产品市场竞争、董事会与企业技术创新的实证检验

本文以我国沪、深股市2005～2007年的上市公司为样本,以产品市场竞争、董事会治理以及企业技术创新为研究对象,通过实证研究的方法,揭示基于不同产品市场竞争度下董事会规模、结构以及董事长与总经理是否两职合一对企业技术创新的影响作用。实证结果发现不论在高竞争行业还是低市场竞争行业中董事会规模与企业技术创新为均负相关关系;在高、低竞争度行业中,企业的内部董事比例与技术创新水平均为正相关关系;独立董事比例在高、低竞争度行业中与企业技术创新水平相关性均没有通过检验;董事长与总经理的两职合一在高、低竞争度行业中与企业的技术创新水平均为正相关关系。     

上市公司治理结构与绩效关系研究

本文将公司治理分为内外两个机制:内部机制主要由股权结构、资本结构、董事会治理和高层管理者激励几个主要方面构成;外部机制主要有产品市场竞争、公司控制权市场、法制基础和对中小股东权益的保护.分别分析这些机制对于公司绩效的影响,从而阐述上市公司公司治理与绩效的关系.     

产品市场竞争、董事会治理与上市公司信息披露质量

以我国627家上市公司为样本,通过实证研究发现董事会规模、内部董事比例、两职分离状况的系数有利于提高企业的信息披露质量;独立董事比例以及董事会会议召开次数对信息披露质量的提高没有影响。在高竞争度的样本内,企业的内部董事比例、董事会会议召开次数与信息披露质量存在一定的显著性,董事会规模、独立董事比例、两职分离状况的系数与信息披露质量均表现出关系不显著的特征,这说明产品市场竞争与董事会治理机制之间为替代关系;而在低产品市场竞争度样本回归中,董事会治理五个特征变量与市场披露的相关系数与全样本基本一致。     

产品市场竞争与寿险公司违规：“诱导”还是“治理”？

本文基于2010-2020年寿险公司和原银保监会披露的保险业监管处罚数据，实证检验产品市场竞争压力对寿险公司违规行为的影响。研究发现，寿险市场中竞争压力能够显著抑制违规，符合“竞争—治理”假说，且以上关系在寿险公司为中资公司、业务地区集中度较低以及偿付能力波动较小时更为明显。进一步分析发现，声誉机制是市场竞争影响公司违规行为的潜在渠道，银保监会合并成立使市场竞争对违规行为的抑制作用更加有效，市场竞争对公司治理类和业务经营类违规行为都存在显著治理作用。     

产品市场竞争的治理效应实证研究

本文实证研究产品市场竞争是否对企业的“第二类代理问题”具有治理作用,结果显示:产品市场竞争以及合理的公司内部治理机制有助于降低大股东的掏空程度;在行业中处于竞争优势的公司其大股东掏空程度往往更大.在对大股东掏空的影响上,产品市场竞争与一些公司内部治理机制之间存在着互补的关系.研究表明要缓解大股东的掏空问题,应在进一步完善公司内部治理机制的同时,更多地降低行业进入壁垒以提高行业内部竞争性.     

高危行业上市公司安全会计信息披露与董事会治理关系研究

正一、引言在现代企业的发展中,公司治理与信息披露是在相互制衡中发展的,二者成为宏观经济运行的重要组成部分。企业真实有效的披露财务信息对于信息不对称、道德风险等方面发挥重要作用,在以往的研究中可以发现,企业会计信息失真的主要原因是公司内部治理不完善,而公司治理中,董事会治理是核心,董事会有义务保障会计信息披露的质量,监管会计信息的披露。自从2006年《高危行业安全生产费用财务管理暂行办法》发行以后,学术界开始对高危行业安全信息披露进行研究,高危行业的安全生产     

产品市场竞争、竞争态势与上市公司盈余管理

本文以2000～2009年沪深A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了产品市场竞争对公司盈余管理的治理效应。研究发现,产品市场竞争度越高,公司盈余管理的程度越高;在区分盈余管理的方向后发现,产品市场竞争迫使上市公司进行正向盈余管理;在行业中处于竞争优势的公司其盈余管理程度更高,且倾向于负向盈余管理。这表明,在我国产品市场竞争存在负面治理效应,从而可能激化经理人与股东之间的代理问题。     

国有商业银行经营绩效的超产权理论分析

超产权论在产权制度改革的基础上提出了竞争和市场结构对企业治理机制改善的作用.我们把超产权理论的企业产权、竞争、治理机制与绩效相互关系模型引入国有商业银行中,建立市场竞争状态下国有商业银行产权、竞争、治理机制和绩效的理论模型.要提高国有商业银行的经营绩效,构建竞争性的银行体系是关键;竞争绩效的产生还有赖于市场的完善和市场得以有序运作的制度结构的建立与完善.     

会计市场过度竞争问题研究

竞争是市场经济的基础,是资源合理配置的有效手段。我国的会计市场竞争因其产品特性及供需关系的特殊,呈现出与一般商品市场竞争不同的特征,目前体现为过度竞争。过度竞争不仅直接损害有效市场机制的建立和公众投资人的利益,而且对行业的自身发展和市场经济秩序的建立带来负面影响。对会计市场竞争的治理就是促进过度竞争向有效竞争转化,转化过程需要法律调整和政策介入的双重作用。法律调整有待相关法规的进一步完善;政策介入以控制供给总量、调整行业结构为重点。政府监管与行业自律是抑制会计市场过度竞争的两个主要渠道,需要二者协同配…     

公司复杂性、最优董事会及其独立性选择

当前各国公司治理都实施统一的董事会治理监管,然而公司经营环境复杂,最优董事会是否是内生性的争论成为近年来公司治理关注的焦点。本文以CEO寻租空间、监督成本等构建最优董事会抉择模型,研究发现:治理成本的存在,使得CEO寻租空间对董事会规模和独立董事比例有积极影响,而监督成本对二者有负面影响;从边际治理成本角度,最优董事会与其独立性存在一定程度的替代性。我国1999～2008年上市公司实证研究发现:一定监管条规下,最优规模与独立性的替代假说成立,鉴于公司经营差异性,僵化的监管制度将提升治理成本,造成董事会效率低下。由此,建议监管机构从治理执行效果出发,考虑最优董事会的相机抉择行为,采用柔性化的监管条规,提高公司治理绩效。     

An Empirical Examination of Sponsor Influence over the Board of Directors

Investment funds have a unique organization structure in which a fund's board of directors frequently contracts the management of the fund with the fund's sponsor but has a fiduciary duty to act in the interest of the fund's shareholders with regard to decisions such as the shareholder fees charged by the sponsor to manage the fund. For a large sample of closed–end funds, my findings indicate that sponsors exert considerable influence over the board of directors through a variety of mechanisms such as the installation of a sponsor–affiliated board leader, director compensation from service on multiple boards for the sponsor, and control of the director selection process. Furthermore, my examination of closed–end premiums indicates that the market perceives that the absence of sponsor involvement in the director selection process is a credible signal that new directors are not "hand–picked" by the sponsor and that this attribute is positively priced by the market.     

Independent director incentives: Where do talented directors spend their limited time and energy?

We study reputation incentives in the director labor market and find that directors with multiple directorships distribute their effort unequally based on the directorship's relative prestige. When directors experience an exogenous increase in a directorship's relative ranking, their board attendance rate increases and subsequent firm performance improves. Also, directors are less willing to relinquish their relatively more prestigious directorships, even when firm performance declines. Finally, forced Chief Executive Officer departure sensitivity to poor performance rises when a larger fraction of independent directors view the board as relatively more prestigious. We conclude that director reputation is a powerful incentive for independent directors.     

Does independent directors’’ monitoring affect reputation? Evidence from the stock and labor markets

Using novel data on independent directors’ opinions in China, we investigate the stock and labor market effects prompted by independent directors publicly saying “no” to major board decisions. We find that the market reacts negatively to modified director opinions, but positively to firms interlocked with the directors who said “no.” We further find substantial turnover and decline in board seats after independent directors issue modified opinions. Overall, we identify a dilemma in China whereby the labor market does not reward vigilant directors for standing up to firm insiders, although investors add a premium to effective board monitoring.     

Independent directors’ board networks and controlling shareholders’ tunneling behavior

As one of the channels by which board directors build important relationships, board networks can affect the governance role of independent directors. Defining director board networks as their connections based on direct ties they establish when serving on at least one common board, this paper explores the role of the network centrality of independent directors in restraining tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders in the Chinese capital market. Our empirical evidence shows that tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders is negatively related to the network centrality of independent directors and that this relationship is stronger when non-operating fund occupation is used as the measure of tunneling. The results of our study show that board networks can help independent directors to restrain tunneling behavior by large shareholders, which plays a positive role in corporate governance.     

Are All Inside Directors the Same? Evidence from the External Directorship Market

Agency theory and optimal contracting theory posit opposing roles and shareholder wealth effects for corporate inside directors. We evaluate these theories using the market for outside directorships to differentiate among inside directors. Firms with inside directors holding outside directorships have better operating performance and market‐to‐book ratios, especially when monitoring is more difficult. These firms make better acquisition decisions, have greater cash holdings, and overstate earnings less often. Announcements of outside board appointments improve shareholder wealth, while departure announcements reduce it, consistent with these inside directors improving board performance and outside directorships being an important source of inside director incentives.     

Appointments of academic directors

We examine the outside director selection process using unique data on appointments of academic directors. Overall, we find that academic directors tend to be appointed by small- and mid-cap firms expanding their boards. However, we find important differences in both the factors influencing academic appointments and the market's reaction when allowing for firm, board, and director heterogeneities. Academics in science, medicine and engineering appear to be appointed for their expertise, and the market reacts favorably. Academic administrators appear to be appointed for their networks, and the market reacts favorably when the administrator is affiliated with a business school but negatively when the administrator is not within close geographic proximity. Business professors appear to be appointed for general expertise and reputation, but we find little evidence of any significant market reaction. The results in this paper highlight the importance of recognizing heterogeneity in understanding the director selection process and the role of outside directors.     

Does the director labor market offer ex post settling-up for CEOs? The case of acquisitions

We examine the rewards for experience and ability in the director labor market. We show that large acquisitions are associated with significantly higher numbers of subsequent board seats for the acquiring CEO, target CEO, and the directors. We also find that, in the case of acquisitions, experience is more important than ability. Both value-destroying and value-increasing acquisitions have significant and positive effects on a CEO's future prospects in the director labor market. In addition to increasing our understanding of the director labor market, these results suggest that the ex post settling-up incentives thought to exist in the director labor market are weak for acquisitions.     

Tradeoffs between Internal and External Governance: Evidence from Exogenous Regulatory Shocks

We use the 2002 NYSE and NASDAQ listing requirements mandating firms have a majority of independent directors on the board as an exogenous shock to examine the interaction between internal and external governance. Relative to compliant firms, noncompliant firms significantly reduced exposure to three external governance mechanisms: the market for corporate control, shareholder activism, and credit markets, by adding antitakeover provisions, adopting officer and director protection provisions, and reducing debt levels, respectively. The results are stronger in firms with greater exposure to the relevant external governance mechanism. The evidence suggests that firms treat internal and external governance as substitutes.     

Length of Board Tenure and Outside Director Independence

I posit and test two competing views on the significance of outside director tenure lengths; the expertise hypothesis suggesting that extended board service time is a sign of director commitment, experience, and competence and the management‐friendliness hypothesis suggesting that extended board service time marks directors who befriend management at the expense of shareholders. I find evidence that Senior directors, defined as directors with twenty or more years of board service, are almost twice as likely to occupy a 'management‐affiliated' profession compared to the rest, and that they are also more likely to staff the firm's nominating and compensation committees. Senior director participation in the compensation committee is associated with higher pay for the CEO, especially when the CEO is more powerful in the firm. These results are consistent with the management‐friendliness hypothesis, and highlight a need for setting term limits for directors.