ISLAMIC BANKING,COSTLY RELIGIOSITY,AND COMPETITION

In this article we explain how Islamic banks (IBs) maximize profitability in the presence of costly religiosity. Because of strong competition between IBs and conventional banks (CBs), a unique equilibrium emerges that affects the IB pricing structure. We propose a new model that identifies the optimal rate on the asset and liability sides of IBs. It shows that the financial products offered by IBs are not an exogenous function of religiosity; instead, they are endogenously determined by the nature of market forces in which IBs are operating. We show that in the presence of costly religiosity and competition, the rates of both converge. Moreover, the competitive pricing mechanism induces IBs to structure their asset- and liability-side financial products (particularly Murabaha) with a risk profile similar to that of the CB loan system. This article empirically supports the theoretical propositions by using data from 17 Muslim majority countries where both IBs and CBs coexist from 2000 to 2015. We find that, holding other factors of bank returns constant, competition significantly affects IB asset- and liability-side returns. The analysis also reveals that because of increasing competition between IBs and CBs, the market power of IBs has significantly declined over time.     

Capital structure of Islamic banks: How different are they from conventional banks?

This paper uses comprehensive data for 112 Islamic and 709 conventional banks from 23 countries over 1995–2015 to compare the capital structure of Islamic banks (IBs) and conventional banks (CBs) from several perspectives. We find that IBs and CBs seem to face different cost pressures in the process of adjusting towards the target capital structure. Asset growth is a key driver of capital structure change, and CBs adjust leverage more aggressively in response to changes in total assets compared to IBs, because they have an advantage in obtaining external funds and can achieve leverage adjustments faster and at a low cost. IBs have more regulatory capital, but their ability to respond to risks is weaker than traditional banks. The results of this paper suggest that Islamic banks are in a disadvantaged position compared to CBs in capital structure management. The conclusion suggests that IBs need to expand its financing tools and funding sources to reduce adjustment costs and improve their capability to deal with asset risk.     

Do banks effectively manage their risks? The role of risk governance in the MENA region

This study aims to investigate (1) the effects of the creation of a board-level risk committee (RC) and the designation of a chief risk officer (CRO) on the risk-taking practices undertaken by financial institutions and (2) whether these mechanisms improve the risk management effectiveness of both conventional banks (CBs) and Islamic banks (IBs). We contribute to the scarce literature on the relationship between risk governance and risk-taking behaviour and investigate IBs in this context. Using a sample of 573 observations representing 65 banks (28 CBs and 37 IBs) in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region from 2005 to 2015, we find a negative association between the risk governance indices and their risk perspectives across both types of banks for the post-crisis period. Interestingly, we find that the existence of risk governance mechanisms in IBs is associated with higher risk taking for the pre-crisis period, i.e., before the recent amendments to the risk governance principles in the MENA region. This result implies that IBs can respond to regulatory reforms in the post-crisis period by curbing excessive risk taking. We offer further evidence that the risk governance effect on overall risk taking stems only from the stand-alone board-level RC and not from the role of the CRO. We note that the CBs’ performance is more associated with risk taking for banks with stronger board-level RCs. The board-level RCs improve the effectiveness of risk management within CBs but do not influence the risk management effectiveness of IBs.     

Islamic vs. conventional banking: Business model,efficiency and stability

How different are Islamic banks from conventional banks? Does the recent crisis justify a closer look at the Sharia-compliant business model for banking? When comparing conventional and Islamic banks, controlling for time-variant country-fixed effects, we find few significant differences in business orientation. There is evidence however, that Islamic banks are less cost-effective, but have a higher intermediation ratio, higher asset quality and are better capitalized. We also find large cross-country variation in the differences between conventional and Islamic banks as well as across Islamic banks of different sizes. Furthermore, we find that Islamic banks are better capitalized, have higher asset quality and are less likely to disintermediate during crises. The better stock performance of listed Islamic banks during the recent crisis is also due to their higher capitalization and better asset quality.     

Political systems and the financial soundness of Islamic banks

We investigate whether and how political systems affect the financial soundness of conventional and Islamic banks. Using factors extracted from principal component analysis, we find that Islamic banks underperform their conventional counterparts in more democratic political systems but outperform them in hybrid and Sharia’a-based legal systems. The findings reflect the challenges Islamic banks face in Western countries in terms of perception, financial infrastructure, and regulatory constraints while mirroring the recognition of their specificities and their cultural and religious compliance with Sharia’a law in Muslim countries. The findings are robust to a battery of alternative estimation techniques and methods of correcting standard errors.     

Using accounting ratios to distinguish between Islamic and conventional banks in the GCC region

This study determines whether it is possible to distinguish between conventional and Islamic banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region on the basis of financial characteristics alone. Islamic banks operate under different principles, such as risk sharing and the prohibition of interest, yet both types of banks face similar competitive conditions. The combination of effects makes it unclear whether financial ratios will differ significantly between the two categories of banks. We input 26 financial ratios into logit, neural network, and k-means nearest neighbor classification models to determine whether researchers or regulators could use these ratios to distinguish between the two types of banks. Although the means of several ratios are similar between the two categories of banks, non-linear classification techniques (k-means nearest neighbors and neural networks) are able to correctly distinguish Islamic from conventional banks in out-of-sample tests at about a 92% success rate.     

Islamic versus conventional banks in the GCC countries: A comparative study using classification techniques

This paper contributes to the empirical literature on Islamic finance by investigating the feature of Islamic and conventional banks in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries over the period 2003–2010. We use parametric and non-parametric classification models (Linear discriminant analysis, Logistic regression, Tree of classification and Neural network) to examine whether financial ratios can be used to distinguish between Islamic and conventional banks. Univariate results show that Islamic banks are, on average, more profitable, more liquid, better capitalized, and have lower credit risk than conventional banks. We also find that Islamic banks are, on average, less involved in off-balance sheet activities and have more operating leverage than their conventional peers. Results from classification models show that the two types of banks may be differentiated in terms of credit and insolvency risk, operating leverage and off-balance sheet activities, but not in terms of profitability and liquidity. More interestingly, we find that the recent global financial crisis has a negative impact on the profitability for both Islamic and conventional banks, but time shifted. Finally, results show that Logit regression obtained slightly higher classification accuracies than other models.     

Stakeholder Returns of Islamic Banks Versus Conventional Banks

Sharia principle shaping the Islamic banking model is most determinant on collection and deployment of funds with its ban on interest. This study aims to look at the results of funded activities in isolation for a healthier comparison between Islamic and conventional deposit banks with respect to their financial stakeholders. The differences are reflected as lower asset returns and lower returns for depositors of Islamic banks. These differences sustain throughout normal and crisis periods. Our findings show that despite differences in asset structures and returns, Islamic banks retain similar returns for shareholders to position themselves close to and in competition with their conventional counterparts.     

Capital and Earnings Management: Evidence from Alternative Banking Business Models

This paper examines whether institutional characteristics distinguishing Islamic from conventional banks lead to distinctive capital and earnings management behavior through the use of loan loss provisions. In our sample countries, the two banking sectors operate under different regulatory frameworks: conventional banks currently apply the “incurred” loan loss model until 2018 whereas Islamic banks mandatorily adopt an “expected” loan loss model. Our results provide significant evidence of capital and earnings management practices via loan loss provisions in conventional banks. This finding is more prominent for large and loss-generating banks. By contrast, Islamic banks tend not to use loan loss provisions in either capital or earnings management, irrespective of the bank's size, earnings profile, or the structure of their loan loss model. This difference may be attributed to the constrained business model of Islamic banking, strict governance, and ethical orientation.     

Payout policy and ownership structure: The case of Islamic and conventional banks

Using a sample of Islamic and conventional financial institutions domiciled in 16 countries for the period 2000–2015, we examine how ownership structure affects dividend policy. Our main findings indicate that ownership identity is important in explaining dividend policy in these banks, albeit in different patterns. In particular, the results suggest that government ownership seems to exert negative effects on dividend payouts in both types of banks, which is in line with the preference of governments towards bank stability. With respect to family ownership, the impact is negative for conventional banks but positive for Islamic ones, consistent with agency theory. These results are to some extent similar in the case of foreign ownership where it is associated with a higher payout policy in Islamic banks, but not significant in conventional ones. Our results are robust to an array of additional analyses including propensity score matching.     

Competition and financial stability in European cooperative banks

Cooperative banks are a driving force for socially committed business at the local level, accounting for around one fifth of the European Union (EU) bank deposits and loans. Despite their importance, little is known about the relationship between bank stability and competition for these small credit institutions. Does competition affect the stability of cooperative banks? Does the financial stability of banks increase/decrease when competition is higher? We assess the dynamic relationship between competition and bank soundness (both in the short and long run) among European cooperative banks between 1998 and 2009. We obtain three main results. First, we provide evidence in line with the competition-stability view proposed by Boyd and De Nicolò (2005). Bank market power negatively “Granger-causes” banks' soundness, meaning that there is a positive relationship between competition and stability. Second, we find that this fundamental relationship does not change during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Third, we show that increased homogeneity in the cooperative banking sector positively affects bank soundness. Our findings have important policy implications for designing and implementing regulations that enhance the overall stability of the financial system and in particular of the cooperative banking sector.     

Efficiency in Islamic vs. conventional banking: The role of capital and liquidity

We show that higher capital and liquidity ratios increase the efficiency of conventional and Islamic banks. Using conditional quantile regressions, we further show that the effect is stronger for highly efficient, small, highly liquid, and highly capitalized conventional banks. We also find that more capitalized and liquid banks were efficient during the 2008/2009 financial crisis and the Arab Spring. Our findings support the view that the constraints imposed by Shari'a law may widen the efficiency gap between the two bank types, at the expense of Islamic banks. Furthermore, our findings suggest that the efficiency of conventional banks not only depends on bank capital and liquidity, but also on the level of bank efficiency while the relationship is inconclusive for Islamic banks. These findings provide insight into how capital and liquidity can shape bank efficiency. They suggest that higher capital and liquidity buffers serve a constraint on policymakers and may function very differently depending on the level of bank efficiency.     

Fund Management and Systemic Risk – Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis

Fund managers play an important role in increasing efficiency and stability in financial markets. But research also indicates that fund management in certain circumstances may contribute to the buildup of systemic risk and severity of financial crises. The global financial crisis provided a number of new experiences on the contribution of fund managers to systemic risk. In this article, we focus on these lessons from the crisis. We distinguish between three sources of systemic risk in the financial system that may arise from fund management: insufficient credit risk transfer to fund managers; runs on funds that cause sudden reductions in funding to banks and other financial entities; and contagion through business ties between fund managers and their sponsors. Our discussion relates to the current intense debate on the role the so‐called shadow banking system played in the global financial crisis. Several regulatory initiatives have been launched or suggested to reduce the systemic risk arising from non‐bank financial entities, and we briefly discuss the likely impact of these on the sources of systemic risk outlined in the article.     

Time series analysis of financial stability of banks: Evidence from Saudi Arabia

Islamic banks are characterized by their compliance to Islamic laws and practices, primarily the prohibition of interest and the trading of loans. During the 2008–2009 financial crisis, when a large number of conventional banks announced bankruptcy, no Islamic bank failures were reported. However, there is no clear consensus in the literature on the question of whether Islamic banks are more or less stable than conventional banks. To shed some light on this issue, we studied a sample of Saudi banks using quarterly data over a period centered on the 2008 financial crisis. Careful analysis of the data suggested first of all that many of the variables typically used in financial stability studies may be non-stationary, a methodological point largely ignored in the literature. Using time series methods suitable for this type of data, we concluded that individual heterogeneity may matter more than either the conventional or Islamic nature of the banks. Concentrating on the largest banks, we find the Islamic banks contribute positively to the stability of the system.     

The Changing Relationship Between CAMEL Ratings and Bank Soundness during the Indonesian Banking Crisis

During the recent Southeast Asian financial crisis, numerous banks failed quickly and unexpectedly. This study uses a unique data set provided by Bank Indonesia to examine the changing financial soundness of Indonesian banks during this crisis. Bank Indonesia's non-public CAMEL ratings data allow the use of a continuous bank soundness measure rather than ordinal measures. In addition, panel data regression procedures that allow for the identification of the appropriate statistical model are used.We argue the nature of the risks facing the Indonesian banking community calls for the addition of a systemic risk component to the Indonesian ranking system. The empirical results show that during Indonesia's stable economic periods, four of the five traditional CAMEL components provide insights into the financial soundness of Indonesian banks. However, during Indonesia's crisis period, the relationships between financial characteristics and CAMEL ratings deteriorate and only one of the traditional CAMEL components—earnings—objectively discriminates among the ratings. The panel data results indicate systemic economy-wide forces must be explicitly considered by the rating system.     

Disappearing internal capital markets: Evidence from diversified business groups in Korea

This paper examines how the onset of a financial crisis affects the operation of internal capital markets among firms within a diversified business group. We find that active internal capital markets within Korean business groups (chaebols) attenuate the financial constraints of the group-affiliated firms, allowing them to make efficient capital allocations during the early 1990s. However, these markets barely function after the financial crisis of 1997. Instead, we observe public debt markets serving as a substitute for internal capital markets. Our results suggest that chaebol firms’ coordinated attempts to achieve healthier financial structures in the wake of the crisis have taken place at the expense of investment efficiency.     

Risk governance and financial stability: A comparative study of conventional and Islamic banks in the GCC

While the linkage between bank governance and financial stability has been discussed widely, empirical explorations of the strength of this relationship are scant. This paper examines the specific role of risk governance in promoting financial stability in banks. Using hand-collected data, it develops a Risk Governance Index (RGI) to measure the strength of risk governance structures and then examines its impact on four main indicators of financial stability for conventional and Islamic banks in the countries of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The results from the dynamic panel models using two-step GMM method suggest that risk governance significantly contributes to the enhancement of the key financial stability measures. The RGI for Islamic banks is found to be smaller than their conventional counterparts and the regression results indicate that risk governance in Islamic banks has a negative impact on stability indicators. While the business models of Islamic banks have features that can enhance stability, poor risk governance can potentially negate this positive feature.     

A comparison of conventional versus Islamic banking customers attitudes and judgment

This investigates the impact of customer attitude and judgment regarding conventional and Islamic banking system in Pakistan. This study attempts to find out, how the customers of Islamic banks perceive about Islamic banking practices in terms of Shariah compliance and conventional banking system regarding earning more profits. This study consists on primary data through a well design questionnaire. Four hundred and thirty (430) questionnaires were distributed among different customers of all three types of banking, such as Islamic, conventional and stand-alone branches in order to investigate customer’s attitude and judgment toward banking system. The findings indicate that overall 28% of Islamic banking customers don’t know the essential concept of Islamic financial institution’s in Pakistan. Furthermore, 54% customers of conventional banking show their interest to convert their accounts toward Islamic banks.

     

Shari’ah supervision,corporate governance and performance: Conventional vs. Islamic banks

The performance and accountability of boards of directors and effectiveness of governance mechanisms continue to be a matter of concern. Focusing on differences between conventional banks and Islamic banks, we examine the effect of (i) Shari’ah supervision boards, (ii) board structure and (iii) CEO-power on performance during the period 2005–2011. We find Shari’ah supervision boards positively impact on Islamic banks’ performance when they perform a supervisory role, but the impact is negligible when they have only an advisory role. The effect of board structure (board size and board independence) and CEO power (CEO-chair duality and internally recruited CEO) on the performance of Islamic banks is overall negative. Our findings provide support for the positive contribution of Shari’ah supervision boards but also emphasize the need for enforcement and regulatory mechanism for them to be more effective.     

Consolidation in banking and financial stability in Europe: Empirical evidence

Using aggregate balance sheet data from banks across the EU-25 over the period from 1997 to 2005 we provide empirical evidence that national banking market concentration has a negative impact on European banks’ financial soundness as measured by the Z-score technique while controlling for macroeconomic, bank-specific, regulatory, and institutional factors. Furthermore, our analysis reveals that Eastern European banking markets exhibiting a lower level of competitive pressure, fewer diversification opportunities and a higher fraction of government-owned banks are more prone to financial fragility whereas capital regulations have supported financial stability across the entire European Union.