Effect of graphical presentations on insights into a company's financial position: an innovative educational approach to communicating financial information in financial reporting

This article focuses on the graphical presentation of the financial ratios of the firm. Following an earlier plea for visualizing the financial report based on pacioli's treatise Divina Proportione, this study investigates the benefits of visualizing and reports on an experiment into the significance of visual information, designed to compare visual and numerical financial information. The experiment was conducted with the help of third-year accounting students. The study demonstrates an alternative teaching method and indicates that this can be a very effective and stimulating process of accounting education and training. Further the co-operation between teacher and students makes an intersting contribution to the development of better accounting education and training. The exploratory research indicates that presentation of graphical information produces time-gains in comparison with numerical information alone. Memory plays a very important role here. The conclusion are: first, that visual information can be considered as very important in providing a clear insight into the financial position of the firm, thus improving communication; and second, that the integration of accounting research and teaching is a very promising way of preparing academically and professionally future accounting practitioners.     

How does institutional investors' information acquisition inhibit share pledging? Evidence from China

This study investigates whether and how institutional investors' information acquisition affects controlling shareholder's share pledging. Taking a unique data of institutional investors' corporate site visits in China, we find that institutional investors' corporate site visits significantly inhibit controlling shareholder's share pledging. This effect is robust to a series of robustness checks, including controlling for endogeneity concerns, propensity score matching method, alternative model specifications, and alternative measures of the independent variable. We then provide evidence that the negative relation between institutional investors' corporate site visits and controlling shareholder's share pledging is more pronounced for listed firms with less efficient information environment and weaker corporate governance. Further analysis indicates that the negative relation is also more pronounced when controlling shareholders are under higher margin call pressure and when the visiting institutional investors consist of more fund companies. Overall, our study is the first to provide direct evidence of the governance mechanism of financial intermediaries on shareholders' pledging decisions.     

Tradeoff between corporate investment and CSR: The moderating effect of financial slack,workforce slack,and board gender diversity

This paper investigates the existence of a tradeoff between corporate investment (i.e., tangible and intangible) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the presence of the moderating effects of financial slack, human resources slack, and board gender diversity. Based on an international sample of 44,129 firm-year observations between 2005 and 2019, we find that corporate investment leads to significantly lower CSR engagement in all three pillars (i.e., environmental, social, and governance). Furthermore, while financial slack positively moderates between corporate investment and CSR, human resources slack and board gender diversity negatively moderate between corporate investment and CSR. This outcome is robust in terms of endogeneity concerns, alternative sampling, alternative investment proxies, CSR regulations, and timing impacts. Hence, we find the dominance of the shareholders' perspective rather than the stakeholders' perspective. The results outline the tradeoff between corporate investment and CSR and the role of contingencies in this tradeoff relationship.     

Do early and voluntary filers of financial information in XBRL format signal superior corporate governance and operating performance?

On March 16, 2005, the SEC issued Final Rule 33-8529 encouraging registrants to voluntarily file tagged financial statement information on the EDGAR reporting System using XBRL format. In this paper, we examine whether early and voluntary filers of financial information in XBRL format demonstrate superior corporate governance and operating performance relative to their non-adopting peers. We investigate performance, market, and structure-related firm variables. Our results suggest that corporate governance is significantly and positively associated with a firm's decision to be an early and voluntary filer of financial information in XBRL format. At the same time, firm performance factors including liquidity and firm size are also associated with the early and voluntary XBRL filing decision. Our findings should be particularly interesting for the SEC, as it considers the corporate governance and firm-performance related associations between certain registrants' early and voluntary response and its call for XBRL-based filings.     

Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice

When capital market investors and firm insiders possess the same information about a company's prospects, its liabilities will be priced in a way that makes the firm indifferent to the composition of its financial liabilities (at least under certain, well-known circumstances). However, if firm insiders are systematically better informed than outside investors, they will choose to issue those types of securities that the market appears to overvalue most. Knowing this, rational investors will try to infer the insiders' information from the firm's financial structure. This paper evaluates the extent to which a firm's choice of risky debt maturity can signal insiders' information about firm quality. If financial market transactions are costless, a firm's financial structure cannot provide a valid signal. With positive transaction costs, however, high-quality firms can sometimes effectively signal their true quality to the market. The existence of a signalling equilibrium is shown to depend on the (exogenous) distribution of firms' quality and the magnitude of underwriting costs for corporate debt.     

The impact of corporate governance on financial performance of Indian and GCC listed firms: An empirical investigation

Corporate governance plays a vital role in creating a corporate culture of consciousness, transparency, and openness. In this context, this paper provides a brief view about the background of corporate governance mechanisms in India and Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) countries, corporate legal system and monitoring policies laid down by Indian and GCC governments. Furthermore, it analyzes the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the financial performance of Indian and GCC listed firms. The study uses a sample that consists of 53 non-financial listed companies from India and 53 non-financial listed companies from GCC countries for the period 2009–2016. Results revealed that board accountability (BA) and audit committee (AC) have an insignificant impact on firms' performance measured by ROE and Tobin’s Q. Similarly, transparency and disclosure (TD) have an insignificant negative impact on firms' performance measured by Tobin’s Q. Moreover, the country dummy results show that Indian firms are performing better than Gulf countries ones in terms of corporate governance practices and financial performance. The current study is considered as a battery for further research and studies particularly in India & GCC listed firms in the context of corporate governance and financial performance.     

Modigliani and Miller Again Revisited: The Cost of Capital with Unequal Borrowing and Lending Rates

The financial literature asserts that financial managers must borrow at least to some degree if they are to optimise the value of their companies. This result has been described in the literature as ‘perhaps the single most important result in the theory of corporate finance obtained in the last 30 years’ (Copeland and Weston, 1988, p. 443). Based on US tax systems, the value added to a company by debt has been estimated as high as 35 to 50% of the debt's market value. More recently in this journal, Ashton (1989b) has argued that under the present UK tax system, the theoretical tax advantage afforded by debt should be estimated at no more than 13% of the debt's market value. The contribution of this paper is to draw attention to an aspect of borrowing that has largely escaped attention, but which nevertheless affects the above conclusions: namely, that the market spread between borrowing and lending constitutes a ‘cost’ for corporate borrowing. This paper demonstrates that in the context of the present UK tax system, this ‘cost’ of borrowing is sufficient to nullify entirely the formerly perceived financial tax benefits of corporate borrowing. We conclude that, at present, corporate borrowing could imply a net disadvantage for the valuation of a company's equity by about 6 or 7% of the debt's market value.     

Using corporate social responsibility performance to evaluate financial disclosure credibility

Due to the paucity of immediate and direct information about financial disclosure credibility, it is often difficult for investors to assess the credibility of financial disclosures (e.g. whether reported earnings are biased). Given this situation, the present study proposes and finds that investors use additional cues, such as information about corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance, to form overall impressions about management's honesty, credibility, and trustworthiness. Similar to other findings in the halo effect literature, we find that these overall impressions subsequently influence both investors' assessments of financial disclosure credibility and the prices they are willing to pay for a company's stock. The findings support the theoretical framework on financial disclosure credibility by (1) showing that management credibility is an important tool that investors use to assess disclosure credibility and (2) suggesting that management credibility is a multidimensional latent construct for which CSR performance can be one of several relevant indicators.     

Internal information quality and financial policy peer effects

This paper investigates how firms' internal information quality (IIQ) influences the peer effects of their financial policies. Using earnings announcement speed and insider trading profitability difference as measurements, we find that when IIQ is low, firms are more likely to change their leverage following a similar change made by peer firms in the same industry. Our further analysis shows that this mimicking behavior hurts firms' operating performance, and is more prevalent when firms are also characterized by poor corporate governance. Overall, our results indicate that poor information quality could amplify the agency problem, therefore leading to stronger peer effects in corporate financial policies.     

The impact of the corporate balanced scorecard on corporate control—A research note

The paper explores the adoption of the corporate balanced scorecard (CBSC) and its impact on corporate control of business units. Following interviews with senior corporate managers in 15 of Sweden's largest multinational companies, 8 were found to adopt CBSC. However, CBSC had little impact on control at the corporate level. Corporate control was financially focused in all the companies: mainly financial measures were important, standards were only set for financial measures and rewards were largely based on financial performance measures. Top management's need for simplicity and comparability internally, and capital market pressures motivated the financial focus.     

The Impact of Corporate Governance and Audit Quality on the Cost of Private Loans*

The objective of this paper is to examine whether banks discriminate between firms on the basis of their financial condition when assessing the credit default risk, and to what extent corporate governance and auditor quality mitigate such risks in the pricing of new bank loans. The results indicate that, depending on the probability of bankruptcy, banks rely on different monitoring devices. For firms with a low probability of bankruptcy, banks do not rely on the quality of corporate governance or the auditor's industry specialization. However, auditor tenure and a change in auditor affect the spread. For firms with a high probability of bankruptcy, the spread is adjusted for the quality of corporate governance and the auditor's specialization. These results are robust to alternative specifications and measures.     

Does corporate governance transparency affect the accuracy of analyst forecasts?

Using country‐level proxies for corporate governance transparency, this paper investigates how differences in transparency across 21 countries affect the average forecast accuracy of analysts for the country's firms. The association between financial transparency and analyst forecast accuracy has been well documented in previous published literature; however, the association between governance transparency and analyst forecast accuracy remains unexplored. Using the two distinct country‐level factors isolated by Bushman et al. (2004 ), governance transparency and financial transparency, we investigate whether corporate governance information impacts on the accuracy of earnings forecasts over and above financial information. We document that governance transparency is positively associated with analyst forecast accuracy after controlling for financial transparency and other variables. Furthermore, our results suggest that governance‐related disclosure plays a bigger role in improving the information environment when financial disclosures are less transparent. Our empirical evidence also suggests that the significance of governance transparency on analyst forecast accuracy is higher when legal enforcement is weak.     

论《公司金融》与《财务管理》本科教学差异——内容侧重和教学法的选择

《公司金融》与《财务管理》在目前的本科课程教学中往往混为一谈，侧重点不清，让学生无所适从。基于我国的现状，《公司金融》课程在理论讲授上应该注重与金融资产定价和金融市场学理论的结合，要注重宏观经济与公司治理环境的分析。而实务方面则更应强调对财务资料运用计量经济学方法检验与分析。《财务管理》课程则更应重视案例分析与启发式教学，并可大力推进任务驱动教学法与全英教学模式。     

Corporate investment during the financial crisis: Evidence from China

China's growth model suggests that the 2008 financial crisis may have affected the Chinese economy differently from what one observes in mature market economies. In this paper, we examine how Chinese corporate investment responded to the financial crisis by using 1689 listed nonfinancial firms during Q12006–Q32010. We document that (1) the overall impact of the financial crisis on Chinese corporate investment is negative; (2) among three channels conveying the effect of the financial crisis, namely, the demand channel, the financial constraints channel, and the uncertainty channel, the demand channel dominates; (3) financial assets held by a nonfinancial firm are important in explaining the firm's fixed investment behaviour; (4) as compared to non-state firms, state-controlled firms are less affected by the financial crisis and more active in engaging in financial assets investment; and (5) foreign ownership can be seen as a buffer against the negative effect of the financial crisis and foreign-involved Chinese firms are less active in financial assets investment as compared to domestic firms.     

Earnings manipulation and similarity of annual report disclosure: Evidence from China

The Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section is an important component of a company's annual report, where the management team provides a textual analysis of the company's performance for investors. Due to the existence of agency problems, management is likely to mask any earnings manipulation in order to maximise their salary, build a corporate empire or obtain more financing, which will reduce the reliability of the company's financial information. Utilising 13,679 Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2020, this study examines the correlation between management earnings manipulation and annual report MD&A similarity. We find that earnings manipulation leads to increased MD&A similarity in order to reduce the transmission of useful information and thus stymie investors. As such, we recommend that regulatory authorities should monitor the level of similarity and validity of MD&A disclosures in addition to the authenticity of numerical financial information.     

An Ohlson valuation framework for valuing corporate governance: The case of Taiwan

We examine the relation between a firm's market value, financial performance, and corporate governance as a cointegrated system in the Ohlson (1995) valuation framework. Using a comprehensive set of 29 governance measures in 4 categories for Taiwanese firms, we find that governance related to ownership structure and divergence between cash flow rights and control rights are important for a firm's market valuation. In particular, information about shareholdings of board directors and supervisors, shareholdings of controlling family, and voting rights are influential for firm value. Controlling for book value and residual incomes in the model, these governance measures track much of the remaining firm valuation that is unrelated to a firm's financial performance. Our findings provide some insight into the intrinsic value of corporate governance and the types of corporate governance mechanisms that are especially important for firms with similar ownership structure and controls.     

Corporate culture and financial statement comparability

In this paper, I empirically examine the influence of corporate culture on the comparability of financial statements. I predict that firms with strong corporate cultures have less-opportunistic managers, who make homogenous decisions when faced with similar economic events, resulting in greater accounting comparability. For a sample of U.S. companies, I find empirical evidence consistent with this prediction: firms with strong corporate cultures have greater peer- and industry-level comparability. These results are robust to using an entropy-balanced sample, correcting for sample selection bias using Heckman's two-step procedure, and employing different measures of corporate culture strength. Further analysis reveals that sudden CEO turnovers that move firms towards (away from) a stronger corporate culture positively (negatively) influence post-turnover accounting comparability. My results provide new insights on the role of corporate culture for financial reporting.     

Connecting earnings management to the real World:What happens in the black box of the boardroom?

This British Accounting & Finance Association (BAFA) distinguished academic 2020 plenary address marries the researcher's two main research areas – financial reporting and corporate governance. Like Vivien Beattie (BAFA 2011 distinguished academic), the researcher commenced in the positivist tradition but was increasingly drawn to more qualitative, interdisciplinary perspectives, influencing the paper's positioning.“Accounting choice”, “income smoothing”, “earnings management”, and “earnings manipulation” are terms frequently used in the academic literature. This paper reviews these terms, highlighting the resonances and dissonances between them, and attempts to reconcile varied perspectives in the prior literature. The paper critiques taken-for-granted assumptions underlying this stream of research. The paper then examines prior earnings management research using alternative methodologies to deepen understanding of the four terms in praxis (best practice in practice). The paper reviews prior research on boards of directors using alternative methodologies to those adopted in mainstream corporate governance research, to provide a menu of opportunities to research earnings management inside the “black box” of the boardroom, including proposed research questions for future research. The paper concludes by considering the implications for policymakers and standard setters.     

Institutional Monitoring: Evidence from the F‐Score

The extant literature shows that institutional investors engage in corporate governance to enhance a firm's long‐term value. Measuring firm performance using the F‐Score, we examine the persistent monitoring role of institutional investors and identify the financial aspects of a firm that institutional monitoring improves. We find strong evidence that long‐term institutions with large shareholdings consistently improve a firm's F‐Score and that such activity occurs primarily through the enhancement of the firm's operating efficiency. Other institutions reduce a firm's F‐Score. Moreover, we find evidence that, while monitoring institutions improve a firm's financial health, transient (followed by non‐transient) institutions trade on this information.     

THE CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT AND CORPORATE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE

Agency theory and signalling theory both suggest that firms are motivated to disclose excellence of financial performance in an unambiguous manner. We might expect, therefore, that good financial performance is associated with a clear and readable Chairman's narrative and poor performance with an obscure or misleading message. Extant work linking corporate performance with clarity of executive narrative fails to distinguish sample cases by industry or financial status. This paper seeks to overcome the consequences of such deficiencies explicitly, by conducting a systematic analysis of the relationship between narrative complexity and alternative measures of financial performance, for a matched sample of failed/non-failed companies across common industries. This study employs separate measures of the readability and the understandability of the chairman's narrative and finds them to be significantly related to overall financial performance and individual measures of performance, most notably liquidity. Poor readability is strongly associated with poor financial performance and ease of readability with relative financial success. The implication is that firms actively signal good news while obscuring, perhaps deliberately, messages which convey bad news.