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1.
本文以国有上市公司2010-2016年数据为样本,通过中介效应模型和分行业的机制检验方法验证政府补助引致管理层权力扩张,进而增加高管超额薪酬的机理。研究结果显示政府补助与高管超额薪酬呈正相关关系,管理层权力对政府补助之于高管超额薪酬具有中介效应,相较于管制行业,政府补助非管制行业所带来的管理层权力扩张效应更加明显。进一步研究发现:政府补助与央企管理层权力的关系不显著,政府补助引致地方国有企业管理层获得更多的超额薪酬,东部地区地方国有企业高管获得超额薪酬低于中西部地区,大规模地方国有企业高管获得超额薪酬低于中小规模企业。最后对政府补助下管理层权力的治理提出相应的建议。  相似文献   

2.
合理的高管人力资本激励机制是发挥高管人力资本效用进而提高企业绩效的有效途径。本文通过实证检验管理层权力、高管人力资本激励与企业绩效的关系,结果表明:高管货币薪酬与企业绩效显著正相关,与国有企业相比,非国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管货币薪酬对企业绩效的激励作用。国有企业的在职消费与企业绩效显著负相关,但非国有企业其二者之间的相关性并不显著;管理层权力加大了在职消费对企业绩效的负向影响。高管团队内部薪酬差距与企业绩效显著正相关,且非国有企业比国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管团队内部薪酬差距对企业绩效的激励作用。  相似文献   

3.
国有企业高管薪酬问题已经引起了社会各界的广泛关注.国有企业高管薪酬与普通职工的差距过大,高管薪酬只升不降且与企业业绩的关联程度较低,同时还有相当一部分隐性薪酬无法为社会大众所知.政府相关部门需要完善国企高管薪酬评价体系,健全高管薪酬监督体系,建立高管薪酬比价体系,最终建立起适合我国国有企业和经济发展的国企高管薪酬制度.  相似文献   

4.
管理层权力假说从个人私利角度解释管理层权力与高管、职工薪酬的正相关关系,但国内文献并未关注管理层权力如何影响职工薪酬。本文以2007~2010年间A股国有上市公司为样本,研究了我国国有企业管理层权力对职工薪酬的影响及其成因。结果显示:(1)权力大的国有企业CEO更倾向于支付较低的职工薪酬。(2)CEO权力大的国有企业更可能超额雇员,超额雇员是国有企业CEO权力与职工薪酬负相关的一种可能解释。(3)进一步分析表明,职工力量、职工监事、管理层持股等内外部制约因素并未有效制约管理层权力,反而增强了CEO权力对职工薪酬的负向影响。本文从超额雇员角度解释了我国国有企业管理层权力与职工薪酬的负相关关系,有助于丰富薪酬的管理层权力假说。  相似文献   

5.
融资结构对企业绩效影响已受到广泛关注和研究,但对企业内不同主体收入差距对企业绩效影响鲜有关注。本文研究表明:管理层薪酬差距、劳动资本收入差距、资本政府收入差距对企业绩效有显著正面影响,管理层员工薪酬差距对绩效只有很小或没有显著性影响;在每个绩效模型中,不同主体收入差距对绩效影响边际效应也不同;企业股份性质、所在地区、企业规模对收入分配差距的绩效影响有调节作用。最后据此提出政策建议。  相似文献   

6.
王雄元  何捷 《会计研究》2012,(11):33-38,94
由于国有企业CEO薪酬由国资委决定,CEO权力无法影响自身薪酬,因此国有企业CEO薪酬可能并不适用管理层权力假说,但现有文献结论并非如此。规模、行政垄断以及业绩是高管薪酬契约最主要的决定因素,管理层权力对其影响较弱,因此仅仅在回归中控制行业、规模、所有制等因素,所得结论可能并不稳健。本文以2007—2010年间4277个A股上市公司为样本的研究发现:在控制行政垄断与规模因素后,非国有企业CEO权力与CEO薪酬显著正相关,而国有企业CEO权力与CEO薪酬不符合管理层权力假说。本文研究有助于丰富薪酬管理层权力假说,有助于理解CEO权力在薪酬决定中的作用。  相似文献   

7.
郭雅娴 《中国外资》2012,(16):268-269
国有企业高管薪酬问题已经引起了社会各界的广泛关注。国有企业高管薪酬与普通职工的差距过大,高管薪酬只升不降且与企业业绩的关联程度较低,同时还有相当一部分隐性薪酬无法为社会大众所知。政府相关部门需要完善国企高管薪酬评价体系,健全高管薪酬监督体系,建立高管薪酬比价体系,最终建立起适合我国国有企业和经济发展的国企高管薪酬制度。  相似文献   

8.
资本结构、管理层防御与上市公司高管薪酬水平   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
将人力资本破产成本引入研究框架是高管薪酬理论研究的新突破.其他条件相同时,公司的资产负债率越高,破产可能性就越大,高层管理者因而要求更高的薪酬水平以补偿所需承担的更高的人力资本破产成本.可见,公司资本结构因暗涵了人力资本破产成本,可作为衡量高管薪酬是否合理的依据.本文以2004-2007年上市公司为样本,从资本结构的视角来审视上市公司的高管薪酬,并探究公司管理层防御现象.研究发现:(1)我国上市公司普遍存在管理层防御现象;(2)平均而言,国有企业高管薪酬水平高于民营企业,但资本结构相近,因此,相比于其所承担的人力资本破产成本,国有企业高管的薪酬水平太高了;(3)与民营企业相比,国有企业存在着更为严重的管理层防御问题.  相似文献   

9.
报酬契约是盈余管理行为的重要动机。本文以2007-2010年间我国A股国有上市公司为样本,考察了国有企业高管团队薪酬差距对盈余管理行为的影响。研究发现,从整体上看,高管团队薪酬差距与盈余管理行为显著负相关。进一步区分国有企业控制级层后发现,相对于地方国有企业,中央国有企业高管团队薪酬差距与盈余管理行为负相关关系更加显著。  相似文献   

10.
张蕊  王洋洋  廖佳 《会计研究》2020,(2):143-153
本文以2006-2016年我国A股上市公司为样本,探讨关键下属高管与CEO之间的薪酬差距如何影响企业创新.研究发现:关键下属高管-CEO薪酬差距越大,企业创新产出越高.进一步地,相比整个高管团队内部的薪酬差距,关键下属高管与CEO之间的薪酬差距对企业创新的影响更强;关键下属高管-CEO薪酬差距对企业创新的激励效应主要体现在关键下属高管晋升CEO的机会较大时,以及国有企业和技术密集型行业中.此外,降低代理成本是关键下属高管-CEO薪酬差距促进企业创新的重要作用机制,且关键下属高管-CEO薪酬差距促进了企业创新对企业价值的提升作用.本文研究结论对推动企业创新及优化上市公司高管薪酬激励体系具有重要的现实意义.  相似文献   

11.
Kun Su  Haiyan Jiang  Gary Tian 《Abacus》2020,56(4):561-601
This paper investigates whether the restriction on executive compensation in Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) imposed by the Government's say-on-pay schemes is conducive to corporate risk taking. Using a sample of listed SOEs over the period 2005–2018, we find that the restriction on executive compensation is negatively associated with corporate risk taking, suggesting that regulatory intervention in executive pay may produce unintended consequences. Our analyses also demonstrate that this negative regulatory effect on corporate risk taking is driven by listed SOEs in the growth stage of the business life cycle and by those in the provinces with a significant degree of government intervention. An additional test shows that the negative effect of the pay restriction on risk taking disappears in the SOEs in which managers hold shares, suggesting that an alignment of interests between managers and other shareholders mitigates the negative effect of the pay restriction. Our finding is robust to a batch of tests to alleviate the concerns about self-selection and reverse causality.  相似文献   

12.
ABSTRACT

This article applies a matching approach to deal with the selection bias and use the complementary log-log model to analyze the impacts of subsidy on Chinese manufacturing firms’ survival from 1998 to 2007. Our empirical results show that government subsidies significantly decrease the likelihood of firm exit. However, the effect decreases as the level of subsidies increases for private and foreign firms, but displays a nonlinear relationship across subsidy levels for SOEs. We also show the effects vary across the levels of institutional quality measured by the prevalence of rent seeking and government intervention. Further results suggest that the potential channels include increased investment in intangible and fixed assets as well as enhanced profitability.  相似文献   

13.
This case study examines why stand-alone Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting has been initiated in a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE). Chinese SOEs have been pioneering CSR reporting since the mid–2000?s and extant literature interprets its development as no more than a consequence of government interventions. However, there is a dearth of qualitative evidence illuminating the subtle interrelationships between the global, national and internal organisational dynamics mediating CSR reporting initiative of Chinese SOEs within the authoritarian state. To fill this gap, we provide a nuanced multi-level institutional analysis of the drivers underlying the initiation of CSR reporting within the case examined.  相似文献   

14.
Using a sample of 916 Chinese listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from 2001 to 2005, we find that the likelihood of top management turnover is negatively associated with firm performance, suggesting the existence of an effective corporate governance mechanism in an emerging economy that is highly controlled by government. We also find that the negative turnover–performance relationship is stronger when the SOE is directly held by the central or local government, holding a monopolistic position in a local economy or in a strategic/regulated industry. The results indicate that the market-based corporate governance mechanism that disciplines top executives as a result of poor performance is not only used in Chinese SOEs, but is used more frequently when the governance control of SOEs is more intense. Our findings support the notion that government control strengthens rather than weakens the turnover–performance governance mechanism. Our additional analysis shows that this complementary effect is stronger in regions that lack pro-market institutions, such as investor protections and a functioning capital market.  相似文献   

15.
This study examines the impact that political connections have on Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) performance and the decisions of Chinese listed firms. We find that political connections destroy (create) value in SOEs (non‐SOEs). Our findings show that connected SOEs are more likely to acquire local targets, especially when the local unemployment rate is high and when the firms are controlled by the local government, and they are less likely to conduct vertical mergers. M&A decisions of connected non‐SOEs are less influenced by the government; instead, political connections in non‐SOEs help bidders to integrate vertically and obtain external financing support.  相似文献   

16.
杨薇  孔东民 《金融研究》2019,468(6):150-168
本文考察薪酬差距如何影响企业内部的人力资本结构变动。基于员工不同教育程度划分人力资本层次,本文研究发现:(1)薪酬差距的增加显著降低了大学学历员工的比例,同时提升了高中及以下学历员工的比例;(2)通过构造工具变量和基于全球性经济危机的场景设定,我们发现薪酬差距和人力资本结构之间存在显著的因果关系;(3)在薪酬差距水平较高的情况下,薪酬差距的增加显著吸引了更有可能进入企业中高层的高学历员工。在薪酬差距水平较低的情况下,扩大薪酬差距显著提升(降低)了高中及以下学历(大学学历)员工比例,一个可能原因在于不同学历员工的议价能力存在差异。(4)薪酬差距与人力资本结构变化之间的相关性主要体现在规模较大、管理者平均年龄较低的企业。(5)人力资本结构在薪酬差距影响创新的过程中发挥了显著的中介效应,薪酬差距提升了研究生和本科学历员工比例,促进了企业创新。  相似文献   

17.
Local state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China continue to face government interference in their operations. They are influenced both by the government’s “grabbing hand” and by its “helping hand.” Our study examines how SOE chairmen with connections to government influence their firm’s employment policies and the economic consequences of overstaffing. Using a sample of China’s listed local state-owned enterprises, we find that the scale of overstaffing in these SOEs is negatively related to the firms’ political connections to government. However, this relationship turns positive when the firm’s chairman has a government background. Appointing chairmen who have government backgrounds is a mechanism through which the government can intervene in local SOEs and influence firms’ staffing decisions. We also find that in compensation for the expenses of overstaffing, local SOEs receive more government subsidies and bank loans. However, the chairmen themselves do not get increased pay or promotion opportunities for supporting overstaffing. Further analysis indicates that whereas the “grabbing hand” of government does harm to a firm’s economic performance, the “helping hand” provides only weak positive effects, and such government intervention actually reduces the efficiency of social resource allocation.  相似文献   

18.
Government intervention and investment efficiency: Evidence from China   总被引:7,自引:0,他引:7  
The extant corporate investment literature has documented that information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and outside investors prevent firms from making optimal investment decisions. In this study, we investigate whether government intervention, as another form of friction, distorts firms' investment behavior and leads to investment inefficiency. Using Chinese data, we test this by measuring government intervention at two different levels. First, we compare investment efficiency between SOEs and non-SOEs. We find that the sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment opportunities is significantly weaker for SOEs. Second, we measure government intervention by whether a firm is politically connected through the employment of top executives with a government background. We find that political connections significantly reduce investment efficiency in SOEs. However, we do not find such evidence in non-SOEs. Taken together, our findings suggest that government intervention in SOEs through majority state ownership or the appointment of connected managers distorts investment behavior and harms investment efficiency.  相似文献   

19.
Executive turnover is important in the governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Herein, we focus on the executive turnover of China’s SOEs, and the implementation of related evaluation mechanisms under different levels of government intervention. We collect executive turnover data of listed Chinese SOEs from 1999 to 2012, and find that about half of the SOE executives leave office within two terms, which is in line with government recommendations. Moreover, we find that more than a third of executives leave after less than one term, and nearly 20% after more than two terms, highlighting the uncertainty and unpredictability of executive appointments in SOEs. We also find that the executive evaluation mechanism for SOEs is implemented differently under different levels of government intervention. SOEs under weak intervention, such as those controlled indirectly by governments, controlled with low shareholdings, from non-regulated industries or in the Eastern regions, prefer the market-oriented evaluation method, which places more weight on executives’ economic performance. In contrast, those under strong intervention prefer the government-oriented evaluation method, which is characterized by policy burden.  相似文献   

20.
本文实证检验了政绩诉求——政府控制——边际社会性支出这样一条政府干预国有企业所产生经济后果的传导机制。研究发现:当地方政府在面临财政收入不足、国有经济面临的就业压力更大和经济增长缓慢时,地方政府往往会加大对国有企业的控制程度。尤其在面临就业压力时,会倾向于加强对员工规模大的企业的控制。随着地方政府对国有企业控制程度的加强,会导致国有企业发生更多的边际社会性支出,如非效率投资和冗员等。  相似文献   

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