后股权分置背景下上市公司控制权机制研究

通过对股权分置时代中国上市公司控制权机制存在的缺陷--控制权配置的错位和控制权市场的失效进行的分析可以发现,在股权分置格局下,大股东与小股东的利益机制截然割裂是导致"大股东控制"和"内部人控制"问题以及控制权市场外部治理机能失效的根源所在.同时,通过对股权分置改革对中国上市公司股权结构、控制权内部配置以及控制权外部转移正反两方面的影响的分析表明,后股权分置时代优化控制权机制应当引入"股东实质平等"原则,以增强中小股东的行权便利性,等等.     

中小投资者利益受侵害的表现及保护措施

保护投资者利益，是世界各国证券市场共同遵守的普遍准则。但在我国证券投资实践中，由于股票市场制度设计存在严重缺陷，上市公司质量不高，因欺骗上市、虚假上市造成的损失无法得到补偿，证券公司违规操作等原因，证券投资者特别是中小投资者的利益不易得到有效保护。需要通过解决股权分置问题，不断提高上市公司质量等五项措施来切实保护中小投资者的利益。     

股权分置改革前后我国上市公司控制权私有收益的变化研究

通过实证分析比较了股权分置改革前后上市公司控制权私有收益的变化。研究发现:股改后上市公司控制权私有收益有小幅下降;流通股比例与控制权私有收益呈负相关,且负相关程度在股改后加强;权益负债比与控制权私有收益呈负相关,且负相关程度在股改后减弱;行业相关性与控制权私有收益呈正相关,且正相关程度在股改后加强。     

定向增发、代理冲突与中小投资者保护

以2006-2010年上市公司定向增发事件为样本,系统研究了定向增发过程中大股东对中小投资者的利益侵害问题.实证研究发现:面向大股东发行的折价率最高,面向大股东和机构投资者发行的折价率居中,面向机构投资者发行的折价率最低.大股东通过定向增发提高了股权集中度,进一步巩固了控制权地位,通过低价发行侵占了中小投资者权益.降低大股东的认购比例、降低资产认购比例、降低增发后与增发前股权集中度之差、减少增发规模、提高公司规模可以有效地制衡大股东在定向增发过程中侵害中小投资者的程度.提高增发前的股权集中度、聘请“十大”券商作为主承销商、改善治理环境、实际控制人为国有机构都没有起到约束大股东进行利益侵占的作用.     

股权分置改革、高股利分配与投资者利益保护——基于驰宏锌锗的案例研究

本文以我国股权分置改革为制度背景,从股利代理理论和投资者保护理论角度出发,研究驰宏锌锗的股利分配行为与投资者利益保护的关系。分析结果表明,驰宏锌锗在股权分置改革过程中所进行的股利分配,有严重侵占中小股东利益之嫌。针对这一问题,我们建议监管当局要加强对上市公司高股利分配行为的监管,并继续完善中小投资者法律保护建设,尤其是执行层面的监督。上市公司则应该提高其所披露信息的质量,促进公司稳定和谐发展。     

后股权分置时代上市公司大股东交易行为研究

股权分置改革，有利于上市公司规范市场行为和完善公司治理，减少大股东通过“隧道挖掘”对中小投资者的利益侵蚀。但在后股权分置时代，如果缺乏有效的制度和法律规范，大股东可能由原来对上市公司的控制变成对公司和二级市场双重控制，市场操纵的模式将发生变化。本文在借鉴国际经验和境外市场曾经出现的与大股东交易相关的案例的基础上，通过对大股东交易目的、动机、影响因素、行为方式和各国法律规范的全面考察，重点对大股东可能出现的违规交易行为或侵害中小投资者权益的交易行为进行了分析，并提出了相应的政策建议。     

全流通时代下中小股东权益得到保护了吗？—基于华丽家族大股东减持的案例研究

中小股东权益保护一直都是公司治理的核心问题之一,中小股东权益的有效保护直接关系着公司的有序运营,证券市场的稳定,乃至国民经济的健康发展。因此,中小股权权益保护也一直是国内外学者关注的一个热点问题。LISV（1999,2002）曾指出,一个国家法律制度的完善程度直接影响着该国的中小股东权益保护。那么,在我国这样一个新兴的资本市场下,中小股东权益保护更成为共同关注的焦点。股权分置0是我国特定历史时期下产生的一个特殊现象,掌握了公司绝大多数股权的大股东不能上市流通,只有少部分股份可以在市场上交易、买卖。鉴于大股东与中小股东目标函数的不一致性,加之大股东拥有的控制权优势和信息优势,大股东便通过各种方式转移控股公司的利益,进行隧道挖掘（tunneling）（唐清泉等,2005）,如并购（刘峰等,2007）、增发配股等（朱云等,2009）、关联交易（郑建明,2007）、操纵报告盈余（Fan and Wong,2005）、支付红利（La Porta et al．,2000）,等等。股权分置改革后,随着限售股的逐步解禁,全流通时代的到来,大股东享有了与中小股东一样上市流通的权利。从理论上讲,大股东与中小股东的利益应趋于一致,但是,大股东为获额外控制权收益的目标并没有改变,中小股东利益仍然没有得到良好的保护（黄志忠等,2010;李增泉等,2011;吴育辉和吴世农,2010）。国内学者从不同角度对全流通下大股东行为、中小股东权益保护进行研究,并通过案例指出股权分置时代下仍存在大股东利益侵占的行为,如五粮液的不当关联交易（李明珠,2010）、武钢模式的关联交易（刘瑁,2013）、驰宏锌锗的高股利分配（周县华和吕长江,2008）、鄂武商的控制权收益争夺（陈玉罡和莫夏君,2013）、ST梅雁的大股东减?     

股票市场均衡与大股东行为选择——对中国股市非均衡的理论分析

中国上市公司的大股东侵害了中小投资者权益。大股东的侵害行为影响了投资者的行为选择并导致了中国股市的非均衡。"股权分置"改革的本质是使大股东的投票权趋于完备——赋予其"用脚投票权",这必将改变大股东与中小股东的博弈规则、扩充大股东的行为可选集,并最终使中国股市趋于动态均衡。     

非公平关联交易、信息披露与终极股东隧道效应

我国上市公司终极股东普遍采取违规信息披露与非公平关联交易的方式侵占中小股东利益,从而产生了终极股东的隧道效应.本文通过Logistic回归方法,分析了能够抑制终极股东隧道行为的主要因素,为推进股权分置改革进一步深化,改善上市公司治理,保护中小股东权益的政策提供了实证依据.     

后股权分置时代上市公司大股东资金利益侵占与现金股利政策之关系的研究

股权分置改革,有利于上市公司规范市场行为和完善公司治理,但如果缺乏有效的制度和法律规范,大股东仍有可能由原来对上市公司的控制变成对公司和二级市场双重控制。研究第一大股东利益侵占与现金股利政策的关系,有利于上市公司规范市场行为和完善公司治理,减少大股东通过"隧道挖掘"对中小投资者的利益侵蚀,加强中小投资者保护,对我国资产市场的发展有重要的意义。本文分析了我国目前上市公司的资金侵占和现金股利分配的背景,提出了3个假设。通过建立相关模型,运用描述性统计、单因素分析和回归分析对所有的假设进行检验,验证了第一大股东资金侵占与上市公司的现金股利政策存在显著关系,以及股权分置改革后现金股利与资金侵占具有负相关关系。针对本文的研究结果,提出了若干建议。     

Split Share Structure Reform,corporate governance,and the foreign share discount puzzle in China

We examine the impact of the Split Share Structure Reform on the well-known foreign share discount puzzle in China. Existing literature confirms that foreign investors are more concerned about insider expropriation because of their information disadvantage relative to domestic investors. The split share structure of the ownership of Chinese listed firms created a conflict of interests between state and private shareholders. Since, before the reform, state shareholders held restricted shares that denied them any wealth effect from share price movements, they had a limited incentive to work with private shareholders to ensure that managers maximized the stock market value of the firm. By abolishing the trading restrictions for state shareholders, this reform has increased the incentive alignment between state and private shareholders, encouraging them to monitor managers. If foreign investors’ concerns over the corporate governance implications of the split share structure at least partly contributed to their discounting of Chinese listed firms, then this discount should be reduced following the reform. Indeed, our evidence confirms this prediction, especially among Chinese listed firms with more state ownership or restricted shares. Our findings imply that this significant institutional reform of the Chinese stock market has benefitted minority investors.     

中小股东一致行动改善了公司治理水平吗?

在资本市场推行注册制改革的背景下,维护中小股东利益成为保障注册制改革效果,助力资本市场平稳运行的关键。本文实证考察了作为非实际控制人的中小股东如何利用一致行动参与公司治理。研究表明,中小股东通过一致行动形成投票表决权的集中配置,进而制衡大股东,从而改善公司绩效。在治理机制方面,中小股东一致行动对绩效的改善,一方面源于其帮助中小股东在股东大会上提出更多代表自身利益的议案,在董事会中委派更多董事,在决策过程中形成更大影响力;另一方面则源于其帮助中小股东实现对大股东的制衡和对经理人的监督,从而抑制实际控制人的“隧道挖掘”行为,缓解内部人控制问题。进一步研究发现,中小股东一致行动的作用效果受到一致行动人的持股比例、形成动机、上市公司的投票表决制度以及一致行动人类型的影响。     

关于股改前后现金股利影响因素的实证研究

对股改前后影响现金股利水平的公司治理变量研究表明,虽然股改矫正了现金股利与增长机会之间的关系,使股改后当存在增长机会时,公司会减少现金股利的发放,但是我国上市公司的现金股利尚未呈现出全流通资本市场上作为降低控股股东与中小股东代理成本工具的现金股利政策应有的特征,突出表现在股改前后影响上市公司现金股利支付水平的股权结构变量并未发生变化,股改前后都存在股权集中度、第一大股东持股比例及第二到第十大股东持股比例与每股现金股利呈显著正相关、而流通(非限售)股比例与每股现金股利呈显著负相关的关系。     

我国金字塔型控股结构下的大股东利益侵害行为研究

我国上市公司普遍存在"大股东"现象。大股东通过金字塔型的控股结构获得超额控制权,并"挖空"上市公司的资源,损害了广大中小股东的利益。本文在考虑我国上市公司金字塔型控股结构的基础上,构建大股东利益侵害行为模型,系统探讨了影响利益侵害行为的因素,并提出了制约大股东"隧道挖空"行为的对策。     

The impact of state ownership on share price informativeness: The case of the Split Share Structure Reform in China

This study examines the impact of state ownership on share price informativeness using the unique setting of the Split Share Structure Reform in China. This reform abolishes the trading restriction on shares held mainly by state shareholders. In doing so, it renders state shareholders' wealth more sensitive to share price movements and decreases their conflict of interests with private shareholders. This change is expected to strengthen the corporate governance incentives of state shareholders and reduce the information asymmetry in Chinese listed firms. This prediction is confirmed through empirical evidence of increased share price informativeness among firms that are more sensitive to the impact of this reform, i.e. those with more state ownership or restricted shares. These findings imply that this reform benefits the information environment and minority shareholders in the Chinese stock market.     

股权分置改革的盈余质量效应

股权分置改革后,股价直接决定了股东的财富,持有大量非流通股的控股股东有动机操纵盈余以最大化自身的利益。国有股权转让的限制,导致国有控股股东盈余操纵动机弱于其他股东。本文研究了股权分置改革对国有控股公司和非国有控股公司盈余质量的不同影响。研究结果表明,股权分置改革后,非国有上市公司向上盈余管理程度显著提高,盈余持续性显著降低;而国有上市公司的盈余管理程度和盈余持续性都没有显著变化。本文检验了股权分置改革的成效,研究结论可为投资者的投资行为提供决策支持。     

投票权重向创业团队的倾斜配置及股权结构设计

股权结构设计和控制权安排是协调股东与经理人代理冲突的基础性公司治理制度安排。"同股不同权"构架的核心是通过投票权重配置向创业团队倾斜,实现创业团队与外部投资者之间从短期雇佣合约到长期合伙合约的转化。上述构架由于顺应了以互联网技术为标志的第四次工业革命对创新导向的企业权威重新配置的内在要求,而受到诸多高科技企业青睐。"一股一票"并非对投资者利益最好的保护,"同股不同权"也并非对投资者利益最不好的保护,投资者自愿购买"同股不同权"构架股票,并未从根本上动摇股东处于公司治理权威地位的"股东中心主义"。与现实需求相契合,"同股不同权"的股权结构设计中,应遵循资金投入要求、日落条款设置及股东权威性不变等设计理念。     

Does strengthening large shareholders’ cash flow rights reduce their expropriation motivation? Evidence from China’s dividend tax reforms

According to classic corporate governance theory, strengthening large shareholders’ cash flow rights without changing their control rights should reduce expropriation incentives by better aligning their interests with those of minority shareholders. However, due to the weaker investor protections and low dividend payouts of listed firms in China, large shareholders typically extract private benefits instead of seeking shared benefits through dividends. They therefore care more about control rights than cash flow rights. An empirical study using the exogenous changes of two rounds of dividend tax reductions reveals that strengthening the largest shareholders’ cash flow rights leaves their expropriation activities unchanged and firm value does not increase. However, when other shareholders supervise the largest shareholder, expropriation activities ease significantly.     

Ownership structure and dividend policy: Evidence from Italian firms

Abstract

This paper reports on empirical investigations into the relationship between dividend policy and ownership structure of firms, using a sample of 139 listed Italian companies. Ownership structure in Italy is highly concentrated and hence the relevant agency problem to analyse seems to be the one that arises from the conflicting interests of large shareholders and minority shareholders. This paper therefore attempts to test the rent extraction hypothesis by relating the firm’s dividend payout ratio to various ownership variables, which measure the degree of concentration in terms of the voting rights of large shareholders. The hypothesis that other non-controlling large shareholders may have incentives to monitor the largest shareholder is also tested. The results of the empirical analysis reveal that firms make lower dividend payouts as the voting rights of the largest shareholder increase. Results also suggest that the presence of agreements among large shareholders might explain the limited monitoring power of other ‘strong’ non-controlling shareholders.     

Tunneling as an incentive for earnings management during the IPO process in China

Using a sample of 185 Chinese IPO firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange during the period 1999–2001, we show that related-party (RP) sales of goods and services could be used opportunistically to manage earnings upwards in the pre-IPO period. We also provide evidence that such behavior may be motivated by the prospect of tunneling opportunities in the post-IPO period, i.e., exploiting economic resources from minority shareholders for the benefit of the parent company. We provide evidence of one such opportunistic tunneling tool: non-repayment by Chinese parent companies of net outstanding corporate loans made to them by their newly listed subsidiaries. Furthermore, we provide evidence in support of our assertion of an association between such tunneling behavior in the post-IPO period and earnings management via abnormal RP sales in the pre-IPO period. Finally, we demonstrate the apparent failure of investors in Chinese IPOs to perceive the link between the two phenomena. The results enhance understanding of the motives for and consequences of earnings manipulation during the IPO process. They highlight a potential additional investment risk facing foreign investors in China’s capital markets as well as in Chinese firms cross-listed in non-Chinese stock exchanges, and have policy implications for China and other emerging markets which need to improve the protection of minority shareholders’ rights.