Sample Selection Approaches to Estimating House Price Cash Differentials

We extend the literature on house price cash differentials in important ways. First, our paper is the first to employ methods to correct for sample selection bias, using both switching regression and propensity score matching of cash vs. non-cash transactions. We use selection models to produce price counterfactuals for cash and noncash buyers. We also include both average treatment effect and a propensity score weighted selection models. From the selection models, we find that previous studies likely overstate the cash discount. Results from counterfactual tests examining cash discounts suggest amplified cash discounts in areas with close proximity to an environmental hazard; and also a pricing differential based on CBG level income, with purchasers in high income areas more likely to pay a cash premium compared to market participants in areas with comparably lower income, where a cash discount is detected. These results provide useful insights for market participants including real estate appraisers, brokers, and buyers and sellers of real estate.     

Buyers' and sellers' agents in the housing market

We explain why buyers in the housing market use an agent employed by the seller. Such agents reduce buyers' search costs so that more buyers search a particular house. This increases the probability of the sale of the house and possibly also its selling price. However, since the selling price increases, if at all, by less than the fee paid by the seller to the agent, both buyers and sellers are better off. We identify two characteristics that give rise to sellers' agents and show that markets that do not have such agents are missing at least one of these characteristics.     

Overnight block trades in the Korean stock market

We examine the characteristics of overnight block trades in the Korean stock market from 2004 to 2015. We find that the discount on the offering price is negatively related to the number and return volatility of shares, the offering price is higher for firm-commitment contracts than for best-effort contracts, the discount level is lower for larger deal values under best-effort contracts, commission fee rates and fees are more pronounced under firm-commitment contracts, and a deal's uncertainty is related to the firm's contract choice. The incentives of sellers and investment banks are aligned unless sellers face an informational disadvantage.     

Search Costs,Behavioral Biases,and Information Intermediary Effects

In many markets, buyers, sellers, and their agents have differential information about the quality of heterogeneous assets. We study negotiated transaction prices in the commercial real estate market, which is characterized by heterogeneous assets, illiquidity, and highly segmented local markets, all of which increase the importance of asymmetric information in negotiated pricing outcomes. Using 114,588 industrial, multi-family and office sale transactions that occurred during 1997–2011, we document that distant commercial real estate buyers pay, on average, premiums of 4 % to 15 % relative to local buyers, controlling for individual property characteristics as well as time fixed-effects. We also examine the extent to which the sources of these observed premiums are a product of higher search costs/information asymmetry problems associated with distance (search cost channel) or a result of reference-dependence preference/anchoring based on the price levels in the investors’ local market (behavioral biases channel). Our results suggest the observed price premiums are explained by distant investors who face higher search costs and are at an information disadvantage compared to investors located in closer proximity to the property. In contrast, anchoring plays a more muted role in explaining observed premiums. The use of an intermediary (broker) increases, on average, the acquisition prices of buyers and decreases the disposition prices of sellers by 3 % to 8 %. This result is consistent with the incentive real estate agents have to convince sellers to dispose of their properties too quickly and to convince buyers to search less and therefore pay higher prices.     

Optimal Portfolio Choices, House Risk Hedging and the Pricing of Forward House Transactions

This paper develops a utility indifference model for evaluating various prices associated with forward transactions in the housing market, based on the equivalent principle of expected wealth utility derived from the forward and spot real estate markets. Our model results show that forward transactions in the housing market are probably not due to house sellers?? and buyers?? heterogeneity, but to their demand for hedging against house price risk. When the imperfections of real estate markets and the risk preferences of market participants are taken into consideration, we are able to show that the idiosyncratic risk premium, which mainly depends on the participants?? risk preferences and the correlation between the traded asset and the real estate, is a remarkable determinant of house sellers?? and buyers?? forward reservation prices. In addition, we also find that the market clearing forward price usually will not converge toward the expected risk-neutral forward price. The sellers?? or buyers?? risk aversion degrees and market powers are also identified to play crucial roles in determining the clearing forward price.     

Determinants of bid and ask quotes and implications for the cost of trading

Financial transaction costs are time varying. This paper proposes a model that relates transaction cost to characteristics of order flow. We obtain qualitatively consistent model results for different stocks and across different time periods. We find that an unusual excess of buyers (sellers) relative to sellers (buyers) tends to increase the ask (bid) price. Hence, the ask and bid components of spread change asymmetrically about the efficient price. For a fixed order imbalance surprise these effects are muted when unanticipated total volume is high. Unexpected high volatility in the transaction price process tends to widen the spread symmetrically about the efficient price. Our findings are consistent with predications from market microstructure theory that the cost of market making should depend on both the risk of trading with better-informed traders and inventory risk. We also find that order flow surprises have a significant impact on the efficient price and can also explain a substantial amount of persistence in the volatility of the efficient price. This dependence does not violate the efficient market hypothesis since the surprises, by definition, are not predictable.     

Pricing and commitment by two‐sided platforms

I study pricing and commitment by platforms in two‐sided markets with the following characteristics: (i) platforms are essential bottleneck inputs for buyers and sellers transacting with each other; (ii) sellers arrive before buyers; and (iii) platforms can charge both fixed fees and variable fees (royalties). I show that a monopoly platform may prefer not to commit to the price it will charge buyers at the same time it announces its seller price if it faces unfavorable seller expectations. With competing platforms, commitment makes the existence of an exclusive equilibrium (in which sellers register with only one platform) less likely, but it has no impact on multi‐homing equilibria (in which sellers support both platforms) whenever these exist.     

Inflation and Welfare in Retail Markets: Prior Production and Imperfectly Directed Search

This paper considers the effect of monetary policy and inflation on retail markets: goods are dated and produced prior to being retailed; buyers direct their search on price and general quality; buyers’ match‐specific tastes are private information. Sellers set the same price for all buyers, some of whom do not value the good highly enough to buy it. The market economy is typically inefficient as a social planner would have the good consumed. Under free entry of sellers, the Friedman rule is optimal policy. When the upper bound on the number of participating sellers binds, moderate levels of inflation can be welfare improving.     

Conflicts of interest,information provision,and competition in the financial services industry

In some markets sellers have better information than buyers over which products best serve a buyer's needs. Depending on the market structure, this may lead to conflicts of interest in the provision of information by sellers. This paper studies this issue in the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, where price competition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We also compare conflicts of interest in two different firm structures, specialized banking and one-stop banking.     

Information, Search, and House Prices: Revisited

Buyers pay different prices for nearly identical homes. One explanation for this is that housing markets are thin, resulting in price bargaining between sellers and buyers. If the relative bargaining power of buyers varies, so will sales prices. One hypothesis is that the relative bargaining strength of buyers coming from outside the local market relative to that of local residents is weak, because distant buyers have high search costs and may know less about the nuances of the local market. Our results, based upon a large number of single-family home transactions from the state of Florida, lend support to this hypothesis. Another related hypothesis is that buyers?? price expectations are anchored to prices they were accustomed to at their previous residence. Hence, if they come from high price markets they will tend to pay more for their new home. This hypothesis is also supported by our results.     

Days on market and home sales

In 2006, Massachusetts adopted a new policy that prohibits home sellers from resetting their properties’ days on market through relisting. Massachusetts homes exposed to the policy change experienced a $16,000 reduction in sale price relative to Rhode Island homes. Slow‐moving homes suffered a greater reduction, but newer listings only had a small increase in sale price. One reason is that some buyers were unaware of sellers’ manipulation of days on market and thus unable to recognize authentically new listings. Sellers reacted to the new policy by cutting listing prices, although in towns where listing price history was transparent, sellers raised listing prices to dampen the stigma of slow sales.     

REINTERPRETATION OF THE SHAREHOLDER GAINS IN SELLOFF TRANSACTIONS

This paper examines the overall wealth effects of selloffs. When sellers and buyers are examined separately, abnormal returns are found around the announcement days. However, a combination of matched-pair buyers and sellers in value-weighted portfolios wipes out these gains. In a sample of 182 selloff portfolios, 93 of them experience positive returns while the remaining 89 cases face negative price reactions. These results cast doubt on the conclusion that selloff activity is generally synergistic. In addition, a large size difference is found between buyers and sellers. Large buyers win more often than small buyers. Small sellers win more often than large sellers. Our results show that when examining selloffs for synergy equally-weighted results can be biased.     

Endogenous housing market cycles

Housing markets tend to display positive serial correlation as well as considerable volatility over time. We present a heterogeneous agent model illustrating the connection between adaptive expectations and housing market fluctuations. A dwelling serves as a shelter, as a vehicle for investment and as mortgage collateral. Interesting dynamics arise as the valuation of these three properties changes over time through the interaction of buyers, sellers and mortgagees. In the absence of credit constraints imposed by mortgagees, house prices oscillate mildly around the equilibrium price. However, credit constraints imposed by mortgagees can affect market dynamics quite dramatically with periods of mild oscillations interrupted by violent collapses. This chaotic behavior arises even though buyers, sellers and mortgagees agree on market forecasts.     

The Impact of Hurricane Mitigation Features and Inspection Information on House Prices

This paper examines the effect of hurricane mitigation features and their verification on the transaction prices of single-family homes. Some of these features are obvious to buyers and sellers (visible) and others are not easily observed (hidden). Prior research on the relationship between mitigation features and house prices has implicitly assumed the features are known and that buyers and sellers are equally informed. This paper contributes to the literature by examining the potentially different effects of the visible and hidden features, and the verification of each by professional inspection, on prices in an environment of incomplete and asymmetric buyer-seller information. Generally, findings are consistent with expectations – that visible mitigation features are positively correlated with price increases; that the effects of the visible and hidden features on price differ significantly; and that inspection information significantly increases the implicit price of hidden features. Interestingly, the inspection is found to also increase the implicit price of the set of visible features, suggesting the implicit prices of characteristics that are, or should be, visible to buyers and sellers may be affected by verification or disclosure.     

Housing Price Dispersion: An Empirical Investigation

The efficiency of a market is challenged when price dispersion occurs. Previous studies focused on non-durable consumption goods. This study extends the analysis to the case of residential property, whose transactions are dominated by a second-hand market with many potential buyers and sellers. We demonstrate that housing price dispersion exists, and the degree of dispersion changes systematically with some macroeconomic factors, though the second and the third moment of the price distribution react differently to the macroeconomic variables. Some directions for future research are suggested.     

Quote setting and price formation in an order driven market

This paper models quote setting and price formation in a non-intermediated, order driven market where trading occurs because investors differ in their share valuations and the advent of news that is not common knowledge, and tests the model using transaction data on individual stocks in the ParisBourse CAC40 index. As an extension of Foucault (1999), we show that the size of the spread is a function of the differences in valuation among investors and of adverse selection. Both GMM estimation of the model parameters and empirical evidence on spread behavior as the relative proportion of buyers and sellers in the market changes, provide strong support for the model. Our analysis yields further insight into the dynamic process of price formation and into the market clearing process in an order driven market.     

Reputation and adverse selection: theory and evidence from eBay

How can a marketplace introduce mechanisms to overcome inefficiencies caused by adverse selection? In this article, I use a unique data set that follows eBay sellers to show that reputation is a major determinant of price variations. I develop a model of sellers' dynamic behavior where sellers have heterogeneous qualities unobservable by buyers. Using reputation as a signal of quality, I structurally estimate the model to uncover buyers' utility and sellers' costs and underlying qualities. I show that removing the reputation mechanism increases low‐quality sellers' market share, lowers prices, and consequently reduces sellers' profit by 66% and consumer surplus by 35%.     

Pricing forward contracts in power markets by the certainty equivalence principle: Explaining the sign of the market risk premium

In this paper we provide a framework that explains how the market risk premium, defined as the difference between forward prices and spot forecasts, depends on the risk preferences of market players and the interaction between buyers and sellers. In commodities markets this premium is an important indicator of the behavior of buyers and sellers and their views on the market spanning between short-term and long-term horizons. We show that under certain assumptions it is possible to derive explicit solutions that link levels of risk aversion and market power with market prices of risk and the market risk premium. We apply our model to the German electricity market and show that the market risk premium exhibits a term structure which can be explained by the combination of two factors. Firstly, the levels of risk aversion of buyers and sellers, and secondly, how the market power of producers, relative to that of buyers, affects forward prices with different delivery periods.     

Demand–supply imbalances in the credit default swap market: empirical evidence

This paper empirically examines demand–supply imbalances in the credit default swap (CDS) market and provides evidence of its effect on the CDS spread dynamics. Analysis is conducted on a large and homogenous data set of the 92 non-financial European companies with the most quoted Euro-denominated CDS contracts during the 2002–2008 period. Main findings indicate that short-term CDS price movements, not related to fundamentals, are positively affected by demand–supply imbalances when protection buyers outstrip protection sellers. Results illustrate that CDS spreads reflect not only the price of credit protection, but also a liquidity premium for the anticipated cost of unwinding the position of protection sellers, especially during stress periods.     

Investor behaviour and reaching for yield: Evidence from the sterling corporate bond market

We provide evidence on how corporate bond investors react to a change in yields, and how this behaviour differs in times of market‐wide stress. We also investigate ‘reaching for yield’ across investor types, as well as providing insights into the structure of the corporate bond market. Using proprietary sterling corporate bond transaction data, we show that insurance companies, hedge funds and asset managers are typically net buyers when corporate bond yields rise. Dealer banks clear the market by being net sellers. However, we find evidence for this behaviour reversing in times of stress for some investors. During the 2013 ‘taper tantrum’, asset managers were net sellers of corporate bonds in response to a sharp rise in yields, potentially amplifying price changes. At the same time, dealer banks were net buyers. Finally, we provide evidence that insurers, hedge funds and asset managers tilt their portfolios towards higher risk bonds, consistent with ‘reaching for yield’ behaviour.