非经常性损益与股票价格的相关性分析

通过对我国企业非经常性损益与股票价格的相关性分析表明:在1993～1999年间,我国企业非经常性损益的降低并没有提高会计信息与股票价格的相关性,投资者只关心短期利润,而不区分持续利润和暂时利润;而在2000～2002年,伴随经营利润和非经常性损益的定价乘数的下降,投资者逐步趋于理性和稳健,开始利用净资产所表示的企业内在价值来修正自己关于企业未来的预期.     

企业会计报表粉饰的危害与对策

企业向外界提供财务信息的主要栽体是财务报告,而财务报告由财务数据和非财务数据组成,前者主要由会计报表提供,后者则由报表附注提供.企业的财务粉饰行为最主要是提供虚假的财务数据,即主要对会计报表进行粉饰.本文试图通过对企业会计报表粉饰原因和动机、常用粉饰手段的分析,构建出针对虚增利润和资产型粉饰的治理对策,提出辨别企业会计报袁粉饰的建议.     

企业会计报表粉饰的危害与对策

企业向外界提供财务信息的主要载体是财务报告，而财务报告由财务数据和非财务数据组成，前者主要由会计报表提供，后者则由报表附注提供。企业的财务粉饰行为最主要是提供虚假的财务数据，即主要对会计报表进行粉饰。本文试图通过对企业会计报表粉饰原因和动机、常用粉饰手段的分析，构建出针对虚增利润和资产型粉饰的治理对策，提出辨别企业会计报表粉饰的建议。     

上市公司非经常性损益操纵的新趋向

非经常性损益是指公司发生的与经营业务无直接关系,以及虽与经营业务相关,但由于其性质、金额或发生频率影响了真实、公允地反映公司正常盈利能力的各项收入、支出.非经常性损益项目的发生具有很大的不确定性,长期以来,我国上市公司出于各种需要,操纵非经常性损益的行为已司空见惯.     

中国证监会要求提高财务信息披露质量

中国证监会近日发出通知,要求各上市公司、会计师事务所进一步提高上市公司财务信息披露质量。证监会要求从六个方面提高上市公司财务信息披露质量,包括各项损失准备的计提、关联方关系及关联交易价格的公允性、会计差错更正、审计范围受到限制、重大不确定性和资产评估事项。通知要求,上市公司不得为粉饰财务状况和经营成果,利用资产减值及会计估计变更调节各期利润;不得利用资产减值准备的机会“一次亏足”,在前期巨额计提后大额转回,随意调节利润;不得不计提或少计提关联方欠款可能发生的坏账损失;不得随意变更计提方法和计提比例。如果…     

从非经常性损益项目看退市制度——以ST迈亚为例

非经常性损益是影响上市公司财务业绩的一个重要因素,更是许多ST公司用于利润调节、规避退市的法宝。在很大程度上,是现行的退市制度对ST公司利用非经常性损益项目调节利润的行为起到了导向作用。本文以ST迈亚为例,分析非经常性损益是如何帮其谋财进而达到保牌的目的。此外,本文针对现行的退市制度提出了相关政策性建议,进而实现证券市场资源的优化配置,维护投资者利益。     

EVA指标优化研究

本文分析了EVA（经济增加值）应用背景和指标的内在结构,指出了其所取数据源因物价变动而使得评价结论缺乏可比性,资本成本的确定也不符合资本市场的实际情况,非经常性损益调整项尚存在人为操纵的可能性;为提高模型指标的评价质量,提出了以物价指数来调整和重述会计报表的货币性项目和非货币性项目,以资本市场个别资本估价模型来重构平均资本成本率,扩充非经常性项目的调整因子,并将扩充后非经常性项目的调整项的整体作为税后净营业利润的减项。     

2002年深市上市公司非经常性损益状况分析

随着对非经常性损益的确认逐步规范化，2002年深市上市公司的非经常性损益整体上对净利润的影响逐渐减弱，上市公司通过非经常性损益操纵利润的情况也有所缓解。     

券商大看台

银行业:息差基本见底业绩改善可期东方证券对资产减值准备、非经常性营收和应付职工薪酬变动等因素进行调整之后,发现上半年上市银行经常性经营利润下滑幅度在10%左右。但从环比来看,二季度的经常性经营利润比一季度保持稳定。     

新会计准则对商业银行贷款损失准备的影响

与国际接轨的新会计准则的实施,给我国商业银行的贷款损失准备及其监管带来了很大影响。新会计准则对银行贷款损失准备监管的主要影响有:(1)新会计准则关于贷款损失准备的规定与监管审慎性要求相矛盾;(2)新会计准则规定的贷款损失准备计提方法与监管要求的贷款损失准备计提方法有分歧。新会计准则对商业银行的贷款损失准备的影响主要有:(1)降低了商业银行利用贷款损失准备操纵利润的可能性;(2)使得贷款损失准备具有更大的波动性;(3)引入时间价值,可能导致准备水平的提高;(4)可能导致利息收入和减值准备同步增加,并将影响各会计期间的利润发生一定程度的变化。本文对以上影响进行了分析,并提出了相应的对策建议。     

国有资产流失的博弈分析

从博弈论视角分析,国有资产流失,是不同经济主体间利益冲突的一种博弈行为结果。从博弈扩展模型分析,表现为信息不对称下委托—代理双方为追求利益最大化而在消极心态下的非合作行为,以及代理方利用权力,在积极心态下追求最大利益的违规行为与委托方监督管理间的博弈均衡。应从激励机制、风险机制、约束机制、监督机制、配置机制等方面阻止国有资产流失。     

Nonrecurring Accounting Transactions and Stock Option Grants

Abstract:  We examine the effect of nonrecurring accounting transactions on stock option grants for a sample of US companies. After controlling for both the economic and corporate governance-related determinants of option grants, we find that the aggregate value of stock option grants is more positively related to nonrecurring gains than to nonrecurring losses. We also examine whether the asymmetric treatment of nonrecurring gains and losses arises because (1) information contained in the nonrecurring transactions is related to firms' long-term prospects, (2) weak corporate governance fails to curb more favorable executive pay arrangements, (3) executives possess superior bargaining power in the labor marketplace, and (4) firms have significant growth opportunities. While we find no support for the first explanation and some support for the third, we find more consistent support for the growth explanation and two factors related to the corporate governance explanation: director-executive duality and the frequency of board meetings.     

Do central banks lose on foreign-exchange intervention? A review article

Estimates of central bank intervention losses or profits vary widely; some estimates find substantial losses, others profits. In most cases, estimated profits are not risk-adjusted, and risk adjustment can have large effects. Furthermore, profit estimates involve variables integrated of order one, and because of this test-statistics may have nonstandard distributions; few studies take this into account. Estimates of risk-adjusted profits for the US Fed and the Swedish Riksbank, with allowances for possible nonstandard distributions, suggest that neither made losses and might have made significant profits.     

Fiscal Consequences of Paying Interest on Reserves

We review the role of the central bank's balance sheet in a textbook monetary model and explore what changes if the central bank is allowed to pay interest on its liabilities. When the central bank (CB) cannot pay interest, away from the zero lower bound its (real) balance sheet is limited by the demand for money. Furthermore, if securities are not marked to market and the central bank holds its bonds to maturity, it is impossible for the CB to make losses, and it always obtains profits from being a monopoly provider of money. When the option of paying interest on liabilities is allowed, the limit on the CB's balance sheet is lifted. In this case, the CB is free to take on interest‐rate risk – for example, by buying long‐term securities and financing those purchases with short‐term debt that pays the market interest rate. This is a risky enterprise that can lead to additional profits but also to losses. To the extent that losses exceed the profits of the monopoly operations, the CB faces two options: either it is recapitalised by Treasury or it increases its monopoly profits by raising the inflation tax.     

把握利润转移规律——利润战略管理探索

会计利润确认与计量的短期特质严重地扭曲了利润指标的完整面目 ,削弱了利润指标在战略管理中的积极作用。必须拓展会计利润观 ,使会计确认与计量利润不只停留于短期 ,而且关注长期趋势 ,并使短期与长期利润形成一种此长彼消的关系 ,以充分发挥利润指标的积极作用。为此 ,依据价值转移规律 ,在会计工作中牢固地树立战略利润观 ,企业基于这样的利润信息可以不断地调整并完善经营策略 ,最终赢得持续创造价值的能力。文章借鉴了西方价值转移理论 ,对我国企业如何确立战略利润的观念 ,基此开展有效的价值管理提出了具体思路     

The 52-week high strategy and information uncertainty

This paper examines the driver of the 52-week high strategy, which is long in stocks close to their 52-week high price and short in stocks with a price far below their one-year high, and tests the hypothesis that this strategy’s profitability can be explained by anchoring—a behavioral bias. To test the null, we examine whether the 52-week high criterion has more predictive power in cases of larger information uncertainty. This hypothesis is based on the psychological insight that behavioral biases increase in uncertainty. For six proxies of ambiguity, we document a positive relationship to returns of 52-week high winner stocks and a negative relationship to returns of 52-week high loser stocks. The opposite effect of information uncertainty on winner and loser stocks implies that the 52-week high profits are increasing in uncertainty measures. Moreover, the study documents that the six variables have a similar impact on momentum profits. Hence, we cannot reject the hypothesis that anchoring explains the profits of the 52-week high strategy and that it is the driver of the momentum anomaly.     

Estimating product market competition: Methodology and application

In oligopolies, firms behave strategically and commit to actions that elicit favorable responses from rivals. Firm actions consequently are a function of the nature of these strategic interactions. In this paper, we develop a methodology for the empirical estimation of strategic interactions in product markets. We then apply our measure of strategic interactions to CEO compensation. We use quarterly data on profits and sales from Compustat to estimate the slope of firm’s reaction function. When the slope is negative and marginal profits decrease with an increase in the rival’s actions the firm is classified as a strategic substitute. When the slope is positive and marginal profits increase with an increase in the rival’s actions the firm is classified as a strategic complement. As predicted by theory, we find significant evidence that strategic substitutes decrease the pay for performance incentives of their CEOs. On the other hand, strategic complements significantly increase CEO pay for performance incentives. The empirical measure developed can be used to test a wide variety of strategic models.     

The Impact of Irreversibility,Uncertainty and Timing Options on Deprival Valuations and the Detection of Monopoly Profits

This paper has two purposes. The first is to derive rules identifying the deprival value of an asset (i) which is irreversible to one extent or another; (ii) the benefit stream of which is subject to continuing uncertainty; and (iii) for which an option to wait exists as to when to reacquire should the owner be deprived of it. The second is to consider whether accounting rates of return employing these deprival value rules can be developed to help in the detection of monopoly profits in circumstances where investment decision-making takes place in the presence of irreversibility, uncertainty and the existence of timing options. The ‘new’ deprival value rules for an asset differ from the ‘conventional’ ones in that present value less the value of the option to reinvest in the asset appears in the ‘new’ rules wherever present value appears in the ‘conventional’ rules. Examples are provided which suggest that ‘new’ and ‘conventional’ deprival value rules can differ materially. A further result is that accounting rates of return can be developed using the ‘new’ deprival value rules that are, in principle, useful in the detection of monopoly profits. Nonetheless, in practice such use requires a level of information that renders the result superfluous in the sense that the provision of replacement cost balance sheet data, combined with the level of information needed, is sufficient to reveal the presence of monopoly profits directly.     

Optimal tax-timing and asset allocation when tax rebates on capital losses are limited

This article studies the portfolio problem with realization-based capital gain taxation when limited amounts of losses qualify for tax rebate payments, as is the case under current US tax law. When the tax rate applicable to realized losses exceeds that on realized capital gains, it can be optimal to realize capital gains immediately and pay capital gain taxes to regain the option to use potential future losses against a higher tax rate. This incentive adds an entirely new and as yet unstudied dimension to the portfolio problem. It causes risk averse investors to hold more equity and attain higher welfare levels than is the case when trading under a tax system that seeks to collect the same amount of taxes, but does not allow for tax rebate payments. This is because the benefit to these investors from having their losses subsidized is greater than the suffering from having profits taxed at a higher rate.     

The relation between non-GAAP earnings and accounting restatements: Evidence after regulation G

Scholarly findings on whether disclosure of Non-GAAP earnings is informative or opportunistic are inconsistent. Since the 2003 implementation of Regulation G, investors can view management's process of adjusting from GAAP earnings to Non-GAAP earnings. This study investigates the information content of Non-GAAP earnings in the context of restatements. The hypotheses of this study are based on the following two propositions. First, the informativeness of Non-GAAP earnings is determined by the nature of items excluded from GAAP earnings to derive Non-GAAP earnings (either nonrecurring special items or recurring exclusions). Second, restatements can be used to distinguish between informative and opportunistic Non-GAAP earnings disclosures. My results show that firms with restatements, especially fraud or core earnings restatements, exhibit greater relative use of Non-GAAP earnings disclosures that adjust GAAP earnings for positive other exclusions (recurring expenses). By contrast, disclosures of Non-GAAP earnings derived by excluding nonrecurring expenses (special items) from GAAP earnings are not associated with restatements.