Real Options,Volatility, and Stock Returns

We provide evidence that the positive relation between firm‐level stock returns and firm‐level return volatility is due to firms’ real options. Consistent with real option theory, we find that the positive volatility‐return relation is much stronger for firms with more real options and that the sensitivity of firm value to changes in volatility declines significantly after firms exercise their real options. We reconcile the evidence at the aggregate and firm levels by showing that the negative relation at the aggregate level may be due to aggregate market conditions that simultaneously affect both market returns and return volatility.     

Firm structure and corporate cash holdings

We analyze whether the organizational structure of firms (i.e., whether a firm is diversified or focused) affects their cash holdings. Using Compustat firm level and segment-level data, we find that diversified firms hold significantly less cash than their focused counterparts. Our results are robust to industry adjustments at the segment level and to different factors previously found to be important determinants of cash holdings. Using time-series, cross-sectional, and additional robustness tests we are able to attribute the lower cash holdings among diversified firms to complementary growth opportunities across the different segments of these firms and the availability of active internal capital markets. We find that the other theories that rely on the potentially effective use of asset sales of non-core segments of diversified firms to generate cash, and the increased agency/influence costs in diversified firms do not offer an economically significant explanation for the lower cash holdings among diversified firms.     

Using real options theory to explain patterns in the valuation of research and development expenditures

Real options theory posits that the value of the firm is a combination of the value generated by the assets in place and the value of the option to invest in the future. It is based on the idea that many decisions are difficult to reverse, and valuing the outcome of these decisions is more complicated than estimating the present value of future cash flows. R&D activities often generate real options due to the nature of these activities, and examining the valuation of R&D expenditures through the lens of real options theory can help explain differing results documented in both the R&D and value relevance of earnings and book value literatures. Numerous studies have documented that the stock market positively values R&D expenditures; however, recent work has raised questions about whether this positive relation occurs across firms reporting both profits and losses. Consistent with real options theory, I find that the negative coefficient on the R&D expenditures of profitable firms documented by prior studies only exists for low growth firms. In addition, for all R&D firms experiencing high sales growth, the market places a lower value on assets in place and a higher value on R&D expenditures.     

Accounting quality,information risk and the term structure of implied volatility around earnings announcements

We examine the association between accounting quality, which is used as a proxy for firm information risk, and the behavior of the term structure of implied option volatility around earnings announcements. By employing a large sample of US firms having options traded on their equity during 1996–2010, we find that lower (higher) accounting quality is significantly associated with stronger (weaker) changes in the steepness of the term structure of implied volatility curve around quarterly earnings announcements. This finding (which is robust to controls for business-stemming uncertainty regarding future firm performance) is consistent with a stronger differential of short vs. long-term uncertainty for higher information risk firms, indicating greater uncertainty on the future economic performance of poorer vs. stronger accounting quality firms. We also establish the trading implications of these findings by demonstrating a (profitable in-sample) self-financed option trading strategy that is based on the quality of the accounting information released on earnings announcement days.     

Local Risk,Local Factors,and Asset Prices

Firm location affects firm risk through local factor prices. We find more procyclical factor prices such as wages and real estate prices in areas with more cyclical economies, namely, high “local beta” areas. While procyclical wages provide a natural hedge against aggregate shocks and reduce firm risk, procyclical prices of real estate, which are part of firm assets, increase firm risk. We confirm that firms located in higher local beta areas have lower industry‐adjusted returns and conditional betas, and show that the effect is stronger among firms with low real estate holdings. A production‐based equilibrium model explains these empirical findings.     

THE INFLUENCE OF ORGANIZED OPTIONS TRADING ON STOCK PRICE BEHAVIOR FOLLOWING LARGE ONE-DAY STOCK PRICE DECLINES

In this study I examine the effect of organized options trading on stock price behavior immediately following stock price declines of 10 percent or more. A matched-pair sample of National Market System option and nonoption firms are analyzed from June 1985 through December 1992. After controlling for the bid-ask bounce, firm size, share price, return standard deviation, and beta, I find that three-day cumulative abnormal returns for option firms are approximately 1.57 percent less than those for nonoption firms. Thus, options trading enhances stock market efficiency and/or liquidity. However, no profitable trading strategies are indicated.     

The option to stock volume ratio and future returns

We examine the information content of option and equity volumes when trade direction is unobserved. In a multimarket asymmetric information model, equity short-sale costs result in a negative relation between relative option volume and future firm value. In our empirical tests, firms in the lowest decile of the option to stock volume ratio (O/S) outperform the highest decile by 0.34% per week (19.3% annualized). Our model and empirics both indicate that O/S is a stronger signal when short-sale costs are high or option leverage is low. O/S also predicts future firm-specific earnings news, consistent with O/S reflecting private information.     

Equity value,implied cost of equity and shareholders’ real options

This study investigates the effects of shareholders’ real options on (i) firm financial performance and (ii) estimations of the implied cost of equity. After measuring the equity value of steady‐state operations using the residual income model, and the abandonment and expansion options using the Black‐Scholes option pricing model, I find that firms with a large expansion (abandonment) option value experience better (worse) financial performance than those with a small such value. I also find that ignoring these options results in a downward bias in implied cost of equity estimates by an average of 1.23 percentage points.     

On the Determinants of Corporate Hedging

Finance theory indicates that hedging increases firm value by reducing expected taxes, expected costs of financial distress, or other agency costs. This paper provides evidence on these hypotheses using survey data on firm's use of forwards, futures, swaps, and options combined with COMPUTSTAT data on firm characteristics. Of 169 firms in the sample, 104 firms use hedging instruments in 1986. The data suggest that firms which hedge face more convex tax functions, have less coverage of fixed claims, are larger, have more growth options in their investment opportunity set, and employ fewer hedging substitutes.     

Do Pro‐Diversity Policies Improve Corporate Innovation?

Using new product announcements, patents, and patent citations as measures of corporate innovation, we find that corporate policies that promote more pro‐diversity cultures, specifically treatment of women and minorities, enhance future innovative efficiency. This positive effect is stronger during economic downturns and in firms that are more innovative, value intangibles and human capital more highly, have greater growth options, have higher cash flow, and have stronger governance. Pro‐diversity policies also increase firm value via this stimulating effect on innovative efficiency. Our results suggest a channel through which workforce diversity may enhance firm value.     

Managerial flexibility and the wealth effect of new product introductions

This paper examines whether investors recognize the value of managerial flexibilities, as proxied by real options, in their valuation of new product introductions. We define a firm’s real options portfolio as the difference between the firm’s market value and its assets in place. A firm’s strategic flexibilities are modeled as the ratio of its real option portfolio to its book value. Using a sample of new product introductions from 1998–2007, we find our real options measure is positively related to announcement period abnormal returns. This result holds after we control for other variables known to be correlated with the announcement effect in previous studies. Our result is robust to alternative measures of real options based on analysts’ earnings expectations and whether a firm has one or multiple segments. In summary, our results suggest that a firm’s perceived strategic and operating flexibilities are an important factor in the valuation of new products.     

Return predictability and shareholders’ real options

This study re-interprets the properties of the residual income model by highlighting the shareholders’ abandonment (liquidation or adaptation) option. We estimate the value of this real option as an explicit component of abnormal earnings in the residual income model and test the improvement in valuation after incorporating it into the model. Relative to the traditional specification of the residual income model, this real options model has a stronger predictive power for future abnormal stock returns. We also find that the superior return predictability of the real options model is pronounced in the set of firms with a high probability of exercising liquidation options (for example, those with low profitability, low growth opportunities, high underlying asset volatility, and low intangible assets), which is consistent with the importance of shareholders’ abandonment option in equity valuation. The results are robust to extensive sensitivity checks.     

Financial reporting for employee stock options: liabilities or equity?

This study seeks to determine whether employee stock options share key characteristics of liabilities or equity. Consistent with warrant pricing theory, we find that common equity risk and expected return are negatively associated with the extent to which a firm has outstanding employee stock options, which is opposite to the association for liabilities. We also find the following. (1) The association is positive for firms that reprice options and less negative for firms that have options with longer remaining terms to maturity, which indicates that some employee stock options have characteristics that make them more similar to liabilities. (2) Leverage measured based on treating options as equity has a stronger positive relation with common equity risk than leverage measured based on treating options as liabilities. (3) The sensitivity of employee stock option value to changes in asset value mirrors that of common equity value and is opposite to that of liability value. Also, we find that, unlike liabilities, employee stock options have substantially higher risk and expected return than common equity. Our findings are not consistent with classifying employee stock options as liabilities for financial reporting if classification were based on the directional association of a claim with common equity risk and expected return. Rather, our findings suggest the options act more like another type of equity.     

Ironing out the kinks in executive compensation: Linking incentive pay to average stock prices

Traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation. Applying a principal-agent analysis, we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices. Among other benefits, averaging reduces volatility by about 42%, making the incentive pay more attractive to risk-averse executives. Holding the cost of the option grant to the firm constant, Asian stock options are more cost effective than traditional stock options and provide stronger incentives to increase stock price. More importantly, the improvement is achieved with little impact on the option grant’s risk incentives (after adjusting for option cost). Finally, averaging also improves the value and incentive effects of indexed stock options.     

Reducing managers’ incentives to cannibalize: Managerial stock options when shareholders are diversified

We analyze the relative advantage of option grants compared to stock compensation when shareholders are diversified. Our analysis recognizes a conflict that is largely neglected in the corporate finance literature. Shareholders want to maximize their portfolio value while capital budgeting rules direct managers to choose projects that maximize firm (equity) value. Options can reduce this conflict by motivating managers to avoid projects that enhance the value of one firm at the expense of another firm. Also, in our framework, relative performance evaluation destroys value for shareholders as it encourages firms to engage in cannibalistic activity. Consistent with the predictions of our model we find that firms with lower insider ownership, higher institutional ownership, and lower leverage tend to provide more option grants as compensation to their executives.     

Leverage and investment in diversified firms

Within diversified firms, the negative impact of leverage on investment is significantly greater for high q than for low q segments and significantly greater for non-core than for core segments. This differs substantially from focused firms and is consistent with the view that diversified firms allocate a disproportionate share of their debt service burden to their higher q and non-core segments. We also find that, among low-growth firms, the positive relation between leverage and firm value is significantly weaker in diversified firms than in focused firms. We conclude that the disciplinary benefits of debt are partially offset by the additional managerial discretion in allocating debt service that is provided by the diversified organizational structure.     

Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors

We examine recent confrontational activism campaigns by hedge funds and other private investors. The main parallels between the groups are a significantly positive market reaction for the target firm around the initial Schedule 13D filing date, significantly positive returns over the subsequent year, and the activist's high success rate in achieving its original objective. Further, both activists frequently gain board representation through real or threatened proxy solicitations. Two major differences are that hedge funds target more profitable firms than other activists, and hedge funds address cash flow agency costs whereas other private investors change the target's investment strategies.     

REAL OPTIONS AND CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT

By formulating an integrated strategy that combines the creation and exercise of real options together with other risk management techniques, management can reduce risk and thereby increase firm value. For example, a company that is in a position to delay investing without losing its competitive edge, to abandon a project that becomes unprofitable, or to adjust its operating strategy at low cost can avoid risks and exploit profitable opportunities. But, even when real options are used in this way to limit the risk profile of the firm, financial derivatives can help to hedge any residual risk that would otherwise affect the value of the real options and the overall firm.
An integrated risk management approach requires a careful process of diagnosing a company's risk exposure. First, management must decompose the company's risk exposure to understand the fundamental sources of risk. Second, the company's capacity to bear risk must be determined, which requires an understanding of why individual risks (if left unmanaged) would reduce the value of the firm. Third, different approaches for addressing risk should be explored, ranging from diversification to use of financial derivatives and other contracts to investing in (or exercising) a wide array of real options. Fourth, the firm must properly integrate the different risk management solutions to optimize its strategy.     

CEO Stock Options and Equity Risk Incentives

Abstract:   We test the hypothesis that the risk incentive effects of CEO stock option grants motivate managers to take on more risk than they would otherwise. Using a sample of mergers we document that the ratio of post‐ to pre‐merger stock return variance is positively related to the risk incentive effect of CEO stock option compensation but this relationship is conditioned on firm size, with firm size having a moderating effect on the risk incentive effect of stock options. Using a broader time‐series cross‐sectional sample of firms we find a strong positive relationship between CEO risk incentive embedded in the stock options and subsequent equity return volatility. As in the case of the merger sample, this relationship is stronger for smaller firms.     

Conglomerate investment under various capital market conditions

This paper studies the investment of diversified and focused firms under various capital market conditions. When external capital becomes more costly at the aggregate level, investment declines in focused firms but remains unchanged in diversified firms. This investment advantage enjoyed by diversified firms could attribute to both their easy access to external capital and their ability to substitute internal capital markets for costly external markets. Consistent with the internal capital market argument, our findings show that the investment advantage exists for diversified firms even after we control for their easy access to external markets. We also find that the role of internal markets in financing investment is more important for diversified firms that are more financially constrained in external markets. Finally, we find that the segment-level investment becomes more efficient in conglomerates’ internal capital markets under depressed external capital market conditions. Overall, our findings suggest that internal capital allocation functions as a valuable and efficient substitute for diversified firms in a tightened external capital market.