The effect of liquidity and solvency risk on the inclusion of bond covenants

Studies have analyzed the impact of firm and issue characteristics but not liquidity and solvency components of financial distress on the use of bond covenants. Using a comprehensive database of corporate bonds from 2001 to 2012, we find that firm liquidity, measured by standardized Lambda, has a negative statistical and economic impact on the inclusion of all categories and sub-categories of restrictive bond covenants. Developed from financial statement information by Emery and Lyons (1991), Lambda is designed as a coverage ratio that, under certain distribution assumptions, maps into the probability of a firm being unable to pay its short-term bills. The strongest solvency proxy is the 10-year credit default swap (CDS) spread which is significant across the categories and sub-categories for investment and payment covenants, weakly significant for the subordinated debt sub-category of the subsequent financing covenant, but strongly significant for the control poison put sub-category of event covenants. This evidence supports a model that uses SLambda as a proxy for liquidity risk and the 10-year CDS spread as a proxy for solvency risk. The liquidity/covenant relationship is dampened when firms have access to commercial paper funding or bank loans. However, during the recent financial crisis liquidity event this liquidity/covenant relationship was enhanced especially for firms which were dependent on commercial paper during this time when the commercial paper market was deteriorating.     

The real effects of bank distress: Evidence from bank bailouts in Germany

How does bank distress impact their customers' probability of default and trade credit availability? We address this question by looking at a unique sample of German firms from 2000 to 2011. We follow their firm-bank relationships through times of distress and crisis, featuring the different transmission of bank distress shocks into already weakened firm balance sheets. We find that a distressed bank bailout, which is subject to restructuring and deleveraging conditions, leads to a bank-induced increase of firms' probabilities of default. Moreover, bailouts tend to reduce trade credit availability and ultimately firms' sales. We further find that the direction and magnitude of the effects depends on firm quality and the relationship orientation of banks.     

The Real Effects of Financial Sector Interventions during Crises

We assess the importance of supply‐side credit market frictions by studying the impact of bank recapitalization on firm growth in 50 countries during the recent crisis. Our identification strategy exploits the crisis as a shock to credit supply and combines an exogenous measure of firms’ dependence on external financing with policy interventions aimed at restoring bank capital. We find that the growth of financially dependent firms is disproportionately positively affected by bank recapitalization. This effect is quantitatively important and robust to controlling for other policies. These results provide new evidence of the influence of credit market frictions on economic activity.     

Political uncertainty and a firm's credit risk: Evidence from the international CDS market

Using a large sample of firms with single-name credit default swap (CDS) contracts in 30 countries, we document the evidence that political uncertainty, proxied by national election dummy, is positively related to firm-level credit risk. Specifically, this positive relation is more pronounced for the firms that have no political connection or poor international diversification, and in the countries with higher political uncertainty and lower investor protections. Further, by using a difference-in-differences approach, we find evidence to support idiosyncratic volatility and debt rollover channels through which political uncertainty affects the credit risk of individual firm.     

Corporate credit risk modeling and the macroeconomy

Despite a surge in the research efforts put into modeling credit and default risk during the past decade, few studies have incorporated the impact that macroeconomic conditions have on business defaults. In this paper, we estimate a duration model to explain the survival time to default for borrowers in the business loan portfolio of a major Swedish bank over the period 1994–2000. The model takes both firm-specific characteristics, such as accounting ratios and payment behaviour, loan-related information, and the prevailing macroeconomic conditions into account. The output gap, the yield curve and consumers’ expectations of future economic development have significant explanatory power for the default risk of firms. We also compare our model with a frequently used model of firm default risk that conditions only on firm-specific information. The comparison shows that while the latter model can make a reasonably accurate ranking of firms’ according to default risk, our model, by taking macro conditions into account, is also able to account for the absolute level of risk.     

The effect of relationship banking on firm efficiency and default risk

Does relationship bank oversight reduce firm default risk and improve firm operational efficiency? I find that a new loan from a relationship bank reduces the default probability and increases the efficiency of a borrowing firm, benefiting both banks and borrowers. Moreover, inefficient and less creditworthy firms experience the highest reductions in their default risks and improvements in their efficiencies in the years following new relationship bank loans. Further, these benefits are disrupted when the relationship bank is acquired.     

Rollover risk and managerial cost adjustment decisions

Rollover risk is the risk that a firm may not be able to refinance its debt when it becomes due. We investigate whether managers’ resource adjustment decisions are influenced by rollover risk and find that cost stickiness is decreasing in rollover risk. Additionally, the negative relationship between rollover risk and cost stickiness is stronger for firms with higher financial constraints and fewer financing sources. These results suggest that, when faced with elevated rollover risk, managers are willing to forego the benefits from a sticky cost behaviour. Finally, the use of an alternative firm-specific measure of cost stickiness corroborates our main finding.     

Rollover risk and credit risk under time-varying margin

For a firm financed by a mixture of collateralized (short-term) debt and uncollateralized (long-term) debt, we show that fluctuations in margin requirements, reflecting funding liquidity shocks, lead to increasing the firm’s default risk and credit spreads. The severity with which a firm is hit by increasing margin requirements highly depends on both its financing structure and debt maturity structure. Our results imply that an additional premium should be added when evaluating debt in order to account for rollover risks, especially for short-matured bonds. In terms of policy implications, our results strongly indicate that regulators should intervene fast to curtail margins in crisis periods and maintain a reasonably low margin level in order to effectively prevent creditors’ run on debt.     

Does the source of debt financing affect default risk?

We examine whether the source of debt financing is important for assessments of firms’ default risk. This study reveals that during the 2007–2010 financial crisis, firms that depend mainly on financing from banks suffer higher increases in default risk than do firms with no such dependence. Conversely, firms that rely solely on financing from public debt markets do not experience significant increases in default risk. These findings suggest that the bank supply shock theory explains the transmission of financial shocks to the real economy. Finally, firms that depend on bank financing cannot offset the adverse impacts of bank lending shocks by substituting bank loans with publicly traded debt.     

The relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk in banks

This paper investigates the relationship between the two major sources of bank default risk: liquidity risk and credit risk. We use a sample of virtually all US commercial banks during the period 1998–2010 to analyze the relationship between these two risk sources on the bank institutional-level and how this relationship influences banks’ probabilities of default (PD). Our results show that both risk categories do not have an economically meaningful reciprocal contemporaneous or time-lagged relationship. However, they do influence banks’ probability of default. This effect is twofold: whereas both risks separately increase the PD, the influence of their interaction depends on the overall level of bank risk and can either aggravate or mitigate default risk. These results provide new insights into the understanding of bank risk and serve as an underpinning for recent regulatory efforts aimed at strengthening banks (joint) risk management of liquidity and credit risks.     

Does conglomeration really reduce credit risk?

I quantify the effects of conglomeration on credit risk by first computing theoretical default probabilities for conglomerates and their hypothetical stand‐alone counterparts and then mapping them into physical probabilities using a comprehensive database of corporate failures. Comparing the credit risk of conglomerates with that of hypothetical stand‐alone firms, I report significant reductions in the annual probability of default for small firms. My results support the proposition that managers can have a strong incentive to engage in conglomeration, even if it reduces shareholder value and show for which firms this is the case.     

Institutional investment horizon,the information environment,and firm credit risk

We provide evidence that the impact of the investment horizon of institutional investors on the credit risk of U.S. industrial firms is both statistically and economically significant. Ceteris paribus, a one percent point increase in the ownership by short-term (long-term) institutions leads to a 0.188 (.046) percentage point decrease (increase) of a firm’s credit spread during 2001–2011. However, during the financial crisis period of 2007/08, long-term institutional investors tend to reduce a firm’s credit risk, especially when a firm’s risk profile is high. Hence, long-term institutions play an important role in enhancing financial stability during the crisis period by mitigating risk.     

Is managerial ability a moderator? The effect of credit risk and liquidity risk on the likelihood of bank default

This study investigates the effect of credit and liquidity risks as well as the moderating role of managerial ability on the likelihood of European commercial bank default during the period 2006 to 2017. We employ data envelopment analysis and a tobit model to measure banks' efficiency, the z-score to measure the likelihood of their default, and perform endogeneity and model specification robustness tests. Our results reveal that both risks significantly affect the likelihood of bank default and that the high skill of managers does not attenuate this effect. Rather, in the case of credit risk, managerial ability extenuates this effect. Managerial overconfidence and narcissism may explain the latter result. Another plausible explanation is that highly skilled managers who are likely to be rewarded with performance-based compensation schemes may be incentivized to hide bad news for an extended period of time. Such a scenario would increase the likelihood of bank default.     

货币政策、外部融资依赖与企业业绩

作为国家宏观调控重要工具之一,货币政策调整会影响企业融资行为进而影响企业经营业绩.运用我国上市企业数据研究发现,货币政策紧缩时期,企业面临较强的融资约束,银行借款减少,转而寻求商业信用.由于商业信用净额增加小于银行借款减少,货币政策紧缩导致企业融资不足使得企业业绩增长放缓,且外部融资依赖程度越高的企业受到的影响越大,但该影响只存在于非国有企业.研究结论有助于理解货币政策对企业业绩的传导机制,对处于三期叠加时期的我国企业与我国经济都具有一定的实践意义.     

经济政策不确定性与企业贷款成本

基于大样本微观银行信贷数据,本文研究经济政策不确定性对企业的银行贷款成本的影响。研究发现,经济政策不确定性升高导致企业的银行贷款成本增加,且使得在中小型银行贷款的企业成本增加更多。异质性分析表明,经济政策不确定性升高对受政策因素影响较大的企业如小微企业、私营企业等的银行贷款成本的影响更为明显。进一步,对企业的银行贷款违约风险的研究发现,随着经济政策不确定性升高,企业的银行贷款违约风险反而降低。这表明,经济政策不确定性升高使得银行选择风险评级更低的贷款,符合谨慎性动机。本文研究结论表明,经济政策不确定性升高时,银行“自我保险”动机的增强使得企业的银行贷款成本增加,这在中小型银行中表现得更加明显,同时也更多地转嫁给中小企业。本文为经济政策不确定性对企业投资、宏观经济波动等的研究提供了微观解释机制,并揭示了政府经济政策的一致性、稳定性对维护金融稳定的重要作用。     

Do banks appraise internal capital markets during credit shocks? Evidence from the Greek crisis

Using data of bank loans to Greek firms during the Greek crisis we provide evidence that affiliated firms, having access to the internal capital markets of their associated group, are less likely to default on their loans. Furthermore, banks require lower loan collateral coverage from affiliated firms and are less likely to downgrade the affiliates’ credit profile. Finally, banks are more likely to show forbearance to affiliated firms with non-performing loans. The results are consistent with the view that banks manage their relationships with firms in a business group jointly, as opposed to viewing each firm as an independent entity. Our findings also suggest that the value of risk sharing through internal capital markets increases when external financing is scarce.     

The differential impact of leverage on the default risk of small and large firms

We analyse a sample of 6 million firm-year observations of large corporations and small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) spanning 6 European countries from 2005 to 2015, to determine the impact of leverage and different sources of funding on default risk. We find that financial leverage has a greater impact on the probability of default of SMEs than of large corporations. The difference in default probability between the top and bottom leverage quartiles is 1.24% for large firms and 2.87% for SMEs. This difference may be explained by the greater exposure of SMEs to short-term debt and their consequently higher refinancing risk. Indeed, we find that SMEs that recover from the state of insolvency may have similar leverage to defaulted SMEs; however their liability structure is significantly altered towards long-term debt and away from short-term debt. Our findings have important implications not only for bank regulators and policy-makers but also for credit risk modelling.     

The Determinants of Corporate Trade Credit Policies in a Bank‐dominated Financial Environment: the Case of Finnish Small Firms

This paper examines trade credit policies of small firms operating in a bank‐dominated environment (Finland). We find that creditworthiness and access to capital markets are important determinants of trade credit extended by sellers. The level of purchases is positively correlated with the level of accounts payable. Larger and older firms and firms with strong internal financing are less likely to use trade credit, whereas firms with a high ratio of current assets to total assets, and firms subject to loan restructurings use it more. Negative loan decisions by financial intermediaries increase and a close bank‐borrower relationship decreases the probability that a firm does not take advantage of trade credit discounts.     

Firm dynamics and financial development

Using comprehensive firm-level datasets, this paper studies the impact of cross-country variation in financial market development on firms' financing choices and growth. In less financially developed economies, small firms grow faster and have lower leverage than large firms. As financial development improves, the growth difference between small and large firms shrinks, while the leverage difference rises. The paper then develops a quantitative model where financial frictions drive firm growth and debt financing through the availability of credit and default risk. The model explains the observed cross-country variations in firm size, leverage and growth in response to changes in financial frictions.     

Idiosyncratic risk and debt maturity dispersion

We investigate the relation between idiosyncratic asset risk and debt maturity dispersion. Idiosyncratic asset volatility represents significant risk, which can impede the ability to obtain or maintain external debt financing necessary for business operations, and is difficult to control given its unpredictable nature. We find that this risk is managed through the maturity structure of debt: firms with higher idiosyncratic asset volatility also have more dispersed maturity structures. Consistent with active management of rollover risk, this relation is weaker for younger firms and stronger for firms without significant credit lines.