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1.
作为一种能够降低银行经营管理成本、提高工作效率、分散和转嫁风险的新兴事务,银行业务外包正在被越来越多的国内商业银行所重视。但银行在将业务外包的过程中,也存在着诸如法律、合同、操作、声誉等各方面的风险。本文分析了银行业务外包的好处和存在的风险,指出了外包管理应坚持的原则,并针对外包业务存在的风险,从外包服务商的选择、完善外包合同、加强业务培训、建立应急机制、完善法律制度等方面提出了针对性的措施和建议。  相似文献   

2.
在政府体制改革中,非常重要的一个方面就是构建高效的服务型政府,这样就需要借助公共服务外包的力量.本文以公共服务外包风险为研究对象,在明确风险涵义的基础上,结合交易成本理论信息经济学理论对风险的各个方面进行分析,并提出如何有效的风险管理对策,以提升公共服务的质量.  相似文献   

3.
公共服务外包中委托代理关系链〖〗面临的风险及其防范   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
公共产品和服务供给领域引入市场机制,实行公共服务的安排与直接生产的分离,成为当前世界各国包括我国政府改革的重要方式之一。但公共服务外包委托代理过程中存在着信息不对称、利益不对称、契约不完全、委托代理链长、公众委托人身份不明确和政府双重身份等缺陷,导致公共服务外包过程中的三个参与主体:政府、公众和企业(或第三部门)各自都存在一系列委托代理风险。对此,可以通过完善相关的代理人选择机制、激励机制和监督约束机制来来解决公共服务外包中的风险问题。  相似文献   

4.
马伟  董晔 《中国税务》2014,(3):60-60
20世纪70年代末以来,随着新公共管理运动在全球范围内的蓬勃兴起以及政府公共服务供给机制改革的日益深化,政府公共服务外包被广泛采用,越来越多的发达国家将公共服务以合同的形式外包给私营部门,以期提高公共服务的质量,控制政府规模,减少开支,增加公众的满意度。英国早在19世纪初就存在公共服务由私人部门承包的情况,涉及监狱管理、税收征缴、道路维护等。  相似文献   

5.
本文从风险的角度对IT外包审计进行了研究。通过对IT外包过程中存在风险的分析,将其分为立项阶段、合同签订、IT外包实施和IT交付与验收等风险类别。在对各风险事项进行风险评估的基础上,根据风险量化指标和分析等级,选择审计重点,确定审计方法,进行IT外包审计,促进IT外包风险管控,降低IT外包风险。  相似文献   

6.
张雪冬 《南方金融》2012,(12):55-58,54
本文分析了银行业服务外包业务的系统失控风险、战略风险、获得信息风险、退出策略风险、对手风险、信誉风险、信息安全风险、操作风险和合同风险,借鉴美国银行业服务外包监管体系的运作经验,从监管法规和监管标准、业务范围、管理责任、银行告知义务、内控机制监管、外包服务商选择标准、外包审计、信息安全、合同规范等方面提出加强我国银行业服务外包监管的对策建议。  相似文献   

7.
本文从风险的角度对IT外包审计进行了研究。通过对IT外包过程中存在风险的分析.将其分为立项阶段、合同签订、IT外包实施和IT交付与验收等风险类别。在对各风险事项进行风险评估的基础上.根据风险量化指标和分析等级,选择审计重点,确定审计方法.进行IT外包审计,促进IT外包风险管控,降低IT外包风险。  相似文献   

8.
金融服务外包的风险控制及其监管研究   总被引:11,自引:0,他引:11  
金融服务外包是金融领域的新兴业务,从国际范围看,金融服务外包行业正处于行业生命周期的高速成长期,尤其是近年来发展迅猛;目前我国金融业务外包已经开始起步并呈现不断发展的趋势。金融服务外包有利于强化金融机构的核心竞争力、规避经营风险和降低经营成本;但也会带来外包失败、成本增加、收益分配的不确定性、战略泄漏等风险。金融机构自身要加强内部控制防范风险,金融监管部门也应加强监管,要合理限定金融服务外包的范围、规范监管机构的权限与监管程序、规范金融机构选择外包商的基本程序和机制、要求金融机构和外包商建立应急机制,并适度从严监管跨国金融服务外包。  相似文献   

9.
金融服务外包是金融领域的新兴业务,从国际范围看,金融服务外包行业正处于行业生命周期的高速成长期,尤其是近年来发展迅猛;目前我国金融业务外包已经开始起步并呈现不断发展的趋势。金融服务外包有利于强化金融机构的核心竞争力、规避经营风险和降低经营成本;但也会带来外包失败、成本增加、收益分配的不确定性、战略泄漏等风险。金融机构自身要加强内部控制防范风险,金融监管部门也应加强监管,要合理限定金融服务外包的范围、规范监管机构的权限与监管程序、规范金融机构选择外包商的基本程序和机制、要求金融机构和外包商建立应急机制,并适度从严监管跨国金融服务外包。  相似文献   

10.
周海霞 《中国外资》2008,(9):139-140
交易费用的产生是由于信息的不对称、有限理性、机会主义等因素造成的。通过签订长期的合同,可以减少在市场上寻找合作伙伴、谈判等费用,有效降低交易费用。物流外包可以有效节约交易成本,是节约交易费用的一种制度安排。  相似文献   

11.
Drawing on transaction cost economics and institutional theory we argue that the effects of institutional constraints on the transaction costs of outsourcing vary systematically with the type of service outsourced and the ownership structure of the outsourcing firm. Using data from hospitals, we demonstrate that these effects lead to a higher extent of outsourcing of nonclinical compared to clinical services, and larger outsourcing response of nonclinical services to cost pressures from managed care. Further, the effects of ownership structure and associated governance mechanisms on institutional constraints are reflected in the empirical results as cross‐sectional variations in the extent to which outsourcing is invoked as a response to cost pressures by hospitals of different ownership.  相似文献   

12.
This paper analyzes how capital structure and product market competition affect the firms’ strategic choice between outsourcing with long term contracts and outsourcing to the spot market. When outsourcing to the spot market firms are exposed to price uncertainty, whereas a long term contract allows them to set in advance the outsourcing price. We show that, to the extent that leverage and uncertainty can lead to financial distress costs in bad states of nature, firms may use long term contracts as a risk management device to hedge input price uncertainty. With a monopoly in the final product market, the outsourcing decision involves a trade-off between a positive convexity effect of input price uncertainty under the spot regime and the option to avoid financial distress costs under the long term contract regime. Moreover, product market competition among buyers can lead to an increase in financial distress costs not only for firms outsourcing to the spot market but also for firms outsourcing with a long term contract. We examine the monopolist’s outsourcing decision and derive the equilibrium for an oligopoly, and show that the equilibrium depends on the magnitude of these costs and on the level of efficiency of the supplier.  相似文献   

13.
The accounting literature has argued that firms overengage in outsourcing because they tend to ignore the transaction costs involved in buying services from external suppliers. A field experiment with managers of health care organizations shows that decision makers are actually quite sensitive to the asset specificity associated with the “buy” option in an outsourcing decision. However, they also appear inappropriately sensitive to the sunk costs inherent in most real-life outsourcing decisions, and may actually underengage in outsourcing. Prior commitment to internal procurement systematically reduced the willingness to outsource, relative to a pure “make or buy” scenario.  相似文献   

14.
We apply transaction cost economics to identify factors influencing companies’ decision to internally generate or outsource risk management services. A unique sample is used which combines publicly available data with private information supplied by 281 Australian listed companies. We find that expenditure on research and development, greater technological uncertainty, more competitive environments, more overseas sales and transaction frequency are associated with less outsourcing of risk management services. Uncertainty due to environmental diversity is associated with more outsourcing of risk management services. Companies that outsource risk management services also have lower staff turnover and provide more specialised training and longer contracts for risk management suppliers.  相似文献   

15.
The first U.S. public‐private partnerships, or P3s as they are now called, began over 200 years ago. These contractual arrangements between government entities and private companies for the delivery of services or facilities have long been used for water/wastewater, transportation, urban development, and the provision of social services. And the use of such partnerships is increasing because they provide an effective means for meeting public needs, maintaining a high level of public control, improving the quality of services, and increasing the cost‐effectiveness of traditional delivery methods. Although outsourcing of public services is sometimes used to accomplish many of the same goals, P3s are likely to be a solution when public funds are not available and when:
  • ? Capital is required to upgrade the infrastructure and so achieve a lower cost, or higher quality, of services.
  • ? The contract horizon in the P3 transaction is sufficiently long for the investor/operation to recoup investment dollars and a rate of return.
  • ? City residents make payments for the service provided, creating the revenue stream for private profits.
  • ? The private partner in the P3 has a low cost of capital, often attributable largely to a large and sophisticated balance sheet.
This article uses examples of several recent P3 contracts to illustrate their role in shifting risk and increasing collaboration between the public and private sectors.  相似文献   

16.
Two risk‐averse litigants with different subjective beliefs negotiate in the shadow of a pending trial. Through contingent contracts, the litigants can mitigate risk and/or speculate on the trial outcome. Contingent contracting decreases the settlement rate and increases the volume and costs of litigation. These contingent contracts mimic the services provided by third‐party investors, including litigation funders and insurance companies. The litigants (weakly) prefer to contract with risk‐neutral third parties when the capital market is transaction‐cost free. However, contracting with third parties further decreases the settlement rate, increases the costs of litigation, and may increase the aggregate cost of risk bearing.  相似文献   

17.
This paper revisits evidence on the correlates of sourcing decisions in the US auto industry to see whether adoption of new contracting terms and early involvement of suppliers in design activities (e.g. “relational contracting”) yields different results as compared to previous findings. Previous studies find that US auto firms insource complex parts that require investments in specific assets. Absent large differences in production costs, the results suggest that transactions costs associated with external suppliers exceed transactions costs associated with internal suppliers (e.g. loss of high powered incentives). Using data on 156 sourcing decisions for process tooling (dies) of a new car program we find that under the new relational contracting regime, transaction cost theory continues to have explanatory power for sourcing decisions; however, attributes that favored insourcing in previous studies favor outsourcing in this setting. Moreover, more complex subassemblies are associated with fewer distinct suppliers than expected — evidence of a tendency to co-locate decision rights to reduce transactions costs related to system interactions. After controlling for transaction characteristics that are associated with the sourcing decision, we find no evidence that outsourcing is associated with increased ex post opportunism by the firm (e.g. agreement about contract completion); however, outsourced parts are submitted by suppliers for evaluation significantly later than insourced parts (e.g. delivery holdup).  相似文献   

18.
This article aims to develop a model for analysing the operation and outcomes of the contracting process as it applies to public services, and to explore the politics of transaction costs involved in this process using a case study of Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) in the UK. For this purpose the article deals with the policy outputs from two time periods, 1991 and 1994, which are regarded as the most dynamic years in terms of CCT policy implementation. The article also demonstrates how transaction costs may be manipulated in the contracting process by the interested parties. Finally, it suggests that the politics of transaction costs should be studied systematically in the future.  相似文献   

19.
交易费用、政府边界与财政体制改革   总被引:9,自引:0,他引:9  
将新制度经济学中的交易费用理论引入政府供给公共产品的分析,给出了政府供给公共产品的边界的理论模型。我国政府在供给公共产品过程中发生的交易费用:决策费用、实施费用和监督费用过高,制约了我国政府供给公共产品的效率。制度的一项重要功能是降低交易成本,改革财政分权体制是降低政府供给公共产品发生的交易费用的有效途径。  相似文献   

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