我国商业银行抵押资产价值评估风险研究

目前,由于抵押品作为银行信用风险缓释技术地广泛应用,抵押品的价值评估在银行全面风险管理中的作用逐渐凸显,其重要性越来越受到银行及监管部门等有关各方的高度重视。本文从商业银行抵押品价值评估的必要性入手,深入分析当前我国商业银行在抵押品价值评估中存在的风险特征和抵押品价值评估现状,并在此基础上．从明确抵押品价值评估职能定位,提高价值评估权威性和独立性等不同角度,提出了推进我国银行业抵押资产价值评估业务稳健发展的思路,以期建立独立、客观、高效的抵押品价值评估管理和执行体系．促进银行全面风险管理的有效实施。     

抵押评估中价值类型的选择

抵押是商业银行一种重要的信用风险缓释工具,加强抵押品的价值认定管理对商业银行风险控制具有重要作用,而价值类型是抵押资产价值评估的基础。目前关于抵押评估中应采用的价值类型有三种不同的观点,即市场价值、抵押贷款价值和清算价值。本文对上述这三种观点进行分析后,认为当前适合商业银行风险管理要求的贷前和贷中阶段的抵押评估价值类型应为市场价值。最后,本文就商业银行的抵押风险管理提出了几点建议。     

资产评估本质:价值还是价格

马克思关于商品价值二重性,决定商品价值和价格二种价值形式,因此,资产评估也应体现资产价格评估和价值评估,对评估方法、价值类型与价值属性的关系、资产价值与价格的关系、价值评估与价格评估的比较等方面进行探讨。     

浅谈商业银行抵押资产价值评估与风险管理

近年来,在经济下行、表外资产回表加快和监管标准趋严等形势下,商业银行信用风险暴露加快,尤其近期若干事件的爆发也显示当前商业银行业不良贷款的规模大、增速快和处置难等特点,其中抵押类不良贷款也明显出现抵押资产价值不足、处置难度大等风险,直接影响到商业银行的长期发展.不良攀升承压之下,也为商业银行的抵押资产价值评估与风险管理提出了更高的要求.本文从评估机构、抵押资产、银行操作风险等出发分析存在的问题,并就问题的成因从评估机构、商业银行和监管机构等角度提出解决问题的建议.     

数据、数据资产及其价值评估

数据与传统生产要素相比具有独特的性质,对于数据的不断认识、对数据资产的深入理解以及对数据资产价值评估的核心要素进行广泛和深入的研究及探讨具有重要的现实意义。本文对数据、数据类型、数据资源和数据资产的相关概念、内涵和相互关系,数据要素价值分配和评估对象进行了阐述,对数据资产的成本、收益、市场和风险要素以及价值评估的主要方法进行了较为系统的分析。本文抛砖引玉,希望引起行业专家学者更广泛和深入的研究和探索。     

浅议商业银行房地产抵押价值评估存在的问题及对策

房地产抵押是商业银行的一种风险缓释措施,近年来我国房地产抵押贷款业务迅速发展,房地产抵押评估业务也随之快速发展。由于房地产抵押价值评估中还存在一些问题,给商业银行带来了一定的风险隐患,本文从商业银行的角度对房地产抵押价值评估存在的问题进行分析,并在分析的基础上提出几点对策。     

抵押评估究竟采用什么价值类型

对于银行贷款中抵押物价值评估应采用什么价值类型,美国价值评估行业认为对应的应该是“市场价值”。他们认为债权方决定贷多少款,那是债权方自己的事,评估师能够且只能够提供的是市场价值,评估师不能替代债权方决策。而欧洲价值评估行业认为贷款抵押物价值评估的价值类型可以使用抵押价值这一价值类型。     

知识资产价值评估动因与评估方法研究

随着知识经济的迅速发展,知识资产在企业价值创造中的作用日益突出,如何有效地评估知识资产成为亟待解决的问题。目前学术界已有四十多种评估方法,如何选择适当的方法成为另一个难题。鉴于此,本文首先对各种评估方法进行梳理和利弊分析,然后总结了知识资产价值评估的动因,最后指出要根据评估动因的不同选择相应评估方法。     

抵押资产：市场价值亦或抵押贷款价值？

银行贷款抵押资产评估问题由来（一）抵押资产评估价值变现率低下的现实 不良贷款一直是我国银行业改革发展的主要障碍,是金融风险的主要表现。从2000年四季度开始,我国银行业不良贷款比例和余额开始实现“双下降“。然而,不良资产存量较高、不良贷款率高位徘徊的问题仍然比较突出。形成不良贷款的原因无疑是多方面的。     

Disparities in Mortgage Lending,Bank Performance,Economic Influence,and Regulatory Oversight

This study investigates factors affecting changes in the disparity of home mortgage denial rates between white and minority loan applicants in the U.S. during the period 1991–1997. We develop a two-stage least-squares regression model that incorporates applicant-level characteristics, neighborhood characteristics, regional economic data, and bank-specific data as explanatory variables. Some have argued that mortgage lenders were under increasing pressure from industry regulators to extend additional credit to minorities and low-income groups during the period under study. The model includes each institution's periodic CRA rating as a proxy for regulatory influence. An alternative explanation is that market forces, such as improvements in economic conditions and in bank financial condition and performance, affected default loss estimates and credit standards in a way that disproportionally benefited minority and low-income applicants. The empirical findings are consistent with the latter hypothesis. We conclude that policy makers should consider the impact of market factors when assessing the allocation of mortgage credit in a particular demographic market. The findings also underscore the importance of controlling for lender assessments of credit risk when evaluating compliance with CRA and fair lending statutes.     

基于借款人保护视角的住房按揭贷款业务分析

文章在揭示住房按揭贷款的内涵与本质的基础上,总结出现阶段我国住房按揭贷款业务中借款人面临的主要问题有:开发商虚假承诺为业主办理按揭贷款、商业银行实施强制保险问题、商业贷款与公积金贷款问题、等额本金还款法与等额本息还款法的利息负担等。针对这些问题产生的原因以及影响,文章从保护借款人的角度分别提出相应的对策建议,包括:保费应与贷款余额同步减少,购房者应事前了解商业银行拒贷原因,购房者应结合自身的投资能力选择还款方式,人民银行应进一步明确对提前还贷违约金的规定等。     

流动性过剩下美国次贷危机的原因与借鉴

2007年美国的次贷危机展现了现代金融风险错综复杂的特征.反思危机,本文认为在流动性过剩背景下,为追求利润的持续快速增长,商业银行很容易出现过度竞争,放松信贷标准,盲目扩大贷款客户群体,追逐高风险、高收益的投资品种和业务创新.对照我国银行业面临的宏观形势,流动性过剩也是困扰我国商业银行持续盈利和发展的一个外在因素.因此,借鉴美国次贷危机,作者提出以下建议:密切关注客观经济形势;加强内控制度建设,强化审慎合规经营理念;高度重视住房抵押贷款的风险;加速资产证券化的试点和推广,有效分散信贷风险;切实做好风险防范,加强全面风险管理;严格信贷标准和要求等.     

Household Income, Termination Risk and Mortgage Pricing

The premium embedded in home mortgage loans to compensate investors for their exposure to prepayment risk is a significant component of the cost of home mortgage lending. Moreover, there is some reason to believe that prepayment risk may be lower for loans to lower-income housing borrowers, especially those that are first-time home owners. If so, investor recognition of this advantage should facilitate greater willingness to acquire portfolios of lower-income housing loans, and encourage more competitive pricing in this segment of the market. This study investigates the possibility of differential mortgage prepayment behavior between lower-income home owners and non-low income home owners. The investigation relies on samples of the American Housing Survey spanning ten years of experience from 1985 to 1995. We find no significant difference between the termination or refinancing behavior of non-low income and low-income households. This result is robust to a number of alternative specifications such as restricting the low-income test group to non-moving households and to first-time owners. The same conclusions are derived from both aggregate prepayment rates and from analysis of individual household prepayment behavior.     

关于商业银行绩效评价体系的实证研究

基于利益相关者理论和效率理论,借鉴CAMELS、PEARLS等银行评级体系,根据我国16家上市商业银行2004~2009年的财务数据,通过相关性分析和因子分析,从风险、收益和效率三个方面建立了三个层级的商业银行绩效评价指标体系,并在设定各项具体评价指标的评分标准和通过层次分析法来设定各级评价指标的权重的基础上,计算出我国16家上市商业银行2004~2009年的绩效评分。该绩效评价体系较好地反映了我国商业银行整体的经营绩效,对商业银行的经营管理具有较好的参考价值。     

美国次贷危机对国内银行经营管理的启示

该文剖析了美国次贷危机的发生及其影响．并深入分析了美国次贷危机对国内银行经营管理的启示,认为国内的银行必须关注绩效激励的逆向选择、不要懈怠贷前尽职调查、不要过分依赖第二还款来源、营销手段应适度以及不应过渡迷信风险转移等。     

Credit Scoring and Mortgage Securitization: Implications for Mortgage Rates and Credit Availability

This article develops a model of the interactions between borrowers, originators, and a securitizer in primary and secondary mortgage markets. In the secondary market, the securitizer adds liquidity and plays a strategic game with mortgage originators. The securitizer sets the price at which it will purchase mortgages and the credit-score standard that qualifies a mortgage for purchase. We investigate two potential links between securitization and mortgage rates. First, we analyze whether a portion of the liquidity premium gets passed on to borrowers in the form of a lower mortgage rate. Somewhat surprisingly, we find very plausible conditions under which securitization fails to lower the mortgage rate. Second, and consistent with recent empirical results, we derive an inverse correlation between the volume of securitization and mortgage rates. However, the causation is reversed from the standard rendering. In our model, a decline in the mortgage rate causes increased securitization rather than the other way around.     

GSEs,Mortgage Rates,and the Long-Run Effects of Mortgage Securitization

Our paper compares mortgage securitization undertaken by government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) with that undertaken by private firms, with an emphasis on how each type of mortgage securitization affects mortgage rates. We build a model illustrating that market structure, government sponsorship, and the characteristics of the mortgages securitized are all important determinants of mortgage rates. We find that GSEs generally—but not always—lower mortgage rates, particularly when the GSEs behave competitively, because the GSEs implicit government backing allows them to sell securities without the credit enhancements needed in the private sector. Using our simulation model, we demonstrate that when mortgages eligible for purchase by the GSEs have characteristics similar to other mortgages, the GSEs implicit government-backing generates differences in mortgage rates similar to those currently observed in the mortgage market (which range between zero and fifty basis points). However, if the mortgages purchased by GSEs are less costly to originate and securitize, and if the GSEs behave competitively, then the simulated spread in mortgage rates can be much larger than that observed in the data.     

Optimal Put Exercise: An Empirical Examination of Conditions for Mortgage Foreclosure

Implicit in option-pricing models of mortgage valuation are threshold levels of put-option value that must be crossed to induce borrower default. There has been little research into what these threshold values are that come out of pricing models or how they compare to exercised option values seen in empirical data. This study decomposes boundary conditions for optimal default exercise to look at the economic dynamics that should lead to optimal default timing. Empirical data on FHA insured mortgage foreclosures is then examined to discern the predictive influence of optimal-option-valuation-and-exercise variables on observed default timing and values. Interesting results include a new understanding of how to measure and use property equity variables during economic downturns, house-price index ranges over which default is exercised for various classes of borrowers, and implied differences in appreciation rates between market-price indices and foreclosed properties.     

Regulation of Subprime Mortgage Products: An Analysis of North Carolina's Predatory Lending Law

This paper estimates the effect of North Carolina's high-cost mortgage law on the subprime mortgage market in that state. The results indicate that creditors sharply restricted lending to higher risk consumers in North Carolina following passage of the law. Creditors did not restrict lending in neighboring states or to lower risk consumers in North Carolina. These results suggest that the restriction in North Carolina was due to rationing in response to higher costs imposed by the law. The findings of this study are of importance beyond North Carolina. Other states and municipalities have proposed or passed similar or more restrictive laws. These laws risk taking back some of the gains in credit availability that lower income and higher risk consumers gained in the 1990s.