建立薪酬激励机制会导致高管操纵利润吗？

我国上市公司从2002年开始普遍建立经理人员的绩效评价标准和薪酬激励约束机制，并以公司会计盈余作为业绩指标之一，这一重要机制的实施对我国上市公司管理层的影响受到国内外资本市场的广泛关注。本文手工收集上市公司年报中披露的高级管理人员的绩效评价标准和薪酬激励机制信息，研究建立与会计盈余挂钩的高管薪酬激励制度是否会导致高管操纵会计利润。研究发现，建立以会计盈余为绩效评价指标的薪酬激励没有使公司高管更为显著地操纵盈余，而且这类公司对管理层有更为完善的监管和制约机制。研究结果说明完善的监管和制约机制能约束管理层的盈余管理行为，但也挑战了国内现行的薪酬机制对管理层的实际激励作用。本文不仅为国内薪酬激励研究首次提供了高管绩效评价标准和薪酬激励机制建立的准确信息，而且为国际上薪酬激励负面效应的研究提供我国的经验证据。     

高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究

本文在对国内外文献进行综评的基础上,立足于中国资本市场的特殊制度背景,分别选择会计绩效指标(ROA、ROE)、市场指标(Tobinq)以及股东财富指标(OF)构建模型,对我国上市公司高层管理当局的薪酬激励、特别是现金薪酬与上市公司业绩之间的相关性进行了经验研究,并减弱了相关的多重共线性现象。我们发现,高层管理当局薪酬与公司以及股东财富前后两期的变化,均成正相关关系;而与本期Tobinq的变化成负相关关系,与上期Tobinq的变化成正相关关系。公司的董事会或薪酬委员会在决定高层管理当局薪酬时青睐于会计盈余指标的变化更甚于信任股东财富指标。     

公允价值计量与管理层薪酬契约

本文以2007、2008年持有公允价值变动损益的A股上市公司为样本,分析了公允价值收益、公允价值损失与管理层薪酬之间的敏感系数。研究结果表明,A股上市公司存在着对公允价值变动损益的"重奖轻罚"现象。"重奖轻罚"现象表明我国上市公司激励有效而约束乏力的薪酬不对称特征也存在于盈余分项目层面,这将会助长管理层的机会主义行为,放大企业风险。本文还发现,公允价值"持有收益"并不必然增加股东财富,委托人不能辨别新增财富的可实现性与现实性的差异,也不能辨别市场优势地位与管理层努力程度对业绩的影响,常见的公司治理机制在该问题上并没有发挥应有的控制作用,表明中国的公司治理机制仍有待完善。     

货币薪酬对我国上市公司高管和股东利益一致性的影响研究

本文选取2001—2008年我国上市公司作为样本,全面考察了高管货币薪酬与股票收益率之间的隐性关系和可能的显性关系,估计了高管货币薪酬和用股东财富增长衡量的公司业绩之间的敏感性关系。从制度背景来看,上市公司高管的货币薪酬主要取决于会计业绩指标;但研究也表明,薪酬机制仍然使高管和股东利益更趋一致,而且股票收益率独立地影响货币薪酬。从薪酬业绩敏感性来看,虽然高管薪酬独立于业绩的增长,但流通股股东财富增加1000元或者全体股东财富增加9000元,仍会导致高管薪酬平均增加近10元。解决这种低敏感性的途径是加强股权激励。     

利润操纵行为影响会计稳健性吗?——基于季度盈余不同汇总方法的经验证据

本文使用季度盈余的方法研究会计稳健性。以往文献主要使用会计年度(即公历年度)盈余分析我国上市公司的会计稳健性,相对无法有效地分离或控制利润操纵行为对会计稳健性的影响。本文使用不同的方法对季度盈余进行汇总,得到会计年度盈余及其他三种受利润操纵行为影响较弱的年度盈余。研究发现,我国上市公司的会计年度盈余和其他三种年度盈余都表现出了稳健性特征。这一经验证据表明,我国上市公司的报告盈余具有实质意义上的稳健性,利润操纵行为并未影响会计盈余的稳健性。     

股权分置改革的盈余质量效应

股权分置改革后,股价直接决定了股东的财富,持有大量非流通股的控股股东有动机操纵盈余以最大化自身的利益。国有股权转让的限制,导致国有控股股东盈余操纵动机弱于其他股东。本文研究了股权分置改革对国有控股公司和非国有控股公司盈余质量的不同影响。研究结果表明,股权分置改革后,非国有上市公司向上盈余管理程度显著提高,盈余持续性显著降低;而国有上市公司的盈余管理程度和盈余持续性都没有显著变化。本文检验了股权分置改革的成效,研究结论可为投资者的投资行为提供决策支持。     

我国上市公司CEO薪酬决定因素研究

上市公司CEO的薪酬问题是企业制度设计的一个重要命题，根据上市公司年报披露的信息，目前我国绝大部分上市公司CEO的薪酬已经与企业绩效挂钩。然而根据研究成果表明，企业绩效并不是CEO薪酬的唯一决策变量。本文阐述除企业绩效外其他决定CEO薪酬的因素，并运用我国上市公司的数据进行实证研究，来说明我国上市公司CEO薪酬的决定因素。     

盈余质量对会计信息报酬契约有用性的影响及股权特征的交互作用分析

本文以盈余可靠性维度作为盈余质量的替代,检验管理者报酬契约中的会计监督作用是否存在、其受到公司股权特征制约或促进的程度以及对企业未来业绩的影响。研究发现:(1)从整体情况看,上市公司盈余的低可靠性对管理者报酬—会计业绩的敏感性产生显著负向影响,说明盈余质量影响了管理者报酬契约中的会计业绩度量。(2)政府机构直接控制的上市公司控股股东缺乏监督经理人的剩余索取权激励,在管理者报酬契约制定中对盈余质量的评价监督重视不足。(3)第一大股东对董事会的控制增强了盈余可靠性影响管理者报酬—会计业绩敏感性的程度,在一定程度上说明大股东与上市公司之间在监督激励管理者方面的“治理协同效应”。(4)第一大股东与第二大股东之比对盈余可靠性影响报酬—会计业绩的敏感性程度产生削弱的影响。(5)盈余的低质量使管理者现金报酬的激励效果受到制约,在管理者报酬契约中针对会计信息的可靠性进行会计监督,增强了对管理者进行激励的效果。     

有关股权激励与盈余管理关系的分析

本文以盈余管理为出发点,通过总结检验,针对关于股票薪酬和股票所有权的管理层股权激励政策与盈余管理国内外研究文献进行了综舍的回顾与评述。我们发现．管理层薪酬与股权激励计划相关度高的管理层更倾向于在未来出售股票．因此更乐于操纵盈余,以便提高股价。本研究的贡献在于系统地总结我国上市公司实施股权激励方案后对于公司盈余的影响,为监管层的进一步监管和上市公司推出更加完善的股权激励方案提供参考。     

董事薪酬、CEO薪酬与公司业绩--合谋还是共同激励？

本文从中国沪深两市观测到的上市公司中CEO和董事薪酬的趋同现象,综合代理理论和乘员理论等多理论基础,基于薪酬激励和公司治理绩效的关系,考察了董事与CEO之间的合谋、单边激励和共同激励等复杂关系。论文采用2005-2007年度我国上市公司样本池数据,通过混合回归、固定效应回归和敏感性分析等实证检验发现,我国董事与CEO薪酬激励已初步与公司业绩挂钩,但是研究揭示CEO激励走在董事绩效激励前面,董事激励不足问题突出。进一步的研究发现上市公司中CEO薪酬与公司业绩正向相关,董事薪酬对公司业绩没有显著影响;结论认为我国上市公司中董事与CEO关系并非简单合谋或共同激励关系,而是处于CEO选择合适角色或监控得当,董事仍持代理角色,并且其战略指导要弱于监控作用的"单边激励"状况。     

关键下属高管晋升锦标赛的创新激励效应研究

本文以2006-2016年我国A股上市公司为样本,探讨关键下属高管与CEO之间的薪酬差距如何影响企业创新.研究发现:关键下属高管-CEO薪酬差距越大,企业创新产出越高.进一步地,相比整个高管团队内部的薪酬差距,关键下属高管与CEO之间的薪酬差距对企业创新的影响更强;关键下属高管-CEO薪酬差距对企业创新的激励效应主要体现在关键下属高管晋升CEO的机会较大时,以及国有企业和技术密集型行业中.此外,降低代理成本是关键下属高管-CEO薪酬差距促进企业创新的重要作用机制,且关键下属高管-CEO薪酬差距促进了企业创新对企业价值的提升作用.本文研究结论对推动企业创新及优化上市公司高管薪酬激励体系具有重要的现实意义.     

Agency,Firm Growth,and Managerial Turnover

We study managerial incentive provision under moral hazard when growth opportunities arrive stochastically and pursuing them requires a change in management. A trade‐off arises between the benefit of always having the “right” manager and the cost of incentive provision. The prospect of growth‐induced turnover limits the firm's ability to rely on deferred pay, resulting in more front‐loaded compensation. The optimal contract may insulate managers from the risk of growth‐induced dismissal after periods of good performance. The evidence for the United States broadly supports the model's predictions: Firms with better growth prospects experience higher CEO turnover and use more front‐loaded compensation.     

CEO incentive compensation in U.S. financial institutions

This paper empirically addresses the questions of whether and, if yes, how U.S. bankers are compensated in particular with regard to incentive pay. Although the level of bank CEO pay has dropped during the financial crisis period, bank CEOs fared much better in comparison to their firms (and, in turn, their shareholders). Furthermore, bank CEO incentive pay beyond the justifiable portion is positively associated with CEO power measures. There is also some evidence, albeit weaker, that CEO power is positively related to CEO incentive pay switches.     

Ceo Compensation And The Transformation Of Banking

We examine the compensation strategies of commercial bank holding companies (BHCs) during 1992–2000. In particular, we analyze whether CEO compensation is more closely tied to the presence of growth options and to risk than is revealed in earlier research. We also examine whether BHC entry into investment banking has influenced compensation policies. Our evidence shows a stronger link between growth options and CEO compensation in the 1990s than observed in earlier studies and that pay‐for‐performance sensitivities are substantially larger for BHCs that have entered the underwriting business. We also find that BHC leverage and variability in returns have positive effects on CEO incentive pay. Finally, we find some evidence supporting the hypothesis that pay‐for‐performance sensitivities decline generally at BHCs as return variability increases, as agency theory predicts.     

CEO职业关注与企业会计信息披露质量

依据2001-2019年沪深两市A股上市公司数据,以C EO年龄水平作为职业关注水平的代理变量,考量CEO职业关注对企业会计信息披露质量的影响.结果表明:CEO职业关注降低了企业的会计信息披露质量,CEO职业关注水平较高时,企业盈余管理倾向更强,应计质量更差,发生盈余粉饰的可能性更高.进一步分析发现,企业正向盈余管理倾向是C EO职业关注影响会计信息披露质量的渠道,职业关注与会计信息披露质量的关系受到财务业绩压力的干扰.     

Air pollution and executive incentive: Evidence from pay-performance sensitivity

Based on the China's non-state-owned listed corporates in 2014–2020, we adopt the real-time air quality index data published by the Ministry of Environmental Protection of China as the proxy of air pollution to examine how air pollution affects firm's CEO pay–performance sensitivity (PPS). The results of logistic regression show that air pollution is negatively correlated with the executives' PPS. We also find that industrial and regional characteristics is heterogeneous by exploring the interaction effect of CEO. In addition, our study indicates that the influence of air pollution on PPS is more significant in companies with improved performance and we provide a possible explanation of this based on the theory of resource category equivalence. The mechanism test shows that air pollution increases the firms' difficulty to motivate executives, it also destroys the effectiveness of compensation contracts and significantly reduces the PPS by increasing explicit and implicit incentive. Furthermore, we investigate the economic consequences of air pollution. Results show that air pollution would damages the firm value directly and also affect their PPS. Overall, our study reveals how air pollution affects executives' incentive, therefore provides policy support to developing countries to balance the relationship between economic development and environmental protection.     

商业银行运营效率与董事会治理

本文在对中国16家上市商业银行绩效进行前沿效率分析的基础上,建立以董事会规模、外部董事监事占比、CEO薪酬和管理层人均薪酬为基础的二元选择模型,对中国商业银行运营效率同董事会治理的关系进行了实证研究。结果表明,独立董事在商业银行公司治理中的作用并不明显,CEO薪酬和董事会规模对商业银行业绩并无显著影响,董事会规模过大无...     

Corporate performance and CEO compensation in China

This paper examines the compensation of CEOs in China's listed firms. First, we discuss what is known about the setting of CEO compensation and then we go on to examine factors that may help explain variations in the use of performance related pay. In China, listed firms have a dominant or controlling shareholder and we argue that the distinct types of controlling shareholder have different impacts on the use of incentive pay. We find that firms that have a State agency as the major shareholder do not appear to use performance related pay. In contrast, firms that have private blockholders or SOEs as their major shareholders relate the CEO's pay to increases in stockholders' wealth or increases in profitability. However the pay–performance sensitivities for CEOs are low and this raises questions about the effectiveness of firms' incentive systems.     

Search,product market competition and CEO pay

We develop a market equilibrium model to show how search frictions in the CEO market, agency conflicts and product market characteristics interact to affect CEO market tightness, firm size and CEO incentive pay. The theory generates novel implications that link firms' product markets with CEO markets. Different determinants of competition—the entry cost, product substitutability, and market size—have contrasting effects on CEO market tightness, CEO pay and firm size. We also derive new predictions for the impact of product market risk on firm size and CEO incentive compensation. We show empirical support for several cross-sectional hypotheses derived from the theory for how CEO pay, CEO incentives, firm size and market tightness vary with product market characteristics.     

Restricting CEO pay

We analyze several proposals to restrict CEO compensation and calibrate two models of executive compensation that describe how firms would react to different types of restrictions. We find that many restrictions would have unintended consequences. Restrictions on total realized (ex-post) payouts lead to higher average compensation, higher rewards for mediocre performance, lower risk-taking incentives, and the fact that some CEOs would be better off with a restriction than without it. Restrictions on total ex-ante pay lead to a reduction in the firm's demand for CEO talent and effort. Restrictions on particular pay components, and especially on cash payouts, can be easily circumvented. While restrictions on option pay lead to lower risk-taking incentives, restrictions on incentive pay (stock and options) result in higher risk-taking incentives.