Group audits: Are audit quality and price associated with the Lead auditor’s decision to accept responsibility?

Lead auditors frequently rely on work performed by Other auditors, especially when auditing clients with operations in multiple countries. The PCAOB has expressed concern that the quality of such group audits may differ depending on whether the Lead auditor accepts or declines responsibility for work done by Other auditors. The PCAOB also has been concerned with the venue through which Lead auditors and Other auditors disclose their participation in group audits, including disclosure of whether Lead auditors accept or decline responsibility. To investigate these issues, we employ a sample consisting entirely of group audit engagements. We identify Lead auditors taking responsibility from PCAOB Form 2, filed by Other auditors of U.S. registrants for fiscal years 2009 to 2017. We identify Lead auditors not accepting responsibility from audit report disclosures during the same period. The results suggest that Lead auditors accepting responsibility charge higher audit fees but provide audits of no higher quality, and possibly of even lower quality. These results are robust to various additional analyses. Our research contributes to the ongoing debate over how the participation of Other auditors affects audit quality.     

AUDITOR'S SKILL,AUDITING STANDARDS,LITIGATION, AND AUDIT QUALITY

This paper introduces a model of the market for audit services in which auditors differ in their levels of skill, which may or may not be observable and capture differences in ability. The model captures the interplay amongst auditing standards, litigation, and auditors’ levels of skill, which determines auditors’ responses to auditing standards. The paper shows that the quality of audit supplied by any auditor is increasing in the auditor's level of skill regardless of whether or not auditors’ levels of skill are observable. An increase in the quality of audit prescribed by auditing standards is shown to induce some auditors endowed with low levels of skill to decrease the quality of their audits so that the average quality of audit and economic welfare may actually decline as auditing standards are raised. Auditors’ choices of audit quality are furthermore shown to be increasing in trial awards. Incentives for trials and out-of-court settlements are shown to depend crucially on whether or not auditors’ levels of skill are observable. Only when auditors’ levels of skill are unobservable do trials obtain with some probability. When auditors’ levels of skill are unobservable, the introduction of either restrictions on costs awarded by the courts or an imperfection in the courts’ technology is shown to lead the most skilled auditors to supply audits of a quality strictly exceeding the quality prescribed by the prevailing auditing standards. When the courts err often enough, the most skilled auditors having exercised due care furthermore make offers to settle when sued.     

Evidence-based policymaking in auditing regulation: An historical analysis of academic research citation in PCAOB standard-setting practices

The success of the auditing profession hinges on the efficient and effective development of authoritative guidance that directs practice. Given the opportunity to assist, academicians can provide an understanding of the costs, benefits, and unintended consequences of potential regulatory decisions. Currently, few studies exist in the extant literature that explore the relationship between the development of auditing standards and the contribution of academic research. To investigate the scope of academic literature consideration in the development of public company auditing regulation, we examine whether and to what extent academic citations are referenced throughout the PCAOB’s rulemaking documents. We find evidence that the PCAOB currently appears to incorporate the use of an evidence-based policymaking approach in its standard-setting practices, progressively evolving since its incipience. The findings of this study may lead to a calling for more robust academic discussion in future PCAOB public policy decisions, which in turn may benefit the auditing profession.     

PCAOB inspection reports and audit quality

With the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), audit firm oversight shifted away from self-regulation to independent regulation. The inspections program is the central feature of the PCAOB. We examine whether PCAOB inspections are able to distinguish actual audit quality (as opposed to perceived) during the period inspected to better understand this important regulatory tool. We use three measures that proxy for actual audit quality: abnormal accruals, restatements, and the propensity to issue a going concern opinion. For triennially inspected auditors, we find that PCAOB inspections are associated with lower audit quality when the reports are seriously deficient (weaker results for deficient reports). More specifically, we find clients of triennially inspected auditors that receive a deficient or seriously deficient report are associated with significantly higher abnormal current accruals and clients of auditors that receive a seriously deficient report are associated with a greater propensity to restate. Our evidence is subject to the caveat that PCAOB reports for triennially inspected auditors do not capture the going concern aspect of audit quality. For annually inspected auditors, the results are conflicting and suggest PCAOB inspection reports do not distinguish audit quality during the period inspected for annually inspected auditors.     

The effect of SOX on small auditor exits and audit quality

We find that over six hundred auditors with fewer than 100 SEC clients exit the market following SOX. Compared to the non-exiting auditors, the exiting auditors are lower quality, where quality is gauged by: (1) avoidance of AICPA peer reviews and failure to comply with PCAOB rules, and (2) severity of the peer review and inspection reports. In addition, clients of exiting auditors receive higher quality auditing from successor auditors, as captured by a greater likelihood of receiving going concern opinions. Our results suggest that the PCAOB inspections improve audit quality by incentivizing low quality auditors to exit the market.     

AN INVESTIGATION OF AUSTRALIAN AUDITORS’ USE OF THE MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATION LETTER

Auditors’ use of the management representation letter has assumed renewed significance because Australian, UK, US and International auditing guidelines recommending that auditors obtain appropriate representations from management have now been adopted as standards. Results from this exploratory survey confirmed that auditors’ use of the representation letter to obtain audit evidence was generally consistent with the professional guidance, but two anomalies were noted. First, one-third of respondent auditors did not use the letter to provide sole audit evidence. Comments from some auditors indicated doubt about the legal acceptability of such evidence. While past litigation might justify such caution, auditors should consider whether it is efficient to neglect the use of the management representation letter to provide primary audit evidence. Second, there was evidence that some auditors use management representations as sole audit evidence when other appropriate audit evidence is available. This suggests the need to inform these auditors about the danger of over-reliance on management representations. Finally, results showed that most auditors use the representation letter to inform management of their responsibilities. This informative use is consistent with professional guidance and with the corporate governance literature that recommends clarifying management’s understanding of their responsibilities and enhancing management’s sense of accountability. This informative use is most important to auditors belonging to smaller audit firms, and suggests that these firms’ clients have greater information needs.     

Do PCAOB Inspections Improve the Quality of Internal Control Audits?

We investigate whether Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspections affect the quality of internal control audits. Our research design improves on prior studies by exploiting both cross‐sectional and time‐series variation in the content of PCAOB inspection reports, while also controlling for audit firm and year fixed effects, effectively achieving a difference‐in‐differences research design. We find that when PCAOB inspectors report higher rates of deficiencies in internal control audits, auditors respond by increasing the issuance of adverse internal control opinions. We also find that auditors issue more adverse internal control opinions to clients with concurrent misstatements, who thus genuinely warrant adverse opinions. We further find that higher inspection deficiency rates lead to higher audit fees, consistent with PCAOB inspections prompting auditors to undertake costly remediation efforts. Taken together, our results are consistent with the PCAOB inspections improving the quality of internal control audits by prompting auditors to remediate deficiencies in their audits of internal controls.     

The attitude of Libyan auditors to inherent control risk assessment

Previous empirical evidence contradicts the practices of audit risk assessment recommended by the professional auditing standards. Key differences represent the presumption that auditors can readily distinguish between different categories of risk, how they assess such risks in practice, their application to the different account levels and their capacity to differentiate between what may constitute potentially high or low risks. The paper addresses these differences in the context of the Libyan auditors’ perceptions and practices. The nature and development of the audit profession in Libya makes this a good comparator for the US and UK contexts of audit behaviour. Equally importantly, the religious, political and socio-cultural context combined with Libya's role as an emergent economy is representative of many other economies in the world, thus providing a good comparator for assessing the validity and applicability of the established auditing management principles and procedures. One hundred and sixty four practicing auditors in Libya were investigated, initially by questionnaire and subsequently interview of a smaller sample of 20 auditors. The evidence reinforces prior empirical evidence that inherent and control risks are assessed interdependently, auditors are aware of the risk differentials depending on the level of account and are cognizant of factors normally associated with potentially high and low risk levels.     

Including audit regulation in the accounting curriculum

Audits and auditors are regulated to uphold audit quality, thus regulation is important to the public interest and clearly impacts firms and CPAs. Moreover, the reach of audit regulation has expanded greatly in the last decade with the establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). Recent research and calls from the profession point to enhancing the coverage of audit regulation in the accounting curriculum so that students understand the consequences of failing to adhere to professional standards. In this paper, we propose regulatory content for inclusion in the curriculum, we survey and catalog existing auditing textbooks and other educational materials for regulatory content, and we suggest flexible alternatives for incorporating this topic into the curriculum. It is our hope that, with these resources, faculty can more effectively include audit regulation in the classroom and achieve a high level of student comprehension and learning on the topic.     

Responsiveness of Auditors to the Audit Risk Standards: Unique Evidence from Big 4 Audit Firms

We examine the effect of changes in audit risk standards on the conduct of financial statement audits in a European setting. We investigate this by analysing the audit hours and audit fees for clients of Big 4 audit firms in Finland in 1996 and 2010. Our results show that audit firms became more sensitive to clients’ business risk due to the introduction of the new audit risk standards, with more audit hours allocated to owner-managed companies in 2010 than in 1996, and fewer audit hours allocated to low-risk clients in 2010 than in 1996. Also, the labour mix in the audit team changed for owner-managed companies, with a greater work load carried by junior auditors in 2010 than in 1996. Regarding the price of audit, we find an increase in audit fees for clients with high business risk, while audit fees remained at roughly the same level for low-risk clients. These findings should be of interest to the auditing profession and those involved in the development of auditing regulations.     

The use of analytical procedures by external auditors in Canada

The Enron debacle and other scandals highlight the issue of whether analytical procedures (APs) or more traditional audit approaches based on substantive testing are more appropriate. This paper surveys the use of APs by Canadian external auditors and augments understanding of the impact of auditing standards on professional practice. Our results demonstrate that APs are extensively applied in practice, particularly by larger firms, and that their use dominates the final review stage of the audit regardless of firm size. While standards do not appear to be an important influence upon practice for audit firms in general, this is not the case for smaller firms. Though auditors place more reliance on APs to reduce tests of detail, there are limits to this reliance. Our results indicate that while auditors may have increased their use of APs with the expectation of efficiency gains, these may be realized at present only partially.     

Risk-preparedness mechanism and audit quality: Evidence from mandatory increase of professional indemnity insurance and professional risk fund

We examine the risk-preparing benefits of Chinese audit firms’ professional indemnity insurance (PII) and professional risk fund (PRF) by using the Notice on Adjusting the Application Requirement of Audit Firms for Securities Qualifications as an exogenous shock. This policy requires audit firms to raise the sum of the cumulative compensation limit of their PII and PRF from 6 million to 80 million yuan. It is found, first, that the capital market regards this policy revision as a signal to strengthen investor protection and responds positively; client firms with high audit risks have a stronger response. Second, auditors’ governance of financial information has strengthened, resulting in the significant improvement of their clients’ financial reporting quality, with a stronger effect on firms with higher earnings management risk. There is no evidence that audit firms pass the costs on to their clients. Finally, the mismatch between auditors and new client firms is alleviated. We show that in an emerging market with weak investor protection, establishing a sound risk-preparedness mechanism for audit firms and strengthening the capacity for civil compensation ex post greatly improve the adaptive degree between international auditing standards and the legal environment of China, thereby enhancing the overall service quality of the audit market.     

The effect of disclosing audit quality control deficiencies on non-audit tax services: Evidence from Deloitte’s 2007 PCAOB Part II inspection report

We examine whether public disclosure of Deloitte 2007 PCAOB Part II report, which identifies quality control deficiencies related to audits of income tax accounts, affects Deloitte’s auditor-provided tax services (APTS). Using a difference-in-differences model, we document a 17 percent lower likelihood of Deloitte’s audit clients employing APTS relative to clients of other annually inspected firms when the report is made public. We also find that the dampening effect of publicly disclosing the Part II report on Deloitte’s APTS is more evident among audit clients paying higher non-audit fees to auditors and those with more complex tax planning. These results suggest that revealing income tax-specific quality control deficiencies prompts audit clients to revise upward (downward) their expected costs (benefits) of perceived auditor independence impairment (knowledge spillover) stemming from APTS. Overall, our study suggests that public disclosure of audit firm-wide quality control deficiencies pertaining to audits of income tax accounts imposes a collateral damage to the inspected firm’s non-audit tax services, thereby providing a more complete understanding of the consequences of the PCAOB’s communications about quality control deficiencies in Part II reports.     

The comparative effect of process and outcome accountability in enhancing professional scepticism

Responding to concerns about insufficient professional scepticism in audits (e.g. PCAOB, 2011 , 2012 ; ASIC, 2012 ), we investigate the effect of process and outcome accountability in enhancing the level of professional scepticism and the differences in effects across audit experience levels. In our experiment, we manipulate the type of accountability (outcome versus process) for both novice auditors and audit seniors. We examine the effect on four measures of professional scepticism and find that auditors show greater levels of professional scepticism when they are expected to justify their judgment process, rather than their final judgments. Our results also show that the professional scepticism of novice auditors improves to a greater extent than that of more experienced auditors (audit seniors) under process accountability.     

Do auditors’ early-life socioeconomic opportunities improve audit quality? Evidence from China

Prior research documents significant variation in audit outcomes based on individual auditors' demographic features, working experience, educational background, and social connections. This study examines whether individual auditors' early-life socioeconomic opportunities also affect audit practices. We expect that auditors from big cities have more access to socioeconomic opportunities and accumulate more human capital in early life, thus are more capable of providing high-quality audits after they start careers. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that auditors from big cities make more audit adjustments to earnings compared with auditors from small towns. Additional tests suggest that this early-life effect on audit quality is moderated when auditors receive higher education or gain more auditing experience and is more pronounced in downward adjustments than in upward adjustments. We also find a fee premium for auditors from big cities. Overall, this paper provides evidence that auditors’ early-life socioeconomic opportunities have a far-reaching influence on audit quality.     

A content analysis of CPA firms’ correspondence following PCAOB inspections: 2004–2010

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has conducted well over 1000 inspections of public accounting firms since 2004, the year their inspections began. The PCAOB inspections are mandated by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, and are designed to promote high professional audit standards and improve the audit quality of registered public accounting firms (U.S. House, 2002). Since then, a growing body of research has emerged focusing on the process, results, and decision implications of the inspections. Most of the research to date has focused on determining the impact of the inspection regimen from the perspective of regulators, clients, or markets, but there has been very little research focused on the effect of inspections on the accounting firms themselves.We evaluate the letters provided by triennial audit firms (100 or fewer issuer clients) to the PCAOB in response to their inspections. The response letters provide insight into what the firms themselves think about the value of the inspection and the results of the inspections. Our study and its findings are particularly timely in light of the PCAOB Chairman James Doty’s recent speech (Doty, 2011) in which he claimed that deficiencies were concrete instances of audit failure, and sharply criticized the responses of many audit firms who received inspection deficiency reports, most of whom maintain that their deficiency finding resulted from either differences in professional judgment or inadequate documentation, or both (but not audit deficiencies).We find that a majority of firms writing response letters (1) state they support the PCAOB’s objective of improving audit quality and (2) believe the inspection process will lead to higher audit quality. However, a substantial majority of firms that had an audit engagement deficiency disagreed with the PCAOB’s evaluation, citing differences in professional judgment and/or documentation issues. Our findings do not support but run counter to the PCAOB Chairman’s criticisms and insistence that inspection deficiencies are not attributable to professional judgment differences.     

An Empirical Study of the Audit Expectation-Performance Gap

The critical, litigious environment which characterises auditing today can be traced to the audit expectation-performance gap. Defined as the gap between society's expectations of auditors and auditors perceived performance, it is seen to comprise ‘reasonableness’ and ‘performance’ components, the latter being subdivided into ‘deficient standards’ and ‘deficient performance’. Empirical research was conducted in New Zealand in 1989 to investigate the audit expectation-performance gap. The study enables the duties which constitute the reasonableness, deficient standards and deficient performance components of the gap to be identified. It also provides the means to estimate the relative contribution of the duties to their respective components, and of the components to the overall gap between society's expectations of auditors and auditors' perceived performance. The research provides new insights into the structure, composition and extent of the audit expectation-performance gap but, more importantly, it signals a rational, comprehensive approach towards narrowing the gap. If adopted, this should bring society's expectations of auditors and auditors' performance into closer accord and, as a consequence, reduce the criticism and litigation which auditors face today.     

Auditors' Liability, Vague Due Care, and Auditing Standards

This paper expands the set of previously considered liability rules to include a negligence liability rule with a vague specification of due care. Auditors who are negligent in conducting their audit are liable for losses that result from reliance on misstated financial statements. However, what constitutes negligence for auditors is not clearly specified in the law. Consequently, courts often resort to Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) and Statements on Auditing Standards (SAS) as benchmarks for determining due care. A liability regime that consists of a vague negligence rule supports and amplifies the credibility of auditing standards. While auditing standards alleviate some of the vagueness that is inherent in the legal standard, they also form a lower bound on due care, since an audit of a quality that is lower than the quality that auditing standards require would be considered negligent. Thus, the vague specification of due care enables auditors to commit to audit quality as pronounced in auditing standards. This paper explores this link between professional standards and auditors' legal liability. It establishes that the commitment to auditing standards could not have been as credible as it is, if auditors' liability was determined based on the strict liability rule, or based on a negligence rule with a clearly specified due care, since under these two liability rules courts would not need to refer to auditing standards to establish fault. The paper also demonstrates that a legal regime where audit standards are used as a benchmark to evaluate negligence is not the same as a legal regime where due care is defined clearly. Therefore, previous studies that assumed a negligence regime with clear due care may have overstated the effort level that is induced by legal liability.     

Quis Auditoret Ipsos Auditores? Can Auditors Be Trusted?

This article explores the extent to which the audit profession and its practices promote public trust in audits. Differences between auditors and non‐auditors as to beliefs about the role of a financial report audit have long been discussed under the term ‘expectations gap’. However, this prior debate has tended to focus on non‐auditors’ alleged misunderstanding of audit processes without a corresponding understanding on the part of the profession as to why the public might place its trust in auditors. The study explores the nature of trust in an auditing context and notes that like any profession, auditing faces practical limitations but the inability to directly observe the conduct of audits combined with professional status create an ‘over trust’ expectation in the public. Changes in audit practices and culture have also exposed the profession to criticism. The article seeks to offer one approach by which the auditing profession can restore public confidence; namely, evidence‐based practice, which has proven effective in improving the quality of practice in medicine. Adoption of a reflective evidence‐based approach to audit practice offers the promise of greater audit quality and an improvement in the profession's accountability and public confidence.