What Drives Stock Price Behavior Following Extreme One-Day Returns

We identify samples of losers and winners by selecting daily stock price returns in excess of 10% (sign ignored) and determine whether these samples over‐ or underreact. We then identify “informed” events, which correspond to announcements in the Wall Street Journal(WSJ), and “uninformed” events, which are not explained in the WSJ. For winners, there is overreaction in response to uninformed events but no overreaction on average in response to informed events. This finding suggests the degree of overreaction to new information depends on whether the cause of the extreme stock price change is publicly released.     

Does the Stock Market Overreact?

Research in experimental psychology suggests that, in violation of Bayes' rule, most people tend to “overreact” to unexpected and dramatic news events. This study of market efficiency investigates whether such behavior affects stock prices. The empirical evidence, based on CRSP monthly return data, is consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. Substantial weak form market inefficiencies are discovered. The results also shed new light on the January returns earned by prior “winners” and “losers.” Portfolios of losers experience exceptionally large January returns as late as five years after portfolio formation.     

Does Shareholder Composition Matter? Evidence from the Market Reaction to Corporate Earnings Announcements

We examine whether institutional ownership composition is related to parameters of the market reaction to negative earnings announcements. When firms report earnings below analysts' expectations, the stock price response is more negative for firms with higher levels of ownership by momentum or aggressive growth investors. There is no evidence, however, that these institutions cause an “overreaction” to earnings news. Ownership structure is also related to trading volume and to stock price volatility on days around earnings announcements. Our findings are consistent with the idea that the composition of institutional shareholders effects stock price behavior around the release of corporate information.     

Sentiment stocks

To study how investor sentiment at the firm level affects stock returns, we match more than 58 million social media messages in China with listed firms and construct a measure of individual stock sentiment based on the tone of those messages. We document that positive investor sentiment predicts higher stock risk-adjusted returns in the very short term followed by price reversals. This association between stock sentiment and stock returns is not explained by observable stock characteristics, unobservable time-invariant characteristics, market-wide sentiment, overreaction to news, or changing investor attention. Consistent with theories of investor sentiment, we find that the link between sentiment and stock returns is mainly driven by positive sentiment and non-professional investors. Finally, exploiting a unique feature of the Chinese stock market, we are able to isolate the causal effect of sentiment on stock returns from confounding factors.     

Corporate goodness and profit warnings

Is a firm that is known for positively engaging stakeholders expected to voluntarily disclose bad financial news? If it makes the announcement, does its corporate goodness help to mitigate the stock price reaction? We examine these issues using a sample of profit warnings, and a sample of firms with negative earnings surprises that did not warn. Firms that have positive corporate social responsibility ratings are more likely to provide earnings warnings than other firms. When they do provide a profit warning, the event negative abnormal returns are of significantly smaller magnitude than the returns of other firms providing warnings. This effect does not occur for social firms that decide not to warn. They suffer the same negative stock price impact on the earnings announcement day as other firms.     

On the Role of Intangible Information and Capital Gains Taxes in Long‐Term Return Reversals

Prior studies have linked long‐term reversals to the magnitude of locked‐in capital gains suggesting that reversals are driven by tax effects and not overreaction. I find that locked‐in capital gains do not explain the reversals in winners when winner returns are based on intangible information. In fact, the reversals for intangible return winners are long lasting and robust to controls for growth in assets and capital expenditures. To the extent that reversals associated with intangible information stem from investors’ overreaction to intangible information and given the prior results linking reversals only to intangible information, my results suggest that overreaction still explains reversal patterns in US stock returns.     

Further Evidence On Investor Overreaction and Stock Market Seasonality

In a previous paper, we found systematic price reversals for stocks that experience extreme long-term gains or losses: Past losers significantly outperform past winners. We interpreted this finding as consistent with the behavioral hypothesis of investor overreaction. In this follow-up paper, additional evidence is reported that supports the overreaction hypothesis and that is inconsistent with two alternative hypotheses based on firm size and differences in risk, as measured by CAPM-betas. The seasonal pattern of returns is also examined. Excess returns in January are related to both short-term and long-term past performance, as well as to the previous year market return.     

Stock Returns following Large One-Day Declines: Evidence on Short-Term Reversals and Longer-Term Performance

We examine stock returns following large one-day price declines and find that the bid-ask bounce and the degree of market liquidity explain short-term price reversals. Further, we do not find evidence consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. We observe that securities with large one-day price declines perform poorly over an extended time horizon.     

Abnormal trading volume,news and market efficiency: Evidence from the Jamaica Stock Exchange

This paper investigates market efficiency of the Jamaica Stock Exchange (JSE). Together, weak and semi-strong form efficiency claim that historical and newly released public information do not predict future stock price movement. We test both forms of market efficiency by analyzing stock price behavior during times of abnormal trading volume and around the release dates of earnings information. Abnormal trading volume may be driven by liquidity demand or reflect new or private information flow to the market. Using JSE data over the period 2000 to 2021, we find price dynamics consistent with price pressure as firms experience negative abnormal returns on the day of abnormal trading activity but offsetting positive abnormal stock returns on the following day. Further findings show post earnings announcement drift on the JSE. Taken as a whole, the evidence suggests violations of market efficiency and has implications for capital allocation in this emerging market.     

The cost of overconfidence in public information

We investigate the effects of investor overconfidence in public information on cross-sectional asset returns. The results show that investors in the US equity market are overconfident about public signals for mature firms that are relatively easy to price—old, large, and dividend-paying firms, value firms, and firms with a higher proportion of tangible assets, little external financing, and low sales growth. However, the effects of the overconfidence on cross-sectional stock returns are reversed quickly and comprise more than half of the short-term return reversals. The risk-adjusted cost of being overconfident about the noisy public signals, measured by return reversals of hedge portfolios formed on unexpected responses, is over 1.1% per month in the first month after portfolio formation, and is still significant despite the active arbitrage trading in the 2000s.     

DO U.S. STOCK MARKET INDEXES OVER‐ OR UNDERREACT?

Our objective is to investigate the short‐term over‐ or underreaction of six U.S. stock market indexes. We find evidence of a one‐day underreaction for winners (days on which an index experiences abnormally high returns) and losers (days on which an index experiences abnormally poor performance). We also find strong evidence of a sixty‐day underreaction for winners. For losers, abnormal returns turn from negative to positive as the period is extended, resulting in significant reversals over the sixty‐day period. Results are generally consistent for each of the six indexes. Overall, these results provide strong support for the uncertain information hypothesis. JEL classification: G14     

VENTURE CAPITAL AND IPO LOCKUP EXPIRATION: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Most initial public offerings (IPOs) feature “lockup” agreements, which bar insiders from selling the stock for a set period following the IPO, usually 180 days. We examine stock price behavior in the period surrounding lockup expiration for a sample of 2,529 firms from 1988 to 1997. We find that lockup expirations are, on average, associated with significant and negative abnormal returns, but the losses are concentrated in firms with venture capital backing. For the venture‐capital‐backed group, the largest losses occur for high‐tech firms and firms with the greatest post‐IPO stock price increases, the largest relative trading volume in the period surrounding expiration, and the highest quality underwriters. JEL classification: G14, G24     

OVERREACTION AND REVERSE ANTICIPATION: TWO RELATED PUZZLES?

In this article we investigate stock price behavior before and after surprise events. We form four base portfolios and sixteen control portfolios, taking into consideration the event direction, the magnitude of event-day surprises, the potentially confounding effects due to calendar regularities in stock returns, and the ex-post outlier month of October 1987. Using capital market data from 1964 to 1989, we find a pre-event stock price behavior pattern that we call the reverse anticipation puzzle. We also confirm the existence of the overreaction pattern. The pre- and post-event stock price behavior patterns are found to be similar.     

Long‐Term Return Reversals: Overreaction or Taxes?

Long‐term reversals in U.S. stock returns are better explained as the rational reactions of investors to locked‐in capital gains than an irrational overreaction to news. Predictors of returns based on the overreaction hypothesis have no power, while those that measure locked‐in capital gains do, completely subsuming past returns measures that are traditionally used to predict long‐term returns. In data from Hong Kong, where investment income is not taxed, reversals are nonexistent, and returns are not forecastable either by traditional measures or by measures based on the capital gains lock‐in hypothesis that successfully predict U.S. returns.     

Does the Stock Market Overreact to Corporate Earnings Information?

This paper tests whether the stock market overreacts to extreme earnings, by examining firms' stock returns over the 36 months subsequent to extreme earnings years. While the poorest earners do outperform the best earners, the poorest earners are also significantly smaller than the best earners. When poor earners are matched with good earners of equal size, there is little evidence of differential performance. This suggests that size, and not investor overreaction to earnings, is responsible for the “overreaction” phenomenon, the tendency for prior period losers to outperform prior period winners in the subsequent period.     

Stock‐Split Post‐Announcement Returns: Underreaction or Market Friction?

We explore the relationship between stock splits and subsequent long‐term returns during the period from 1950 to 2000. We find that, contrary to much previous research, firms do not exhibit positive long‐term post‐split returns. Instead, we find that significant positive returns after the announcement date do not persist after the actual date of the stock split. We also observe that abnormal returns are correlated with the price‐delay or market friction. We conclude that the stock‐split post‐announcement “drift” is only of short duration, and it is attributable to trading frictions rather than behavioral biases.     

Sources of gains to shareholders from bankruptcy resolution

Using a logistic regression model, we identify the characteristics of firms whose shareholders are likely to benefit from bankruptcy resolution. That is, winners (losers) are firms whose shareholders experience positive (negative) excess returns after bankruptcy filing. We find that winners are relatively smaller firms with higher proportions of convertible debt, tend to file for bankruptcy for strategic reasons, have low share-ownership concentration, and suffer comparatively larger pre-filing stock price declines. Among winners, shareholder returns are greater for firms that have higher levels of private debt and research and development (R&D) expenditures, and operate in more concentrated industries. In addition, our analysis indicates that an ex ante trading strategy of purchasing bankrupt stocks with a greater than 50% probability of being a winner on the day after bankruptcy filing and holding the stocks for a year, on an average, can generate average compounded and excess compounded holding-period returns of +71% and +42%, respectively.     

Asymmetric reverting behavior of short-horizon stock returns: An evidence of stock market overreaction

This paper investigates the uneven mean reverting pattern of monthly return indexes of the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ, using asymmetric non-linear smooth-transition (ANST) GARCH models. It also evaluates the extent to which time-varying volatility in the index returns support the stock market overreaction hypothesis. The models illuminate patterns of asymmetric mean reversion and risk decimation. Between 1926:01 and l997:12, not only did negative returns reverse to positive returns quicker than positive returns reverted to negative ones, but negative returns, in fact, reduced risk premiums from predictable high volatility. The findings support the market overreaction hypotheses. The asymmetry is due to the mispricing behavior on the part of investors who overreact to certain market news. The findings also corroborate arguments for the “contrarian” portfolio strategy.     

Information salience,investor sentiment,and stock returns: The case of British soccer betting

Soccer clubs listed on the London Stock Exchange provide a unique way of testing stock price reactions to different types of news. For each firm, two pieces of information are released on a weekly basis: experts' expectations about game outcomes through the betting odds, and the game outcomes themselves. The stock market reacts strongly to news about game results, generating significant abnormal returns and trading volumes. We find evidence that the abnormal returns for the winning teams do not reflect rational expectations but are high due to overreactions induced by investor sentiment. This is not the case for losing teams. There is no market reaction to the release of new betting information although these betting odds are excellent predictors of the game outcomes. The discrepancy between the strong market reaction to game results and the lack of reaction to betting odds may not only be the result from overreaction to game results but also from the lack of informational content or information salience of the betting information. Therefore, we also examine whether betting information can be used to predict short-run stock returns subsequent to the games. We reach mixed results: we conclude that investors ignore some non-salient public information such as betting odds, and betting information predicts a stock price overreaction to game results which is influenced by investors' mood (especially when the teams are strongly expected to win).