EVA® FOR BANKS: VALUE CREATION, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND PROFITABILITY MEASUREMENT

This article presents a complete ranking of America's 100 largest bank holding companies according to their shareholder value added. This research, the first of its kind for the banking industry, defines an EVA measurement for banks and presents evidence of EVA's stronger correlation with bank market values than traditional accounting measures like ROA and ROE. Besides developing EVA and MVA as analytical tools for viewing the economic performance of the organization from a shareholder perspective, the authors also present a framework for calculating EVA at all levels of the organization, including lines of business, functional departments, products, customer segments, and customer relationships. The implementation of an EVA profitability measurement system at the business unit (or lower) level requires methods for three critical tasks: (1) transfer pricing of funds; (2) allocation of indirect expenses; and (3) allocation of economic capital. Although solutions to the first two are fairly straightforward, the allocation of capital to business units is a major challenge for banks today. In contrast to the complex, “bottom-up” approach used by a number of large banks in implementing their RAROC systems, the authors propose a greatly simplified, “top-down” approach that requires calculation of only the volatility of a business's operating profit (or NOPAT). The advantage of using NOPAT volatility is that it allows EVA analysis at any level of the organization in a way that captures the volatility effects from all sources of risk (credit, interest rates, liquidity, or operations). While such a top-down approach is clearly not meant to take the place of a comprehensive, bottom-up RAROC analysis, it is intended to provide a complement–a high-level “check” on the detailed, bottom-up risk management procedures and controls now in place at most banks. Moreover, for those banks that have developed extensive funds transfer pricing, cost allocation, and RAROCstyle capital allocation systems, the EVA financial management system can either be integrated with those systems or serve as an independent economic assessment of the bank's business risks and returns.     

A management control system to support corporate sustainability strategies

This paper outlines a management accounting system, based upon cost variance analysis, which supports the pursuit of environmental and traditional financial goals within a decentralized organization. The framework decomposes inefficiencies into two parts. The first consists of what might be considered a natural outcome of pursuing the traditional economic goal of efficiency through cost-minimization, a “waste” variance. The second part consists of sustainability gains that produce societal benefit but may be incongruent with short-term economic goals, a “sustainability” variance. While elimination of waste variances can be encouraged using a traditional performance evaluation and reward structure, elimination of sustainability variances requires re-design of performance evaluation tools and reward structures. We demonstrate that differing production functions across operational units within organizations can impact the relative magnitude of the two variances. The failure to recognize and incorporate these differences can lead to inefficient allocation of resources and/or only partial fulfillment of the strategic environmental goals of the organization.     

Corporate Governance and Labor Relations*

This article begins with the premise that since the corporation involves a symbiotic relationship between labor and capital, a single‐minded focus on shareholder value is likely to be shortsighted, and some degree of employee influence on corporate governance has the potential to increase an organization's efficiency and value. But the set of findings and implications that emerge from the author's analysis is a complicated one. On the one hand, “moderate” levels of employee ownership (for example, the 6% ownership of the average American ESOP) are associated with increases in corporate productivity and values as well as worker morale and productivity. On the other hand, majority employee ownership and corporate ownership and governance systems like “co‐determination” that give labor a major say on governance issues often lead to worker‐management alliances that end up hurting the firm's investors—and, in the longer run, the workers themselves— by reducing competitiveness. The author ends with a call for a balanced governance system that, while aiming to maximize the total value of the enterprise, seeks to encourage the participation and emotional allegiance of workers—and indeed all important corporate stakeholders.     

A FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT THEORY OF THE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION

Certain unique operational and financial characteristics of nonprofit organizations prevent the transfer and successful application of orthodox economic and financial management theories to financial management decisions in the nonprofit context. These characteristics include a dual management structure composed of professional and financial managers, multiple objectives, legal restrictions on the disposition of earnings and assets, and the constant threat of illiquidity as the result of the uncoupling of organizational goals and cash flows. The financial management theory presented here separates the financial management goals from the professional goals and allows the finance practitioner to concentrate on keeping the nonprofit organization operating as a going concern. The theory is designed as a “partial” theory of the firm and is completely consonant with accepted economic orthodoxy. Hence, by employing financial decision rules based on the new theory, a nonprofit organization can survive financially through time while its professional manager pursues utility-denominated goals delineated by the organization's tax-exempt status.     

Enterprise Risk Management: Theory and Practice

The Chief Risk Officer of Nationwide Insurance teams up with a distinguished academic to discuss the benefits and challenges associated with the design and implementation of an enterprise risk management program. The authors begin by arguing that a carefully designed ERM program—one in which all material corporate risks are viewed and managed within a single framework—can be a source of long‐run competitive advantage and value through its effects at both a “macro” or company‐wide level and a “micro” or business‐unit level. At the macro level, ERM enables senior management to identify, measure, and limit to acceptable levels the net exposures faced by the firm. By managing such exposures mainly with the idea of cushioning downside outcomes and protecting the firm's credit rating, ERM helps maintain the firm's access to capital and other resources necessary to implement its strategy and business plan. At the micro level, ERM adds value by ensuring that all material risks are “owned,” and risk‐return tradeoffs carefully evaluated, by operating managers and employees throughout the firm. To this end, business unit managers at Nationwide are required to provide information about major risks associated with all new capital projects—information that can then used by senior management to evaluate the marginal impact of the projects on the firm's total risk. And to encourage operating managers to focus on the risk‐return tradeoffs in their own businesses, Nationwide's periodic performance evaluations of its business units attempt to refl ect their contributions to total risk by assigning risk‐adjusted levels of “imputed” capital on which project managers are expected to earn adequate returns. The second, and by far the larger, part of the article provides an extensive guide to the process and major challenges that arise when implementing ERM, along with an account of Nationwide's approach to dealing with them. Among other issues, the authors discuss how a company should assess its risk “appetite,” measure how much risk it is bearing, and decide which risks to retain and which to transfer to others. Consistent with the principle of comparative advantage it uses to guide such decisions, Nationwide attempts to limit “non‐core” exposures, such as interest rate and equity risk, thereby enlarging the firm's capacity to bear the “information‐intensive, insurance‐ specific” risks at the core of its business and competencies.     

Structuring an Enterprise Risk Assessment Protocol: Traditional Practice and New Methods

In a world that has become increasingly complex, enterprise risk management (ERM) has emerged as a practice for identifying reasonably foreseeable hazards that pose risks to an organization, both its physical and human assets. Due to the breadth and depth of factors that can impact an organization's risk portfolio, it is incumbent that the underlying risk assessment process that supports ERM embodies a holistic and systematic approach. This is easier said than done, however, as much of the effort in self‐acclaimed ERM programs remain entrenched in compartmentalized parts of the organization or ignore threats that are “outside of the box” of the operating environment to which management is accustomed. This environment therefore creates opportunities for key risks to go unnoticed. The authors propose a comprehensive, yet flexible framework for overcoming this challenge, an approach that can be utilized by both the public and private sector. A sample application is provided, using a free, web‐based tool developed as part of the initiative.     

A Look Back at the Beginnings of EVA and Value‐Based Management

In this interview conducted five years ago, one of the pioneers of value‐based management discusses his life's work in converting principles of modern finance theory into performance evaluation and incentive compensation plans that have been adopted by many of the world's largest and most successful companies, including Coca‐Cola, SABMiller in London, Siemens in Germany, and the Godrej Group in India. The issues covered include the significance of dividend payouts (are dividends really necessary to support a company's stock price and, if so, why?) as well as the question of optimal capital structure (whether and why debt might be cheaper than equity). But the most important focus of the interview is corporate performance measurement and the use of executive pay to strengthen management incentives to increase efficiency and value. As Stern never tired of arguing, the widespread tendency of public companies to manage “for earnings”—or in accordance with what he refers to as “the accounting model of the firm”—often leads to value‐destroying decisions. As one example, the GAAP accounting principle that requires intangible investments like R&D and training to be written off in the year the money is spent is likely to cause significant underinvestment in such intangibles. At the same time, the failure of conventional income statements to reflect the cost of equity almost certainly encourages corporate overinvestment. Stern's solution to this problem was an executive incentive compensation plan whose rewards were tied to increases in a measure of economic profit called economic value added, or EVA, which research has shown to have a significance relation to changes both in share value and the premium of market value over book value. Moreover, by combining such a plan with a “bonus bank” that pays out annual awards over a multiyear period, boards could ensure that management will be rewarded not for good luck but for sustainable improvements in performance.     

A Look Back at the Beginnings of EVA and Value‐Based Management

One of the pioneers of value‐based management discusses his life's work in converting principles of modern finance theory into performance evaluation and incentive compensation plans that have been adopted by many of the world's largest and most successful companies, including Coca‐Cola in the U.S., SABMiller in London, Siemens in Germany, and the Godrej Group in India. The issues covered include the significance of dividend payouts (are dividends really necessary to support a company's stock price and, if so, why?) as well as the question of optimal capital structure (whether and why debt might not be cheaper than equity). But the most important focus of the interview is corporate performance measurement and the use of executive pay to strengthen management incentives to increase efficiency and value. According to Stern, the widespread tendency of public companies to manage “for earnings”—or in accordance with what he refers to as “the accounting model of the firm”—often leads to value‐destroying decisions. As one example, the GAAP accounting principle that requires intangible investments like R&D and training to be written off in the year the expenses are incurred is likely to cause underinvestment in such intangibles. At the same time, the failure of conventional income statements to reflect the cost of equity almost certainly encourages corporate overinvestment. Stern's solution to this problem is an executive incentive compensation plan in which rewards are tied to increases in a measure of economic profit called economic value added, or EVA, which research has shown to have a significance relation to changes both in share value and the premium of market value over book value. Moreover, by combining such a plan with a “bonus bank” that pays out annual awards over a multi‐year period, boards can ensure that management will be rewarded not for good luck but rather for sustainable improvements in performance.     

Alignment of performance measurement to sustainability objectives: A variance-based framework

Meaningful incorporation of environmental and social responsibility goals into organizational strategic plans requires a mechanism to measure and reward performance contributing to that objective. This paper formulates such a framework using management accounting concepts. We demonstrate that the benefits of pursuing sustainability objectives can be decomposed into three parts. The first consists of what might be considered a natural outcome of pursuing the traditional economic goal of efficiency through cost-minimization (a “waste” variance). The second part consists of sustainability gains that produce societal benefit but may be incongruent with short-term economic goals (a “sustainability” variance). The third part stems from a change in optimal output level when that is considered endogenous to the firm (a “volume” variance). While elimination of waste variances can be encouraged using a traditional performance evaluation and reward structure, elimination of sustainability and volume variances requires redesign of performance evaluation tools and reward structures. We demonstrate that failure to recognize and incorporate the difference between the three variances can lead to inefficient allocation of resources, over- or under-production, and only partial fulfillment of environmental goals. Further, availability of shadow price information is essential to implementing such a performance measurement system; thus it is a public policy imperative to develop markets that establish such prices.     

Is performance measurement and management fit for the future?

Performance measurement and management (PMM) is a management and research paradox. On one hand, it provides management with many critical, useful, and needed functions. Yet, there is evidence that it can adversely affect performance. This paper attempts to resolve this paradox by focusing on the issue of “fit”. That is, in today's dynamic and turbulent environment, changes in either the business environment or the business strategy can lead to the need for new or revised measures and metrics. Yet, if these measures and metrics are either not revised or incorrectly revised, then we can encounter situations where what the firm wants to achieve (as communicated by its strategy) and what the firm measures and rewards are not synchronised with each other (i.e., there is a lack of “fit”). This situation can adversely affect the ability of the firm to compete. The issue of fit is explored using a three phase Delphi approach. Initially intended to resolve this first paradox, the Delphi study identified another paradox – one in which the researchers found that in a dynamic environment, firms do revise their strategies, yet, often the PMM system is not changed. To resolve this second paradox, the paper proposes a new framework – one that shows that under certain conditions, the observed metrics “lag” is not only explainable but also desirable. The findings suggest a need to recast the accepted relationship between strategy and PMM system and the output included the Performance Alignment Matrix that had utility for managers.     

A Tale of Leadership in Value Creation

In this prologue to his new book, Curing Corporate Short‐Termism, the founder and CEO of Fortuna Advisors presents a fictional account of a corporate turnaround—a “composite” reflection of the author's many years of consulting experience that dramatizes the pressure to meet near‐term earnings targets and other kinds of “agency” problems facing a public company called Blue Dynamics Corp. The tale begins with the puzzlement of the incoming CEO, Betty Manning, at finding the company's highest‐return business unit starved for investment, even as the low‐return units continue to receive and spend capital with little success. At the core of the company's capital allocation and “underinvestment” problems, she finds a corporate‐wide performance measurement and reward system focused on setting and beating budgets and growth in EPS and ROE. Manning's solution is to divorce the performance and reward system entirely from the budgeting process and implement new annual incentives and target‐setting practices that result in both more reliable budgeting and forecasting and a longer‐term view of value creation. The new measure of economic profit, called BDVA (short for Blue Dynamics Value Added), is based on a customized measure of EBITDA less a capital charge. The adoption of the new measure has the effect of encouraging her team to take a number of decisive steps: make an objective, “fact‐based” case for a strategic acquisition whose price appears to be too high (at least using conventional measures like EPS accretion); pull the trigger on a divestment that appears to have been adding value, but is more valuable outside the firm; and, more generally and most important, guide operating managers toward an ideal balance of overall growth and return on capital.     

The Purpose of the Firm,Valuation, and the Management of Intangibles

This article provides a different way of thinking about, and responding to, four important issues that confront most public companies. First, in articulating the overarching corporate purpose, the author suggests a middle ground between shareholder value maximization and stakeholder theory that aims to achieve the end result of value maximization while taking a “holistic” view that meets most of the demands of stakeholder advocates. As described by the author, there are four critical steps for management and boards in creating such companies: (1) communicating a vision of the company and its purpose to employees as well as investors (and other key outsiders); (2) organizing to survive and prosper through efficiency and innovation; (3) working continuously to develop win‐win relationships with stakeholders and other companies; and (4) taking care of the environment and future generations. Second, in thinking about the corporate purpose and how to evaluate success in achieving it, managements and boards need a valuation model that provides a clear and insightful connection between long‐term corporate performance and market valuation, and how both might be expected to change as the firm matures. A strong case is presented for the life‐cycle valuation model, widely used by money management organizations, in which a company's projected cash flows reflect an expected “fade” in both economic returns on capital and reinvestment rates. The potential uses of this model are illustrated using lifecycle corporate performance data for 3M during the past 50 years. Third, in an effort to capture the value of innovation and investment in intangible assets, the author presents an alternative to the accounting approach of capitalizing and amortizing such assets that attempts to capture their expected future benefits by using more favorable forecasts of long‐term fade rates. Fourth, the author shows how incorporating Life‐cycle Reviews for each of a company's business units as part of its Integrated Reporting could improve management's resource allocation decisions, help build a shareholder base of long‐term investors, and provide management with the support and confidence to resist Wall Street's excessive emphasis on quarterly earnings.     

Using Organizational Architecture to Lead Change*

Effective leadership involves more than developing and communicating the right strategic vision for the company. To encourage employees to carry out the corporate vision, companies must ensure consistency among the following three main components of their “organizational architecture:”

• ? the allocation of decision‐making authority (that is, who in the organization gets to make what decisions);
• ? performance measurement systems (for evaluating the performance of individuals as well as business units); and
• ? reward systems (the rewards for success, both financial and otherwise, and the consequences of failure).

The authors illustrate the application of this framework with the case of Xerox's (eventually) successful attempt to create a customer‐oriented workforce in the 1980s. But a more effective demonstration of the importance of these principles, as the authors go on to suggest, might well be the same company's well‐known failure to realize the commercial promise of the many inventions by its research group in Palo Alto. This organizational framework is especially useful for evaluating the likely effects of major corporate initiatives such as “Six Sigma” or the “Balanced Scorecard.” For example, it could be used to help top management determine whether, and under what circumstances, decentralization is likely to improve decision‐making and performance, as well as the changes in the firm's performance management and incentive systems that would be required to make decentralization work. Finally, the authors apply the framework to another important leadership issue: corporate ethics. In response to the scandals of the past decade and the passage of Sarbanes‐Oxley, many U.S. companies have issued formal codes of conduct, appointed ethics officers, and instituted training programs in ethics. But a key question for top management is whether the incentives established by the firm's organizational architecture reinforce or undermine the code of conduct. In this sense, ensuring consistency in organizational design is an important leadership function—one that is critical to encouraging ethical behavior as well as the pursuit of shareholder value.     

Beyond EVA

A former partner of Stern Stewart begins by noting that the recent acquisition of EVA Dimensions by the well‐known proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) may be signaling a resurgence of EVA as a widely followed corporate performance measure. In announcing the acquisition, ISS said that it's considering incorporating the measure into its recommendations and pay‐for‐performance model. While applauding this decision, the author also reflects on some of the shortcomings of EVA that ultimately prevented broader adoption of the measure after it was developed and popularized in the early 1990s. Chief among these obstacles to broader use is the measure's complexity, arising mainly from the array of adjustments to GAAP accounting. But even more important is EVA's potential for encouraging “short‐termism”—a potential the author attributes to EVA's front‐loading of the costs of owning assets, which causes EVA to be negative when assets are “new” and can discourage managers from investing in the business. These shortcomings led the author and his colleagues to design an improved economic profit‐based performance measure when founding Fortuna Advisors in 2009. The measure, which is called “residual cash earnings,” or RCE, is like EVA in charging managers for the use of capital; but unlike EVA, it adds back depreciation and so the capital charge is “flat” (since now based on gross, or undepreciated, assets). And according to the author's latest research, RCE does a better job than EVA of relating to changes in TSR in all of the 20 (non‐financial) industries studied during the period 1999 through 2018. The article closes by providing two other testaments to RCE's potential uses: (1) a demonstration that RCE does a far better job than EVA of explaining Amazon's remarkable share price appreciation over the last ten years; and (2) a brief case study of Varian Medical Systems that illustrates the benefits of designing and implementing a customized version of RCE as the centerpiece for business management. Perhaps the most visible change at Varian, after 18 months of using a measure the company calls “VVA” (for Varian Value Added), has been a sharp increase in the company's longer‐run investment (not to mention its share price) while holding management accountable for earning an adequate return on investors’ capital.     

Aligning Performance Measurement Systems With Strategy: The Case of Environmental Strategy

Alignment of an organization's performance measurement system with its strategy is widely advocated as a guiding principle in management control system design. Despite its importance, it is far from clear what strategic alignment of performance measures entails, whether and how organizations achieve it. In this article we explore the alignment of performance measures focusing on firms' use of environmental performance indicators as the consequence of pursuing an environmental strategy. Based on the economic and contingency literatures on management control system design and performance measurement, we propose that the use of such performance measures is a consequence of changing the design of the performance measurement system to accommodate the strategy, and by increasing the informativeness of performance metrics. We test these propositions in a sample of financial managers in manufacturing firms in The Netherlands. We find that alignment to environmental strategy is mostly achieved through the increased quantification of environmental performance measures and via their increased sensitivity to managerial actions.     

Using a robust performance measurement system to illuminate intellectual capital

The central premise of the “fit-as-mediation” view states that knowledge-related factors could determine the usage and design of specific organizational systems, such as management accounting and control systems. This could, in turn, facilitate information processing and bring about positive organizational outcomes. While the influence of knowledge-based assets on measurable performance has been examined extensively in the intellectual capital literature, little is known concerning the role of an organizational control system in fostering the management of intellectual capital as the most strategic asset for organizations. As such, this study primarily aims to explore what role a performance measurement system plays in terms of the diversity of measurement in the relationship between intellectual capital and organizational performance. We incorporate social capital into the general three-dimensional classification of intellectual capital; namely, human capital, structural capital, and relational capital, to provide a more comprehensive measure of intellectual capital. Further, we conceptualize the diversity of measurement by supplementing the original Kaplan and Norton's BSC model with a new perspective, social and environmental measures. Such integration of financial, customer, internal business process, learning, and growth, along with social and environmental measures could result in an overarching and robust conceptualization of performance measurement; a concept that was barely mentioned in previous literature. We conducted a questionnaire survey involving chief financial officers of 128 Iranian public listed companies. Using the partial least squares (PLS), we find that companies with higher levels of intellectual capital emphasize a greater diversity of performance measures. The findings also show that the diversity of measurement mediates the relationship between intellectual capital and organizational performance. This paper may offer guidance to companies concerning the competencies needed for securing positive organizational outcomes from their knowledge resources, such as intellectual capital.     

REVISITING MARKET EFFICIENCY: THE STOCK MARKET AS A COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEM

Well‐functioning financial markets are key to efficient resource allocation in a capitalist economy. While many managers express reservations about the accuracy of stock prices, most academics and practitioners agree that markets are efficient by some reasonable operational criterion. But if standard capital markets theory provides reasonably good predictions under “normal” circumstances, researchers have also discovered a number of “anomalies”—cases where the empirical data appear sharply at odds with the theory. Most notable are the occasional bursts of extreme stock price volatility (including the recent boom‐and‐bust cycle in the NASDAQ) and the limited success of the Capital Asset Pricing Model in accounting for the actual risk‐return behavior of stocks. This article addresses the question of how the market's efficiency arises. The central message is that managers can better understand markets as a complex adaptive system. Such systems start with a “heterogeneous” group of investors, whose interaction leads to “self‐organization” into groups with different investment styles. In contrast to market efficiency, where “marginal” investors are all assumed to be rational and well‐informed, the interaction of investors with different “decision rules” in a complex adaptive system creates a market that has properties and characteristics distinct from the individuals it comprises. For example, simulations of the behavior of complex adaptive systems suggest that, in most cases, the collective market will prove to be smarter than the average investor. But, on occasion, herding behavior by investors leads to “imbalances”—and, hence, to events like the crash of '87 and the recent plunge in the NASDAQ. In addition to its grounding in more realistic assumptions about the behavior of individual investors, the new model of complex adaptive systems offers predictions that are in some respects more consistent with empirical findings. Most important, the new model accommodates larger‐than‐normal stock price volatility (in statistician's terms, “fat‐tailed” distributions of prices) far more readily than standard efficient market theory. And to the extent that it does a better job of explaining volatility, this new model of investor behavior is likely to have implications for two key areas of corporate financial practice: risk management and investor relations. But even so, the new model leaves one of the main premises of modern finance theory largely intact–that the most reliable basis for valuing a company's stock is its discounted cash flow.     

Unpacking the notion of subjectivity: Performance evaluation and supervisor discretion

This study puts forward the notion of subjectivity according to supervisor discretion and the organization's subjective performance evaluation rules. This is needed because most studies investigating subjectivity do not distinguish supervisor idiosyncrasies from features of the organization's management control systems. This study uses a survey to capture subjectivity and suggests that subjectivity entails two concepts. One concept is related to the amount of discretion that supervisors can exercise under the organization's current performance evaluation. The other concept concerns supervisor's idiosyncrasies when evaluating subordinates. This study provides evidence that subjectivity is multidimensional and may not represent a single concept. The results suggest that studies investigating subjectivity should treat supervisor discretion and subjective performance evaluation rules separately because of their different associations towards subordinate performance, psychological empowerment, and supervisor-subordinate conflict.     

EVA IN THE E&P INDUSTRY: THE CASE OF NUEVO ENERGY

This article presents a case study illustrating some aspects of the new business model discussed in the roundtable above. Continuing a major theme in the roundtable, the authors begin by arguing that the long‐run failure of the E&P industry to create shareholder wealth stems to a large degree from weak or distorted incentives held out to the top executives and managers of most large, publicly traded companies. This article traces the incentive problem to the lack of an effective wealth creation metric to guide the financial management process. Although the industry employs a variety of accounting‐based performance measures, none is a reliable measure of wealth creation. In place of traditional financial metrics such as earnings, annual cash flow, and return on capital, this article recommends a performance evaluation and incentive compensation system that is tied to the use of a “reserve‐adjusted” EVA measure—one that exhibits a strong statistical correlation with changes in shareholder wealth in the E&P business. The greater explanatory power of this new measure reflects the reality that changes in the value of reserves in the ground can greatly outweigh changes in annual earnings or cash flows. As the focal point of a compensation plan, EVA has advantages over stock options in that it can be calculated at various levels in the organization, even at the level of a single well, whereas stock prices only exist for the company as a whole. For this reason, an EVA incentive system permits a clearer “line of sight” between pay packages and the performance of the part of the business for which managers are directly accountable. Perhaps even more important, EVA can be calculated (using an “internal hedging” mechanism) in a way that removes the impact of changes in oil prices on the incentive outcome. And, as demonstrated in the case study of Nuevo Energy, such internal hedging allows companies to give their employees a much greater share of wealth created with far less cost than by simply granting stock or stock options.     

How to Evaluate Risk Management Units in Financial Institutions?

Based on the existing Enterprise Risk Management framework and current government regulations, “banks are required to establish risk management units (RMUs) to review and evaluate their risks, monitor them, and to advise top management.” Currently an integral part of the risk governance and management process, RMUs in financial institutions have become increasingly important since the 2007–2008 financial crisis. This article details the authors' creation of an index to evaluate the performance of risk management units in financial institutions, and then examines some of their findings. The index transforms twelve parameters into a simple and convenient index that isolates the RMU's activities from the rest of the organizational risk management process, its risk preferences and the activities of the rest of the units. The index's parameters are divided into three dimensions of the RMU's performance: professionalism, organizational status and relationship with top management and the board. The authors found a positive relationship between their RMUI and some important risk governance characteristics: CROs who are among the five highest paid executives at the bank, banks with at least one independent director serving on the board's risk committee having banking and finance experience and boards with greater efficacy.