suggest that dispersion in debt maturity structure mitigates the agency problem associated with shareholder–creditor conflicts by reducing rollover risk and alleviating the need for monitoring, which results in borrowers receiving more favorable terms in loan contracts.  相似文献   

19.
This paper examines dynamic information losses associated with loan terminations. We assume that the aggregated returns of current borrowers contain information about the mean returns to future borrowers. In a competitive loan market, the value of this information is not fully internalized by individual borrowers and lenders, and loan decisions fail to be first best. Introducing heterogeneous borrowers, who know their own risk characteristics better than lenders, safer borrowers are less willing to borrow when risk premia rise. As they cease borrowing, the information generated in credit markets becomes noisier and this tends to increase risk premia. The model produces alternating and persistent periods of “tight” and “loose” credit.  相似文献   

20.
In this paper, we seek empirical evidence for information rents in loan spreads by analyzing a sample of UK syndicated loan contracts for the period from 1996 to 2005. We use various measures for borrower opaqueness and control for bank, borrower and loan characteristics and we find that undercapitalized banks charge approximately 34 bps higher loan spreads for loans to opaque borrowers. We further analyze whether this effect persists throughout the business cycle and find that this effect prevails only during recessions. However, we do not find evidence that banks exploit their information monopolies during expansion phases.  相似文献   

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