负债真不能发挥治理效应吗?——来自中国房地产上市公司的新证据

负债在公司治理中的作用一直是资本结构问题研究关注的热点。本文就产权性质对负债引起的经理人代理成本的影响,进行了理论分析与实证检验。利用中国A股房地产上市公司2003-2008年的面板数据,研究表明,负债的治理效应具有两重性,即企业的银行负债显著提高了经理人代理成本,非银行负债显著降低了经理人代理成本;进一步研究发现,产权性质是造成负债治理效应出现两重性特征的根本原因。本文所得出的研究结论不仅丰富了委托代理、资本结构等相关理论,而且对于银行与国有企业产权改革,以及企业融资决策具有较强启示意义。     

我国上市公司资本结构影响股权代理成本的实证分析

公司资本结构是公司治理结构的重要方面,它对公司代理成本有着直接的影响。本文对1990—2003年上市公司资本结构影响股权代理成本的实证分析表明,经营者持股比例与股权代理成本呈显著负相关;负债融资比例、法人股比例和第一大股东持股比例与股权代理成本呈不显著负相关;国家股比例和流通股比例与股权代理成本呈较显著正相关。这些研究结论表明,资本结构对股东、经营者和债权人之间的契约关系有着直接的影响,完善资本结构是完善我国上市公司治理结构从而降低代理成本的重要途径之一。     

我国上市公司负债融资的自由现金流效应研究

文章基于自由现金流(FCF)的视角,依据负债的代理成本控制效应,以2009至2012年上市公司的数据为依据,分别对负债和FCF做回归分析.研究企业负债与FCF的相关性,并提出了负债的自由现金流效应.从一个新的视角分析我国的公司治理效应,分析在我国上市公司中负债是否真正具有降低自由现金流和代理成本的作用,从而对能够优化和完善我国上市公司负债的治理机制提供一定的支持与建议.     

会计稳健性或高管股权激励——不同代理冲突下的治理方式选择

会计稳健性和高管股权激励是上市公司降低代理成本的重要途径,其治理效应备受关注。本文选择2008～2010年中国A股非金融类上市公司作为研究样本,按照代理冲突程度高低将研究样本划分为两类,在此基础上实证研究会计稳健性与高管股权激励的治理效应。研究结果表明:在低代理冲突样本组中,会计稳健性能显著降低代理成本,而高管股权激励的治理效果不显著;在高代理冲突样本组中,高管股权激励能显著降低代理成本,而会计稳健性的治理效果不显著。研究显示出,在选择合适的治理方式时,必须考虑代理冲突的严重程度。     

商誉减值存在同伴效应吗?——来自中国A股市场的证据北大核心

本文分别探究内部治理、外部治理和环境不确定性对企业商誉减值同伴效应的影响。研究发现,企业商誉减值过程中存在明显的同伴效应,高管团队的内部治理与分析师的外部治理会显著削弱商誉减值同伴效应;而环境不确定性则会显著增强商誉减值同伴效应。进一步研究发现,高管团队教育背景和职能背景的差异越小,高管团队内部治理对商誉减值同伴效应的削弱作用越强。     

高管股权激励、内部控制缺陷披露与资本成本研究

合理有效的股权激励机制能对约束经理层的自利和短视行为起到积极作用,从而达到降低企业资本成本、提升企业价值的目的。本文根据我国上市公司的数据进行实证研究后发现,实施高管股权激励后,上市公司的资本成本并未显著降低,反而在一定程度上加大了管理层权力,增加了代理成本。进一步研究发现,企业通过实施内部控制审计,能够抑制股权激励带来的负面效应,通过股权激励机制从激励和监督两方面完整实现委托代理机制带来的治理目的。     

数字化转型能降低企业过度负债吗？

防范化解金融风险是国家当前重要的金融工作之一,从企业这一微观主体角度来看,合理安排资本结构、降低过度负债有利于控制企业的金融风险。为此,本文以2011—2020年我国A股上市公司为样本,结合当前数字经济的发展,实证检验了企业数字化转型对过度负债的降低作用,并分别构建了中介效应模型和调节效应模型进行进一步研究。实证结果显示,企业数字化转型能够显著降低企业过度负债水平,融资约束和内部治理环境在这一过程中发挥了显著的中介作用,分析师关注度和地区数字金融水平对这一过程分别发挥了负向和正向的调节作用,即在分析师关注度低和地区数字金融水平高的条件下,企业数字化转型能够更好地降低过度负债。本文丰富了企业数字化转型经济效应的相关研究,同时为降低企业过度负债和防范化解金融风险提供了新的思路。     

优化营商环境与抑制民营企业高管职务消费实证研究

优化营商环境能够通过降低代理成本和维系良好政企关系进而有效抑制民营企业高管职务消费,这一论点尚未得到学术界的关注。笔者以2009—2019年间中国资本市场A股民营上市公司为研究样本,使用多元线性回归模型实证检验优化营商环境如何影响民营企业高管职务消费。研究结果显示:优化营商环境显著降低了民营企业高管职务消费,表明优化营商环境对民营企业高管职务消费具有抑制作用。进一步的分析表明,相较于股权激励程度较高的企业,优化营商环境对民营企业高管职务消费的抑制作用在股权激励程度较低的企业中更为显著;内部控制质量削弱了优化营商环境对民营企业高管职务消费的抑制作用。文章从民营企业高管职务消费视角考察了营商环境在微观企业中的治理效应,研究结论丰富了营商环境经济后果的相关研究,同时为如何抑制民营企业高管职务消费提供了新的参考思路。     

控制权、现金流权与资本结构——一项基于我国民营上市公司面板数据的实证分析

本文利用我国91家民营上市公司2003-2005年面板数据检验终极股东控制与资本结构的关系。研究发现,终极股东控制权一致性与总资产负债率、流动负债率显著正相关,终极股东控制权/现金流权偏离度与总资产负债率、流动负债率显著负相关。这表明资本结构决策本身存在代理问题,终极股东一方面积极利用股权融资的非稀释效应,另一方面对负债的破产威胁效应和利益转移限制效应作出了壕沟防守反应。     

企业数字化转型与资本市场定价效率——来自股票定价偏误的经验证据

基于中国沪深A股上市公司2013～2020年数据，实证检验了企业数字化转型对股票定价偏误的影响及其机理。研究发现：企业数字化转型显著降低了股票定价偏误程度；机制分析表明，企业数字化转型程度的提高，主要是通过外部治理机制发挥信息效应和内部治理机制弱化企业代理问题来降低股票定价偏误程度；异质性分析表明，企业数字化转型效力的发挥在非国有企业以及地区信息化水平较高的企业中更为明显。研究及结论为上市公司提高资本市场定价效率提供了经验证据。     

Capital Structure, CEO Dominance, and Corporate Performance

We use agency theory to investigate the influence of CEO dominance on variation in capital structure. Due to agency conflicts, managers may not always adopt leverage choices that maximize shareholders’ value. Consistent with the prediction of agency theory, the evidence reveals that, when the CEO plays a more dominant role among top executives, the firm adopts significantly lower leverage, probably to evade the disciplinary mechanisms associated with debt financing. Our results are important as they demonstrate that CEO power matters to critical corporate outcomes such as capital structure decisions. In addition, we find that the impact of changes in capital structure on firm performance is more negative for firms with more powerful CEOs. Overall, the results are in agreement with prior literature, suggesting that strong CEO dominance appears to exacerbate agency costs and is thus detrimental to firm value.     

Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Dynamics

We develop a dynamic tradeoff model to examine the importance of manager–shareholder conflicts in capital structure choice. In the model, firms face taxation, refinancing costs, and liquidation costs. Managers own a fraction of the firms’ equity, capture part of the free cash flow to equity as private benefits, and have control over financing decisions. Using data on leverage choices and the model's predictions for different statistical moments of leverage, we find that agency costs of 1.5% of equity value on average are sufficient to resolve the low‐leverage puzzle and to explain the dynamics of leverage ratios. Our estimates also reveal that agency costs vary significantly across firms and correlate with commonly used proxies for corporate governance.     

The Impact of Corporate Governance on Executive Compensation

This paper examines the relationship between the compensation of the top five executives at a set of over 400 publicly listed Canadian firms and various internal and external corporate governance‐related factors. The media is full of stories suggesting a relationship between large executive compensation packages and failures in governance at various levels within organisations, but there exists little formal analysis of many of these relationships. Our analysis provides empirical evidence supporting some of these assertions, refuting others and documenting new relationships. We find that variances in internal governance related to differences across firms in the characteristics of the CEO, compensation committee and board of directors do influence both the level and composition of executive compensation, especially for the CEO. Considering external measures of corporate governance, we find that different types of shareholders and competitive environments impact executive compensation. We do not find that either the internal or external governance characteristics dominate.     

Tournament incentives,age diversity and firm performance

This study introduces a new dimension, age diversity of non-CEO executives, which moderates the relationship between promotion-based tournament incentives, measured as the pay gap between the CEO and non-CEO executives, and firm performance. For a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2005 to 2015, we find that the tournament incentives for non-CEO executives relate positively to firm performance. This relationship is weaker when non-CEO executives are from different age cohorts, whereas the tournament effect is enhanced when non-CEO executives are from the same age cohort. The negative moderation effect of age diversity is more pronounced in state firms and in the Northern China Plain cultural region. The negative moderation effect disappears in firms with CEOs who have overseas experience. We reason that the peer pressure among the similar-aged non-CEO executives enhances the tournament competition and that age hierarchy reduces incentives for younger executives to compete. Our findings have important implications for firms not only in China, but also in countries and regions where seniority is highly valued when setting executive compensation and optimizing organizational structure.     

临时CEO与盈余管理——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

我国大部分企业缺乏接班人计划,现任CEO突然离职导致企业不得不任命临时CEO代为行使职权。本文以我国资本市场非金融类上市公司聘任的临时CEO为研究对象,发现出于转正预期,临时CEO有较强的动机进行盈余管理,并且更多地表现为正向盈余管理行为。进一步考察CEO个体特征后发现,临时CEO是内部委任和在上市公司领取薪水的情况下更倾向于进行盈余管理。此外,有效的公司治理机制对临时CEO的盈余管理行为存在抑制作用。研究结论对于我国企业制定接班人计划具有重要的指导意义。     

Internal corporate governance and the use of IPO over-financing: Evidence from China

In this paper, we describe how Shenzhen A-share listed companies used funds raised in over-financed IPOs during the 2006–2010 period. In exploring the relationship between internal corporate governance and the use of funds raised in over-financed IPOs, we find that the use of such funds to engage in severe over-investment behavior is prevalent among listed companies. Reasonable internal corporate governance mechanisms can effectively alleviate over-investment problems listed companies encounter in using funds raised in over-financed IPOs. However, the same individual serving as both chairman and CEO leads to funds raised in over-financed IPOs being over-invested. Moreover, executives driven by high levels of monetary compensation are more likely to use funds raised in such IPOs to engage in over-investment. We find that improving the balance of power between shareholders will help alleviate the over-investment of excess IPO funds. In addition, the over-investment problem is less severe in state-controlled listed companies than in their non-state-controlled listed counterparts. This study provides policy recommendations for Chinese securities regulators to ensure listed companies use funds raised in over-financed IPOs both rationally and effectively.     

Managerial entrenchment and capital structure: The effect of diversification

This paper empirically examines how diversification influences the relation between corporate governance and capital structure. Consistent with the creditor alignment hypothesis, we find a positive relation between managerial entrenchment and leverage in diversified firms. In contrast, we find a negative relation between managerial entrenchment and leverage in focused firms, which supports the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. These effects are stronger or only exist in samples with low excess values, which supports the agency channel through which governance influences leverage decisions. Our results are robust to different measures of leverage, diversification, and governance, and continue to hold when we attempt to account for selection bias and the joint endogeneity of leverage, diversification, and governance.     

The Effect of CEO Option Compensation on the Capital Structure: A Natural Experiment

Firms simultaneously choose both their capital and their executive compensation structure. Using the Internal Revenue Code 162(m) tax law as an exogenous shock to compensation structure in a natural experiment setting, I identify firm leverage changes as a result of chief executive officer (CEO) option compensation changes. The evidence provides strong support for debt agency theory. Firms appear to decrease leverage when CEOs are paid with more options and when CEO options become a higher percentage of future cash flows. The findings are robust to controlling for corporate governance and convertible debt.     

境外股东异质性、企业性质与公司治理效率——基于中国上市公司的实证检验

依据2014年一直有境外股东持股的沪深 A股上市公司样本数据,考量不同类型外资持股的治理效应进行实证检验。结果表明：境外股东持股能够提升公司治理效率,不同性质的境外投资者对公司治理的影响存在差异。外资基金和非金融类外资股东的治理效应是显著的,QFII未能对上市公司经营者形成有效监督和制约,外资银行、保险、证券公司反而一定程度上加重了上市公司的代理冲突。此外,外资持股在民营企业中的治理效应优于国有企业。     

Agency costs,taxes and debt: The UK evidence

This paper provides an empirical examination of the impact of the corporation tax and agency costs on firms' capital structure decisions. Our evidence suggests that the agency costs are the main determinants of corporate borrowing. Consistent with the agency theory, we find that firms that have fewer growth options have more debt in their capital structure. Moreover, our results show that debt mitigates the free cash flow problem and that firms that are more likely to be diversified and less prone to bankruptcy are highly geared. the negative effect of insider shareholding on leverage disappears, however; when all the agency mechanisms are accounted for. In addition, we find that, in the long run, companies that are tax exhausted exhibit significantly lower debt ratios than tax-paying firms. However, in the short run, firms' capital structure decisions are not affected by taxation.