政治风险文献综述

<正>一、引言政治因素已成为资本市场系统风险和非系统风险的重要来源。从宏观角度看,政治体制改革、政党更迭、地缘政治等因素成为资本市场政治风险的来源;从微观角度看,企业政治关联(企业与政治人物或政府官员之间的密切关系(Faccio,2006))在不同国家广泛存在,政治人物或政府官员的失势或死亡也就成为政治风险的来源。自从改革开放以来,我国至今已经经历了近四十年的发展历程,而在这将近四十年发展过程中,我国由以往的计划经济体制逐     

政治关联与我国民营上市企业的多元化投资

本文以2010年我国沪深民营上市企业为研究对象,研究民营上市企业的政治关联对民营企业多元化投资的影响.研究发现:1.民营上市企业的政治关联对其多元化程度的影响是显著为正的,当民营上市企业的政治关联划分为代表委员类政治关联、前政府官员类政治关联和政府行业协会类政治关联之后,只有代表委员类政治关联对民营上市企业多元化程度有...     

风险投资对上市公司盈余管理和市场表现的影响

风险投资对上市公司盈余管理和市场表现的影响有两种相反的观点。一种观点认为风险投资能够提升企业价值;另一种观点认为风险投资存在侵害企业的动机。联合风险投资对上市公司盈余管理和市场表现也有两种观点。一种观点认为联合风险投资通过整合资源、分散风险能提高企业业绩,另一种观点认为联合风险投资内部的协作成本将导致风投监督作用下降,提升盈余管理,降低上市后表现。     

风险投资对上市公司盈余管理和市场表现的影响

风险投资对上市公司盈余管理和市场表现的影响有两种相反的观点。一种观点认为风险投资能够提升企业价值;另一种观点认为风险投资存在侵害企业的动机。联合风险投资对上市公司盈余管理和市场表现也有两种观点。一种观点认为联合风险投资通过整合资源、分散风险能提高企业业绩,另一种观点认为联合风险投资内部的协作成本将导致风投监督作用下降,提升盈余管理,降低上市后表现。     

财务困境中的CEO权力和银行贷款——基于中国ST上市公司的实证分析

以2008-2016沪深未退市ST上市公司为样本,实证检验了在财务困境当中CEO对内控制力、政治关联、银行关系这些CEO权力对于银行贷款获取的影响.研究结果显示,在财务困境当中,CEO的对内控制力能够显著的帮助获取银行贷款,而CEO的银行关系、政治关联这两种外部影响力对于其获取银行贷款反而较难.进一步研究发现,CEO的对内控制力、银行关系对于企业获取银行贷款不因企业性质的不同而不同.政治关联在民营企业当中能够获取更多的银行贷款,但是在国有企业当中,由于其天然性的政治资源,CEO的政治关联并没有让企业业绩变好,反而让其陷入财务困境,降低了银行贷款规模.     

政治关联、股权集中度与银行绩效——基于我国上市银行业的实证研究

本文利用2006-2013年的数据分析我国上市银行董事长、总经理各自的政治关联以及银行股权集中度对银行业绩的影响。实证结果表明:上市银行董事长和总经理的政治关联对银行业绩的影响各不相同,董事长的政治关联显著提高银行的绩效,而总经理的政治关联则与之相反;上市银行的业绩随着股权集中度的上升而逐步提高,同时,股权集中度在一定程度上抑制了政治关联所起的作用。将银行样本划分为"一股独大"和"股权制衡"两种类型后,上述结论仍然成立。     

董事会政治关联、投资者关系管理与企业价值——来自民营上市公司的经验证据

随着我国资本市场的不断发展,人们对投资者关系管理的重视程度逐渐增高.而作为公司治理核心的董事会,其政治关联是一种资源和非正式的制度替代机制,对企业的投资者关系管理水平产生怎样的影响？基于此,本文以2013-2015年深市A股民营上市公司为样本,研究董事会政治关联对投资者关系管理水平的影响以及投资者关系管理在提升企业价值方面的重要作用.     

金融同业活动与实体企业经营风险——来自地区层面同业存单业务的证据

本文研究了地区层面金融同业活动对实体企业经营风险的影响。基于各省份金融机构开启同业存单业务的研究表明,地区层面金融同业活动显著提升了当地上市企业股价大幅下跌的风险。进一步研究表明,随着同业存单业务的发展,当地上市企业债务融资成本和风险水平有所上升,而业绩表现和市场价值有所下降。上述发现表明,企业融资链条变长后,信贷市场道德风险上升,部分企业因风险偏好增强导致经营风险上升,更容易突然出现负面事件而导致股价大幅下跌。本文的发现揭示了金融同业活动存在监管规避的可能性及其影响实体企业的潜在路径,凸显了完善金融监管以更好服务实体经济发展的重要现实意义。     

金融同业活动与实体企业经营风险——来自地区层面同业存单业务的证据

本文研究了地区层面金融同业活动对实体企业经营风险的影响。基于各省份金融机构开启同业存单业务的研究表明,地区层面金融同业活动显著提升了当地上市企业股价大幅下跌的风险。进一步研究表明,随着同业存单业务的发展,当地上市企业债务融资成本和风险水平有所上升,而业绩表现和市场价值有所下降。上述发现表明,企业融资链条变长后,信贷市场道德风险上升,部分企业因风险偏好增强导致经营风险上升,更容易突然出现负面事件而导致股价大幅下跌。本文的发现揭示了金融同业活动存在监管规避的可能性及其影响实体企业的潜在路径,凸显了完善金融监管以更好服务实体经济发展的重要现实意义。     

政治关联、研发投入与企业价值

立足于企业研发投入,以创业板上市公司为研究对象,本文对政治关联影响企业价值的具体途径进行了探讨.研究发现,政治关联会显著地降低企业价值.同时,研发投入是政治关联影响企业价值的途径,政治关联带来的资源优势会造成企业的短视行为,降低对创新方面的投入,从而减少企业价值.进一步地,基于不同的视角将政治关联进行分类之后的回归结果表明,研发投入只在政府委员类和地方级别类政治关联中才对企业价值有着中介作用,即更优渥的政治资源对企业价值的"诅咒"效应更明显.本文的研究结论,从侧面反映了我国政企关系的现状及其对企业创新的影响.     

Stock Recommendations for Politically Connected Firms

Social network connections of corporations can significantly affect operating performance and firm valuation. Political connections are one form of social networking which often manifests into improved firm profitability as a result of political favors granted by politicians. However, analysts often have greater difficulty forecasting the earnings of politically connected firms than those of non‐connected firms. This is because politicians often grant political favors to firms in an unpredictable manner making it difficult for market participants to time precisely when political benefits will translate into higher firm profitability. I examine how political connections affect analysts’ stock recommendations using a unique dataset of political contributions in the US over the period 1993–2012. I show that analysts’ recommendations are less profitable for firms with high connectedness than for firms with low (or no) connectedness. I also find that analysts are less effective in translating earnings forecasts into profitable recommendations for highly connected firms. Overall, the findings suggest that analysts do not impound all of the information concerning corporate political connections efficiently into their primary research outputs.     

Politicians and the IPO decision: The impact of impending political promotions on IPO activity in China

This paper shows that incentives created by the impending turnover of local politicians can accelerate the pace of initial public offering (IPO) activity in certain politicized environments. Focusing on China, we exploit a research setting where politicians are rewarded for capital market development, firms rely on political connections for access to capital, rent-seeking behavior is rampant, and the objectives of the state might not be to maximize capital market efficiency. We find that the rate of exchange eligible firms engaging in an IPO temporarily increases in advance of impending political promotion events. This effect holds for both state-owned and non-state-owned entities. For state-owned firms, the effect is strongest in those provinces where the politicians are more likely to be rewarded for market development activity. For non-state-owned firms, the temporary increase in IPO activity appears to be (rationally) opportunistic in nature, with the effect stronger around events more likely to disrupt the firms' political connections. Promotion period IPOs underperform non-promotion period IPOs in terms of both future financial performance and long-run stock returns, have controlling shareholders who retain a larger fraction of the company, and are more likely to divert proceeds away from their intended use after the offering.     

Political Party Affiliation of the President,Majority in Congress,and Sin Stock Returns

We find that in contrast to the stock market, which performs better during Democratic presidencies, “sin” stocks—publicly traded producers of tobacco, alcohol, and gaming—perform better during Republican presidencies and even more so when the Republican presidency is accompanied by a Republican majority in at least one chamber of Congress. We examine whether sin firms use contributions to establish connections with politicians and find that sin firms contribute more to Republican candidates and that these contributions are greater when Republicans are in power. We also find a positive relation between political contributions and future returns. The relation is stronger for contributions to Republicans.     

Do Political Connections Affect Firm Performance? Evidence from a Developing Country

We investigate how politicians serving on the boards of directors influence firm performance. The results show a negative relationship between political connections and firm performance. Specifically, politically connected firms underperform nonconnected firms directors by almost 17 percent and 15 percent based on return on assets and return on equity, respectively. By stratifying the sample duration into two periods based on the political environment, we find that this effect is more pronounced in autocratic as opposed to democratic regimes. Finally, our results also suggest that the performance of connected firms with more growth opportunities is not affected by political connections.     

How are political connections valued in China? Evidence from market reaction to CEO succession

Using a sample of listed Chinese firms between 2000 and 2010, the paper analyzes the stock market reaction to CEO succession. We document significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns when CEO succession is accompanied with increased political connections. We also show that the market reaction to political connections is significantly stronger for external successors and for poorly performing firms, while it is significantly weaker for firms in high-tech industries and firms located in more developed regions. Finally we find that political connections are valued significantly less in state owned enterprises than in privately controlled firms. Our findings suggest that Chinese investors do value political connections, and such valuation is conditioned by successor origin, prior firm performance, industry, region, and ownership structure.     

Political Connections and Corporate Borrowing: an Analysis on the Listed Real Estate Firms in China

This paper investigates the relationship between political connections and corporate borrowing behaviour using the listed real estate development firms in China from 2001 to 2014. Evidence from China is of particular importance due to China being the world’s largest emerging and transition economy. We find that the benefit of political connections is manifested in firms obtaining loans from state-controlled banks in the first instance, but that political influence diminishes over subsequent loan extensions. The performance based requirement prevents banks providing systemic favourable treatment to the connected real estate firms, especially after the Chinese banking system reform in 2006. The results provide fresh insight on the risks and benefits of political connections in the Chinese real estate market as it transitions from a centrally planned to a market based economy under on-going market oriented banking and political reforms.     

Individual political contributions and firm performance

We present evidence that individuals make political contributions strategically by targeting politicians with power to affect their economic well-being. Individuals in Congressional districts with greater industry clustering choose to support politicians with jurisdiction over the industry. Importantly, individual political contributions are associated with improvements in operating performance of firms in industry clusters. The relation between contributions and firm performance is strongest for poorly performing firms, firms closer to financial distress, and for contributions in close elections. The results imply that individual political contributions are valuable to firms, especially during bad economic times.     

THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS ON FIRMS’ OPERATING PERFORMANCE AND FINANCING DECISIONS

We investigate the impact that the political connections of publicly traded firms have on their performance and financing decisions. Using a long‐term event study covering a sample of 234 politically connected firms headquartered in 12 developed and 11 developing countries from 1989 to 2003, we find that firms increase their performance and indebtedness after the establishment of a political connection. We also find that the political connection is more strongly associated with changes in leverage and operating performance for firms with closer ties to political power. Overall, our study confirms that politically connected firms gain easier access to credit and reap benefits in terms of performance from their ties with politicians.     

Political promotion incentives and within-firm pay gap: Evidence from China

In this paper, we investigate how the promotion incentive of politicians affects the pay gap between executives and employees in local firms. We find that the promotion incentive of local politicians significantly reduces the within-firm pay gap. This effect is more pronounced for large firms, firms in regions subject to more government intervention, state-owned-enterprises, private firms with political connections, and firms with more geographically concentrated operations. Our findings are robust to the use of the loss of top-rank political connections and economics loss due to earthquakes as instrumental variables for the promotion incentive. Furthermore, a reduction in pay gap is mainly driven by an increase in employee pay, instead of a decrease in executive pay. Overall, this study sheds light on the determinants of within-firm pay gaps from the perspective of the career concerns of local politicians.     

Investor-legislators: Tax holiday for politically connected firms

In this paper, we examine whether political connections in the U.S. Congress affect voting patterns with respect to the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA). Using the financial disclosure statements of members of the U.S. Congress, we define political connections as equity-based ties between lawmakers and business groups, which capture the deliberate decision of lawmakers to establish a relationship by investing personal wealth in firm equity. We first examine whether politicians are more likely to hold equity in firms receiving benefits under the AJCA (i.e., firms with high repatriation tax costs). Our results suggest that politicians are more likely to hold equity positions in firms with high repatriation tax benefits only when such firms donate to their political campaign. We further examine how equity-based connections affect the AJCA voting outcomes and find that members of the House, but not of the Senate, holding repatriating firm's equity are more likely to vote in favour of the AJCA when PAC donations support their election campaigns. Last, we investigate whether politicians with equity holdings in repatriating firms are more likely to receive larger donations from firm-affiliated PACs before the AJCA vote in Congress. We find that PACs have larger contributions to House members who purchase equity in repatriating firms immediately prior to the AJCA vote. The results suggest that PACs of repatriating firms strategically target House representatives to increase political support for the tax holiday.