Financial Intermediary Versus Production Approach to Efficiency of Marketing Distribution Systems and Organizational Structure of Insurance Companies

An examination of the efficiency of the marketing distribution channel and organizational structure for insurance companies is presented from a framework that views the insurer as a financial intermediary rather than as a “production entity” which produces “value added” through loss payments. Within this financial intermediary approach, solvency can be a primary concern for regulators of insurance companies, claims‐paying ability can be a primary concern for policyholders, and return on investment can be a primary concern for investors. These three variables (solvency, financial return, and claims‐paying ability) are considered as outputs of the insurance firm. The financial intermediary approach acknowledges that interests potentially conflict, and the strategic decision makers for the firm must balance one concern versus another when managing the insurance company. Accordingly, we investigate the efficiency of insurance companies using data envelopment analysis (DEA) having as insurer output an appropriately selected (for the firm under investigation) combination of solvency, claims‐paying ability, and return on investment as outputs. These efficiency evaluations are further examined to study stock versus mutual form of organizational structure and agency versus direct marketing arrangements, which are examined separately and in combination. Comparisons with the “value‐added” or “production” approach to insurer efficiency are presented. A new DEA approach and interpretation is also presented.     

Meta-analysis of the impact of financial constraints on firm performance

A large number of studies have investigated the relationship between financial constraints and firm performance. However, due to heterogeneity in study design factors, such as choice of measures for constraints and performance, control variables, estimation methods and study sample, the empirical results have been mixed. To mitigate this issue, this paper reports a meta-analysis of the association between financial constraints and firm performance. To assess the overall direction of the relationship and the sources of heterogeneity, we apply meta-analytic methods to 26 studies (providing 189 effect sizes) on the association between financial constraints and financial performance in listed companies. Our result shows that, overall, there is a positive relationship between financial constraints and firm performance. In addition, meta-regression results suggest that return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) as measures of financial performance, and external finance and size as measures of financial constraints, have a significant negative impact on the relationship between financial constraints and firm performance relative to the mean impact on effect size. Similarly, all of North America and Asia as regional differences, control of size and corporate governance as control variables, and journal quality as strength of results, also have a significant negative impact. On the other hand, market value as a measure of financial performance, and the Whited & Wu index as a measure of financial constraints, have significant positive impact relative to the mean impact. Similarly, cross-country and Europe as regional differences, and publication status as strength of results, all have significant positive impact. Given that firm performance is of fundamental importance to investors, this study therefore helps researchers and policymakers to understand the variation in the empirical results on the impact of financial constraints.     

Investment options with debt-financing constraints

A contingent claims model is used to study the impact of debt-financing constraints on firm value, optimal capital structure, the timing of investment and other variables, such as credit spreads. The optimal investment trigger follows a U shape as a function of exogenously imposed constraint. Risky, equity-financed R&D growth options increase firm value by increasing the option value on unlevered assets, while their impact on the net benefits of debt is small.     

CEO compensation,director compensation,and firm performance: Evidence of cronyism?

We model CEO and director compensation using firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, and governance variables. After controlling for monitoring proxies, we find a significant positive relationship between CEO and director compensation. We hypothesize that this relationship could be due to unobserved firm complexity (omitted variables), and/or to excess compensation of directors and managers. We also find evidence that excess compensation (both director and CEO) is associated with firm underperformance. We therefore conclude that the evidence is consistent with excessive compensation due to mutual back scratching or cronyism. The evidence suggests that excessive compensation has an effect on firm performance that is independent of the poor governance variables discussed by previous studies.     

Modeling the behavior of real asset prices

Recently there has been much research treating housing and other real assets as financial claims, primarily in order to value their derivative assets, such as mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. Real asset prices are then typically modeled as a lognormal process, in the same manner that has traditionally been applied to firm value. The service flow or implicit value of a house is thus considered, in analogy with stock dividends, to be a fixed proportion of the fluctuating house price. We consider the appropriateness of this formulation and draw some distinctions between real assets, such as a house, and investment enterprises, such as a firm. We then propose an alternative method of formulating the service flow and the price of real assets which seems more appropriate to the economic characteristic of such assets.     

The Chinese experience: The impact of financial restatements on firm value and its implications on the investigatory practices of regulators

We examine the relationship between restatements of prior period financial results and firm value in China. This relationship is relevant to the millions of global investors who purchase Chinese equity securities because Chinese regulatory authorities must focus on the restatement events that, in their judgment, most warrant investigation. We recommend that they focus their attention on restatement announcements (and the firms that announce them) that possess the characteristics that most impact firm value.Prior studies of the American equity markets found evidence of a relationship between the nature of the restatement announcements and firm value, as well as evidence that core account adjustments and high-magnitude adjustments affect firm value more than noncore account adjustments and low-magnitude adjustments. However, based on a sample of Chinese listed firms that made corporate announcements that appeared in the Asian press between 2003 and 2011, we only find mixed evidence in the Chinese equity markets in support of the former relationship, and no evidence at all in support of the latter relationship.In other words, restatement announcements in China do not impact firm value to the same extent, and in the same manner, as restatement announcements in America. Chinese regulators must thus develop policies that are unique to the Chinese markets in order to effectively prioritize their oversight activities on firms that issue restatement announcements.What factors should be considered by Chinese regulators? We identify a collection of corporate governance variables, as well as a smaller collection of financial variables, that are significantly associated with decreases in firm value. We also develop a set of regression analyses that utilize these variables to explain a significant portion of the variability of firm value during the sample period. Interestingly, however, we find no evidence that the growth patterns of the firms are significantly associated with changes in firm value.Using this evidence, we recommend the development of a model of regulatory guidance that is customized for the unique characteristics of the Chinese equity markets. We believe that this model can help Chinese authorities focus their attention on specific restatement announcements that most impact firm value.     

Monitoring, Implicit Contracting, and the Lack of Permanence of Leveraged Buyouts

We present a possible explanation for the lack of permanenceof the very high levels of concentration of ownership that accompanyleveraged buyouts. We first argue that some diffusion of ownershipcan be beneficial to the shareholders of a firm by encouragingthe employees of the firm to enter into implicit contracts withthe firm. The level of concentration of ownership that maximizesfirm value is therefore that which trades off the well-knowngains from monitoring with the gains from implicit contracting.We then argue that, in the process of concentrating the ownershipof a firm that has excessively diffuse ownership to a levelthat maximizes firm value, investors in leveraged buyouts willchoose an initial level of concentration of ownership that isvery high. They will do so in order to put pressure on managersto breach existing implicit contracts. Following the breachof these contracts, investors will decrease the level of concentrationof ownership to the level that maximizes firm value. There willbe no further breach of implicit contracts, for such breachis incidental to the transformation of the firm from one thathas excessively diffuse ownership to one that has the optimallevel of diffusion of ownership. No change in the concentrationof ownership therefore occurs once the level of diffusion ofownership that maximizes firm value has been attained. JEL Classification:G30.     

The Time Series Properties of Financial Ratios: Lev Revisited

This paper re‐evaluates the time series properties of financial ratios. It presents new empirical analysis which explicitly allows for the possibility that financial ratios can be characterized as non‐linear mean‐reverting processes. Financial ratios are widely employed as explanatory variables in accounting and finance research with applications ranging from the determinants of auditors' compensation to explaining firms' investment decisions. An implicit assumption in this empirical work is that the ratios are stationary so that the postulated models can be estimated by classical regression methods. However, recent empirical work on the time series properties of corporate financial ratios has reported that the level of the majority of ratios is described by non‐stationary, I (1), integrated processes and that the ratio differences are parsimoniously described by random walks. We hypothesize that financial ratios may follow a random walk near their target level, but that the more distant a ratio is from target, the more likely the firm is to take remedial action to bring it back towards target. This behavior will result in a significant size distortion of the conventional stationarity tests and lead to frequent non‐rejection of the null hypothesis of non‐stationarity, a finding which undermines the use of these ratios as reliable conditioning variables for the explanation of firms' decisions.     

The consequences of limiting shareholder litigation: Evidence from exclusive forum provisions

In response to an explosion of shareholder litigation, many firms have adopted exclusive forum provisions which limit lawsuits to courts in a firm's state of incorporation. This paper examines the consequences of a required venue for shareholder litigation. Delaware-incorporated companies experience significant increases in firm value around exogenous events that confirmed the use of a specified forum. Reduced legal costs and the designation of the domicile court as the sole forum to hear shareholder claims contribute to the increase in firm value. Overall, these findings suggest that a required venue for shareholder litigation benefits firms by eliminating multi-jurisdictional lawsuits and reducing the threat of claims with little merit.     

Banks as lenders and shareholders: Evidence from Japan

This paper examines the effects of the main bank's equity–debt structure, (i.e., equity stakes and debt claims) on firm performance and financial policies in Japan over the period 1977–1987. Results show that firms with main bank equity stakes have lower performance than those without. However, among firms with main bank equity stakes, the equity–debt structure of claims has a positive effect on firm performance. The positive effect of the main bank's equity–debt structure is found to be greater in group-affiliated firms than in independent firms. The main bank maximizes its own interests by charging a higher interest rate when its equity stakes are relatively less than its debt claims and by prompting firms to pay more dividends when its equity stakes are relatively high.