Entrepreneurial finance: Banks versus venture capital

We analyze how entrepreneurial firms choose between two funding institution: banks, which monitor less intensively and face liquidity demands from their own investors, and venture capitalists, who can monitor more intensively but face a higher cost of capital because of the liquidity constraints that they impose on their own investors. Because the firm's manager prefers continuing the firm over liquidating it and aggressive (risky) continuation strategies over conservative (safe) continuation strategies, the institution must monitor the firm and exercise some control over its decisions. Bank finance takes the form of debt, whereas venture capital finance often resembles convertible debt. Venture capital finance is optimal only when the aggressive continuation strategy is not too profitable, ex ante; the uncertainty associated with the risky continuation strategy (strategic uncertainty) is high; and the firm's cash flow distribution is highly risky and positively skewed, with low probability of success, low liquidation value, and high returns if successful. A decrease in venture capitalists’ cost of capital encourages firms to switch from safe strategies and bank finance to riskier strategies and venture capital finance, increasing the average risk of firms in the economy.     

On debt service and renegotiation when debt-holders are more strategic

The contingent claims analysis of firm financing often presents a debt renegotiation game with a passive bank that does not use its ability to force liquidation strategically, contrary to what is observed in practice. We consider two motives that may lead a bank to refuse to renegotiate: maintaining its reputation to preserve its future lending activity and deterring firms from overstating their debt service abatement when they renegotiate. We show that with public information and private debt only, the optimal probability of debt renegotiation is high when the firm’s anticipated liquidation value is high. Under asymmetric information about liquidation value, the high liquidation value firm may be tempted to mimic the low liquidation value firm to reduce its debt service. To deter such mimicking, banks may sometimes refuse to renegotiate with firms having a low liquidation value.     

Last resort gambles, risky debt and liquidation policy

This paper develops a real option model in which the interaction between debt, liquidation policy and risky investments is studied. We consider a manager who owns the firm and faces the opportunity to invest in risky projects which may boost current profits at the cost of bankruptcy if they turn out to be unsuccessful. These investments are “last resort gambles” in the sense that, if successful, they save the company from insolvency, while, if unsuccessful, they make liquidation unavoidable. It is shown that last resort gambles delay liquidation. We study how the liquidation trigger and the last resort investment decisions are affected by the firm's capital structure.     

Automatic bankruptcy auctions and fire-sales

We test for fire-sale tendencies in automatic bankruptcy auctions. We find evidence consistent with fire-sale discounts when the auction leads to piecemeal liquidation, but not when the bankrupt firm is acquired as a going concern. Neither industry-wide distress nor the industry affiliation of the buyer affect prices in going-concern sales. Bids are often structured as leveraged buyouts, which relaxes liquidity constraints and reduces bidder underinvestment incentives in the presence of debt overhang. Prices in “prepack” auctions (sales agreements negotiated prior to bankruptcy filing) are on average lower than for in-auction going-concern sales, suggesting that prepacks may help preempt excessive liquidation when the auction is expected to be illiquid. Prepack targets have a greater industry-adjusted probability of refiling for bankruptcy, indicating that liquidation preemption is a risky strategy.     

Resolution of financial distress under agency frictions

We introduce, in a dynamic-contracting framework with moral hazard, the possibility of recapitalization as an alternative to liquidation when a firm is distressed. This is achieved by considering a risk-averse agent and by allowing (but not requiring) the latter to inject additional capital into the firm when necessary. We show that firm recapitalization may arise in an optimal, long-term contract. As a consequence, we find that there are two mechanisms at a firm’s disposal so as to deal with financial difficulties: one corresponds to a recapitalization process, the other to a liquidation one. The choice of mechanism is based on a cost-benefit analysis.     

DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN BUSINESS START‐UPS: THE ROLE OF NONFINANCIAL STAKEHOLDER RELATIONSHIP COSTS

According to the finance literature, nonfinancial stakeholders (NFS), such as customers, suppliers, and employees, take into account their expected liquidation costs when dealing with a firm. In this framework, firms can influence their probability of liquidation by choosing an appropriate capital structure. Also, the literature suggests NFS bargaining power may affect firm financing decisions. In the current article we investigate these ideas for initial financing decisions by business start‐ups, where ex ante failure risk is high and NFS must decide whether to make relationship‐specific investments. We find that start‐ups imposing larger costs on their NFS following liquidation significantly reduce leverage. This effect is strengthened when suppliers have greater bargaining power. We also document a marginally negative effect of NFS liquidation costs on the proportion of bank loans. Finally, business start‐ups rely less on bank loans when customers and suppliers are in a powerful bargaining position.     

Optimal Debt and Equity Values in the Presence of Chapter 7 and Chapter 11

Explicit presence of reorganization in addition to liquidation leads to conflicts of interest between borrowers and lenders. In the first–best outcome, reorganization adds value to both parties via higher debt capacity, lower credit spreads, and improved overall firm value. If control of the ex ante reorganization timing and the ex post decision to liquidate is given to borrowers, most of the benefits are appropriated by borrowers ex post. Lenders can restore the first–best outcome by seizing this control or by the ex post transfer of control rights. Reorganization is more likely and liquidation is less likely relative to the benchmark case with liquidation only.     

Strategic Actions and Credit Spreads: An Empirical Investigation

Do strategic actions of borrowers and lenders affect corporate debt values? We find higher bond spreads for firms that can renegotiate debt contracts relatively easily. Consistent with theories of strategic debt service, the threat of strategic default depresses bond values ex ante, even though there may be efficiency gains from renegotiation ex post. However, the economic significance of the net effect is small, suggesting that bondholders have considerable bargaining power. The effect of strategic actions is higher when creditors are particularly vulnerable to strategic threats, including risky firms with high managerial shareholding, simple debt structures, and high liquidation costs.     

When time is (not) money: preliminary guidance on the interchangeability of time and money in laboratory-based risk research

The familiar adage that ‘time is money’ may not be entirely accurate according to research involving hypothetical choice: People’s decisions are less sensitive to temporal expenditures and outcomes than monetary ones. We provide a novel examination of whether similar patterns of risky choice are found for time and money when choices are consequential (i.e. monetary outcomes are obtained and temporal outcomes are experienced) – both for one-shot and repeated choices, over gains and losses. On the aggregate, across decision contexts (described and experienced), choices are similar for time and money. However, on the level of the individual, little relationship between risk preferences for time and money are observed. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.     

Deviations from Fundamentals in US and EU Stock Markets: A Comparative Analysis

Abstract

A ‘two-stage growth’ discounted cash flow (DCF) model is built to test whether changes in the underlying market fundamentals help to explain movements in stock prices. Empirical results on two samples of US and EU stocks show that the ‘fundamental’ earning price ratio (E/P) explains a significant share of cross-sectional variation of the observed E/P, this impact being stronger in the US market. It is also found that: (i) the fundamental component of the E/P has superior explanatory power than simpler measures of expected earnings growth; (ii) ‘non-fundamental’ components, interpreted as signals reducing asymmetric information (such as firm size, the number of forecasts and the chartist momentum), mitigate the role of the fundamentals; (iii) current deviations from the fundamentals are affected by ex post adjustment of publicly available information in the EU sample. It is argued that differences in regulatory environments and in the composition of investors between the US and EU financial systems may help to explain these comparative findings. Results appear consistent with the ‘market integrity hypothesis’ postulating that reliance on publicly observable fundamentals is higher when insider trading is lower.     

The benefits of extended liability

We characterize the optimal regulation of a firm that undertakes an environmentally risky activity. This firm (the agent)is protected by limited liability and bound by contract to a stakeholder (the principal). The level of safety care exerted by the agent is nonobservable. This level of care depends both on the degree of incompleteness of the regulatory contract and on the allocation of bargaining power between the principal and the agent. Increasing the wealth of the principal that can be seized upon an accident has no value when private transactions are regulated but might otherwise strictly improve welfare. An incomplete regulation supplemented by an ex post extended liability regime can sometime achieve the second best.     

Reputation, renegotiation, and the choice between bank loans and publicly traded debt

We model firms' choice between bank loans and publicly tradeddebt, allowing for debt renegotiation in the event of financialdistress. Entrepreneurs, with private information about theirprobability of financial distress, borrow from banks (multiperiodplayers) or issue bonds to implement projects. If a firm isin financial distress, lenders devote a certain amount of resources(unobservable to entrepreneurs) to evaluate whether to liquidatethe firm or to renegotiate its debt. We demonstrate that banks'desire to acquire a reputation for making the 'right' renegotiationversus liquidation decision provides them an endogenous incentiveto devote a larger amount of resources than bondholders towardsuch evaluations. In equilibrium, bank loans dominate bondsfrom the point of view of minimizing inefficient liquidation,.however, firms with a lower probability of financial distresschoose bonds over bank loans.     

Implications of Debt Renegotiation for Optimal Bank Policy and Firm Behavior

This paper analyzes the problems associated with the renegotiation of debt contracts involving a bank (the lender) and a firm (the borrower) when the latter is operated by a risk averse manager. Firms undertake risky projects with loan capital borrowed from the bank. When a firm cannot pay off a loan it is technically bankrupt. Both the borrower and the lender may however experience a Pareto-improvement in their positions by renegotiating the loan. By renegotiating the terms of the debt the financially distressed firm can avoid the stigmatization of bankruptcy and the bank can avoid the costs of seizing the borrower's assets. However, our main finding is that, from the bank's point of view, renegotiating as a policy of recovering loan payments may be inefficient in practice because of false bankruptcy claims and moral hazard problems associated with exposure of the borrowing firm to the risk of default. We present a solution to the false bankruptcy claim problem that involves a mixe d strategy between asset seizure by the bank and debt renegotiation.     

Which Institutional Investors Trade Based on Private Information About Earnings and Returns?

Recent work suggests that institutional investors execute profitable trades based on private information about earnings and returns. We provide new evidence on the prevalence and sources of such informed trading by (1) testing for the creation and liquidation of positions based on private information, (2) introducing private information proxies that reflect the size and nature of an institution's position in each portfolio firm, and (3) using a methodology that examines multiple investor characteristics simultaneously at the institution‐firm level. We find that changes in ownership by institutions with large positions in a firm are consistent with informed trading. However, other previously documented proxies for private information produce results more consistent with risk‐based trading (e.g., investment style) or insignificant in the presence of other proxies (e.g., fiduciary type). We also find that informed trading is more prevalent in small firms and when the large positions are taken by investment advisers and large institutions.     

Risk management strategies for banks

We analyze optimal risk management strategies of a bank financed with deposits and equity in a one period model. The bank’s motivation for risk management comes from deposits which can lead to bank runs. In the event of such a run, liquidation costs arise. The hedging strategy that maximizes the value of equity is derived. We identify conditions under which well known results such as complete hedging, maximal speculation or irrelevance of the hedging decision are obtained. The initial debt ratio, the size of the liquidation costs, regulatory restrictions, the volatility of the risky asset and the spread between the riskless interest rate and the deposit rate are shown to be the important parameters that drive the bank’s hedging decision. We further extend this basic model to include counterparty risk constraints on the forward contract used for hedging.     

Analyst Firm Coverage and Forecast Accuracy: The Effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure

In this study, we revisit the relationship between analyst firm coverage and forecast accuracy. In contrast to the proposed negative association in Clement (1999) owing to the portfolio complexity effect, we hypothesize an ‘economy‐of‐scale effect’ that is likely to dominate when analysts rely mostly on public information. In support of the latter effect, we find a positive association between firm coverage and forecast accuracy after the enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), which substantially reduces the flow of material private information to analysts. Such a result survives a battery of robustness analyses. We further show that, in the post‐Reg FD period, covering more firms increases an analyst's probability of being selected as a star analyst in the subsequent year. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of the information environment in shaping the economic link between an analyst's firm coverage and forecast accuracy.     

Employee treatment and firm innovation

We identify firm innovation as a channel through which the treatment of employees affects firm value. Long‐term incentive theory supports positive effects of ‘good’ employee treatment on innovation. Alternatively, entrenchment theory suggests such treatment will lead to complacency and shirking, hence deterring innovation. These opposing views merit investigation since human capital is increasingly essential to the growth and success of a firm. Using the KLD database and patent/citation data, we find a significant positive relationship between favorable employee treatment and the innovation quantity and quality of a firm. Furthermore, we find that the positive treatment of employees improves innovation focus – more innovation related to firms’ core business, leading to greater firm value via the increased economic value of patents. These findings, robust to endogeneity concerns, provide support for the long‐term incentive hypothesis, suggesting that well‐treated employees increase firm innovation. Thus, firm innovation represents a channel through which positive employee treatment enhances firm value.     

Determinants of Bank Debt in a Continental Financial System: Evidence from Spanish Companies

We test hypotheses about the structure of corporate debt ownership and the use of bank debt by firms in a civil‐law country, Spain. We focus on bank debt effects in the presence of information asymmetries and agency costs, and on efficient versus inefficient firm liquidation. We find that the relation between growth opportunities and bank financing is not as strong as the one found in common‐law countries, that there is a positive relation between firm size and the proportion of bank debt used, and that firms closer to bankruptcy and highly leveraged are more likely to use bank debt.     

Staged venture capital contracting with ratchets and liquidation rights

This paper uses real options analysis to study later round financing in the presence of two standard venture capital contracting provisions: anti-dilution (ratchet) and liquidation preference. We argue that such provisions can preclude financing of a positive NPV venture in the case of a large follow-on financing relative to firm value. Liquidation preference contracting at multiples greater than one is not feasible in the later round if the financing is small relative to firm value. We highlight an interaction effect between the two provisions: increasing the liquidation multiple can help to avoid dilution and the need for the prior venture capitalist to waive ratchet provisions.     

Household portfolio allocation,uncertainty, and risk

Analysing the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the Health and Retirement Study, we investigate the extent to which US households reduce their financial risk exposure when confronted with background risk. Our novel modelling approach – termed a deflated ordered fractional model – quantifies how the overall composition of a household portfolio with three asset classes adjusts with background risk, and is unique in recovering for any given risky asset class the shares that are reallocated to each safer asset category. Background risk exerts a significant impact on household portfolios, inducing a ‘flight from risk’ from riskier to safer assets.