商业银行货款抵押物价值的衰减与防范对策

我国商业银行贷款抵押品普遍存在贷款存续期间价值衰减的现象。本文认为贷款抵押品管理的核心是抵押品价值的管理,并试图从价值角度分析抵押在信用风险缓释机理,探讨了目前抵押贷款中抵押品价值衰减的原因,揭示了银行抵押贷款的风险,并提出了防范对策。     

我国汽车消费贷款的风险防范机制

我国汽车消费贷款业务开展过程中主要存在着下述四类风险: 1.个人信用信息网和个人资信评估制度未建立给银行准确评估个人信用带来困难而导致的信用风险. 2.借款人抵押、担保制度不完善使银行贷款缺乏有效保证而导致的偿付风险. 3.汽车抵押品变现的二级市场及汽车消费贷款的二级市场尚未建立而导致的银行资金流动性风险.     

周锋荣：抵押品风险监控手段亟须提高

中国农业银行江西省余干县支行周锋荣2011年8月27日来稿指出,银行业应重视抵押品的风险管理,不断提高风险监控手段。一是正确确定抵押品。在办理抵押贷款时,银行必须对每一笔抵押贷款都认真细致地审查,确定抵押品,使之合规合法,更好地防范风险。要注重选择多品种的抵押品,除主要采取房地产抵押方式外,可考虑用企业的专利技术、有公开评估值的商标、机器设备、企业股权等来办理贷款抵押。二是合理估值抵押品。     

我国商业银行抵押资产价值评估风险研究

目前,由于抵押品作为银行信用风险缓释技术地广泛应用,抵押品的价值评估在银行全面风险管理中的作用逐渐凸显,其重要性越来越受到银行及监管部门等有关各方的高度重视。本文从商业银行抵押品价值评估的必要性入手,深入分析当前我国商业银行在抵押品价值评估中存在的风险特征和抵押品价值评估现状,并在此基础上．从明确抵押品价值评估职能定位,提高价值评估权威性和独立性等不同角度,提出了推进我国银行业抵押资产价值评估业务稳健发展的思路,以期建立独立、客观、高效的抵押品价值评估管理和执行体系．促进银行全面风险管理的有效实施。     

后危机时代金融与资产评估业的机遇与挑战

一、如何定位抵押资产评估 银行抵押品价值评估职能定位的特点是系统性,专业性和独立性.系统性体现在担保品的价值评估和管理,涉及到贷款的分类和内部评级、准备金、风险的定价、风险的识别、评级、计量和决策等各方面的内容.     

谈抵押贷款

<正>在我国银行改革单一的信用放款方式后,抵押贷款作为专业银行一种新的贷款方式逐步推广.本文就抵押贷款的一些通常做法作些介绍.一、抵押品的选择抵押贷款是一种以对实际财产的留置权作担保的贷款.它要求借款人在借款时,必须向银行提供一定数量的抵押品,贷款到期,如借款人不能归还贷款,则银行可以处理抵押品,以补偿贷款的损失.     

国外银行抵押贷款种类简介

抵押贷款是以有形的和可变现的抵押物为条件而发放的贷款。由于银行不愿承担贷款损失风险而选择抵押物为贷款前提。国外银行抵押贷款种类及特点如下: 抵押为了担保债务,债务人交给债权人的物品或物权凭证称之为抵押品。毫无疑问,偿清债务后,所抵押的物品将退还给抵押人。依据1974年英国消费信贷法,抵押意味着承押人对抵押物的所有权。当     

论银行内部建立评估及监督机构的必要性

美国次贷危机给全球金融机构提出了新的挑战,探索回避信用风险、市场风险、操作风险新课题,最大限度地控制不良贷款的是金融业重要任务之一,本文仅从抵押贷款评估源头入手,分析评估机构目前现状,银行内部管理存在的弊端,以及金融机构建立自己的评估监督机构的必要性.     

商业银行房地产抵押登记风险及防范

房地产抵押担保是商业银行最重要的贷款担保方式,但由于我国尚未建立不动产统一登记制度,登记规定政出多门,登记流程错综复杂,加上我国商业银行对抵押品的管理尚处干探索阶段,这给房地产抵押贷款业务造成了风险隐患,部分风险已给商业银行带来了损失。本文通过对商业银行和外部登记机构操作中可能存在的风险进行梳理,分析风险成因,评估风险结果,并提出相应的防范措施,以期提高我国商业银行抵押担保的有效性和安全性。     

银行票据业务(续三)

第五章 票据抵押贷款 第一节 抵押贷款的概述 抵押贷款,是银行凭借款单位、企业或个人提交的某种抵押品作为担保而提供的贷款,是一种货物信用行为。其抵押品一般是易于保存、变卖和转让的财产,如票据、商品凭证(栈单、提单)、有价证券(股票、债券、定期储蓄存单、外币兑换券)、房地产契据等。银行在办理这种贷款时,并不按抵押品的定额贷放,除定期储蓄存单和外币兑换券不打折扣外,其余抵押品均按一定的折扣率计算,其目的在于防止在处理抵押品时蒙受损失。同时按其贷款规定的利率计算     

商标专用权质押贷款契入茶产业发展的分析

茶叶中小企业融资难,一直是茶产业发展的一大障碍。谋求银行信贷资金支持,除信用、担保贷款外,必须要有自身资产进行抵押、质押。茶叶商标专用权是茶叶企业的自有知识产权,是企业可以运用的无形资产。本文通过分析案例茶叶商标质押贷款,探索分析茶叶质押贷款的路径,并从中分析出茶叶商标贷款的问题和风险,并提出了一些针对性的对策建议。     

商业银行打包放款业务的运作及其法律风险防范

打包放款是与信用证有关的贸易融资形式之一.国内商业银行在打包贷款的操作上虽然存在一些分歧,但在定性上是基本一致.从法律关系来看,打包放款是一种融资法律关系,实质上是一种信用贷款,它与信用证有密切的关联性.银行在办理打包放款业务中通常都要求申请人提供信用证正本作抵押.打包放款存在诸多风险,尤其是客户的资信能力风险;信用证的真实性、合法性和有效性风险;开证行的偿付能力和开证行所在国家的信用风险以及汇率风险等.商业银行必须高度重视这些风险,并采取严格审查贸易真实性、合法性,留存信用证正本,监督借款用途以及要求第三方担保等措施来加以防范.     

What determines the composition of banks’ loan portfolios? Evidence from transition countries

This paper explores how bank characteristics and the institutional environment influence the composition of banks’ loan portfolios. We use a new and unique data set based on the EBRD Banking Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS), which was conducted for 220 banks in 20 transition countries. We show that bank ownership, bank size, and legal creditor protection are important determinants of the composition of banks’ loan portfolios. In particular, we find that foreign banks play an active role in mortgage lending. Moreover, banks that perceive pledge and mortgage laws to be of high quality choose to focus more on mortgage lending.     

Bank ownership and lending patterns during the 2008–2009 financial crisis: Evidence from Latin America and Eastern Europe

This paper examines the impact of bank ownership on credit growth in developing countries before and during the 2008–2009 crisis. Using bank-level data for countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America, we analyze the growth of banks’ total gross loans as well as the growth of corporate, consumer, and residential mortgage loans. While domestic private banks in Eastern Europe and Latin America contracted their loan growth rates during the crisis, there are notable differences in foreign and government-owned bank credit growth across regions. In Eastern Europe, foreign bank total lending fell by more than domestic private bank credit. These results are primarily driven by reductions in corporate loans. Furthermore, government-owned banks in Eastern Europe did not act counter-cyclically. The opposite is true in Latin America, where the growth of government-owned banks’ corporate and consumer loans during the crisis exceeded that of domestic and foreign banks. Contrary to the case of foreign banks in Eastern Europe, those in Latin America did not fuel loan growth prior to the crisis. Also, there are less pronounced and robust differences in the behavior of foreign and domestic banks during the crisis in Latin America.     

The Impact of Derivatives Activity on Commercial Banks: Evidence from U.S. Bank Holding Companies

We have examined the impact of derivatives activity on commercial banks based on panel data from 18 large U.S. bank holding companies (BHC). This paper found that in general the larger the notional values of non-traded derivatives, the more derivative positions held by banks, meaning potentially better performance. The derivatives activity increased the BHCs’ overall risk level, the reason is that most US BHCs are able to take more speculative positions in derivatives contracts in the name of risk management, excluding the impact of held-for-trading positions. Additionally, we found that while participative banks took more speculative positions in derivatives contracts in the name of risk management, while dominant banks preferred to hold derivatives positions for the sake of hedging the underlying risks. Furthermore, we found that the BHCs take more speculative positions in derivatives contracts in the name of risk management before the sub-prime mortgage loan crisis than after the sub-prime mortgage loan crisis, so they assumed more risks before the sub-prime mortgage loan crisis. Overall, our findings suggest that the usage of derivatives for commercial banks is a double-edged sword. Using derivatives maybe a matter of managerial risk appetite to hedge underlying risks for commercial banks, however, it maybe also increase the commercial banks’ overall risks if the derivatives positions are used to speculate, though derivatives activity could increase the profitability of BHCs.     

Measuring Integrated Market and Credit Risk in Bank Portfolios: An Application to a Set of Hypothetical Banks Operating in South Africa

The banking crises of the ‘90s emphasize the need to model the connections between financial environment volatility and the potential losses faced by financial institutions resulting from correlated market and credit risks. Due to the number of variables that must be modeled and the complexity of the relationships an analytical solution is not feasible. We present here a numerical solution based on a simulation model that explicitly links changes in the relevant variables that characterize the financial environment and the distribution of possible future bank capital ratios. This forward looking quantitative risk assessment methodology allows banks and regulators to identify potential risks before they materialize and make appropriate adjustments to bank portfolio credit qualities, sector and region concentrations, and capital ratios on a bank by bank basis. It also has the potential to be extended so as to assess the risks of correlated failures among a group of financial institutions (i.e., systemic risk analyses). This model was applied by the authors to the study of the risk profile of the largest South African Banks in the context of the Financial System Stability Assessment program undertaken by the IMF in 1999. In the current study, we apply the model to various hypothetical banks operating in the South African financial environment and assess the correlated market and credit risks associated with business lending, mortgage lending, asset and liability maturity matches, foreign lending and borrowing, and direct equity, real estate, and gold investments. It is shown to produce simulated financial environments (interest rates, exchange rates, equity indices, real estate price indices, commodity prices, and economic indicators) that match closely the assumed parameters, and generate reasonable credit transition probabilities and security prices. As expected, the credit quality and diversification characteristics of the loan portfolio, asset and liability maturity mismatches, and financial environment volatility, are shown to interact to determine bank risk levels. We find that the credit quality of a bank's loan portfolio is the most important risk factor. We also show the risk reduction benefits of diversifying the loan portfolio across various sectors and regions of the economy and the importance of accounting for volatility shocks that occur periodically in emerging economies. Banks with high credit risk and concentrated portfolios are shown to have a high risk of failure during periods of financial stress. Alternatively, banks with lower credit risk and broadly diversified loan portfolios across business and mortgage lending are unlikely to fail even during very volatile periods. Asset and liability maturity mismatches generally increase bank risk levels. However, because credit losses are positively correlated with interest rate increases, banks with high credit risk may reduce overall risk levels by holding liabilities with longer maturities than their assets. Risk assessment methodologies which measure market and credit risk separately do not capture these various interactions and thus misestimate overall risk levels.     

Syndicated Leveraged Loans During and After the Crisis and the Role of the Shadow Banking System

In an article published in this journal in 1998, Nobel laureate Merton Miller argued that one of the best weapons available to national economies in their defense against the macroeconomic effects of banking crises is the availability of non‐bank financial institutions and products—or what we now refer to as the “shadow banking system.” Although Miller may have exaggerated the independence of bank‐ and market‐based sources of financing, the author argues that events during and after the recent crisis have shown Miller's claims about the importance of non‐bank investors in the provision of credit to be fundamentally correct. Critics of securitization and the shadow banking system tend to focus on the subprime mortgage story in which the sudden re‐pricing of credit risk and the resulting disappearance of investment demand for ABCP, private‐label mortgage‐related ABS, and ABS CDOs created unexpected and significant downward price pressure on those asset types. But the leveraged loan market tells a very different story. In contrast to the near complete disappearance of private mortgage securitizations, the extraordinary recovery of the U.S. syndicated leveraged loan market demonstrates that the relation between commercial and shadow banking has proved to be a highly productive and resilient one—and very much a two‐way street. When leveraged loans and CLOs experienced problems from 2007 through 2009 due primarily to the widespread liquidity and credit market disruptions that affected essentially all structured credit products, institutional investors in leveraged loans disappeared and the leveraged loan primary market imploded. But when institutional participants recognized the value of the underlying asset—corporate loans—and regained confidence in shadow‐banking products, leveraged lending by banks recovered quickly and dramatically. This outcome is viewed as vindicating Professor Miller's statement about the benefits of shadow markets and securitization— namely, the role of non‐bank investors in diversifying the risk of credit creation while at the same time improving the price discovery process in different markets. The recent history of the U.S. leveraged loan market demonstrates that shadow banking system participants play a critical role in meeting the total demand for such loans, and that the ebbs and flows from institutional leveraged loan markets are strongly connected with the health and integrity of the underlying leveraged bank loan market.     

流动性过剩下美国次贷危机的原因与借鉴

2007年美国的次贷危机展现了现代金融风险错综复杂的特征.反思危机,本文认为在流动性过剩背景下,为追求利润的持续快速增长,商业银行很容易出现过度竞争,放松信贷标准,盲目扩大贷款客户群体,追逐高风险、高收益的投资品种和业务创新.对照我国银行业面临的宏观形势,流动性过剩也是困扰我国商业银行持续盈利和发展的一个外在因素.因此,借鉴美国次贷危机,作者提出以下建议:密切关注客观经济形势;加强内控制度建设,强化审慎合规经营理念;高度重视住房抵押贷款的风险;加速资产证券化的试点和推广,有效分散信贷风险;切实做好风险防范,加强全面风险管理;严格信贷标准和要求等.     

Do Loan Loss Provisions Affect the Credit Fluctuations in China’s Banking System?

ABSTRACT

The global financial crisis of 2008 sparked new ideas on pro-cyclical transmission in the financial system. The accounting treatment method of loan loss provisions differs between the accounting standards that banks use and the supervisory rules of banks. This fundamental difference has attracted wide attention from academics and regulators. This article studies whether bank loan loss provisions affect credit fluctuation in China’s banking system. We divide loan loss provisions into discretionary and non-discretionary loan loss provisions. We find that non-discretionary loan loss provisions result in greater credit fluctuation, whereas discretionary loan loss provisions have no significant impact on credit fluctuation. Further evidence shows that the relation between non-discretionary loan loss provisions and credit fluctuations does not vary among different types of banks. Overall, our study shows that non-discretionary loan loss provisions can increase credit fluctuation and therefore strengthen banks’ pro-cyclical behavior.     

The seeds of a crisis: A theory of bank liquidity and risk taking over the business cycle

We examine how the banking sector could ignite the formation of asset price bubbles when there is access to abundant liquidity. Inside banks, to induce effort, loan officers are compensated based on the volume of loans. Volume-based compensation also induces greater risk taking; however, due to lack of commitment, loan officers are penalized ex post only if banks suffer a high enough liquidity shortfall. Outside banks, when there is heightened macroeconomic risk, investors reduce direct investment and hold more bank deposits. This ‘flight to quality’ leaves banks flush with liquidity, lowering the sensitivity of bankers’ payoffs to downside risks and inducing excessive credit volume and asset price bubbles. The seeds of a crisis are thus sown.