Forced retirement risk and portfolio choice

Current literature on the effect of labor income on portfolio choice overlooks that workers face a risk of being forced to retire before their planned retirement age. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, this paper finds that the forced retirement risk is both significant and highly correlated with stock market fluctuations. Using a life-cycle portfolio choice model, this paper shows that forced retirement risk makes labor income near retirement stock-like. Therefore, contrary to conventional wisdom, those who are still working but near retirement should have a lower share of risky assets in their financial portfolios than retirees do.     

Retirement and Social Security in a Probabilistic Voting Model

Why are social security transfers associated with retirement rules? This paper focuses on the political interactions between retirement and social security. Using a probabilistic voting approach, it analyzes why old people are induced to retire in order to receive pension transfers from the young. A crucial hypothesis is that leisure in old age represents a “merit good,” which is positively valued by all agents in the society, young and old. Thus, the politicians choose to tax the labor income of the old, to induce them to retire. Retirement increases the level of ideological homogeneity of the old. In fact, once retired, the elderly are more “single-minded,” since they only care about redistributive issues, such as pensions. This increase in their political power allows them to win the political game and to receive a positive transfer from the young (social security).     

我国职工退休年龄影响因素的实证研究

当前我国劳动力逐渐短缺,职工退休年龄直接关系到我国劳动力供给的数量和结构。使用2011年在广东省21个地市的问卷调查数据,研究影响职工退休年龄问题的影响因素。实证研究表明,工资、工龄对职工退休年龄的影响显著为正。养老金对男职工退休年龄的影响显著为负。机关事业单位职工的退休年龄更晚。教育年限对女职工的影响显著为正。已婚、...     

Wages,productivity, and retirement

Pensions, both state provided and privately provided, affect incentives to retire. But private pensions are part of the long term compensation package, and altering pensions not only affects retirement incentives, but also wages. A key factor in determining whether retirement occurs at the appropriate age is the relation of productivity to alternatives. When wages, coupled with public and private pension accrual, deviate from worker productivity, private retirement incentives are distorted. Sometimes this results in too much early retirement, creating fiscal difficulties. Sometimes, it results in a desire for delayed retirement, which argues for mandatory retirement rules. Pay compression, where wages do not vary across individuals as much as productivity, exacerbate distortions. Defined benefit pension plans tend to create incentives to retire after a certain number of years of work. Defined contribution plans do not have this feature. Public plans should be designed noting their interaction with incentives that are already inherent in the private wage and pension schemes.     

EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECT OF TAXES ON FIRMS' DECISIONS TO RETIRE DEBT EARLY

We examine the effect of marginal tax rates on the decision to retire debt early. Other factors that have been linked to the debt retirement decision are also investigated, including leverage adjustment and the value associated with the immediate recognition of a loss for tax purposes on early retirement. Results indicate that firms that retire debt early have lower marginal tax rates than firms that do not retire debt early. This finding is consistent with the proposition that firms are motivated to retire debt early by an incentive to reduce tax shields that cannot be used efficiently. Further, firms that retire debt early are more highly leveraged than firms that do not retire debt early. Evidence also suggests that some firms retire debt early at a loss to reduce currently taxable income.     

Making Federal Pension Policy Work

Abstract

Millions of Americans retire while they are still productive. Of these, many will have the resources to enjoy all of their golden years. Unfortunately, many others will face economic hardships after they have exhausted their own resources but have become too frail to return to work. Part of the problem is that the current pension system is fraught with financial incentives that push ablebodied elderly workers into retirement just when they should instead be encouraged to remain in the workforce to accumulate additional retirement assets. This paper recommends a number of ways to change federal pension laws in order to encourage elderly workers to remain in the workforce. For example, this paper recommends toughening the penalty on premature distributions, repealing the minimum distribution rules, and repealing the exceptions to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act that permit retirement plans to provide early retirement incentives and subsidies.

This paper also considers whether the government should require that all retirement plans be neutral as to the timing of retirement. In an age-neutral world, workers would always accrue more benefits if they kept working. Consequently, more workers would remain in the workforce, accumulating additional assets for their eventual retirement.

Finally, this paper also considers how federal pension policy could help counteract the tendency of Americans to retire too early because they underestimate their life expectancies, overestimate their financial resources, and fail to understand the deleterious effects of inflation. In particular, this paper recommends that the government require that virtually all retirement plans pay at least a portion of their benefits in the form of an inflation-adjusted annuity.     

At What Age Do You Expect to Retire? Retirement Expectations and Increases in the Statutory Retirement Age

We analyse the extent to which an increase in the statutory retirement age affects individuals' retirement expectations. Understanding how individuals adjust their expectations is crucial to the evaluation of this policy, since retirement expectations directly affect other important decisions such as labour supply, engagement in (further) education and, of course, savings and investments. We consider the 2007 German pension reform that legislated an increase in the statutory retirement age from 65 years to 67. Our analysis is based on a longitudinal study that directly asks respondents at what age they expect to retire. Using a difference‐in‐differences approach, we look at the changes in subjective retirement expectations over time and estimate the extent to which they can be attributed to the 2007 reform. We find that the reform shifted the retirement expectations of the younger cohorts, although there is some heterogeneity in the way individuals adjusted. While there are no significant differences between men and women, lower‐educated individuals failed to revise their expectations. As these individuals usually acquire both lower pension claims and lower private savings, the fact that they have been slower in updating their retirement expectations causes concern regarding their income security after retirement.     

The Displacement Effect of Public Pensions on the Accumulation of Financial Assets*

The generosity of public pensions may depress private savings and provide incentives to retire early. While there is plenty of evidence supporting the latter effect, there remains considerable controversy over whether public pensions crowd out private savings. This paper uses international micro‐data sets collected over recent years to investigate whether public pensions displace private savings. The identification strategy relies not only on cross‐country differences in generosity but also on differences in the progressivity or non‐linearity of pension formulas across countries. We estimate that an extra dollar of pension wealth depresses accumulated financial assets around the time of retirement by 22 cents. An extra 10,000 dollars in public pension wealth reduces the average retirement age by roughly one month, which implies an elasticity of years of retirement with respect to pension wealth of 0.15.     

University-Provided Retirement Planning Support and Retiree Financial Satisfaction During Retirement: Differences by Gender, Job Classification, and Planning Behavior

Sound financial planning and financial advice is necessary to achieve retirement income adequacy. The shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pension plans and the recent bankruptcy of Enron Corporation underscore the importance of managing retirement accumulation and liquidation risks. This study analyzes the effectiveness and adequacy of institutional-provided information and advice on employees' retirement planning decisions and their satisfaction with financial resources during retirement. Results suggest that retirement planning should begin earlier in an employee's career and that employer-provided retirement information and advice is a highly valued service. Gender, planning practices, job classification, and age are all significant predictors of satisfaction with financial resources during retirement. Targeting women and union employees with retirement information and advice that focuses on allocating contributions using a balanced portfolio approach should result in significant increases in satisfaction with financial resources during retirement. Regulatory objectives should focus on reducing retirement accumulation and liquidation risks, improving the delivery of professional financial advice to plan participants, and expanding qualified retirement plan choice for all labor force participants. To encourage employer participation in employee retirement planning, employers acting in "good faith" should be federally protected from liability for providing retirement planning information and advice to employees.     

How Behavioral Finance Can Inform Retirement Plan Design1

Several key lessons for pension design have emerged in the last decade from behavioral economics and finance research. This article analyzes the insights from this literature on how workers decide to save, manage their retirement investments, and draw down their assets in retirement. The aim is to understand how workers and retirees deviate from the rational, well‐informed agents that underpin economic theory, public policy, and often retirement plan design. The evidence suggests that many people save too little, others make poor investment decisions, and still others spend their accumulated assets too quickly in retirement. The “behavioral” reasons for such tendencies include overconfidence, limited self‐control, the overvaluation of the present at the expense of the future, susceptibility to “framing,” and an aversion to realizing losses. By shedding light on why people fail to achieve an ideal outcome on their own, this literature offers practical guidance to plan sponsors and policymakers who must design, regulate, and evaluate the institutions that help provide for economic security in old age. More specifically, the literature suggests that the plan design should be made automatic for the many individuals unwilling to exercise full control over their retirement savings choices. Recommended design features include automatic enrollment, scheduled annual savings increases, and default investment options or managed account programs that represent optimal portfolio choices.     

Demographic change, social security systems, and savings

In theory, improvements in healthy life expectancy should generate increases in the average age of retirement, with little effect on savings rates. In many countries, however, retirement incentives in social security programs prevent retirement ages from keeping pace with changes in life expectancy, leading to an increased need for life-cycle savings. Analyzing a cross-country panel of macroeconomic data, we find that increased longevity raises aggregate savings rates in countries with universal pension coverage and retirement incentives, though the effect disappears in countries with pay-as-you-go systems and high replacement rates.     

Gradual Retirement: An Additional Option in Work and Retirement

Abstract

Aging of the population raises many questions and issues for individuals, families, and society: economic, political, social, psychological, medical, ethical, moral, religious, and legal, all of which bear on the quality of life in its many dimensions. Economic security in old age is one rubric under which many of the problems and their possible solutions may be discussed. How a society arranges for its members to work and retire is an important facet in the provision for old-age economic security.

This article is concerned with the implications of demographic and labor force changes for work and retirement. It discusses the role of gradual (or phased) retirement in introducing flexibility into the range of choices between work and retirement.

Section 1 explains the rationale for gradual retirement. Section 2 spells out the barriers to implementing gradual retirement programs, including legal barriers and barriers relating to pension plan objectives. Section 3 discusses some possible solutions for implementing gradual retirement programs. Section 4 describes some selected examples of gradual retirement programs, and Section 5 contains concluding remarks.     

Pay me now (and later): Pension benefit manipulation before plan freezes and executive retirement

Large US firms modify top executives’ compensation before pension-related events. Top executives receive one-time increases in pensionable earnings through higher annual bonuses one year before a plan freeze and one year before retirement. Firms also boost pension payouts by lowering plan discount rates when top executives are eligible to retire with lump-sum benefit distributions. Increases in executive pensions do not appear to be an attempt to improve managerial effort or retention and are more likely to occur at firms with poor corporate governance. These findings suggest that in some circumstances managers are able to extract rents through their pension plans.     

Will we outlive our money?

Fewer and fewer Americans retire with benefits in the form of life annuities. The author raises key issues regarding the increased importance that uncertainty plays in determining retirement income. The key issues include longevity risk and how savings withdrawals rates will be affected at varying rates of return.     

Issues for Implementing Phased Retirement in Defined Benefit Plans

Abstract

U.S. society is aging. The nature of work has changed from work that requires physical strength to work based on knowledge. As a result, workers are beginning to phase into retirement rather than going directly from full-time work to full retirement. From a retirement income perspective, many final-average-pay defined benefit plans have features that make phased retirement difficult at best and detrimental at worst. U.S. pension law and regulations present barriers to phased retirement if the phased retiree wants to receive a portion of available pension benefits during phased retirement.

This paper examines private sector options to encourage phased retirement and to eliminate the disincentives that currently affect defined benefit plans. It offers alternative calculations of final average pay that do not penalize the part-time worker. It also demonstrates that the plan’s early retirement reduction and late retirement increase can be set to maintain actuarial equity throughout phased retirement. The paper presents benefit calculations with equal actuarial values for various payout patterns.

The paper discusses the coordination between phased retirement and subsidized early retirement. Finally, the paper notes some of the changes in ERISA that will be needed to facilitate phased retirement in defined benefit plans, especially for participants who want to receive pension distributions while working part time.     

Voting on Pensions with Endogenous Retirement Age

It is often argued that the observed trend towards early retirement is due mainly to the implicit tax imposed on continued activity of elderly workers. We study the relevance of such a distortion in a political economy model with endogenous age of retirement. The setting is a two-period overlapping generations model. Individuals differ in their productivity. In the first period they work a fixed amount of time; in the second, they choose when to retire and then receive a flat rate pension benefit. Pensions are financed by a payroll tax on earnings in the first and in the second period of life. Such a tax is non distortionary in the first period; it is distortionary in the second period. We allow for some rebating of the second period tax. Individuals vote on the level of the payroll tax given the rebate which can range from 0 (biased system) to 100% (neutral system). We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a voting equilibrium and study its properties. Under these conditions, high tax rates are supported by all the old and by low productivity young individuals. We show that the pivotal voter is a young individual. The number of young individuals who have higher wage than the pivotal voter equals half the total population. We also show that the introduction of a bias increases the political support for the pension system. Finally, we study the simultaneous determination of the bias and the tax rate through a voting procedure and show that the equilibrium (if any) implies a bias which is always positive and may or not be larger than one.     

It's time to retire. Retirement

Companies have been so focused on down-sizing to contain costs that they've largely neglected a looming threat to their competitiveness: a severe shortage of talented workers. The general population is aging and with it, the labor pool. People are living longer, healthier lives, and the birthrate is at a historical low. During the next 15 years, 80% of the native-born workforce growth in North America--and even more in much of Western Europe--is going to be in the over-50 age cohort. When these mature workers begin to retire, there won't be nearly enough young people entering the workforce to compensate. The Bureau of Labor Statistics projects a shortfall of 10 million workers in the United States in 2010, and in countries where the birthrate is well below the population replacement level (particularly in Western Europe), the shortage will hit sooner, be more severe, and remain chronic. The problem won't just be a lack of bodies. Skills, knowledge, experience, and relationships walk out the door every time somebody retires--and they take time and money to replace. And while the brain drain is beginning now, the problem is going to become much more acute in the next decade or so, when baby boomers--more than one-quarter of all Americans, amounting to 76 million people--start hitting their mid sixties. Based on the results of their yearlong research project, the authors of this article offer recommendations for gaining the loyalty of older workers and creating a more flexible approach to retirement that allows people to continue contributing well into their sixties and seventies. Companies can no longer afford to think of retirement as a onetime event, permanently dividing work life from leisure.     

The impact of a partial borrowing limit on financial decisions

We consider a consumption, investment, life insurance, and retirement decision problem in which an economic agent is allowed to borrow against only a part of future income. The closed-form solution is attained by applying a dual approach that directly imposes the conditions for the borrowing limit on a dual value function. We provide analytic comparative statics for optimal strategies with rigorous proofs. It is confirmed that a more stringent borrowing limit leads to less consumption and less life insurance purchase. However, even with a tighter borrowing limit, an agent with weak incentive to retire can invest more when the wealth level is high enough. We also show that a more stringent borrowing limit can delay or hasten the optimal retirement timing depending on the agent's current wealth level.     

基于合理赡养比的动态退休年龄研究:模型与仿真

本文在分析预测我国人口规模和结构演化特征的基础上,引入合理赡养比指标,并突破退休年龄不变、赡养比变化的传统思路,建立数学模型,模拟各个时期退休年龄的动态值。结果显示,老龄人口规模加速增长和劳动适龄人口快速萎缩相叠加的阶段应为推行延迟退休的关键时期,且以渐进调整的做法为宜。